GIFT  OF 

SEELEY  W.  MUDD 

and 

GEORGE  I.  COCHRAN    MEYER  ELSASSER 
DR.  JOHN  R.  HAYNES    WILLIAM  L.  HONNOLD 
JAMES  R.  MARTIN         MRS.  JOSEPH  F.  SARTORI 

to  tin 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
SOUTHERN  BRANCH 


JOHN  FISKE 


UNIVERSITY  oi  CALIFORNIA 

LCS  ANGELES 
UBRARX 


\ 


By  JOHN  CODMAN  ROPES. 


The  Story  of  the  Civil  War.  A  Concise  Account 
of  the  War  in  the  United  States  of  America  between 
1861  and  1865. 

To  be  complete  in  four  parts,  printed  in  four  octavo 
volumes,  with  comprehensive  maps  and  battle  plans. 
Each  part  will  be  complete  in  itself  and  will  be  sold 
separately. 

Part  I. — Narrative  of  Events  to  the  Opening  of  the 
Campaigns  of  1862.  With  5  maps.  8°,  pp.  xiv  -j- 

274 $i-50 

"  The  most  complete,  comprehensive,  and  interesting  account 
of  the  Civil  War  which  has  ever  been  published.  .  .  .  We 
unhesitatingly  recommend  it  as  containing  a  wealth  of  information 
that  no  one  can  afford  to  be  deprived  of."  —  New  Haven  Evening 
Leader. 

Part  II. — The  Campaigns  of  1862.  With  13  maps. 
8°,  pp.  viii  +  475 $ 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS,  NEW  YORK  &  LONDON 


THE 


STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR 


A  CONCISE  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  WAR  IN  THE 

UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

BETWEEN  1861  AND  1865 


JOHN  CODMAN  ROPES,  LL.D. 

Member  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  and  the  Military  Historical  Society  of 

Massachusetts  ;  Fellow  of  the  American  Academy  of  Arts  and  Sciences,  and  the 

Royal  Historical  Society ;  Honorary  Member  of  the  United  States 

Cavalry  Association,  and  the  Royal  Artillery  Institution,  etc. 

Author  of"  The  Army  under  Pope,"  "The  First  Napoleon," 
"  The  Campaign  of  Waterloo,"  etc. 


WITH    MAPS    AND    PLANS 


PART   I  I. 

THE  CAMPAIGNS  OF  1862 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW    YORK  LONDON 

»7  WEST  TWENTY-THIRD  STHBBT  24  BEDFORD  STRKBT,  STRAND 

£bt  ftnichtrborhrr  JKSS 
1898 


COPYRIGHT,  1898 

BY 
JOHN  CODMAN  ROPES 


Tlbt  Unicfeerbocfeer  pr«M,  Hew  Both 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

CHAPTER  I  :     Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh 3 

Note  to  Chapter  I  .........  96 

CHAPTER  II  :     The  Peninsular  Campaign      .....  99 

Notes  to  Chapter  II 213 

CHAPTER  III :     Lee  takes  the  Offensive  in  the  East    .         .         .  218 

Notes  to  Chapter  III .  380 

CHAPTER  IV  :     Bragg  takes  the  Offensive  in  the  West         .         .  384 

CHAPTER  V  :     The   Federals  resume  the  Offensive  in  the  West  : 

The  Battle  of  Murfreesborough       .         .         .         .         .         .  419 

CHAPTER  VI  :     The  Federals   resume  the  Offensive  in  the  East  : 

The  Battle  of  Fredericksburg 434 

CHAPTER  VII :     General  Observations 473 


LIST  OF  MAPS. 

(In  Cover- Pocket  at  End  of  Volume.) 


i. — KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  on  the  morning  of  Feb- 
ruary 6,   1862. 

2. — THE  FIELD  OF  SHILOH 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  troops  about  6  A.M.,   April  6, 

1862. 

3. — EASTERN  VIRGINIA 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  on  March  15,  1862. 

4. — THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  on  May  21,  1862. 

5. — THE  NEIGHBORHOOD  OF  RICHMOND 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  on  the  morning  of  May 
31,  1862. 

6. — THE  NEIGHBORHOOD  OF  RICHMOND 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  on  the  evening  of  June 

28,  1862. 

7. — PART  OF  VIRGINIA 

Showing    the   positions   of   the   armies   on    the   morning  of 
August  27,  1862. 

8. — THE  FIELD  OF  BULL  RUN 

Showing   the   positions  of  the  troops  at  4.30  P.M.,   August 

29,  1862. 

9. — PART  OF  MARYLAND 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  at  6  A.M.,  September  16, 

1862. 
10. — THE  FIELD  OF  SHARPSBURG,  OR  OF  THE  ANTIETAM 

Showing  the   positions  of  the  troops  at  3  P.M.,  September 
17,   1862. 

ii. — KENTUCKY  AND  TENNESSEE 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  on  September  5,  1862. 

12. — PART  OF  VIRGINIA 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  armies  on  November  10,  1862. 

13. — THE  FIELD  OF  FREDERICKSBURG 

Showing  the  positions  of  the  troops  on  the  morning  of  De- 
cember 13,   1862. 


LIST    OF    WOKKS    CITED,    WITH    THEIR 
ABBREVIATIONS. 


THESE  works  are  cited  in  the  ensuing  book  by  the  words  or  letters  which 
are  in  this  list  printed  in  capitals,  and  all  works  are  cited  after  the  usage 
which  prevails  in  legal  literature, — that  is,  the  words  "volume"  and 
"  page  "  are  omitted,  the  number  of  the  volume  is  prefixed  to  the  title,  and 
the  number  of  the  page  follows  it. 

In  citing  the  War  Records,  only  the  "  serial  number"  (so  called)  of  the 
volume  is  given.  This  was  first  printed  on  the  back  of  the  36th  serial  num- 
ber, which,  according  to  its  official  designation,  bears  the  cumbrous  title  of 
Series  I.,  Vol.  XXIV.,  Part  I.  Why  the  volumes  were  not  numbered  from 
the  first  in  simple  arithmetical  (or  serial)  order,  we  have  never  been  able  to 
conjecture.  It  would  greatly  have  simplified  the  task  of  the  historian.  The 
only  comfortable  way  to  do  is  to  paste  the  "  serial  numbers  "  on  the  backs 
of  the  first  thirty-five  volumes  ;  the  government  printers  have  printed  the 
"serial  numbers "  on  the  backs  of  all  the  rest. 

Until  the  publication  of  Vol.  XXIV.,  Part  I.,  the  volumes  (as  we  have 
said)  bore  only  their  official  designations  in  Roman  numerals.  As  the 
references  to  the  earlier  volumes  have  been  made  in  this  book  by  their 
"serial  numbers,"  a  table  harmonizing  the  same  with  their  official  designa- 
tions is  here  given  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader : 

Official 
Designations. 

XIV 20 

XV 21 

XVTjPartI 22 

XV1{  Part  II 23 

XVII  -I  Part  l 24 

XV11}PartII 25 

XVIII 26 

Part  1 2j 

Part  II J2&. 

Part  1 29 

Part  II 30 

3i 

j  Part  1 32 

\  Part  II 33 

]  Parti 34 


Serial 
Numbers. 


Official 
Designations. 

I 

II 

Ill 

IV 

V 

VI 

VII 

VIII 

IX 

Part  1 10 

Part  II n 

(  Parti 12 

XI  \  Part  II 13 

Part  III 14 


Serial 
Numbers. 


XIX 


XXI. 


XII 


XIII. 


f  Part  1 15 

I  Part  II 16 

1  Part  II.,  part  ii 17 

[Part  III 18 


.19 


XXIIl 

XXlli]  Part  II  ...............  35 

(Parti  ................  36 

XXIV  -^  Partll  ................  37 

(  Part  III  ...............  38 


viii  LIST  OF  WORKS  CITED. 


ALLAN  :  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  1862.  By  William  Allan, 
A.M.,  LL.D.,  formerly  Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Chief  Ordnance  Officer, 
Second  Corps,  A.  N.  V.  Boston  and  New  York  :  Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co. 
1892. 

ALLAN'S  JACKSON  :  History  of  the  Campaign  of  Gen.  T.  J.  (Stonewall) 
Jackson  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  of  Virginia  from  November  4,  1861,  to 
June  17,  1862.  By  William  Allan,  formerly  Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Chief 
Ordnance  Officer,  Second  Corps,  A.  N.  V.  With  full  maps  of  the  region  and 
of  the  battle-fields  by  Jed  Hotchkiss,  formerly  Captain  and  Topographical 
Engineer,  Second  Corps,  A.  N.  V.  Philadelphia  :  J.  B.  Lippincott  &  Co. 
1880. 

A.  T.  :  Report  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  at  the  Fourteenth  Annual  Meeting,  held  at  Cincinnati,  Ohio, 
April  6  and  7,  1881.     Cincinnati :  Published  by  the  Society.     1885. 

BADEAU  :  Military  History  of  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  from  April,  1861,  to 
April,  1865.  By  Adam  Badeau,  Colonel  and  Aide-de-Camp  to  the  General- 
in-Chief,  Brevet  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  Army.  3  Volumes.  New  York : 
D.  Appleton  &  Co.  1868. 

B.  &  L.  :  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  being  for  the  most  part 
Contributions  by  Union  and  Confederate  Officers,  based  upon  "  The  Cen- 
tury War  Series."     Edited  by  Robert   Underwood  Johnson  and  Clarence 
Clough  Buel,  of  the  Editorial  Staff  of  the  Century  Magazine.     4  Volumes. 
New  York  :  The  Century  Co.     1887. 

BEAUREGARD  :  The  Military  Operations  of  General  Beauregard  in  the 
War  between  the  States,  1861  to  1865,  including  a  brief  personal  sketch 
and  a  narrative  of  his  services  in  the  war  with  Mexico,  1846-8.  By  Alfred 
Roman,  formerly  Colonel  of  the  i8th  Louisiana  Volunteers,  afterwards 
Aide-de-Camp  and  Inspector-General  on  the  Staff  of  General  Beauregard. 

2  Volumes.    New  York  :   Harper  &  Brothers.     1884. 

CIST  :  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War.  VII.  The  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land. By  Henry  M.  Cist,  Brevet  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  V.  ;  A.A.G.  on 
the  Staff  of  Major-General  Rosecrans  and  the  Staff  of  Major-General 
Thomas  ;  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  New 
York  :  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1882. 

COMTE  DE  PARIS  :  History  of  the  Civil  War  in  America.  By  the  Comte 
de  Paris.  Translated,  with  the  approval  of  the  author,  by  Louis  F.  Tasistro. 
Edited  by  Henry  Coppee,  LL.D.  4  Volumes.  Philadelphia :  Jos.  H. 
Coates&Co.  1876. 

C.  W.  (1863)  :  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 

3  Volumes.    Washington  :  Government  Printing  Office.     1863. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  CITED.  ix 


C.  W.  (1865)  :  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
at  the  Second  Session  Thirty-Eighth  Congress.  3  Volumes.  Washington  : 
Government  Printing  Office.  1865. 

C.  W.  SUPPLEMENT  :  Supplemental  Report  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War.  2  Volumes.  Washington  :  Government  Printing 
Office.  1866. 

DABNEY  :  Life  of  Lieutenant-General  Thomas  J.  Jackson  (Stonewall 
Jackson).  By  Professor  R.  L.  Dabney,  D.D.,  of  Richmond,  Virginia. 
Edited  by  Rev.  W.  Chalmers,  A.M.,  London.  2  Volumes.  London: 
James  Nisbet  &  Co.  1864. 

FORCE:  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War.  II.  From  Fort  Henry  to  Corinth. 
By  M.  F.  Force,  late  Brigadier-General  and  Brevet  Major-General  U.  S.  V. 
New  York  :  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1881. 

FRANKLIN'S  MEMOIRS  :  By  S.  R.  Franklin,  Rear- Admiral  U.  S.  Navy 
(retired).  New  York  and  London  :  Harper  &  Brothers.  1898. 

FRANKLIN'S  REPLY  :  Reply  of  Major-General  W.  B.  Franklin  to  the 
Joint  Committee  of  Congress  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  on  the  First  Battle 
of  Fredericksburg.  Second  Edition.  With  Notes  and  Correspondence. 
(From  the  Rebellion  Record.}  New  York  :  D.  Van  Nostrand.  1867. 

FRY  :  The  Army  under  Buell  :  Operations  of  the  Army  under  Buell  from 
June  10  to  October  30,  1862,  and  the  "  BUELL  COMMISSION."  By  James 
B.  Fry  (retired),  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  with  rank  of  Colonel ;  Brevet 
Major-General  U.  S.  A.  ;  Chief  of  Staff  to  General  Buell,  November  15, 
1861,  to  October  30,  1862.  Revised  Edition.  New  York  :  D.  Van  Nos- 
trand. 1884. 

GORDON  :  Brook  Farm  to  Cedar  Mountain  in  the  War  of  the  Great  Re- 
bellion, 1861-1862.  By  George  H.  Gordon,  Brevet  Major-General  U.  S. 
Volunteers.  Boston  :  James  R.  Osgood  &  Co.  1883.  (Now  sold  by 
Houghton,  Miffiin  &  Co.,  Boston.) 

GORDON'S  A.  V.  :  History  of  the  Campaign  of  the  Army  of  Virginia 
under  General  John  Pope  from  Cedar  Mountain  to  Alexandria,  1862.  By 
George  H.  Gordon.  Boston  :  Houghton,  Osgood  &  Co.  1880. 

GRANT  :  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant.  2  Volumes.  New  York  : 
Charles  L.  Webster  &  Co.  1885. 

GREENE  :  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  WTar.  VIII.  The  Mississippi.  By 
Francis  Vinton  Greene,  Lieutenant  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  Army  ;  late  Military 
Attache  to  the  U.  S.  Legation  at  St.  Petersburg,  etc.  New  York  :  Charles 
Scribner's  Sons.  1882. 

HANNAFORD  :  The  Story  of  a  Regiment :  A  history  of  the  campaigns, 
and  associations  in  the  field,  of  the  Sixth  Regiment  Ohio  Volunteer  Infan- 
try. By  E.  Hannaford.  Cincinnati:  Published  by  the  Author.  1868. 


x  LIST  OF  WORKS  CITED. 

HENDERSON:  Stonewall  Jackson  and  the  American  Civil  War.  By 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  G.  F.  R.  Henderson,  Major,  the  York  and  Lancaster 
Regiment,  etc.  2  Volumes.  London  :  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.  1898.' 

JOHNSTON  :  The  Life  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  embracing  his 
services  in  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  the  Republic  of  Texas,  and  the 
Confederate  States.  By  William  Preston  Johnston.  New  York  :  D.  Ap- 
pleton  &  Co.  1879. 

JOHNSTON'S  NARRATIVE  :  Narrative  of  Military  Operations,  directed, 
during  the  late  war  between  the  States,  by  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  General, 
C.  S.  A.  New  York :  D.  Appleton  &  Co.  1874. 

LEE'S  LEE  :  Great  Commanders.  General  Lee.  By  Fitzhugh  Lee,  his 
nephew,  and  cavalry  commander.  New  York  :  D.  Appleton  &  Co.  1894. 

LONGSTREET  :  From  Manassas  to  Appomattox  :  Memoirs  of  the  Civil 
War  in  America.  By  James  Longstreet,  Lieutenant-General  Confederate 
Army.  Philadelphia  :  J.  B.  Lippincott  Company.  1896. 

MAGAZINE  OF  AMERICAN  HISTORY  :  Illustrated.  Edited  by  Mrs.  Martha 
J.  Lamb.  January,  1886.  30  Lafayette  Place,  New  York. 

MCCLELLAN'S  O.  S.  :  McClellan's  Own  Story.  The  War  for  the  Union  ; 
the  soldiers  who  fought  it,  the  civilians  who  directed  it,  and  his  relations 
to  it  and  to  them.  By  George  B.  McClellan,  late  Major-General  Command- 
ing the  Armies.  New  York  :  Charles  L.  Webster  &  Co.  1887. 

M.  H.  S.  M.  :  Papers  of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts. 
Volume  I.  Campaigns  in  Virginia.  Edited  by  Theodore  F.  Dwight. 
Boston  and  New  York  :  Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co.  1895. 

The  same.  Volume  II.  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  1862  under  General 
Pope. 

N.  &  H.  :  Abraham  Lincoln  :  a  History.  By  John  G.  Nicolay  and  John 
Hay.  10  Volumes.  New  York  :  The  Century  Co.  1890. 

OFFICIAL  ATLAS  :  Atlas  to  accompany  the  Official  Records  of  the  Union 
and  Confederate  Annies.  Washington  :  Government  Printing  Office. 

PALFREY  :  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War.  V.  The  Antietam  and  Fred- 
ericksburg.  By  Francis  Winthrop  Palfrey,  Brevet  Brigadier-General  U.  S. 
V.,  and  formerly  Colonel  Twentieth  Massachusetts  Infantry,  etc.  New 
York  :  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1882. 

PERS.  RECOLL.  :  Personal  Recollections  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 
Addresses  delivered  before  the  New  York  Commandery  of  the  Loyal  Legion 
of  the  United  States,  1883-1891.  Edited  by  James  Grant  Wilson  and 
Titus  Munson  Coan,  M.D.  2  Volumes.  New  York:  Published  by  the 
Commandery.  1891. 

1  To  the  writer's  regret,  this  valuable  work  did  not  come  into  his  posses- 
sion until  his  own  book  was  half  through  the  press. 


LIST  OF  WORKS  CITED.  xi 


POLLARD  :  A  Southern  History  of  the  War.  By  Edward  A.  Pollard, 
editor  of  the  Richmond  Examiner.  4  Volumes.  New  York  :  Charles  B. 
Richardson.  1866. 

ROPES  :  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War.  IV.  The  Army  under  Pope.  By 
John  Codman  Ropes.  New  York  :  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1882. 

SHERMAN:  Memoirs  of  General  W.  T.  Sherman.  By  himself.  2  Vol- 
umes. New  York  :  D.  Appleton  &  Co.  1875. 

SMITH  :  The  Battle  of  Seven  Pines.  By  Gustavus  W.  Smith,  formerly 
Major-General  Confederate  States  Army.  New  York  :  C.  G.  Crawford. 
1891. 

SMITH  :  C.  W.  P. :  Confederate  War  Papers.  Fairfax  Court  House, 
New  Orleans,  Seven  Pines,  Richmond  and  North  Carolina.  By  Gustavus 
W.  Smith,  late  Major-General  Confederate  States  Army.  Second  Edition. 
New  York  :  Atlantic  Publishing  and  Engraving  Co.  1884. 

SOLEY  :  The  Navy  in  the  Civil  War.  I.  The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers. 
By  James  Russell  Soley,  Professor  U.  S.  Navy.  New  York :  Charles 
Scribner's  Sons.  1883. 

S.  H.  S.  :  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers.  Richmond,  Va.  :  Pub- 
lished by  the  Society. 

STUART  :  The  Life  and  Campaigns  of  Major-General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 
Commander  of  the  Cavalry  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  By  H.  B. 
McClellan,  A.M.,  late  Major,  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  and  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Boston  and  New 
York:  Houghton,  Mifflin  &  Co.  Richmond,  Va.  :  J.  W.  Randolph  & 
English.  1885. 

SWINTON  :  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  :  A  critical  history 
of  operations  in  Virginia,  Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania,  from  the  commence- 
ment to  the  close  of  the  war :  1861-1865.  By  William  Swinton.  Revision 
and  Reissue.  New  York  :  Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1882.  On  the  out- 
side, this  book  is  called  "Story  of  the  Grand  Army."  It  was  formerly 
known  as  "  The  Army  of  the  Potomac." 

VAN  HORNE  :  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  its  organization, 
campaigns,  and  battles,  written  at  the  request  of  Major-General  George  H. 
Thomas,  chiefly  from  his  private  military  journal  and  official  and  other 
documents  furnished  by  him.  By  Thomas  B.  Van  Home,  U.  S.  A.  Illus- 
trated with  Campaign  and  Battle  Maps  compiled  by  Edward  Ruger,  late 
Superintendent  Topographical  Engineer  Office,  Headquarters  Department 
of  the  Cumberland.  2  Volumes  and  Atlas.  Cincinnati :  Robert  Clarke  & 
Co.  1875. 


Xll 


LIST  OF  WORKS  CITED. 


~  W.  R.  :  The  War  of  the  Rebellion.  A  compilation  of  the  official  records 
of  the  Union  and  Confederate  armies.  Washington  :  Government  Printing 
Office.  1880  and  subsequently.  For  the  numbers  of  these  volumes,  see  the 
note  prefixed  to  this  List. 

WEBB  :  Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War.  III.  The  Peninsula:  McClellan's 
Campaign  of  1862.  By  Alexander  S.  Webb,  LL.D.,  President  of  the  Col- 
lege of  the  City  of  New  York  ;  Assistant  Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the 
Potomac  ;  Chief  of  Staff,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  etc.  New  York  :  Charles 
Scribner's  Sons.  1882. 

WHITE'S  LEE  :  Robert  E.  Lee  and  the  Southern  Confederacy  (1807-1870). 
By  Henry  Alexander  White,  M.A.,  Ph.D.,  D.D.  New  York  and  London  : 
G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons.  1897. 


THE  STOKY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 
PART  II. 


THE 

STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.1 

IN  February,  1862,  while  President  Lincoln  and 
General  McClellan  were  disputing  respecting  the 
size  and  composition  of  the  army  which  was  to  un- 


NOTE. 

It  was  originally  planned  to  insert  the  maps  in 
the  chapters  where  they  were  referred  to.  The 
number  and  the  size  of  the  maps,  however,  made 
it  necessary  to  modify  this  plan,  and  it  was  de- 
cided that  it  would  be  more  convenient  for  the 
reader,  to  place  the  maps  in  a  pocket  at  the  end  of 
the  book. 


THE 

STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR, 


CHAPTER  I. 

FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.1 

IN  February,  1862,  while  President  Lincoln  and 
General  McClellan  were  disputing  respecting  the 
size  and  composition  of  the  army  which  was  to  un- 
dertake the  spring  campaign  in  Virginia,  and  as  to 
its  line  of  operations,  military  events  of  the  greatest 
importance  were  happening  in  the  West. 

The  Confederates,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  en- 
trusted to  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  the  en- 
tire control  of  their  forces  in  this  region ;  and  that 
officer  had  hitherto  succeeded,  by  maintaining  very 
advanced  positions  in  the  State  of  Kentucky,  in 
holding  a  large  part  of  that  State  and  also  the  State 
of  Tennessee  for  the  Confederate  Government.  The 
Confederate  authorities  were  exceedingly  averse  to 
giving  up  any  part  of  Kentucky,  for  although  the 
State  had  not  seceded,  it  was  well  known  that  a 

1  See  Map  I.,  facing  page  98. 


4  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

large  part  of  the  population  had  desired  to  carry  the 
State  out  of  the  Union  ;  while  as  for  Tennessee,  she 
was  a  member  of  the  Confederacy.  It  was  confi- 
dently expected  in  Richmond  that  Johnston  would 
be  able  to  maintain  his  hold  on  these  States;  but 
this  expectation  was  founded  rather  on  the  unwill- 
ingness of  the  Confederate  administration  and  Con- 
gress to  admit  the  possibility  of  failure,  than  on  a 
careful  estimate  of  the  military  situation.  In  fact, 
Johnston's  available  force  in  the  latter  part  of  Janu- 
ary, 1862,  consisted  mainly  of  the  garrisons  of  Co- 
lumbus, and  other  points  on  the  Mississippi,  under 
General  Polk,  numbering  about  18,000  men,1  and  of 
the  active  army,  then  in  the  intrenched  camp  of 
Bowling  Green,  where  Johnston  commanded  person- 
ally, numbering  about  25,000  men.2  These  places 
were  connected  by  rail,  and  to  protect  the  points 
where  the  railroad  crossed  the  Cumberland  and  Ten- 
nessee rivers,  as  well  as  to  prevent  these  rivers  from 
being  used  by  the  invaders,  Forts  Henry  and  Donel- 
son  had  been  erected.  The  recent  reconnoissance 
made  by  General  Halleck's  orders,  at  General  Mc- 
Clellan's  suggestion,  by  General  Grant  and  Commo- 
dore Foote,  had  had,  for  its  only  effect,  to  cause 
Johnston  to  strengthen  the  garrisons  of  these  places,3 
and  at  this  time  there  were  about  3000  men  at 
Fort  Henry,  and  2000  at  Fort  Donelson,  all  under 
General  Tilghman.4  The  capture  of  these  forts,  and 
the  destruction  of  the  railway  bridges  across  the  riv- 
ers, woulr'.  break  the  communications  between  the 
army  at  Bowling  Green  and  the  garrisons  on  the 

1  7  W.  R.,  853.         » Ib.,  852.       *  Johnston,  424,  425.       4  7  W.  R.,  855. 


i862]         FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  5 

Mississippi ;  would  necessitate  the  retreat  of  John- 
ston from  Bowling  Green ;  and  probably,  also,  would 
result  in  the  evacuation  of  Columbus  by  Polk.  For 
it  would  be  manifestly  out  of  the  question  for  John- 
ston to  maintain  himself  at  Bowling  Green  when  his 
line  of  retreat  on  Nashville  was  exposed,  as  it  must 
be  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson,  to  a  Federal 
force  ascending  the  Cumberland  ;  and,  after  western 
Kentucky  should  have  been  evacuated  by  the  Con- 
federates, it  would  probably  be  found  impossible  for 
Polk  to  hold  Columbus  for  any  length  of  time. 

In  fact,  the  situation  of  the  Confederates  in  Ken- 
tucky was  an  extremely  precarious  one.  Johnston 
himself  was  fully  aware  of  it ;  he  had  tried  in  vain  to 
obtain  sufficient  reinforcements ] ;  he  was  gravely  de- 
ficient in  men,  and  the  men  he  had  were  badly  armed. 
He  knew  that  the  Federal  ironclad  fleet  was  far  supe- 
rior to  any  force  that  the  Confederates  could  muster 
on  the  three  rivers.  He  knew,  in  fact,  that  he  could 
not  maintain  himself  against  well-directed  attacks, 
and  that  his  only  chance  lay  in  the  possibility  that  his 
adversaries  would  make  mistakes  of  which  he  could 
take  advantage.  He  had,  at  any  rate,  so  long  as  his 
communications  remained  unbroken,  the  advantage 
of  interior  lines ;  he  could  rapidly  concentrate  his 
forces.  He  did  not  at  this  time  (January  and  Feb- 
ruary, 1862)  fear  any  sudden  movement  of  the 
enemy  by  land,a  for  the  roads  were  in  very  bad 
condition,  although,  as  he  well  knew,  he  could  be 


1  7  W.  R.,  788,  792-795,  820. 

2  He  had,  however,  in  December,  when   the  roads  were  excellent,  feared 
that  his  right  might  be  turned  :  7  W.  R.,  781,  792,  793. 


6  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

flanked  out  of  his  camp  at  Bowling  Green.  He 
might,  however,  at  any  time,  hear  that  Federal  ships 
had  ascended  the  Cumberland,  or  the  Tennessee,  or 
both  rivers,  and  were  attacking  the  forts.1  This 
was,  for  the  moment,  the  great  danger.  Johnston 
seems  to  have  expected  that  the  first  movement  of 
the  Federal  forces  would  be  on  the  Cumberland 
River,  and  he  afterwards  wrote  to  President  Davis 
that  he  had  "determined  to  fight  for  Nashville  at 
Donelson." : 

In  the  last  chapter  but  one 3  we  stated  the  compre- 
hensive plan  of  General  Buell 4  for  a  movement  of 
his  own  army  by  land  on  Bowling  Green  and  Nash- 
ville, to  be  made  simultaneously  with  an  advance  up 
the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers  of  a  force  of 
some  20,000  men  of  Halleck's  command  supported 
by  the  ironclad  fleet ;  we  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  this  scheme  had  never  enlisted  the  cordial  sup- 
port of  the  General-in-chief,  McClellan,  who  preferred 
that  Buell  should  begin  his  operations  by  the  occu- 
pation of  East  Tennessee,5 — a  thing  which  President 
Lincoln  also  had  much  at  heart ;  we  pointed  out  that 
General  Halleck,  who  would  naturally  have  charge 
of  the  movements  on  the  rivers,  his  Department 
comprising  that  part  of  Kentucky  which  was  west 
of  the  river  Cumberland,  being  at  first  strenuously 
opposed  to  Buell's  scheme,6  subsequently  (January 
20th)  urged,7  in  place  of  it,  that  a  movement  be  made 
up  the  rivers  with  a  force  of  not  less  than  60,000 

1  7  W.  R.,  844,  845.  *  Part  I.,  ch.  xi.(  187.  s  Ib.,  206. 

*  Ib.,  259.  *  Ib.,  204.  •  Ib.,  204. 

1  Ib.,  210,  211  ;  8  W.  R.,  508-510. 


1862]         FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  7 

men,  and  that  the  greater  part  of  Buell's  army, — "  all 
not  required  to  secure  the  line  of  Green  River," * — be 
sent  to  him  for  this  purpose.  This  communication 
McClellan  briefly  acknowledged  on  the  29th,  promis- 
ing to  "  reply  in  full  in  a  day  or  two." 2 

And  now  we  come  to  a  feature  in  this  transaction 
which  is  not  easy  of  explanation.  We  find  Halleck, 
on  January  30th,  the  day  after  he  had  received  this 
non-committal  reply  of  the  General-in-chief  to  his 
elaborate  exposition  of  the  true  strategical  disposi- 
tions demanded  by  the  situation  contained  in  his  letter 
of  the  20th,3  ordering  Grant4  with  only  15,000  men5 
to  take  Fort  Henry  and  break  the  railroad  bridge 
across  the  Tennessee.  This  he  does  without  hav- 
ing received  any  further  word  from  McClellan,  and 
without  having  made  any  arrangements  with  Buell 
for  reinforcements,  or  for  a  simultaneous  movement 
of  Buell's  army  from  Bowling  Green  to  Nashville. 
Can  it  be  supposed  that  he  had  changed  his  views 
in  the  ten  days  which  had  elapsed  since  he  had  made 
to  the  General-in-chief  his  careful  presentation  of  the 
true  course  to  be  pursued, — that  he  had  in  the  inter- 
val come  to  the  conclusion  that  15,000  men  could 
accomplish  what  he  had  so  short  a  time  before  con- 
sidered a  task  for  60,000  ? 6  And  that  it  would  not 
be  necessary  (as  he  had  so  recently  thought  it  would 
be)  for  the  bulk  of  Buell's  army  to  be  sent  to  him, 
in  order  to  carry  this  movement  to  a  successful  con- 


1  Buell's  army  was  at  and  near  Nolin  and  Munfordville,  north  of  Green 
River. 

»?W.  R.,  930.  4  7  W.  R.,  121. 

3  8  W.  R.,  508-510.  *  Ib.t  574,  575.          68  W.  R.,  509,  ad  finem. 


8  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

elusion  ?  Or  can  we  suppose  that  Halleck,  having 
changed  his  views  about  the  campaign,  did  not  see 
the  importance  of  giving  the  General-in-chief  due 
notice  of  his  intention  to  move  at  once,  so  that  the 
latter  might  so  dispose  of  his  available  forces  as  to 
reap  the  fullest  advantage  in  the  campaign,  the  first 
move  only  in  which  Halleck  was  making  ?  It  cer- 
tainly may  be,  as  we  have  ourselves  suggested,1  that 
Halleck  was  strongly  influenced  in  deciding  to  take 
the  initial  step  of  ordering  the  attack  of  Fort  Henry 
by  the  representations  of  the  feasibility  of  capturing 
it  made  to  him  by  Commodore  Foote  and  Generals 
Grant  and  Smith.2  But  in  our  judgment  the  evi- 
dence shows  that  General  Halleck  clearly  saw  the 
immense  importance  of  breaking  the  Confederate 
communications  by  taking  Forts  Henry  and  Donel- 
son,  and  also  believed  that  the  movement  would  re- 
quire the  employment  of  nearly  all  the  troops  in 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee ;  and  that,  not  having  been 
successful  in  getting  his  plan  of  having  the  bulk  of 
Buell's  army  sent  to  him  for  this  purpose  adopted 
by  the  General-in-chief,  he  deliberately  took  the  first 
step  in  the  campaign  with  the  inadequate  force  at 
his  disposal,  feeling  sure  in  his  own  mind  that  the 
Government  would  soon  be  compelled  to  send  him 
from  Buell's  army  all  the  men  needed  to  carry  the 
movement  through  to  a  successful  conclusion.  There 
was,  he  thought,  a  great  chance  for  him  to  win  a 
series  of  most  important  successes  ;  and  so,  without 
orders,  without  even  permission,  without  having 
made  any  arrangements  for  support,  reinforcement, 

1  Part  I.,  211.  »  7  W.  R.,  120,  121,  561. 


1 862]        FOR T  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  g 

or  co-operation/  but  feeling  confident  that  the  re- 
quirements of  the  situation,  as  they  would  in  time 
become  developed,  would  make  it  imperative  for  the 
Government  to  send  him  the  necessary  means,  he 
took  the  first  step. 

Halleck's  own  account  of  the  matter  is  a  very 
brief  and  unsatisfactory  one.  On  January  29th, 
McClellan  telegraphed  Halleck  that  a  deserter  had 
heard  Confederate  officers  say 2  that  Beauregard  was 
under  orders  to  go  to  Kentucky  with  fifteen  regi- 
ments.3 The  next  day  Halleck  notified  McClellan 
that  he  had  received  his  despatch,  and  said  :  "  Gen- 
eral Grant  and  Commodore  Foote  will  be  ordered  to 
immediately  advance,  and  to  reduce  and  hold  Fort 
Henry."  4  On  February  6th,  he  telegraphed  McClel- 
lan, "  /  was  not  ready  to  move,5  but  deemed  best  to 
anticipate  the  arrival  of  Beauregard's  forces."  6  Hal- 
leck, also,  in  his  letter  of  instructions  to  Grant,  told 
him  that  Beauregard  had  left  Manassas  with  fifteen 
regiments  for  the  line  of  Columbus  and  Bowling 
Green,  and  that  it  was  therefore  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance to  cut  that  line  before  he  should  arrive.7 
On  the  question  whether  this  story  which  the  de- 
serter told  could  have  effected  in  General  Halleck's 
mind  an  abrupt  change  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the 

1  Cf.  Buell  to  McClellan,  7  W.  R.,  587. 

*  The  italics  are  ours. 

37W.  R.,  571. 

4/£.,572. 

6  The  italics  are  ours. 

6  7  W.  R.,  587  ;  cf.  his  letter  to  Buell,  593. 

7  Ib.,  122.     Here  the  deserter's  story  has  grown  into  an  ascertained  fact. 
Yet  the  ' '  instructions  "  were  written  on  the  same  day  on  which  he  received 
McClellan's  telegram. 


io  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

proper  strategy  to  be  employed  in  this  campaign,  or 
can  account  for  his  extraordinary  conduct  in  under- 
taking such  an  important  movement  without  being 
"ready  to  move,"  and  without  first  securing  the 
sanction  of  General  McClellan  and  the  co-operation 
of  General  Buell,  we  have  already  indicated  our 
opinion. 

It  was,  however,  unquestionably  the  right  time  to 
make  the  advance  up  the  Cumberland  and  the  Ten- 
nessee. The  waters  were  exceptionally  high,  and 
all  the  obstructions  which  the  Confederates  had 
placed  in  the  rivers  were  rendered  useless.  Of 
these  facts  General  Buell  was  made  aware  by  a 
letter  from  a  friend  in  Paducah,  and  he  lost  not  a 
moment  in  urging  upon  McClellan  and  Halleck  the 
propriety  of  an  immediate  movement.1  To  his  let- 
ter to  the  latter,  dated  January  30th,2  he  received 
the  next  day  a  reply  that  the  movement  had  already 
been  ordered.3  McClellan  did  not  reply  till  Febru- 
ary 5th,4  when  he  asked  Buell  to  give  him  in  detail 
his  views  as  to  the  number  of  gunboats  necessary, 
and  then,  still  unwilling  to  substitute  anything,  no 
matter  how  promising,  for  the  projected  advance 
into  East  Tennessee,  again  urged  on  Buell  the  im- 
portance of  immediate  action  in  that  region. 

1  7  W.  R.,  572,  573.  Buell,  in  a  letter  to  Halleck  dated  February  3d,  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  the  gunboats  could  "  run  past  the  batteries  at  night 
without  great  risk.  This  accomplished,"  he  continued,  "the  taking  and 
holding  Fort  Henry  and  Dover  [Fort  Donelson]  would  be  comparatively 
easy"  (7  W.  R.,  580).  But  this  was  not  attempted,  though  Halleck  sub- 
sequently— February  roth — ordered  it  (/£.,  601). 

1  /*.,  573- 

*  Ib.t  574  ;  Halleck  to  Buell,  January  31,  1862. 


1 86  2]         FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH. 


Just  here,  in  fact,  lay  the  principal  objection  to 
Halleck's  precipitate  movement.  McClellan  had 
ordered  Buell  to  follow  up  Thomas's  victory  of  Mill 
Springs  and  invade  East  Tennessee.  To  do  this 
successfully  required  not  only  that  Thomas's  column 
should  be  detached  from  Buell's  main  force,  but  that 
arrangements  should  be  made  for  its  protection  in 
its  long  march.  It  was  while  these  movements  were 
in  progress,  and  while  Buell's  troops  were  much 
scattered  and  separated,  that  Halleck  announced 
that  he  had  undertaken  to  advance  up  the  Tennessee 
River.1 

It  will  readily  be  granted  that  if  General  McClel- 
lan had  taken  the  same  view  of  the  military  situation 
in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  which  General  Buell 
took,  he  would  have  placed  Buell  in  command  of  the 
Union  forces  throughout  those  States.  The  op- 
portunity of  inflicting  a  deadly  blow  on  the  power 
of  the  Confederates  in  this  region  had  been  clearly 
perceived  by  Buell  from  the  time  he  assumed  com- 
mand at  Louisville.2  He  had,  from  the  first,  re- 
cognized the  possibility  of  breaking  their  lines  of 
communication,  and  had  foreseen  the  immense  results 
which  might  be  expected  therefrom, — the  recovery 
of  the  two  States  to  the  national  cause,  and  the  de- 
moralization and  disintegration  of  the  Confederate 
army  of  the  West.  But  to  carry  out  such  a  scheme  to 
perfection  required  that  all  the  forces  of  the  United 
States  in  that  region  should  be  under  the  control  of  one 
man,  and  that  he  should  be  on  the  spot.  If  General 
McClellan  had  intended  to  carry  out  this  scheme, 

1  7  W.  R.,  931  ;  473,  586,  936.  8  Part  I.,  200  et  s*q. 


12  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

we  may  be  sure  that  he  would  have  entrusted  it  to 
Buell.  He  would  not  have  given  it  to  Halleck,  for 
Halleck,  as  appears  from  his  own  repeated  state- 
ments, had  his  head  full  of  the  affairs  of  Missouri. 
But  McClellan  had  no  such  scheme  in  his  mind.  All 
he  wanted  and  all  he  expected  was  that  Buell  should 
invade  East  Tennessee  ;  and  it  is  altogether  probable, 
that,  if  Halleck  had  not,  for  reasons  of  his  own, 
without  orders  from  McClellan,  and  even  without 
giving  him  notice  of  what  he  was  proposing  to  do, 
ordered  Grant  and  Foote  up  the  Tennessee  River,  a 
movement  by  Thomas  under  Buell's  direction  upon 
East  Tennessee,  to  carry  out  McClellan's  and  Presi- 
dent Lincoln's  wishes,  would  have  been  the  only 
military  operation  of  consequence  in  this  region  in 
the  early  spring  of  1862. 

Halleck's  precipitate  move,  however,  forced  Mc- 
Clellan to  renounce  the  invasion  of  East  Tennessee. 
Buell's  elaborate  letter 1  of  February  1st,  urging 
the  abandonment  of  this  project,  and  advocating  a 
movement  on  Bowling  Green  in  conjunction  with 
one  up  the  rivers,  seems  to  have  received  no  reply. 
But  while  Buell  was  sending,  on  the  5th,  a  despatch  2 
insisting  strongly  on  this  course,  McClellan  was 
sending  him  a  request 3  to  make  a  demonstration  on 
Bowling  Green,  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  Halleck ; 
and  on  the  6th,4  he  suggests  to  Buell  the  advisabil- 
ity of  throwing  "  all  available  force  on  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson,"  and  "of  making  that  the  main  line 
of  operations."  Thenceforward  the  attention  of 

1  7  W.  R.,  931-933.  '  Ib.,  584. 

*/£.,  585.  4  /<*.,  587. 


1 862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  13 

both  McClellan  and  Buell  was  devoted  to  securing 
the  success  of  the  campaign  which  Halleck  had  so 
recklessly  begun ;  but  we  shall  see,  as  we  proceed, 
how  much  was  lost  and  how  much  more  was  un- 
necessarily risked  by  entrusting  the  fortunes  of  the 
campaign  to  co-operation  between  two  officers  of 
equal  rank  in  different  Departments,  instead  of  to 
the  single  and  uncontrolled  direction  of  a  single 
general  on  the  spot. 

Fort  Henry,  against  which  General  Halleck  was 
about  to  send  the  combined  expedition  under  Gen- 
eral Grant  and  Commodore  Foote,  was  situated  on 
the  right  (or  eastern)  bank  of  the  river  Tennessee, 
about  forty  miles  from  the  town  of  Paducah  in  Ken- 
tucky, where  the  Tennessee  empties  into  the  Ohio. 
About  twelve  miles  east  of  Fort  Henry,1  situated  on 
the  left  (or  western)  bank  of  the  river  Cumberland, 
which  here  runs  north  into  the  Ohio  in  a  course 
nearly  parallel  to  that  of  the  Tennessee,  and  just 
north  of  the  little  town  of  Dover,  was  Fort  Donel- 
son.  Both  these  works  were  in  the  State  of  Ten- 
nessee ;  their  sites  had  been  selected  and  their 
construction  had  been  begun  in  the  previous  sum- 
mer under  the  direction  of  the  authorities  of  the 
State.  It  has  been  said,2  and  it  is  very  likely  true, 
that  if  the  Government  of  Tennessee  had  not  felt 
bound  to  respect  the  neutrality,  so  long  maintained, 
of  Kentucky,  better  sites  could  have  been  found  in 
that  State,  especially  at  a  point  where  the  two  rivers 
approach  within  three  miles  of  each  other.3  But  when 

1  7  W.  R.,  161  ;  Johnston,  408. 

2  Johnston,  407.  3  i  Beauregard,  217,  n. 


i4  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

the  sites  for  these  forts  were  selected,  the  soil  of 
Kentucky  was  not  open  to  the  engineer  officers  of 
Tennessee,  and  they  were  obliged  to  make  the  best 
choice  they  could  from  the  positions  available  to 
them  in  their  own  State.1  It  cannot  be  said  that 
they  displayed  very  good  judgment  in  their  selec- 
tion of  sites  for  these  forts.  Fort  Henry  was  laid 
out  on  ground  so  low  that  the  magazine  was  liable 
to  be  flooded  when  the  river  rose.2  The  work  was 
also  completely  commanded  by  a  high  hill  on  the 
opposite  shore,  easily  within  range.  Heights  on  the 
same  shore,  too,  and  not  far  from  the  fort,  could,  if 
occupied  by  an  enemy,  seriously  imperil  its  safety.3 
As  for  Fort  Donelson,  it  was  also  commanded  by 
high  ground  a  short  distance  only  from  its  northerly 
side.  Both  works,  however,  could  bring  a  heavy 
fire  to  bear  upon  any  vessels  undertaking  to  ascend 
the  rivers.  Twelve  out  of  the  seventeen  guns  of 
Fort  Henry  swept  the  channel  of  the  Tennessee. 
Thirteen  guns  in  the  batteries  of  Fort  Donelson 
commanded  the  approach  to  that  work  by  the  Cum- 
berland River. 

Both  forts,  however,  were  too  large — Fort  Henry 
covered  ten  acres,  Fort  Donelson  a  hundred.4  To 
defend  them  at  all  several  thousand  men  were 
needed ;  but  to  make  an  obstinate  and  protracted 
defence,  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  hold  a  large 
area  of  ground  in  the  neighborhood  of  each  fort, 
and  many  thousand  men  might  easily  be  required 
for  such  extensive  tasks.  This  was,  it  may  be 

1  Johnston,  407,  408.  '  7  W.  R.,  139. 

1  7  W.  R.,  149  ;  ii  W.  R.,  4,  5.  *  Johnston,  426,  440. 


i862]         FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  15 

here  remarked,  a  common  fault  of  the  Confederate 
works ;  they  were  too  large, — resembling  intrenched 
camps  almost  as  much  as  forts, — and  often,  as  at 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  having  lines  of  field- 
works  outside,  for  supporting  infantry.1  Such  con- 
ditions made  too  heavy  a  draft  on  the  limited  re- 
sources of  the  Confederate  armies.  Thousands  of 
men  were  shut  up  in  these  works  who  should  have 
been  serving  in  the  field  with  the  active  armies.2 

Both  forts  were  under  the  command  of  General 
Tilghman,  an  educated  and  competent  officer  of  the 
old  army.  He  had  between  5000  and  6000  men  at 
his  disposal  at  the  time  when  the  attack  began. 

The  expedition  for  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry 
consisted  of  a  force  of  about  15,000  men  under  Gen- 
eral Grant,3  and  of  a  fleet  of  four  ironclad  and  three 
wooden  gunboats  under  Flag-Officer  Foote.4  The  1st 
division  under  General  McClernand  left  Paducah 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  3d  of  February,  1862,5  in 
transports  preceded  and  accompanied  by  the  gun- 
boats, and  landed  early  the  next  morning6  some 
eight  or  nine  miles  below  the  fort.  Grant  himself 
soon  arrived ;  and,  boarding  the  gunboat  Essex, 
steamed  up  the  river  to  obtain,  if  possible,  a  more 
convenient  place  for  the  landing  of  his  troops.  The 
fort  opened  upon  the  vessel,  one  rifled  shot  passing 
through  the  deck,7  and  it  was  the  sound  of  this 


1  ii  W.  R.,  352. 

1  Cf.  Johnston's  Narrative,  85,  86.  */&.,  122. 

3  7  W.  R.,575;  58i,  583-  '/*.,  58i. 

'/}.,  126.     McClernand  is  apparently  in  error  in  stating  that  he  started 
on  the  2d  and  arrived  the  next  day  ;  cf,  i  Grant,  288. 
7  7  W.  R.,  581. 


1 6  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

heavy  firing  which  first  notified  the  Confederate 
general,  who  happened  at  the  moment  to  be  at  Fort 
Donelson,  of  the  presence  of  the  Federal  forces  on 
the  Tennessee  River.1  During  the  day  McClernand's 
division  re-embarked  and  landed  about  four  or  five 
miles  nearer  the  fort.2  The  transports  then  returned 
to  Paducah  for  the  remainder  of  the  force, — a  divi- 
sion under  General  C.  F.  Smith, — and,  on  the  next 
day,  the  5th,  nearly  the  whole  command  had  arrived. 
Smith's  division  disembarked  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river,  and  proceeded  at  once  to  seize  the  heights 
there,  on  which  a  work,  styled  Fort  Heiman,  had 
been  begun.  The  place  was  found  abandoned. 

There  was  no  unnecessary  delay.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  6th,  McClernand's  division  was  ordered 
to  move  inland  to  the  road  which  led  to  Fort  Donel- 
son, while  the  fleet,  on  whose  ability  to  reduce  Fort 
Henry  both  Grant  and  Foote  mainly  relied,  was  to 
attack  the  work.  It  was  the  expectation  not  only 
to  reduce  the  fort,  but  to  capture  the  entire  garrison 
by  preventing  them  from  reaching  Fort  Donelson. 

About  half-past  eleven  in  the  morning  the  gun- 
boats came  in  sight  of  the  fort,  and,  about  an  hour 
later,  at  the  distance  of  a  mile,  they  opened  fire.  The 
fort  replied  vigorously,  but  the  gunboats  steadily 
advanced.  They  carried  over  fifty  guns,  and  their 
fire  swept  the  fort  from  end  to  end.  The  ironclads 
were  for  the  most  part  protected  by  their  armor 
from  the  effect  of  the  heavy  shot  which  the  fort 
poured  upon  them.  The  Essex,  however,  although 
an  ironclad,  received  a  shot  which  penetrated  her 

1  7  W.  R.,  133,  137.  »  /*.,  127,  581. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  17 


boiler,  causing  serious  injuries  to  her  commander, 
Porter,  and  killing  and  wounding  many  of  her  crew. 
But  the  guns  of  the  fort,  being  nearly  on  a  level 
with  the  water,  possessed  neither  the  immunity  nor 
the  advantage  of  position  of  those  in  a  fort  situated 
at  a  considerable  height  above  the  water.  Still,  the 
fleet  would  undoubtedly  have  suffered  much  more 
severely,  and  very  possibly  might  have  been  repulsed, 
had  not  several  of  the  most  powerful  guns  in  the 
fort  been  accidentally  disabled,  in  addition  to  those 
injured  by  the  fire  of  the  ships.  Tilghman  was  not 
long  in  seeing  that  his  case  was  hopeless ;  he  early 
gave  orders  for  his  main  body  to  retire  to  Fort 
Donelson ;  but  being  himself  a  brave  and  resolute 
man,  he  was  unwilling  to  surrender  till  the  last  mo- 
ment, and  he  also  protracted  the  defence  as  long  as 
possible  so  as  to  give  the  troops  outside  the  fort  the 
time  needed  to  make  good  their  retreat  towards  Fort 
Donelson.1  About  2.  P.M.  the  fort  was  surrendered. 
Only  the  artillerymen  and  the  sick  in  the  hospital 
were  made  prisoners,  the  troops  effecting  their  re- 
treat to  Fort  Donelson. 

Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  two  of 
the  gunboats,  the  Lexington  and  Tyler,  under  Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Phelps,  proceeded  up  the  river, 
and,  that  night,  destroyed  the  railway  bridge  across 
the  Tennessee  and  burned  several  Confederate  trans- 
port-steamers. Pursuing  his  course  up  the  river, 
Phelps,  on  the  8th,  reached  the  town  of  Florence,  in 
Alabama,  at  the  foot  of  the  shallows  known  as 
Muscle  Shoals,  destroying  on  his  way  large  quanti- 


1  7  W.  R.,  140,  142. 

VOL.  II. — 2 


1 8  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

ties  of  supplies  destined  for  the  Confederate  army, 
and  spreading  alarm  throughout  the  whole  region. 

The  effect  of  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry  on  the 
people  of  the  whole  country,  North  and  South,  was 
electrical.  It  was  the  first  great  success  won  by  the 
Union  arms  within  the  limits  of  the  Confederacy. 
It  was  accomplished,  too,  so  suddenly  and  so  unex- 
pectedly that  the  spirits  of  the  Northern  people  were 
elated  almost  beyond  measure,  while  those  of  the 
people  of  the  South  were  correspondingly  depressed. 
The  brilliant  and  apparently  irresistible  attack  of 
the  fleet,  to  which  alone  the  capture  of  the  fort  was 
due,  greatly  intensified  these  feelings,  for  it  seemed 
as  if  the  North  possessed  a  weapon  which  the 
South  was  powerless  to  resist.  This  was  not  true, 
as  subsequent  events  were  soon  to  show,  but  at  the 
time  every  one  seems  to  have  been  of  this  opinion. 
Johnston  wrote  l  on  February  8th  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  at  Richmond  that  the  slight  resistance  at  Fort 
Henry  indicated  that  the  best  open  works  could  not 
meet  successfully  a  vigorous  attack  by  ironclad  gun- 
boats. Feelings  of  distrust  and  alarm  were  rife 
throughout  the  South. 

So  convinced  was  the  Confederate  general  that 
Fort  Donelson  must  succumb  to  an  attack  by  the 
Federal  fleet,  in  which  event  the  Cumberland  River 
would  be  open  as  far  as  Nashville,  that  he  decided, 
on  the  day  after  Fort  Henry  fell,  to  evacuate  Bowl- 
ing Green,  and  to  retreat  to  and  across  the  Cumber- 
land River  to  Nashville.8  At  the  same  time  he  sent 


J?W.  R.,  131,  863;   cf.  Gilmer  to  Mackall,  it.,  869;  Floyd  to  John- 
ston, it.,  865.  J  7  W.  R.,  861  ;  Johnston,  487. 


1 86  2]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  19 

about  12,000  men  to  Fort  Donelson,  thereby  raising 
the  total  force  there,  including  some  troops  which 
had  arrived  from  Columbus,  to  rather  over  18,000 
men.1  To  the  command  of  this  force  he  assigned 
General  Floyd,  who  had  been  Secretary  of  War  in 
Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet,  and  had  lately  commanded 
in  West  Virginia.  He  reserved  for  his  own  immedi- 
ate command  only  about  14,000  men,  with  whom, 
on  February  llth  and  12th,2  he  fell  back  from  Bowl- 
ing Green,  reaching  Nashville  on  the  16th.3 

It  is  not  easy  to  discover  General  Johnston's  rea- 
sons for  detaching  Floyd's  command  from  the  main 
army,  or  to  imagine  what  task  he  expected  that  offi- 
cer to  perform.4  He  had  fully  recognized  that  the 
fort  was  not  tenable,5 — at  least,  against  an  attack  by 
water, — and  augmenting  its  garrison  certainly  would 
not  render  it  more  capable  of  resisting  the  Federal 
gunboats.6  Did  he  then  expect  Floyd  to  defeat 
Grant  ?  It  was,  it  is  true,  possible,  immediately 
after  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  to  concentrate  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Fort  Donelson  a  force  largely 
superior  to  that  which  General  Grant  would  have 
under  his  command ;  and  in  that  case  Grant  might 
be  attacked  and  defeated  before  he  could  carry 
the  lines  of  the  fort,  defended  as  they  were  by 
some  5000  men.  To  attempt  this  was  assuredly 
Johnston's  true  course,  if  he  proposed  to  attempt 

'Johnston,  443  ;  7  W.  R.,  922. 

2  Johnston,  493. 

3  Ib.,  494. 

4"I  determined,"  he  subsequently  wrote  to  President  Davis,  "to  fight 
for  Nashville  at  Donelson." — 7  W.  R.,  259. 

6  7  W.  R.,  861  ;  Johnston,  487.  'Johnston,  435. 


20  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

anything  at  all ;  for  a  severe  defeat  inflicted  on  the 
Federal  land  forces  could  not  but  have  a  great 
moral  effect ;  it  might  even  counterbalance  the  shock 
occasioned  by  the  capture  of  the  forts  by  the  Fed- 
eral fleet.  But  to  carry  out  this  scheme  required 
that  a  much  larger  force  should  be  sent  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Fort  Donelson  than  that  which 
Johnston  despatched,  and  that  the  precise  object  of 
the  movement  should  be  clearly  prescribed  in  the 
orders  to  Floyd,  who  should  be  instructed  that  he 
was  not  sent  there  to  throw  his  command  into  an 
untenable  work,  but  to  defeat,  if  he  could,  the  en- 
emy's army,  either  as  it  approached  the  work,  or 
after  it  had  sat  down  before  it.1 

It  is  plain  from  Johnston's  orders  that  he  had  no 
such  scheme  as  this  in  his  mind.  Operations  in  the 
open  field  formed  no  part  of  his  plan.  All  that  he 
proposed  to  do  was  to  throw  into  the  work  a  garri- 
son large  enough  to  defend  it  for  a  time  against  the 
Federal  investing  forces ;  and  he  appears  to  have 
relied  on  the  ability  of  the  general  in  charge,  in  the 
event  of  the  fort  being  taken,  to  extricate  his  com- 
mand and  rejoin  the  main  body.  "  I  was  in  hopes," 
he  afterward  wrrote  to  President  Davis,  "  that  such 
dispositions  would  have  been  made  as  would  have 
enabled  the  forces  to  defend  the  fort,  or  withdraw 
without  sacrificing  the  army." 2  Accordingly  his 
only  orders  to  B.  R.  Johnson,  who  succeeded  Tilgh- 
man,  and  to  Pillow,  who  succeeded  Johnson,  were  to 
take  command  of  the  post.3  Floyd,  who  ranked 

1  General  Halleck  feared  that   Johnston  would  make  this  attempt  :    7 
W.  R.,  590,  591,  632.  *  7  W.  R.,  260.  3  Ib.,  278,  358. 


1 86 2]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  21 

them  both,  was  at  first  directed  "to  repair  at  once 
to  the  support  of  the  garrison," *  and,  on  the  14th, 
he  was  told,  "if  he  lost  the  fort,  to  get  his  troops 
back  to  Nashville,  if  possible." 2 

It  happened,  just  at  this  time,  that  General  Beau- 
regard  had  been  assigned  to  duty  in  the  Mississ- 
ippi Valley,  and,  on  his  way  to  Columbus,  where  he 
proposed  to  establish  his  headquarters,  he  reached 
Bowling  Green  on  the  evening  of  the  4th  of  Febru- 
ary. Here  he  remained  for  a  week,  and  was  in  con- 
stant consultation  with  his  superior  officer,  General 
Johnston.  He  entirely  approved  of  the  latter's  de- 
cision on  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry  to  evacuate  Bowling 
Green  and  retire  to  Nashville.3  But  he  urged  on 
Johnston  to  go  to  Fort  Donelson  himself  and  to 
take  10,000  men  with  him  in  addition  to  those  al- 
ready sent,  so  that  he  might  be  able  to  attack 
Grant  with  an  army  of  25,000  men,  or  thereabouts 
(exclusive  of  the  troops  retained  as  the  garrison  of 
the  fort).4  Johnston,  however,  would  not  adopt  his 
advice,  being  unwilling  to  reduce  to  4000  men  the 
force  which  was  retiring  on  Nashville  before  Buell's 
army,  which  it  was  known  would  immediately  ad- 
vance on  that  city,  and  believing  that  the  proper 
task  for  himself  was  to  conduct  the  retreat  in  person. 

Returning  now  to  the  question  asked  above, — 
what  was  General  Johnston's  plan  of  operations, 


1 7  w.  R.,  267. 
*  /£.,  260, 880. 

3  Ib.,  863,  864. 

4  i  B.  &  L.,  571,  572  ;  i    Beauregard,    217,  227,  230,  231.     But   that 
Beauregard  gave  this  advice  is  denied  by  Johnston's  biographer  ;  i  B.  &  L., 
548. 


22  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 


what  did  he  expect  to  accomplish  by  the  steps 
which  he  took  ? — we  must  say  that  we  cannot  tell. 
The  18,000  men  under  Floyd  within  the  lines  of 
Fort  Donelson  and  its  outlying  intrenchments,  ex- 
posed to  the  bombardment  of  Commodore  Foote's 
gunboats  and  to  the  assaults  of  General  Grant's  sol- 
diers,— might  indeed  hold  the  works  for  a  few  days, 
but  it  was  as  certain  as  anything  could  be  that  they 
would  be  forced  to  surrender  in  the  end.  There  was 
no  reason  why  the  Federal  investing  army  should 
not  be  reinforced  to  any  needed  extent.  There  was 
no  possibility  of  relieving  the  beleaguered  garrison. 
Johnston  had  no  army  with  which  to  march  to  their 
aid.  There  were  no  Confederate  gunboats  on  the 
rivers.  There  was  nothing  for  Floyd  and  his  men 
to  do  but  to  leave  the  fort  to  its  fate  and  to  try  to 
cut  their  way  out  of  a  trap  into  which  they  should 
never  have  been  sent.1  The  5000  men  who  con- 
stituted the  original  garrison  of  both  the  forts  and 
were  all  now  in  Fort  Donelson  were  enough  to  hold 
the  place  against  a  coup-de-mam,  and,  if  Johnston  had 
been  willing  himself  to  take  the  field  at  the  head  of 
20,000  or  25,000  men,  and  attack  Grant,  they  might 
have  been  withdrawn  if  the  attack  failed.  At  any 
rate,  this  was  Johnston's  only  chance  of  achieving 
any  success.  It  was,  perhaps,  not  a  very  promising 
chance,  for  there  was  every  reason  to  suppose  that 
Grant  would  be  reinforced  largely  from  time  to 
time  until  his  task  was  accomplished.  But  to  defeat 
Grant's  army  was,  we  repeat,  the  only  chance  for  the 
Confederates.  To  throw  a  large  garrison  into  a  fort 

1  But  see  Johnston,  453. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  23 

which  was  attacked  on  all  sides,  when  there  was  not 
the  slightest  expectation  of  relieving  the  garrison 
either  by  land  or  water,  was  simply  to  invite  disas- 
ter. To  carry  out  Johnston's  plan  of  "  fighting  for 
Nashville  at  Donelson,"  something  other  than  de- 
fending Donelson  was  demanded, — namely,  a  daring 
and  resolute  attempt  to  defeat  the  army  which  was 
attacking  Donelson. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Beauregard's  advice 
was  sound.  The  withdrawal  of  the  balance  of  the 
Confederate  army  from  Bowling  Green  to  Nashville, 
where  the  very  muddy  roads  prevented  active  pur- 
suit, would  not  have  been  a  difficult  matter  for  a 
general  of  average  experience  and  good  ability  ;  and 
in  Hardee,  who  was  next  in  rank  to  Johnston,  the 
Confederates  had  an  officer  quite  adequate  to  such 
a  task.  The  real  question  was,  whether  it  was  pos- 
sible to  defeat  Grant.  If  it  was,  then  Johnston 
should  have  taken  charge  of  the  matter  himself,  and 
should  have  taken  with  him  all  the  troops  he  could 
spare.  The  true  place  for  Johnston  under  such  cir- 
cumstances was  where  the  critical  conflict  was  to  be 
fought ;  no  one  could  meet  the  certain  calls  and  the 
unforeseen  exigencies  of  the  expedition  against  Grant 
so  fully  as  the  General-in-chief ;  it  was  for  him  to  in- 
spire the  soldiers  with  the  hope  of  success  and  with 
the  confidence  of  being  ably  and  gallantly  led  to 
victory.  Johnston,  too,  was  precisely  the  man  for 
such  an  emergency.  He  was  eminently  a  fighting 
man  ;  a  resolute  and  determined  officer.  Nothing 
but  his  conviction  that  he  ought  personally  to  be 
with  his  own  army  in  its  retreat  before  Buell's,  in- 


24  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

duced  him  to  make  the  fatal  mistake  of  entrusting 
to  the  incompetent  hands  and  heads  of  Floyd  and 
Pillow  a  task  of  vital  importance  to  the  cause  which 
he  served. 

Fort  Henry,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  fallen  on 
February  6th.  General  Grant  fully  intended  to 
move  at  once  on  Fort  Donelson.  He  wrote  to  Hal- 
leek  the  same  day  that  he  should  "  take  and  destroy  " 
Fort  Donelson  on  the  8th.1  But  as  the  fleet  had  to 
repair  damages,  and  as  he  did  not  "  feel  justified " 
in  attacking  the  place  without  the  co-operation  of 
some  at  least  of  the  gunboats,2  he  did  not  move  until 
the  12th.  On  that  day  he  started  with  the  divisions 
of  McClernand  and  C.  F.  Smith.  Another  division, 
which  had  just  arrived  under  Lewis  Wallace,  and 
which  included  a  brigade  (Craft's)  sent  by  General 
Buell,8  went  round  by  water.  Before  night  the 
neighborhood  of  the  fort  was  reached  by  McCler- 
nand and  Smith,  and  the  troops  had  taken  up  a 
position  surrounding  the  work.  The  next  day 
Wallace  arrived,  the  lines  were  rectified,  and  some 
fighting  took  place.  On  the  14th  the  fleet  arrived. 
Commodore  Foote  at  once  took  his  ships  into  action. 
But  this  time  the  fates  were  against  him.  The  Con- 
federate guns  were  better  placed,4  and  they  did  not 
burst,  or  meet  with  any  disabling  accidents.  Their 
fire  was  accurate  and  well  kept  up,  and  the  Federal 
vessels,  though  handled  with  the  greatest  gallantry, 

1  7  W.  R.,  124. 
3  16.,  600. 

3  Ib.,  612. 

4  The  guns  at  Fort  Donelson  were  32  feet  above  the  river  ;  7  W.  R., 
164. 


1 862]         FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  25 

were  found  to  be  no  match  for  the  fort.  Two  of 
the  ironclads,  the  St.  Louis,  which  carried  the  Com- 
modore, and  the  Louisville,  had  their  steering-ap- 
paratus shot  away,  and  helplessly  drifted  down  the 
river  out  of  the  action.  The  other  two  were  so 
greatly  damaged  between  wind  and  water  as  to  be 
compelled  to  withdraw.  The  two  wooden  vessels 
necessarily  followed  suit.  The  whole  fleet  was  ren- 
dered unserviceable,  and  Foote  himself  was  badly 
wounded.  It  was  necessary  to  send  the  disabled 
gunboats  to  Cairo  to  be  repaired,  and  further  opera- 
tions by  water  were  accordingly  indefinitely  post- 
poned. 

The  Federal  army  did  no  fighting  on  the  14th 
of  February.  General  Grant  merely  extended  his 
lines,  and  completed  the  investment  of  the  fort  and 
the  outlying  works.  He  expected  that  the  fleet 
would  reduce  the  fort,  and  that  in  that  case  the  gar- 
rison and  supporting  troops  would  soon  be  compelled 
to  surrender  to  the  United  States  forces  which  sur- 
rounded them.  But  after  he  had  witnessed  the  re- 
pulse of  the  fleet  he  felt  that  a  speedy  victory  was 
not  to  be  expected.  He  looked  forward  to  a  pro- 
tracted siege.  The  enemy's  works  appeared  to  him 
too  strong  to  be  assaulted  successfully  by  the  raw 
troops  at  his  disposal.  It  seemed  not  unlikely  that 
siege-operations  might  be  required.1  Moreover  "  the 
weather  had  turned  intensely  cold ;  the  men  were 
without  tents,  and  could  not  keep  up  fires  where 
most  of  them  had  to  stay," 2  in  full  range  of  the  en- 
emy's guns.  "  The  sun  went  down,"  says  General 

1  7\V.  R.,  613,  614.  8  i  Grant,  299,  303. 


26  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

Grant  in  his  Memoirs,  "  on  the  night  of  the  14th  of 
February,  1862,  leaving  the  army  confronting  Fort 
Donelson  anything  but  comforted  over  its  pros- 
pects." ' 

The  problem  was,  however,  nearer  a  solution  than 
General  Grant  thought.  Inside  the  Confederate 
lines,  instead  of  increased  confidence,  caused  by  the 
defeat  of  the  Federal  gunboats,  the  feeling  of  being 
surrounded,  imprisoned,  doomed  to  inevitable  cap- 
ture by  an  enemy  whose  numbers  seemed  hourly  to 
be  increasing,  was  predominant,  and  far  outweighed 
the  satisfaction  of  having  successfully  maintained 
the  fort  against  the  naval  attack.2  It  was  feared 
that  the  Federal  troops  would  gain  the  bank  of  the 
river  above  the  fort,  establish  batteries  there  to 
command  the  river,  and  thus  prevent  supplies  reach- 
ing the  defenders.  A  council  of  war,  consisting  of 
Generals  Floyd,  Pillow,  and  Buckner,  was  called  in 
the  evening,  and  it  was  decided  to  attack  the  Federal 
right  at  daybreak  the  next  morning,  with  the  view  of 
opening  the  road  by  which  the  army  could  retire  to 
Nashville.3  In  this  plan  the  three  generals  cordially 
concurred.4  Floyd,  indeed,  had  never  been  in  favor 
of  concentrating  such  a  large  force  at  Fort  Donel- 
son. He  had,  as  late  as  the  12th,  attempted  to  unite 
the  bulk  of  his  available  forces  at  Cumberland  City, 
where  the  railroad  diverges  from  the  river,  and  from 
which  point  he  could  move  upon  any  Federal  force 
crossing  from  Fort  Henry  to  Fort  Donelson,5  and  he 


1  I  Grant,  303.  *  /£.,  268. 

9  7  W.  R.,  263,  265,  268,  281,  331.  4  Ib.,  265,  268,  281,  330. 

5  Floyd  to  Johnston  ;  Ib.,    272. 


1 862]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  27 

had  even  ordered  the  withdrawal  of  Buckner's  di- 
vision from  Fort  Donelson  to  Cumberland  City.1  But 
he  had  been  overruled  by  Johnston,  and  ordered  to 
the  fort.2  His  own  views  as  to  the  folly  of  attempt- 
ing to  hold  the  place  with  no  larger  a  force  than 
that  under  his  command  were  very  clear.3  Hence 
he  was  strongly  in  favor  of  making  an  immediate 
effort  to  cut  his  way  out.  But,  lacking,  as  he  was, 
in  military  knowledge  and  experience,  he  contented 
himself  with  simply  ordering  an  attack  to  be  made 
the  next  morning;  he  gave  no  directions,  and  made 
no  provision,  for  the  veiy  difficult  task  which,  in  the 
event  of  success,  would  have  to  be  undertaken  in- 
stantly, that  of  beginning  a  retreat  which  was  almost 
certain  to  be  followed  up  actively  by  the  United 
States  forces.  For  this,  the  most  precise  arrange- 
ments as  to  transportation  and  supplies,  order  of 
march,  and  formation  of  a  rear-guard,  were  obviously 
required.  But  Floyd  entirely  neglected  to  provide 
for  this  part  of  his  scheme.4  In  fact,  nothing  was 
even  said  at  the  council  about  commencing  the  re- 
treat of  the  army  immediately  from  the  field  of  bat- 
tle, in  case  the  attack  on  the  Federal  right  wing 
should  meet  with  the  success  which  was  hoped  for, 
and  the  road  to  Nashville  should  be  opened.5 

The  next  morning,  the  1 5th,  the  right  wing  of  the 
Federal  army  under  McClernand  was  vigorously  and 
persistently  attacked,  and  after  a  brave  and  obstin- 
ate resistance  it  was  forced  to  give  way  in  some  con- 
fusion. The  division  of  Wallace,  on  its  left,  also 

1  7  W.  R.,  328.  3  Ib.,  271. 

*  /*.,  267.  4  Ib.,  265,  315,  365,  387.  5  Ib.,  387. 


28  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

suffered  a  good  deal.  By  one  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon the  road  to  Nashville  was  opened.  The  action 
was  stubbornly  contested  on  both  sides,  but  the  re- 
sult was  a  decided  victory  for  the  Confederates. 
They  had,  in  fact,  gained  what  they  had  aimed  at. 

Then,  at  the  very  moment  of  victory,  Pillow,  who 
had  directed  the  principal  attack,  ordered  the  troops 
back  to  their  intrenchments l ;  and  Floyd  acquiesced 
in  this  most  extraordinary  and  fatal  blunder.2  It 
was,  no  doubt,  true,  as  Pillow  afterwards  urged  in 
his  defence,  that  no  preparations  whatever  had  been 
made  for  a  retreat  from  the  field 8 ;  that  the  men  had 
no  rations  with  them 4 ;  that  the  wagon-trains  had  not 
been  made  up ;  that  none  of  the  needful  arrange- 
ments had  been  made.  But  it  was  early  in  the  day ; 
all  the  troops  had  not  been  engaged ;  and  it  was 
certainly  possible  to  fit  out  trains  with  a  sufficiency 
of  provisions  and  ammunition  to  enable  the  army  to 
avail  itself  of  the  advantage  of  position  it  had  just 
gained.  The  march  past  the  defeated  troops  of  Me- 
demand  might  certainly  have  been  protected  by 
the  division  of  Buckner,  acting  as  a  rear-guard  5 ; 
and  although  the  sufferings  of  the  men  in  their  im- 
perfectly equipped  condition  would  have  been  great, 
and  the  whole  movement  would  necessarily  have 
been  hazardous,  owing  to  the  neglect  of  the  com- 
manding general  to  make  any  preparations  for  a 

1  7  W.R.,  283,  314,  318. 

9  /*.,  332,  333. 

3/3.,  318. 

4  General  Grant,  however,  says  :  "  I  heard  some  of  the  men  say  that  the 
enemy  had  come  out  with  knapsacks,  and  haversacks  filled  with  rations  "  ; 
i  Grant,  307.  This  may  have  been  true  of  a  part  of  the  Confederate  forces. 

6  7  W.  R.,  332. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  29 

retreat,  yet  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  a  large 
part  of  the  Confederate  army  would,  if  the  attempt 
had  been  made,  have  succeeded  in  reaching  Nash- 
ville.1 Whether,  in  this  event,  Floyd  would  not 
have  been  severely  criticised  by  an  exacting  and 
impatient  public  for  abandoning  the  fort,  is  another 
matter.  But  it  is  plain  enough  that  a  march  from 
the  field  which  had  just  been  won  was  what  should 
have  been  attempted ;  and  it  is  certain  that  Pillow, 
whose  order  to  his  victorious  troops  to  retire  to  their 
intrenchments  had  been  apparently  in  part  carried 
out  before  Floyd  was  cognizant  of  it,2  was  mainly 
responsible  for  the  course  taken  by  the  Confederates. 
By  a  singular  mischance  General  Grant  was  not 
with  his  troops  in  this  affair.  Commodore  Foote  had 
sent  for  him, — the  Commodore  having  been  wounded 
in  the  naval  attack, — that  he  might  confer  with 
him  in  regard  to  the  situation.  General  Grant  made 
all  the  despatch  he  could  in  going  and  returning, 
but  he  had  a  long  way  to  ride  to  and  from  the  land- 
ing-place below  the  fort,  and  the  fleet  had  dropped 
some  distance  down  the  river.  When  he  reached 
the  field,  the  fighting  was  over,  and  the  victorious 
Confederates  had  made  their  way  back  to  their 
old  lines  in  obedience  to  Pillow's  preposterous  or- 
ders.3 Grant,  who  had  apparently  in  his  conference 
with  Foote  settled  on  the  adoption  of  a  waiting  pol- 
icy, on  meeting  McClernand  and  Wallace,  directed 
them  to  withdraw  their  commands  out  of  cannon 
range  and  to  throw  up  works.4  He  was  then  in- 

1  7  W.  R.,  266.  3  i  Grant,  307. 

2  /£.,  266,  269.  4  i  B.  &  L.,  422. 


3o  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

formed  that  the  right  wing  of  the  army  had  been 
defeated,  and  that  the  road  to  Nashville  was  now 
open  to  the  enemy.  Observing,  however,  that  the 
Confederates  were  not  making  any  use  of  their 
success  of  the  morning,  he  very  naturally  supposed 
them  to  be  more  or  less  disorganized  or  even  demoral- 
ized.1 This,  as  we  know,  was  not  the  case ;  but 
General  Grant  was  quite  warranted  in  his  inference, 
and,  at  any  rate,  the  fact  was  plain  to  every  one  that 
the  enemy  had  fallen  back  to  their  lines.  Kemarking 
to  his  lieutenants  that  "  the  position  on  the  right 
must  be  retaken,"  2  and  so  warning  them  to  go  to 
work  at  once  to  collect  and  reorganize  their  scattered 
troops,  Grant  rode  off  to  his  headquarters  and  wrote 
a  despatch  to  Commodore  Foote,  which  showed  him 
to  be  laboring  under  an  anxiety  about  the  situation 
which  he  had  been  far  too  wise  t6  disclose  to  his 
subordinates  on  the  field.  "  If,"  wrote  he  to  Foote,3 
"  all  the  gunboats  that  can  will  immediately  make 
their  appearance  to  the  enemy,  it  may  4  secure  us  a 
victory.  Otherwise,  all  may  be  defeated.  A  terrible 
conflict  ensued  in  my  absence,  which  has  demoralized 
a  portion  of  my  command,  and  I  think  the  enemy  is 
much  more  so.  If  the  gunboats  do  not  show  them- 
selves, it  will  reassure  the  enemy,  and  still  further 
demoralize  our  troops.  I  must  order  a  charge  to 
save  appearances.  I  do  not  expect  the  gunboats  to 
go  into  action,  but  to  make  appearance,  and  to  throw 
a  few  shells  at  long  range." 

Evidently  Grant  was  very  anxious  as  to  the  effect 

1  7  W.  R.,  159,  618.  »  7  W.  R.,  618. 

1  I  B.  &  L.,  422.  *  The  italics  are  ours. 


i862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SH1LOH.  31 

of  the  morning's  defeat  on  his  raw  troops,  if  the 
fleet  should  stay  away.  He  therefore  begged  the 
Commodore  to  put  in  an  appearance  at  any  rate,  and 
to  fire  a  few  shells  at  the  fort.  He  also  indeed  pro- 
posed to  "order  a  charge,"  but  it  was  mainly  "to 
save  appearances,"  that  is,  to  show  to  his  own  men 
and  to  the  enemy  that  his  army  was  still  on  the 
offensive.  It  is  clear  that  he  did  not  expect  any 
important  result  from  the  charge ;  it  was,  he  saw, 
the  proper  thing  to  order,  but  he  relied  mainly  on 
the  reappearance  of  the  fleet  to  restore  confidence  to 
his  troops. 

Having  sent  off  this  despatch,  General  Grant  rode 
immediately  to  the  left  to  see  General  C.  F.  Smith, 
and  to  give  him  the  order  to  assault  the  works  in 
his  front.  Smith,  who  was  one  of  the  most  inde- 
fatigable and  experienced  officers  in  the  service,  had 
improved  the  leisure  of  the  previous  day  in  making 
a  personal  reconnoissance  of  the  enemy's  lines,  and 
had  discovered  a  weak  place  in  them.1  Receiving 
Grant's  order  towards  three  o'clock,2  he  put  his 
troops  in  motion  without  delay.  The  ground  over 
which  the  assault  must  be  made  was  very  rough 
and  broken,  and  was  obstructed  by  felled  trees  and 
abatis.  Fortunately  for  the  attacking  party,  the 
lines  were  not  fully  manned,  Buckner,  who  had 
charge  of  them,  not  having  been  able  to  bring  his 
troops  back  to  their  position  before  Smith  assaulted3 ; 
still,  the  few  troops  which  were  in  the  works  de- 


1  Smith's  Report,  Magazine  of  American  History,  January,  1886,  27. 

3  ^.,37- 

3Buckner's  Report,  7  W.  R.,  327,  333  ;  I  Grant,  307. 


32  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

fended  themselves  with  great  spirit  and  tenacity. 
Smith  ordered  the  men  to  take  the  caps  off  their 
muskets  and  to  advance  with  fixed  bayonets.1  He 
himself,  though  the  commander  of  the  division,  led 
the  charge  in  person,  feeling  the  importance  of  his 
presence  to  the  raw  volunteers.  The  advance  was 
steadily  and  gallantly  made  under  a  heavy  fire,  and 
the  works  were  handsomely  carried.  Buckner  with 
his  returning  troops  made  repeated  efforts  to  retake 
them  during  the  afternoon,  but  without  success.  At 
sunset  the  Confederates  desisted  from  further  at- 
tempts. The  position  thus  carried  by  Smith  was 
found  to  possess  an  unusual  importance.  It  was,  in 
fact,  an  angle  of  the  works  inside  the  fort.  It  prac- 
tically commanded  the  entire  work.8 

After  having  given  the  order  to  Smith  to  assault 
on  the  left,  General  Grant  ordered  McClernand  and 
Wallace  to  advance  their  commands  and  reoccupy 
their  abandoned  lines.3  This  they  succeeded  with- 
out difficulty  in  accomplishing  ;  so  that  by  dark  the 
Union  right  wing  was  again  in  the  path  of  any  pos- 
sible Confederate  retreat. 

The  Confederate  generals  inside  the  fort  recog- 
nized to  the  full  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  A 
council  of  war  was  held  that  evening.  It  was  known 
that  the  Union  forces  had  reoccupied  their  lines  on 
their  right.  The  Confederates  were  in  no  condition 
to  attempt  again  to  open  the  road  to  Nashville. 
They  were  exhausted  by  the  severity  of  the  weather, 


1  Magazine  of  American  History,  January,  iS36,  41  :  Newsham's  letter. 
s  McPherson's  Report,  7  W.  R.,  163. 
J/3.,  179,  1 80. 


1 86  2]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  33 

and  greatly  fatigued  by  the  fight  of  the  morning,  in 
which,  too,  they  had  suffered  severe  loss.1  It  was, 
moreover,  known  that  General  Grant  had  recently 
received  reinforcements.  Pillow  indeed  advocated 
another  effort  to  cut  their  way  out ;  but  Floyd  and 
Buckner  were  decided  in  their  opinion  that  the  thing 
was  impracticable.  Buckner,  who  was  an  educated 
and  capable  officer,  said  that  he  was  sure  of  being 
attacked  in  the  morning,  and  that  he  could  not  hold 
his  position  half  an  hour.  Both  he  and  Floyd  saw 
no  other  course  to  take  but  to  surrender  the  post 
and  garrison  on  the  best  terms  possible.  Floyd, 
however,  stated  that  he  would  not  become  a  pris- 
oner, and  Pillow  followed  his  example.2  Floyd 
then  turned  over  the  command  to  Pillow,  and  Pillow 
turned  it  over  to  Buckner,  and  he  and  Floyd  there- 
upon left  the  fort.  Buckner  immediately  despatched 
a  note  to  General  Grant  proposing  the  appointment 
of  commissioners  to  agree  upon  terms  of  capitula- 
tion. Grant  wrote  back  the  since  famous  reply  that 
"no  terms  except  an  unconditional  and  immediate 
surrender"  could  be  accepted,  and  stated  that  he 
proposed  "  to  move  immediately  "  upon  the  enemy's 
works ;  whereupon  Buckner,  without  further  parley, 
surrendered  his  command. 

About  11,500  men3  with  forty  guns4  were   the 
fruits  of  this  great  victory.     Forrest  retired  with  his 


'7W.  R.,  335. 
9  76.,  288. 

3  Johnston,  479  ;  Cullum  to  Halleck,  7  W.   R.,  944.     Badeau,  however, 
says  that  14,623  rations  were  issued  to  the  prisoners.     I  Badeau,  51,  n. 
47W.  R.,  159. 

VOL.  !!.—•} 


34  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

cavalry,  and  the  greater  part  of  a  Virginia  brigade 
found  an  escape  with  Floyd,  on  the  steamers  at*  his 
disposal.  There  were  also  a  great  many  stragglers, 
most  of  whom  got  away  because  the  Union  soldiers 
were  in  too  exhausted  a  state  to  take  efficient  meas- 
ures to  secure  their  prisoners.  The  United  States 
forces  lost  nearly  3,000  men  killed  and  wounded  J ; 
the  Confederates,  according  to  their  own  statement, 
not  half  as  many.2 

The  capture  of  Fort  Donelson  was  not  a  great 
affair  judged  by  the  number  of  the  slain,  but  judged 
by  its  moral  and  strategical  results,  it  was  one  of 
the  turning  points  of  the  war.  Following  so  soon 
as  it  did  after  the  loss  of  Fort  Henry,  the  news 
of  the  surrender  of  Donelson  threw  the  Southwest 
into  a  state  of  excitement,  not  to  say  of  panic,  hardly 
to  be  described.  Denunciations  of  Floyd,  Pillow, 
Buckner,  and  (most  of  all)  of  Johnston  himself 
were  freely  made.  The  Confederate  Congress  ap- 
pointed a  committee  of  inquiry.  President  Davis 
was  urged  to  remove  Johnston.  Nashville  was  on 
the  verge  of  an  outbreak.  The  excitement  was  the 
more  intense  because  up  to  the  very  last  moment  the 
despatches  from  Floyd  and  Pillow  had  been  most 
encouraging.3  Then,  without  a  single  word  of  warn- 
ing, came  the  news  of  the  surrender.4 

In  the  North,  exultation,  confident  expectation, 
rising  almost  to  the  dangerous  point  of  underesti- 
mating the  remaining  resources  and  the  enduring 
valor  of  the  South,  were  the  feelings  of  the  hour. 

'7W.  R.,  169.  s/3.,  495;  7  W.  R.,255. 

1  Johnston,  479.  4  Ib.,  256. 


1 86 2]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  35 

And  no  one  can  wonder  at  it.  The  whole  system  of 
the  Confederate  defence  in  the  West  had  been  broken 
up.  It  seemed  well  within  the  limits  of  possibility 
to  follow  up  Sidney  Johnston  until  he  should  be 
forced  to  surrender  with  what  was  left  of  his  army. 
Chattanooga,  the  key  of  East  Tennessee,  apparently 
lay  open  to  the  invading  Federal  armies  on  one  flank, 
and  Vicksburg,  the  only  strong  post  on  the  lower 
Mississippi,  lay  seemingly  unprotected  on  the  other. 
Of  the  Confederate  army  of  the  West,  part  had  been 
captured,  part  was  retreating  before  the  large  and 
well-appointed  army  of  Buell,  and  part  was  shut  up 
in  fortified  works  on  the  left  (or  eastern)  bank  of 
the  upper  Mississippi,  whose  capture  was  only  a 
question  of  time,  now  that  by  the  fall  of  the  forts 
on  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers,  they  were 
cut  off  from  supports  and  supplies. 

General  Grant  was  naturally  the  hero  of  the  hour, 
and  this  he  deserved  to  be.  His  course  throughout 
this  whole  expedition  shows  him  to  have  been  in 
every  way  equal  to  his  task.  He  did  all  that  could 
be  done  at  Fort  Henry ;  the  retreat  of  the  main 
body  of  the  Confederates  to  Fort  Donelson  could 
not  have  been  prevented.  He  moved  to  Fort  Donel- 
son as  soon  as  the  fleet  was  ready  to  co-operate ;  and, 
once  there,  with  a  discretion  which  on  similar  occa- 
sions afterwards  he  did  not  always  show,  he  did  not 
waste  the  strength  of  his  troops  by  assaulting  the 
unbroken  and  well-manned  fortifications  of  his  an- 
tagonists. He  had  good  cause  to  rely  on  the  gun- 
boats to  render  the  fort  untenable,  and  he  kept  his 
troops  in  their  lines.  His  absence  from  the  conflict 


36  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

of  the  15th  was  no  fault  of  his.  On  his  return,  he 
had  reason  enough  to  be  depressed,  but  he  concealed 
his  feelings  from  his  men.  He  moreover  did  pre- 
cisely what  he  ought  to  have  done  in  the  circum- 
stances. He  correctly  divined  that  the  Confederates 
had  weakened  their  lines  on  their  right,  and  he  at 
once  ordered  Smith  to  attack,  though  he  did  not 
expect  much  from  his  attack.  He  saw  that  the 
enemy  had  fallen  back  to  their  works  on  their  left, 
and  he  directed  that  our  original  positions  in  front 
of  their  left  should  be  immediately  reoccupied.  He 
could  have  done  no  more. 

Then  fortune  favored  him,  as  she  has  favored 
most  successful  generals.  Smith  carried  by  assault 
the  key  to  the  enemy's  position.  The  Confederates, 
demoralized  by  returning  after  their  successful  bat- 
tle to  their  lines  of  the  morning,  thought  of  nothing 
but  surrender.  They  determined  to  offer  no  further 
resistance.  They  asked  for  terms  of  capitulation. 
Grant  instantly  saw  his  advantage.  It  is  possible 
that,  as  Smith's  adjutant-general  states,1  Grant,  in 
his  letter  to  Buckner,  employed  the  very  words  of 
which  Smith,  to  whom  the  officer  from  the  fort  first 
addressed  himself,  had  just  made  use;  but  there 
was  no  more  forcible  language  which  could  have 
been  employed,  and  if  Grant  did  borrow  it,  he  did 
well  to  do  so.  But  whether  he  did  or  not  is  of  no 
consequence.  He  showed  unmistakably  that  he 
was  ready  for  victoiy,  prepared  to  accept  the  re- 
sults of  success, — no  matter  how  complete  that  suc- 
cess might  be.  He  was  again  equal  to  the  situation  ; 

1  Colonel  Newsham  ;  Magazine  of  American  History,  January,  1886,  41. 


1 862]         FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  37 

and  he  deserved  the  praise  which  he  received  from 
the  public,  and  the  promotion  which  President  Lin- 
coln at  once  bestowed  on  him.1 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  apparent  that  the  task 
which  General  Grant  had  so  successfully  accom- 
plished was  not  one  of  those  which  call  for  the 
highest  and  rarest  qualities  of  generalship.  His 
work  was  laid  out  for  him  by  Halleck,  upon  whose 
shoulders  rested  the  responsibility  of  deciding 
whether  or  not  the  task  was  feasible,  and,  if  feasible, 
whether  it  was  wise  to  attempt  it  at  that  time.2 
Grant  had  simply  to  carry  out  Halleck's  orders  to 
the  best  of  his  ability.  His  position  did  not  call  for 
the  exercise  of  discretion,  that  is,  to  any  great  ex- 
tent. Nor  was  he  placed  at  any  time  in  a  situation 
of  unusual  peril  or  difficulty.  But  he  certainly 
showed  himself  equal  to  all  the  demands  which 
were  made  upon  him. 

The  brief  campaign  which  we  have  just  narrated 
had  indeed  resulted  must  successfully  for  the  Union 
arms,  but  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  its  prosecu- 
tion was  unattended  with  the  risk  of  defeat.  Gen- 
eral Halleck,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  begun 
operations  without  any  authority  from  General 

1  See  Johnston,  476. 

*  It  has  been  claimed  for  Grant  (i  Badeau,  33)  that  he  suggested  to  Hal- 
leck the  movement  on  Fort  Donelson.  But  while  it  is  true  that  Halleck's 
original  order  (7  W.  R.,  121)  was  confined  to  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry, 
we  know  that  Halleck  had,  before  issuing  it,  intended  a  movement  on  Fort 
Donelson,  and  we  think  it  altogether  probable  that  Grant  understood  that 
this  operation  was  to  follow  the  reduction  of  Fort  Henry.  See  Halleck  to 
Buell,  7  W.  R.,  574,  578.  Grant's  intention  at  first  was  to  destroy  Fotf 
Donelson,  and  return  to  Fort  Henry,  unless  he  should  find  that  he  could 
occupy  the  former  place  with  a  small  force,  rather  as  a  sort  "  of  an  advance 
grand-guard  than  as  a  permanent  post  "  ;  7  W.  R.,  124,  125. 


38  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

McClellan  or  any  understanding  with  General  Buell 
as  to  either  reinforcements  or  co-operative  move- 
ments.1 When  Buell  first  heard  of  Halleck's  pro- 
ject, as  far  back  as  January  31st,  he  asked  him  if  he 
needed  "  active  co-operation."  z  Halleck  replied  on 
February  1st  that  at  that  moment  it  was  not  essen- 
tial,3 and,  on  the  2d,  he  stated  to  Buell  that  the 
garrison  of  Fort  Henry  was  6000  men.4  On  the 
3d,  Buell  informed  him  that  10,000  men  under 
Floyd  and  Buckner  had  just  left  Bowling  Green, 
and  that  he  had  better  count  on  meeting  this  addi- 
tional force.5  This  news,  which  was  substantially 
correct,6  alarmed  Halleck.  On  the  5th  he  asked 
Buell  to  make  a  diversion  in  his  favor  by  threaten- 
ing Bowling  Green.7  But  this  Buell  could  not  do. 
His  main  army  was  forty  miles  from  Bowling  Green ; 
the  roads  leading  to  it  were  obstructed  for  nearly 
the  whole  distance ;  and  the  place  itself  was  behind 
a  river  and  was  strongly  fortified.  All  the  roads  in 
that  region  were  in  very  bad  condition,  so  that  any 
attempt  to  flank  Johnston  out  of  his  lines  at  Bowl- 
ing Green  would  inevitably  consume  many  days. 
Buell,  of  course,  could  advance  in  force  on  Bowling 
Green,  and  either  attack  or  turn  the  place,  but  the 
situation  was  one  which  did  not  render  a  mere  dem- 
onstration practicable.8  He  therefore  offered  Hal- 
leck one  of  his  brigades 9  and  placed  at  his  disposal 

1  Ante,  7,  8.  *  Ib.,  580. 

*  7  W.  R.,  574.  •  Ante,  18,  19.     The  number  was  really  12,000. 

'/*.,  576.  '7  W.  R.,  583. 

4/<*-,  578,  579-  '/<*.,  583,  584- 

'/£.,  584.     This  brigade,  Cruft's,  arrived  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  cap- 
ture of  Fort  Donelson.     Ib.,  243,  461. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  39 

eight  new  regiments  then  in  Indiana  and  Ohio.1 
Buell  was  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  thing  for  him 
to  do  at  this  moment  was  to  advance  in  force  on 
Bowling  Green,  but  he  was  still  under  orders  to 
invade  East  Tennessee.  Accordingly,  on  the  5th, 
he  wrote  to  the  General-in-chief,  stating  his  convic- 
tion that  the  East  Tennessee  movement  ought  to  be 
indefinitely  postponed  and  an  advance  on  Bowling 
Green  made  at  once.2  McClellan  evidently  had  not 
contemplated  this,  for  we  find  him  about  this  time 
urging  Buell  "  to  delay  the  move  on  East  Tennessee 
as  little  as  possible." 3  But  the  repeated  and  urgent 
appeals  which  Halleck  was  now  making  for  rein- 
forcements,4 and  the  deliberate  opinion  of  Buell  as 
to  the  importance  of  an  immediate  advance  on  Bowl- 
ing Green,  finally  had  their  effect  on  McClellan  ;  he 
consented  to  postpone  the  invasion  of  East  Tennes- 
see ;  and  thenceforward  he  did  all  in  his  power  to 
co-ordinate  the  operations  of  the  forces  under  Hal- 
leck and  Buell,  with  the  hope  of  carrying  through  to 
a  successful  termination  the  "  move,"  which,  to  use 
the  language  of  Buell,  "  right  in  its  strategical  bear- 
ing, but  commenced  by  General  Halleck  without 
appreciation,  preparation,  or  concert,  had  now  be- 
come of  vast  magnitude."5  The  varying  aspects 
of  the  military  situation  from  time  to  time  during 
the  siege  of  Fort  Donelson,  and  the  views  of  the 
three  generals  as  to  the  proper  steps  to  be  taken  at 
each  juncture,  may  well  detain  us  a  few  moments. 
General  Halleck,  as  soon  as  he  was  informed  by 

1  7  W.  R.,  588.        3  Ib.,  586  ;  February  6,  1862. 

2  Ib.,  585.  4  Ib.,  583,  591,  594,  599,  612.  •  Ib.,  587. 


40  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 


Buell  that  10,000  men  had  been  sent  from  Bowling 
Green  to  oppose  Grant  at  Fort  Henry,  not  only  (as 
we  have  seen)  asked  Buell  to  make  a  demonstration 
in  his  favor,  but  telegraphed  directly  to  the  General- 
in-chief  for  reinforcements.1  McClellan,  who  had  at 
the  moment  no  troops  to  spare,2  inclined  to  the  course 
which  Halleck  had  advocated  in  his  letter  of  Janu- 
ary 20th,3  namely,  the  transfer  to  the  Cumberland 
and  Tennessee  rivers  of  all  of  Buell's  troops  not  re- 
quired to  secure  his  present  position.  "  Had  we  not 
better,"  he  wrote  to  Buell,  on  Februaiy  6th,4  "  throw 
all  available  force  on  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  ? 
What  think  you  of  making  that  the  main  line  of 
operations  ?  .  .  .  Ought  you  not  to  go  in  person  ? " 
Buell,  in  his  reply  the  next  day,5  said  that  he  had 
himself  been  thinking  of  changing  his  line  of  opera- 
tions to  support  Grant's  movement.  "  But,"  said  he, 
the  change  "  will  have  to  be  made  in  the  face  of 
50,000,  if  not  60,000,  men,  and  is  hazardous."  This 
was  an  overestimate  of  the  force  at  Johnston's  dis- 
posal, which  could  not  have  much  exceeded  40,000 
men.6  Buell  himself  had  43,000  infantry  and  twenty- 
two  batteries  fit  for  duty  and  nearly  30,000  more 
infantry  under  arms  and  in  the  field,  although  unin- 
structed.7  But  though  an  overestimate,  it  was  not 
an  excessive  one.  Buell  relied  mainly  on  his  dis- 

1  7  W.  R.,  583,  584,  586,  587- 

*  ^M     584. 

*Ante,  6  ;  8  W.  R.,  510, 
4  7  W.  R.,  587. 

*  /*.,  587,  588. 

"  There  were  some  18,000  at  Donelson,  14,000  at  Bowling  Green,  some 
6000  under  Crittenden  in  Southeastern  Kentucky,  besides  some  troops  at 
Nashville  and  other  places.  1  7  W.  R.,  563,  611,  615,  616. 


1 862]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  41 

ciplined  troops,  of  which  he  had  perhaps  45,000. 
Johnston  could  have  concentrated  a  force  of  nearly 
40,000  men  to  resist  an  advance,  or  to  interfere  with 
or  take  advantage  of  any  operation  undertaken  by 
Buell.  If  Buell  should  send  30,000  men  to  the  Cum- 
berland, it  might  be  possible  for  Johnston,  in  case 
Fort  Donelson  should  be  found  too  strong  to  be 
carried  by  assault  and  more  than  a  match  for  the 
Federal  ships  of  war,  to  reunite  his  forces,  take  the 
offensive,  and  thus  arouse  the  Confederate  sympa- 
thizers in  Kentucky,  the  people  of  which  State  were, 
as  we  know,  very  evenly  divided  in  sentiment.  The 
presence  of  a  large  United  States  army  in  the  State 
unquestionably  had  a  strong  influence  in  favor  of 
the  cause  of  the  Union,  and  this  influence  it  was 
very  important  to  preserve  unimpaired.  On  the 
other  hand,  no  one  was  more  convinced  than  General 
Buell  that  the  operation  which  General  Halleck  had 
begun  was  one  of  first-rate  importance.  He  saw 
clearly  the  immense  results  of  success  and  the  disas- 
trous consequences  of  failure.  What  he  wanted  to 
do  was  to  keep  his  own  army  intact, — a  thing 
always  of  great  military  importance,  tending,  as  it 
does,  so  powerfully  to  create  an  esprit  de  cwps,  as 
well  as  to  ensure  the  perfecting  of  the  details  of  or- 
ganization and  administration,  but  especially  import- 
ant in  the  outset  of  the  career  of  an  army  formed, 
as  was  this  one,  entirely  of  volunteers.  Then  Buell 
desired  to  advance  on  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville, 
leaving  it  to  Halleck  to  sustain  the  movement  up 
the  rivers.  But  he  was  entirely  ready  to  deplete  his 
own  army,  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  do  so,  in  order 


42  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

to  secure  the  success  of  Grant's  expedition.  He  was 
not  a  man  of  quick  decision,  and  he  took  some  days  to 
think  over  the  situation  and  decide  what  was  best 
to  be  done,  meantime  sending  one  brigade  (Cruft's) 
to  Grant,  and  placing  at  Halleck's  disposal  the  eight 
raw  regiments  in  Ohio  and  Indiana.1 

While  Buell  was  considering  the  advisability  of 
this  change  in  his  line  of  operations,  Fort  Henry  was 
taken  on  February  6th.  Halleck  the  next  day  wrote 
to  McClellan,2  urgently  renewing  his  proposition. 
"  It  is  said  that  the  enemy  is  concentrating  troops 
by  railroad  to  recover  his  lost  advantage.  If  Gen- 
eral Buell  cannot  either  attack  or  threaten  Bowling 
Green  on  account  of  the  roads,  I  think  every  man 
not  required  to  defend  Green  River 3  should  be  sent  to 
the  Tennessee  River  or  Cumberland  River.  .  .  .  The 
enemy  must  abandon  Bowling  Green.  .  .  .  He 
ought  to  concentrate  at  Dover  and  attempt  to 
retake  Fort  Henry.  It  is  the  only  way  he  can  re- 
store an  equilibrium.  We  should  be  prepared  for 
this.  If  you  agree  with  me,  send  me  everything  you 
can  spare  from  General  Buell's  command,  or  else- 
where." To  the  same  effect,  and  in  nearly  the  same 
words  Halleck  wrote  on  the  same  day  to  Buell,  add- 
ing that  he  had  only  15,000  men  at  Fort  Henry  and 
Dover.4  On  the  8th  Halleck  again  urged  his  sugges- 
tion on  the  General-in-chief.5 


1  Ante,  38,  39. 

»7  W.  R.,  590,  591- 

3  Buell's  line  of  defence.     Ante,  7,  n.  i. 

4  7  W.  R.,  592.     Cruft's  brigade  had  not  yet  arrived,  nor  the  eight  raw 
regiments  from  Ohio  and  Indiana.      Id.,  597,  600.      Cruft's  brigade  left  on 
the  7th  (592)  and  arrived  on  the  nth  (612).  *  16.,  594. 


1 86  2]         FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  43 

It  was,  in  fact,  not  until  after  the  fall  of  Fort 
Henry  that  General  Halleck  saw  the  full  danger  at- 
tending his  inconsiderate  move.  He  had  sent  Grant 
to  Fort  Henry,  with  instructions  also  to  capture 
Fort  Donelson,  and  he  had  given  him  only  15,000 
men,  for  these  were  all  he  could  dispose  of.  Fort 
Henry  had  proved  an  easy  capture  indeed ;  but  it 
was  certain  that  a  formidable  resistance  was  to  be 
expected  at  Fort  Donelson ;  and  Halleck  now  saw, 
apparently  for  the  first  time,  that  it  was  perfectly 
practicable  for  Johnston  to  send  troops  from  Bowling 
Green  to  Clarksville  or  Nashville  by  rail,  and  thence 
by  steamer  to  Fort  Donelson  or  Dover,  in  such  num- 
bers as  he  might  think  sufficient,  and,  furthermore, 
that  this  was  what  Johnston  ought  to  do,  and  prob- 
ably would  do.1  He  also  saw  that  such  a  force 
might  very  possibly  crush  Grant  by  superior  num- 
bers and  return  to  Bowling  Green,  before  Buell, 
hindered,  as  he  was,  by  the  bad  roads  and  the  un- 
fordable  rivers,  could  carry  that  fortified  place  by 
siege  or  storm,  or  flank  the  Confederates  out  of  it.2 
Hence  he  was  exceedingly  and  justifiably  anxious  as 
to  the  fate  of  his  expedition.  He  had  no  troops  in 
his  own  Department, — at  least,  this  was  his  own  opin- 
ion,— which  he  could  spare  for  Grant's  support.  He 
could  only  ask  McClellan  and  Buell  for  assistance; 
but  to  what  extent  or  in  what  way  that  assistance 
would  be  furnished,  it  would  probably  be  left  for 
Buell,  who  possessed  McClellan's  full  confidence,  to 
decide.  Halleck  had  neglected  to  take  the  precau- 
tion to  have  a  definite  understanding  with  Buell ; 

1  7  W.  R.,  590-593.  *  16.,  627,  628. 


44  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 


and,  though  he  knew  that  Buell  would  do  all  in  his 
power  to  help  him,  he  could  not  tell  what  course 
Buell,  who  would  naturally  be  largely  influenced  by 
the  needs,  real  or  supposed,  of  his  own  Department, 
would  deem  it  wisest  to  take.  He  was  now  thor- 
oughly alarmed  lest  Johnston,  who  was,  as  he  knew, 
secure  in  his  works  at  Bowling  Green  from  any  sud- 
den attack  by  Buell,  should  concentrate  a  large  force 
at  Dover,  and  overwhelm  Grant. 

The  Gen eral-in -chief  evidently  leaned  to  Halleck's 
opinion,  while  retaining  the  greatest  respect  for 
Buell's  military  judgment.  He  again  (on  February 
7th)  urged  Buell  "  to  take  the  line  of  the  Tennessee 
with  "  his  "  command  and  operate  on  Nashville."  * 

But  General  Buell  could  not  at  first  bring  himself 
to  agree  with  the  General-in-chief  and  General  Hal- 
leek.  He  telegraphed  the  former  on  the  7th  *  that, 
"  on  reflection,"  he  could  not  think  a  change  of  his 
line  would  be  advisable.  He  added,  however,  "  I 
will  go,  if  necessary."  The  next  day  he  wrote3: 
"I  am  concentrating  and  preparing,  but  will  not  de- 
cide definitely  yet."  On  the  12th  Buell  wrote  to 
Halleck  that  he  was  "  advancing  in  some  force  on 
Bowling  Green,  and  preparing  the  rest  of  "  his  "  force 
for  either  alternative."4  In  reply  Halleck  wrote 
him 5  that  it  was  reported  that  40,000  rebels  were 
at  Dover  and  Clarksville.  This  report  seems  to 
have  decided  Buell.  He  telegraphed  to  Halleck  and 
McClellan  the  same  day6  (the  12th)  that  he  would 

1  7  W.  R.,  593.     Nashville  is  on  the  Cumberland,  but  the  troops  under 
Grant  were  at  this  time  at  Fort  Henry  on  the  Tennessee. 
3  /*.,  593-  */*.,  607. 

3  /*.,  594.  •/*.,  607.  «  16.,  607.  938. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  45 

"  move  on  the  line  of  the  Cumberland  River  or  Ten- 
nessee River."  Three  days  later  he  decided  to  take 
two  divisions, — say  16,000  to  20,000  men, — to  the 
Cumberland  River,1  "  leaving  the  rest  of  the  army 
to  operate  against  Bowling  Green." 2 

It  may  well  be  that  this  plan  of  General  Buell's 
was  a  judicious  one,  but  it  certainly  would  seem  that 
it  was  not  adopted  with  that  promptitude  which 
the  exigency  called  for.  General  Buell  was  on  Feb- 
ruary 7th  fully  aware  that  Grant's  force  consisted 
only  of  15,000  men,  with  the  addition  of  the  brigade 
(Cruft's)  sent  from  his  (Buell's)  army  and  the  raw 
troops  from  Ohio  and  Indiana ;  and  he  also  knew 
that  it  was  perfectly  feasible  for  Johnston  to  concen- 
trate at  or  near  Fort  Donelson  a  force  largely  supe- 
rior to  that  of  Grant  in  numbers  and  efficiency.  He 
himself  was  not  at  the  moment  employing  his  own 
army ;  he  was  not  threatened  with  a  forward  move- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  Confederates ;  nor  could  he 
advance  on  their  position  at  Bowling  Green  without 
great  difficulty  and  some  delay.  Moreover,  if  Fort 
Donelson  should  be  taken,  Bowling  Green  would  in 
all  probability  be  evacuated.  This  was  Buell's  own 
opinion.3  Under  these  circumstances,  therefore,  it 
would  certainly  seem  that  one  or  perhaps  two  divi- 
sions should  have  been  despatched  at  once  to  the 
critical  point,  Fort  Donelsou,  to  render  certain  be- 
yond a  reasonable  question  the  success  of  the  move- 
ment upon  which  depended  in  all  probability  the 
evacuation  of  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville.  That 
this  was  Buell's  own  opinion  of  the  true  course  for 

1  7  W.  R.,  619-621.  2  /*.,  938.  3  Ib.,  936. 


46  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

him  to  pursue  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  it  was  the 
one  which  he  did,  on  February  12th,  adopt,  and, 
four  days  later,  partially  carry  into  execution.  But 
there  seems  to  have  been  no  good  reason  why  it 
might  not  have  been  adopted  on  the  7th,  and  carried 
at  once  into  execution. 

While  General  Buell  was  thus  getting  ready  to 
start  for  the  Cumberland  River  with  two  divisions, 
he  learned  that  Bowling  Green  had  been  evacuated.1 
He  immediately  decided  that  one  division  would  now 
suffice  for  the  assistance  of  Grant,  and  that  he  ought 
to  march  at  once  on  Nashville  himself  with  the  re- 
mainder of  his  army.2  Nelson's  division  was  accord- 
ingly embarked  on  the  16th  for  Fort  Donelson.3 
Buell  on  the  15th  wrote  to  McClellan  and  Halleck, 
communicating  his  decision.4  Halleck  considered 
his  course  bad  strategy 5 ;  but  Buell  held  that  an  im- 
mediate march  on  Nashville,  which  was  now  made 
possible  by  the  fall  of  Bowling  Green,  would  be 
certain  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  Grant  at  Donelson6 ; 
and  McClellan  concurred  with  him.7  There  can  be 
no  question  that  McClellan  and  Buell  were  correct 
in  their  judgment.  Grant  by  this  time  had,  or  would 
shortly  have,  when  Nelson's  division  should  arrive, 
a  force  quite  sufficient  for  his  needs.8  Buell,  on  the 
other  hand,  supposed,  naturally,  that  he  had  before 
him  the  bulk  of  Johnston's  army  ;  and  there  was  no 

7  W.  R.,6i6. 

It  was  finally  found  that  it  was  better  to  send  Thomas's  division  to 
Nashville  by  water,  ft.,  651. 

Ib.,  621.  «/a.,620. 

Ib.,  619-621.  *  Ib.,  617,  620,  625. 

Ib.,  617,  621,  624.  8  Ib.,  620;  Buell  to  McClellan. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  47 

reason  to  think  that  the  troops  which  Johnston  had 
detached  to  defend  Fort  Donelson  would  not  be 
able  ultimately  to  effect  a  junction  with  the  main 
body,  whatever  might  become  of  the  fort.  Buell 
expected,  moreover,  that  Johnston's  army  would  be 
largely  reinforced  at  Nashville  by  troops  from  the 
Gulf  States  and  perhaps  from  Virginia,  and  that  the 
city  would  be  stoutly  defended.1  Hence  he  desired 
to  carry  with  him  as  large  a  force  as  possible. 

On  the  16th  of  February  Fort  Donelson  fell,  and 
the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  troops  which  had  de- 
fended it  were  made  prisoners  of  war.2  Buell's 
advance  had  just  reached  Bowling  Green.3  It  would 
take  about  a  week  for  Buell's  army  to  march  to 
Nashville.  Halleck,  however,  had  30,000  men  un- 
der Grant  at  Fort  Donelson,  and  there  was  water- 
communication  with  Nashville  the  whole  way.  But 
Halleck  had  no  scheme  in  his  mind.  "I  have," 
he  wrote  to  McClellan,  the  day  before  the  fort 
surrendered,  "no  definite  plan  beyond  the  tak- 
ing of  Fort  Donelson  and  Clarksville." 4  McClellan 
replied  at  once  by  directing  him  to  move  on  Nash- 
ville by  the  quickest  route.5  McClellan  saw  that 
the  Confederates  had  received  a  terrible  blow  by 
the  capture  of  Donelson,  and  that  active  pursuit  of 
Johnston's  army  was  the  right  policy  at  this  junc- 
ture. He  also  saw  that  the  hold  of  the  enemy  on 
the  Mississippi  River  had  now  become  extremely 

1  7  W.  R.,  630  ;  see  also  Lincoln  to  Halleck,  ii>.,  624. 
5  /<$.,  625. 
1  Ib.,  627. 

*  It.,  616.    Clarksville  is  on  the  Cumberland,  about  half-way  to  Nash- 
ville. *  Ib. ,  625. 


48  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

precarious,  and  that,  in  all  probability,  Columbus 
would  very  soon  be  abandoned.1 

Halleck,  on  the  contrary,  entirely  misconceived 
the  military  situation.  He  was  absolutely  blind  to 
the  ruinous  consequences  which  the  disaster  of  Don- 
elson  entailed  on  the  Confederates.  He  thought 
that  Beauregard,  who  had  taken  charge  of  the  Con- 
federate operations  on  the  Mississippi,  instead  of 
contemplating  the  speedy  evacuation  of  Columbus, 
had  designs  on  Cairo  and  Paducah,  and  perhaps  on 
Fort  Henry.2  Hence,  instead  of  moving  on  Nash- 
ville, as  he  had  been  directed  to  do,  he  retained 
Grant  at  Donelson,  and  ordered  all  the  gunboats 
but  one  back  to  Cairo.3  Foote,  indeed,  on  the  19th, 
captured  Clarksville  without  resistance,4  and  Grant 
sent  Smith's  division  there  a  day  or  two  afterwards,5 
but  this  was  all.  Both  these  officers  desired  to  push 
on  to  Nashville,6  but  Halleck  would  not  take  the  re- 
sponsibility. He  wanted  Buell  to  march  on  Clarks- 
ville, and  to  move  thence  on  Nashville.7  He  wrote 
indeed  to  Scott,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  that 
if  he  would  "  divide  the  responsibility  "  with  him— 
a  most  singular  proposition  for  a  general  to  make, 
—he  would  "go  ahead."8  This  was  on  February 
21st.  On  the  23d,  however,  he  went  so  far  as  to 
order  Foote  to  send  all  his  available  gunboats  to 
Clarksville,  and  Grant  to  concentrate  20,000  men  at 
the  same  place,  and  all  other  troops  (except  garri- 
sons to  be  left  for  the  two  forts)  in  the  immediate 

'7W.  R.,  640.  5  Ib.,  423. 

*  Ib.,  627-629,  632,  633,  635-637.  '  70.,  648. 

*/*.,  633.  '7^,642. 

4  Il>.,  422.  87£.,648. 


1 86 2]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  49 

neighborhood,  "prepared  for  a  movement  up  the 
Cumberland,"  and  for  "  a  great  and  decisive  con- 
test."1 But  the  next  day,  when  Halleck  learned 
that  Nashville  had  been  abandoned  by  the  enemy, 
he  at  once  countermanded  his  orders  to  Foote  and 
Grant,  directed  that  transports  should  be  collected 
at  Paducah,  and  that  all  his  troops  should  be  with- 
drawn from  the  Cumberland  and  "  made  ready  for 
the  field,"  *  that  is,  for  operations  on  the  Tennessee.3 
It  is  not  an  easy  task  to  follow  the  movements  of 
General  Halleck's  mind  during  the  ten  days  which 
succeeded  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson.  It  would  seem 
that  he  was  so  apprehensive  of  an  attack  by  Beaure- 
gard  from  Columbus  upon  Cairo  and  Paducah  that 
he  did  not  dare  to  risk  a  collision  with  Johnston  at 
Nashville  by  sending  Grant  at  once  to  that  city. 
He  was,  instead,  actually  afraid  of  an  attack  upon 
Grant  after  the  fall  of  Donelson  by  a  force  coming 
from  Nashville,4  although  he  kept  him  at  Dover  and 
Clarksville  till  Buell  had  occupied  Nashville.  How 
far  these  fears  of  his,  as  expressed  in  his  letters,  were 
genuine,  and  how  far  they  were  only  put  forward  as 
excuses  for  his  inaction,  it  is  hard  to  say.  One  thing 
is  certain,  that  he  did  not  do  what  McClellan  ex- 
pected and  told  him  to  do,  and  that  was,  to  proceed 
to  occupy  Nashville  without  delay  after  the  fall  of 
Fort  Donelson.  Had  he  done  so  he  would  certainly 
have  had  every  chance  of  winning,  with  the  force 
under  Grant,  another  considerable  success,  for  John- 
ston's army  was  largely  inferior  to  that  of  Grant, 

1  7  W.  R.,  655.  3/<*.,  671,  672,  674. 

8  Ib.,  661,667.  4  74.,  627. 

VOL.  II. — 4 


50  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

both  in  numbers  and  moral.  Why  he  refrained  from 
ordering  Grant  forward,  it  is  hard  to  say,  but  it  is 
not  impossible  that  Halleck  was  unwilling  to  take 
any  course  which  might  have  the  result  of  merging 
(even  for  a  time)  any  considerable  portion  of  his 
own  army  in  that  of  Buell,  and  thus  of  giving  to 
that  officer  such  a  large  command  that  the  Govern- 
ment would  naturally  look  to  him  to  take  the  next 
important  step  in  the  campaign. 

What  General  Halleck  had  always  wanted,  it 
must  be  remembered,  was  that  Buell's  army  should 
be  sent  to  him.  During  the  progress  of  the  events 
which  we  have  narrated,  he  was  continually  besieg- 
ing the  General-in-chief  and  the  War  Department 
with  his  applications  to  be  given  the  chief  command 
in  the  West.  "  Give  it  to  me,"  he  wrote  on  Febru- 
ary 19th,1  "and  I  will  split  secession  in  twain  in 
one  month."  "  I  must,"  said  he  on  the  20th,  "  have 
command  of  the  armies  in  the  West." 2  The  next 
day  he  is  even  more  emphatic.  "  One  whole  week," 
he  writes  to  the  Secretary  of  War,3  "  has  been  lost 
already  by  hesitation  and  delay.  There  was,  and 
I  think  there  still  is,  a  golden  opportunity  to  strike 
a  fatal  blow,  but  I  can't  do  it  unless  I  can  control 
Buell's  army.  There  is  not  a  moment  to  be  lost. 
Give  me  authority,  and  I  will  be  responsible  for 
results."  But  to  this  request  the  Government  would 
not  accede,4  and  Halleck  had  to  submit  to  its  de- 
cision.5 One  cannot  help  being  struck  by  the  con- 

'7W.  R.,636;  ef.  595. 

'/£.,  641. 

J  /£.,  655.     The  true  date  of  this  despatch  is  February  21. 

4  Ib.,  652.  '/£.,  660. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  51 

trast  between  the  confident  tone  of  these  demands, 
and  the  strain  of  apprehension  and  uncertainty  which 
runs  through  his  ordinary  correspondence  with  Stan- 
ton  and  McClellan.  If  he  had  any  well-matured 
and  specific  project  for  crushing  the  Confederate 
power  in  the  West,  he  certainly  failed  in  convey- 
ing the  impression  that  such  was  the  fact. 

General  Buell's  advance  on  Nashville  was  made 
with  the  greatest  energy  and  boldness.  He  did  not 
wait  to  concentrate  his  army,  but  pushed  forward 
with  Mitchel's  division  alone.  When  he  reached 
the  Cumberland,  opposite  Nashville,  on  the  evening 
of  February  24th,  he  found  that  Nelson,  who  had 
come  up  the  river  from  Donelson,  where  he  was  no 
longer  needed,  had  occupied  the  place.  Mitchel's 
division  was  at  once  sent  across,  and  positions  were 
taken  on  the  outskirts  of  the  city.1  Buell  had  with 
him  18,000  men  and  36  guns,2  but  as  his  other  divi- 
sions were  some  days  in  the  rear,  and  the  strength 
of  the  enemy  under  Johnston,  who  had  fallen  back 
to  Murfreesborough,  was  estimated  at  30,000  men,3 
he  sent  for  C.  F.  Smith,  who  was  at  Clarksville,  to 
come  forward  to  Nashville.4  When  McCook  and 
Wood  of  Buell's  army  arrived  on  March  1st,  Smith's 
division  was  returned  to  Halleck's  command.5  The 
three  divisions  of  Mitchel,  McCook,  and  Wood  had 
been  pushed  forward  without  transportation  and 
baggage,6  and  some  days  were  required  to  equip 
them  for  further  operations.7  Thomas's  division 

'7W.  R.,425.  4Ib.,  944. 

s/£.,945.  6/^.,675. 

»/£.,  425.  *  n  W.  R.,  10,  it. 

1  Scott  to  Stanton,  7  W.  R.,  680. 


52  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

came  by  water  somewhat  later.  On  the  10th  of 
March,  Buell  wrote  to  Halleck  that  he  would  be 
able  to  advance  in  a  few  days,  as  soon  as  his  trans- 
portation was  ready.1 

General  Grant  had  at  this  time  under  his  com- 
mand at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  and  at  Clarks- 
ville,  including  the  troops  embarked  for  operations 
on  the  Tennessee,  nearly  40,000  men,  with  54  guns.2 

The  army  under  General  Buell  consisted  at  this 
time  of  about  50,000  men,  with  a  proper  comple- 
ment of  artillery,  exclusive  of  the  detachments  in 
the  eastern  districts  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.3 

It  was  a  great  misfortune  for  the  Union  cause 
that  these  forces,  or  a  part  of  them,  could  not  have 
been  sent  at  once  in  pursuit  of  Johnston's  army, 
which  numbered  less  than  20,000  men,4  and  had 
presumably  become  much  discouraged  by  the  reverses 
it  had  suffered.  It  is  impossible  to  overrate  the 
effect  which  the  destruction  of  this  army  would 
have  had  on  the  Confederate  cause  in  the  West.5 
But  the  condition  of  the  roads  and  streams  con- 
vinced both  the  Federal  generals  that  it  was  imprac- 
ticable to  undertake  the  task  of  following  up  the 
army  of  Johnston.  "  A  pursuit,"  says  General  Buell, 
"  with  the  hope  of  overtaking  it  [Johnston's  army] 
on  its  line  of  march,  would  have  been  futile,  .  .  . 
even  if  the  force  had  been  up  \_sic\  to  commence  it  at 
once,  for  every  stream  was  flooded,  and  every  bridge 
was  destroyed  as  the  enemy  retired.  The  only 

'n  W.  R.,  27.  »/£.,  37;  cf.  148. 

*/3.,  21.  «7W.  R.,427. 

*  See  letter  from  Scott,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  to  McClellan,  Feb- 
ruary 23,  1862  :  7  W.  R.,  656. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  53 

alternative  was  to  operate  deliberately  against  some 
line  or  point  which  it  was  his  object  to  defend,  and 
the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  presented  such 
an  object.  It  was  the  same  for  the  forces  that  were 
operating  up  the  Tennessee  River  under  the  orders 
of  Major-General  Halleck,  more  especially  against 
the  enemy's  forces,  that,  by  the  recent  operations, 
had  been  compelled  to  evacuate  the  principal  part 
of  West  Tennessee."  1  This  last  remark  refers  to 
those  Confederate  troops  which  had  been  rendered 
available  for  field  service  by  the  abandonment  of 
Columbus  on  the  2d  of  March,  a  step  which  was 
decided  on  as  soon  as  Fort  Donelson  had  fallen,  and 
which  was  successfully  carried  out  by  General  Polk 
by  order  of  General  Beauregard,  who  now  com- 
manded (under  General  Johnston)  the  Confederate 
forces  on  the  Mississippi. 

The  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  ran  al- 
most due  east  from  Memphis  to  Chattanooga,  through 
the  towns  of  Corinth,  luka,  Tuscumbia,  Decatur, 
Stevenson,  and  Bridgeport.  At  Corinth  it  was  in- 
tersected by  a  railroad  which  ran  northwest  from 
the  interior  of  the  State  of  Mississippi,  through 
Jackson  and  Humboldt  in  Tennessee,  to  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Island  No.  10  and  New  Madrid,  where 
the  Confederates  had  strong  works,  by  which 
they  trusted  to  close  the  Mississippi  River  to  the 
Federal  fleet.  At  this  time  these  works  were  under 
siege  by  a  Federal  force  under  General  Pope.  It 
was,  therefore,  certain  that  the  Confederates  would 
make  special  efforts  to  defend  Corinth ;  not  only 

>22  W.   R.,   28. 


54  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

because  it  was  a  point  on  the  direct  route  to  Mem- 
phis, but  also  because  the  railroad  which  supplied 
their  posts  and  troops  on  the  east  side  of  the  Missis- 
sippi ran  through  the  town.  Moreover,  it  was  soon 
known  that  Johnston  had  retired  south  from  Mur- 
freesborough  across  the  Tennessee  River,  and  it  was 
naturally  supposed  that  he  intended  to  unite  his 
forces  with  those  of  Beauregard,  by  sending  them 
west  along  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad ; 
and  the  occupation  of  Corinth  in  force  by  the  Fed- 
erals would  it  was  believed,  hinder  or  prevent  this 
junction. 

It  is  interesting  to  see  how  differently  the  two 
Union  commanders  viewed  the  military  situation. 

Buell,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  Tennessee  River, 
controlled,  as  it  was,  by  the  Federal  gunboats,  con- 
stituted from  its  mouth  to  Florence  in  Alabama  an 
almost  perfect  line  of  defence  to  the  Union  armies 
operating  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  against  any 
attack  from  the  west,  was  of  opinion  that  the  whole 
available  force  under  his  own  command  and  that  of 
General  Halleck,  should  be  assembled  at  some  point 
on  its  easterly  side,  "  as  high  up  as  possible,"  l  that 
a  crossing  of  the  combined  armies  should  be  made 
there,  and  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad 
seized.  Florence  was  the  place  which  he  preferred 
as  the  point  of  crossing.2  He  thought  it  certain  that 
in  that  case  the  enemy's  principal  force  would  be 
encountered,  and  that  Island  No.  10  and  New  Mad- 
rid would  be  abandoned  at  once. 

Halleck,    on  the  other  hand,   about   the    1st   of 

1  ii  w.  R.,  27.  *  76.,  10, 23, 38,  39. 


1 86  2]         FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  55 

March,  organized  an  expedition  of  about  35,000 
men i  which  should  go  up  the  Tennessee,  and,  land- 
ing on  its  west  side,  should  break  up  the  railroads, 
burn  the  bridges,  and  generally  interfere  with  the 
communications  of  the  Confederate  armies.  His  or- 
ders to  Grant,2  to  whom  he  at  first  entrusted  the 
command  of  this  column,  were  in  very  general  terms, 
but  they  enjoined  on  that  officer  that  he  should 
"  avoid  any  general  engagement  with  strong  forces," 
and  that,  after  having  accomplished  the  objects  of 
the  expedition,  or  such  of  them  as  might  be  practi- 
cable, he  should  return  by  water  to  Danville,  a  place 
some  twenty  miles  above  Fort  Henry,  and  then 
move  out  to  Paris,  a  town  in  Tennessee,  about  thirty 
miles  west  of  the  Tennessee  River.  It  is  evident  that, 
at  that  time,  Halleck  thought  that  the  situation  de- 
manded nothing  more  important  from  him  than  a 
raid  on  the  enemy' s  communications  west  of  the 
Tennessee  River,  and  that  he  intended  that  the  ex- 
peditionary force  should  finally  remain  on  that  side 
of  the  river. 

Owing  to  a  temporary  misunderstanding  between 
Halleck  and  Grant,  the  command  of  the  expedition 
was  entrusted  at  first  to  C.  F.  Smith.  But  that  ex- 
cellent officer  met  with  a  serious  accident  early  in 
March,  from  the  effects  of  which  he  never  recov- 
ered ;  and  Grant  resumed  command  of  the  forces  on 
March  17th.3  Smith,  however,  had,  before  he  left  the 
field,4  selected  a  place  for  a  camp  on  the  west  side  of 
the  river,  and  had  stationed  some  troops  there.  The 

1  n  w.  R.,  20, 21.  3  ii  w.  R.,  42. 

8  7  W.  R.,  674.  4  /£.,  25.45. 


56  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

place  was  known  as  Pittsburg  Landing.1  It  was 
situated  about  twenty  miles  north  of  Corinth,  and 
about  nine  miles  above  Savannah,  a  small  town  on  the 
other  (east)  bank  of  the  river.  Savannah  is  some 
ninety  miles  above  Fort  Henry.  The  selection  was 
well  made,  as  the  position  was  naturally  a  strong 
one,  protected  on  its  flanks  by  the  river  and  by  deep 
creeks,  and  capable  of  being  made  well-nigh  impreg- 
nable to  assault.2  But  there  was  no  possibility  of  re- 
treat from  it.  The  Tennessee  was  at  this  time  very 
high,  ovei-flowing  its  banks.  No  bridge  could  be 
thrown  across  it.3  In  the  rear  of  the  position  were 
deep  and  muddy  creeks  which  were  practically  impas- 
sable. For  the  purposes  of  a  temporary  occupation 
the  place  would  answer  well  enough ;  but  unless  it 
should  be  strengthened  by  intrenchments  it  was 
the  height  of  rashness  to  make  of  it  a  permanent 
camp.  That  it  was  necessary  to  fix  temporarily 
upon  some  such  point  on  the  west  side  of  the  Ten- 
nessee in  order  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  the  ex- 
pedition may  very  likely  be  true,  but  that  it  was 
necessary  or  expedient  to  remain  there,  as  General 
Grant  did,  after  it  had  been  ascertained  that  the 
purposes  of  the  expedition  could  not  be  accom- 
plished, may  well  be  doubted.  And  it  was  soon 
found  that  the  objects  prescribed  to  Grant  in  Hal- 
leek's  order  could  not  be  attained.  The  columns 
sent  out  under  Wallace  and  Sherman  found  the 
roads  impracticable  and  the  enemy  in  considerable 


1  See  Map  II.,  facing  page  90. 

*  Johnston,  531  ;  Force,  101  ;  10  W.  R.,  27. 

»  ii  W.  R.,  45. 


1 862]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  57 

force,  and  were  obliged  to  return  to  Pittsburg  Land- 
ing without  having  accomplished  anything.1  Yet 
Grant,  without  objection  from  Halleck,  retained  the 
troops  at  the  Landing.  By  the  first  of  April  his 
force  there  had  increased  to  about  45,000  men.2  He, 
nevertheless,  established  his  own  headquarters  at 
Savannah,  which  place  was,  as  has  just  been  stated, 
some  nine  miles  north  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  on 
the  east  side  of  the  river.  He  gave  to  General 
Sherman  the  command  of  all  the  troops  at  the  Land- 
ing, except  those  belonging  to  the  division  of  McCler- 
nand.3  The  whole  arrangement  was  manifestly  faulty, 
and  indicated  great  recklessness  on  the  part  of  Gen- 
eral Grant,  who  was  perfectly  aware  that  the  enemy 
in  very  considerable  force — estimated  at  from  50,000 
to  80,000  men — were  at  no  great  distance.4  No  works 
of  any  kind  were  thrown  up,  although  Halleck  had 
ordered  him  to  fortify  his  position,5  nor  was  any  line 
of  defence,  or  of  battle,  determined  on.6  The  vari- 
ous camps  were  established  with  reference  to  the 
convenience  of  the  different  commanders,  and  with- 
out any  pretence  to  system.  There  were  no  cavalry 
pickets  posted  between  the  camp  and  Corinth.  All 
the  well-known  maxims  of  war,  applicable  to  such  a 

1  10  W.  R.,  8-29,  83-86. 

9  Ib.,  112.     That  is,  this  was  the  nominal  force. 

3  ii  W.  R.,  43. 

4  10  W.  R.,  8  ;  ii  W.  R.,  47,  49,  55,  62,  93,  94. 
*  ii  W.  R.,  51. 

6  Grant  says  that  his  engineer-officer,  McPherson,  "was  directed  to  lay 
out  a  line  to  intrench,  but  reported  that  it  would  have  to  be  made  in  rear  of 
the  line  of  encampment." — i  Grant,  332.  But  such  a  line  would  have  been 
invaluable  on  the  day  of  battle.  On  the  reasons  afterwards  given  by  Grant 
and  Sherman  for  their  neglect  to  fortify  the  position,  see  Note  i,  at  the  end 
of  this  chapter. 


58  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

position,  were  absolutely  unheeded  by  General 
Grant.  Probably  there  never  was  an  army  en- 
camped in  an  enemy's  country  with  so  little  regard 
to  the  manifest  risks  which  are  inseparable  from 
such  a  situation. 

Meanwhile  General  Halleck  had  at  last  been 
appointed  to  the  sole  command  of  the  United  States 
forces  in  the  West.1  When  McClellan  began  active 
operations  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  he  was, 
as  we  have  seen,2  relieved  of  the  command  of  all  the 
armies  of  the  North,  and  restricted  to  the  control  of 
his  own  army.  General  Halleck's  Department  ex- 
tended from  Knoxville  in  East  Tennessee  to  and  be- 
yond the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and 
General  Buell  was  placed  under  him.  This  was  a 
natural  appointment  for  the  Government  to  make, 
inasmuch  as  the  recent  successes  had  mostly  been 
obtained  by  troops  in  Halleck's  command,  or  had 
followed  naturally  from  those  successes.  Yet  it  was 
a  very  unfit  appointment,  for  Halleck,  though  he 
had  been  educated  at  West  Point,  and  had  even 
written  a  book  on  the  art  of  war,  had  had  no  expe- 
rience in  the  field,  having  passed  most  of  his  life  out 
of  the  army,  and,  what  was  of  more  importance,  he 
had  little  natural  aptitude  for  military  affairs.  He 
was,  moreover,  careless,  indolent,  and  inexact  to  a 
degree  hardly  to  be  credited. 

Halleck's  conduct  of  the  vitally  important  inter- 
ests at  this  time  under  his  sole  control,  exhibit  his 
defects  in  the  most  striking  manner.  It  was  by  his 
permission  that  Grant,  with  upwards  of  40,000  men, 

1  it  W.  R.,  28  ;  March  n,  1862.  *  Ante,  Part  I.,  255. 


1 86  2]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  59 

was  encamped  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  in  a  position 
from  which  there  was,  in  case  of  disaster,  no  possi- 
bility of  retreat.  It  was  due  to  his  negligence  that 
this  position  was  not  intrenched,  for  only  once  did 
he  allude  in  his  letters  to  Grant  to  the  necessity  of 
taking  this  obvious  precaution.  The  truth  was,  he 
never  appreciated  the  gravity  of  the  situation.  He 
indeed  ordered  Buell  to  direct  his  march  on  Savan- 
nah,1 but  he  never  considered,  still  less  did  he  ever 
intimate  to  Buell,  that  the  army  under  Grant  at 
Pittsburg  Landing  was  in  peril  until  the  troops  com- 
ing from  Nashville  should  have  joined  it.  He 
counted  with  easy  assurance  on  the  enemy's  remain- 
ing on  the  defensive  until  he  should  get  his  two 
armies  united,  and  should  be  ready  to  advance  on 
Corinth.2  To  the  danger  to  which  the  army  under 
Grant  was  exposed,  of  being  overwhelmed  by  the 
entire  force  of  the  enemy  before  the  army  under 
Buell  could  possibly  arrive  to  its  assistance,  Halleck 
was  absolutely  blind. 

In  reality,  that  danger  was  imminent.  The  Con- 
federates had  rallied  from  the  shock  of  the  capture 
of  Fort  Donelson  and  the  abandonment  of  middle 
Tennessee  with  wonderful  courage  and  vigor.  John- 
ston himself  saw  clearly  that  nothing  but  a  suc- 
cessful battle3  could  restore  the  prestige  of  the 
Confederacy  and  recover  the  territory  which  had 
been  lost,  and  he  believed  that  a  successful  battle 
could  be  fought.  He  determined  without  hesitation  ' 
on  an  aggressive  policy.  In  President  Davis  he  had 

1  II  W.  R.,  42,  44,  77.  *  76.,  77.  3  Johnston,  514,  515. 

*  Johnston  to  Davis,  February  25,  1862  ;  7  W.  R.,  426,  427. 


60  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

a  strong  and  steady  supporter.1  In  General  Beaure- 
gard  he  found  an  able  and  zealous  coadjutor.  The 
course  to  be  pursued  at  first,  at  any  rate,  was  plain. 
It  was  to  unite  the  remains  of  the  army  of  Johnston 
to  the  troops  on  and  near  the  Mississippi,  at  that 
time  under  the  immediate  command  of  Beauregard, 
and  to  add  to  these  troops  such  reinforcements  as 
could  be  procured  from  other  parts  of  the  Confeder- 
acy. It  was  to  be  expected  on  general  principles 
that  the  Federal  generals  would  cross  the  Tennessee 
somewhere  with  the  object  of  seizing  some  import- 
ant point  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad, 
and  it  was  hoped  that  in  this  way  an  opportunity 
would  be  presented  for  a  sudden  and  fierce  attack 
upon  the  Union  forces  by  an  army  of  considerable 
magnitude,  led  by  able  and  determined  men,  and 
animated  by  a  resolute  and  daring  spirit.  This  op- 
portunity had  now  offered  itself.  There  was  the 
army  of  Grant  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  there  was 
the  army  of  Buell  marching  to  join  it.  It  was  plain 
that  the  thing  to  do  was  to  strike  Grant  before 
Buell  could  arrive.  This  seemed,  and  really  was,  a 
perfectly  feasible  thing  to  do.  The  wonder  is,  that  it 
never  should  have  occurred  either  to  Halleck  or 
Grant  that  the  Confederate  generals,  to  whom  the 
facts  were  perfectly  known,  would  be  sure  to  make 
the  attempt. 

The  army  of  Johnston,  or,  rather,  what  remained 
of  it  after  the  surrender  of  Donelson,  retired,  as  we 
have  seen,  from  Nashville  to  Murfreesborough.2 
Thence  it  marched  south  over  terribly  bad  roads 

1  Davis  to  Johnston,  n  W.  R.,  365  ;  Johnston,  512.        *  Ante,  51. 


1862]         FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  61 

and  across  swollen  streams  until  Decatur  in  Alabama 
was  reached.  Here,  about  the  middle  of  March, 
the  Tennessee  River  was  crossed.  From  Decatur  the 
march  was  resumed  in  a  westerly  direction,  and  the 
head  of  the  column  reached  Corinth  in  Mississippi 
about  the  18th.1  Johnston  carried  with  him  20,000 
men.2  About  the  same  time  a  force  of  some  10,000 
men,  under  command  of  General  Bragg,  arrived  at 
Corinth  from  Pensacola  and  New  Orleans.3  To  the 
same  point  also,  Beauregard  directed  the  troops  un- 
der Polk,  which,  after  the  evacuation  of  Columbus, 
had  been  stationed  at  Humboldt  and  Jackson.  Some 
days  were  necessarily  consumed  in  organizing  these 
troops,  a  large  part  of  whom  were  in  a  poor  state  of 
discipline.4  On  the  29th  of  March  Johnston  form- 
ally assumed  command  of  these  forces,  to  which 
he  gave  the  name  of  "  The  Army  of  the  Missis- 
sippi."5 He  appointed  Bragg,  whose  reputation  as 
an  organizer  and  disciplinarian  stood  very  high,  his 
chief-of-staff,  and  he  announced  that  Beauregard  was 
second  in  command.6  He  divided  his  army  into 
three  corps,  placing  them  under  Polk,  Bragg,  and 
Hardee  respectively.  There  was,  besides,  a  reserve 
division  of  infantry,  placed  at  first  under  Crittenden, 
but  afterwards  under  Breckinridge,  who  had  been, 
in  Buchanan's  time,  Vice-President  of  the  United 
States.  The  whole  force  numbered  (exclusive  of 
the  sick  and  of  men  on  extra  duty  and  in  arrest) 
nearly  40,000  men,  of  whom  35,000  were  infantry, 

1  7  W.  R.,  259.  '  ii  W.  R.,  339. 

*/£.,  261.  4/*.,  340;  Johnston,  548.  6n  W.  R.,  370. 

'  Johnston  actually  offered  Beauregard  the  chief  command,  but  Beaure- 
gard declined  to  accept  it.     Johnston,  549,  550  ;  I  Beauregard,  266. 


62  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR,       [1862 

and  the  rest  cavalry  and  artillery.1  There  were 
about  100  guns.  This  comprised  all  the  troops 
that  could  be  concentrated  for  battle  in  the  Depart- 
ment after  providing  for  the  holding  of  East  Ten- 
nessee, and  for  the  protection  of  the  communications. 
The  spirit  of  the  army  was,  on  the  whole,  good, — 
at  any  rate  for  an  aggressive  movement.  Recent 
events,  of  course,  must  have  had  a  depressing  effect 
on  the  soldiers  of  Johnston  and  Polk,  but  they  were 
anxious  to  be  led  against  their  foes,  and  were  unmis- 
takably in  the  mood  for  battle.  They  all  took  in 
the  situation  perfectly ;  they  saw  clearly  the  rare 
opportunity  before  them  of  achieving  a  capital  suc- 
cess in  striking  Grant  before  Buell  could  join  him. 
The  Confederate  army  was  well  led.  Johnston  was 
generally  admitted  to  be  one  of  the  finest  officers  in 
the  service.  The  corps-commanders  were  graduates 
of  West  Point,  and  were  men  of  capacity.  Bragg 
subsequently  commanded  this  army,  and  although 
he  was  not  a  successful  strategist,  he  was  in  many 
respects  a  good  general.  Breckinridge  was  a  civilian, 
but  he  was  known  as  a  gallant  and  efficient  officer. 

The  important  thing  was  to  move  at  once, — be- 
fore any  of  Buell's  troops  should  be  able  to  reach 
Pittsburg  Landing, — but  the  inexperience  of  both 
officers  and  men  was  so  great,  and  the  different  bod- 
ies composing  the  army  had  so  recently  been  brought 
together,  that  the  prompt  action  which  had  been 
hoped  for  was  not  obtained.2  It  was  not  until  April 
3d  that  the  orders  were  issued  for  the  advance  from 
Corinth  to  Pittsburg  Landing.8  Johnston's  original 

1  10  W.  R.,  398.  *  i  Beauregard,  326.  *  10  W.  R.,  392. 


1 86  2]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  63 

plan  was  that  Folk's  corps  should  constitute  the  left 
wing,  Hardee's  the  centre,  and  Bragg's  the  right 
wing  of  the  army,  with  Breckin ridge's  division  in 
reserve.1  But  he  finally  concluded  to  leave  the 
matter  of  the  disposition  of  the  troops  to  Beaure- 
gard,  and  that  officer  directed  that,  in  making  the 
attack,  the  three  corps  should  advance  in  line,  one 
behind  the  other.  Hardee's  corps,  with  a  brigade 
from  Bragg's,  was  to  constitute  the  first  line,  the  re- 
mainder of  Bragg's  corps  the  second  line,  and  Folk's 
corps,  with  Breckinridge's  division,  the  third.2  This 
unusual  tactical  arrangement  was  found  to  be  incon- 
venient for  many  reasons;  the  corps-commanders, 
for  instance,  could  not  possibly  oversee  the  move- 
ments of  their  troops  as  well  as  if  the  front  of  each 
command  were  less  extended,  and  the  chance  of  the 
different  organizations  getting  mixed  up  was  obvi- 
ously greatly  increased.3  In  fact,  about  the  middle 
of  the  day  of  the  battle,  it  was  arranged  between 
the  three  corps-commanders  that  Hardee  should 
take  charge  of  the  left,  Polk  of  the  centre,  and 
Bragg  of  the  right.4 

Although  the  distance  to  be  traversed  was  only 
twenty  miles,  and  the  marching  orders  were,  as  we 
have  seen,  issued  on  April  3d,  such  was  the  wretched 
condition  of  the  roads,  and  so  rainy  was  the  weather, 
that  the  army  did  not  get  into  its  designated  posi- 
tion for  the  attack  until  Saturday  afternoon,  April 
5th.  During  the  advance  the  pickets  had  some  tri- 

1  Johnston  to  Davis,  n  W.  R.,  387. 

8  10  W.  R.,  386. 

8  Force,  160  ;  but  see  i  Beauregard,  328. 

4  Folk's  Report,  10  W.  R.,  408  ;    i  Beauregard,  293. 


64  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

fling  encounters  with  the  Federal  outposts,1  and 
Beauregard  could  not  but  believe  that  the  Federal 
generals  must  be  aware  of  the  proximity  of  the  Con- 
federate army,  and  that  they  had  constructed  at 
least  some  defensive  works.  This  consideration,  and 
the  more  important  one,  that,  as  the  attack  could 
not  be  made  on  the  5th,  as  originally  intended,  there 
was  a  strong  probability  that  the  Confederates 
would  encounter  Buell's  troops  as  well  as  Grant's, 
induced  Beauregard  to  advise  that  the  plan  be  given 
up  and  the  army  brought  back  to  Corinth.  But  to 
this  Johnston  would  not  listen ;  he  had  come,  and 
so  had  the  army,  for  a  pitched  battle,  and  to  go  back 
without  fighting  would  demoralize  his  undisciplined 
troops.  Accordingly  the  orders  were  given  to  at- 
tack the  enemy  at  daybreak  of  Sunday,  the  6th.2 

The  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  for  this  had  now 
become  the  proper  designation  of  the  force  under 
General  Grant,  consisted  of  six  divisions  of  infantry, 
those  of  McClernand,  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  Lewis 
Wallace,  Hurlbut,  W.  T.  Sherman,  and  Prentiss,3 
and  numbered  on  paper  nearly  45,000  men.4  Of 
these,  about  3000  were  cavalry.  There  were  more 
than  100  guns, — over  twenty  batteries.5  All  the 
division  generals  were  men  of  unquestioned  bravery, 
and  perfectly  equal  to  their  tasks.  Sherman  subse- 
quently rose  to  the  command  of  this  army. 

1  10  W.  R.,  89-93  ;  ii  W.  R.,  87,  90. 
J  Johnston,  567-569  ;  i  Beauregard,  277-279. 
*io  W.  R.,  100-105. 

4  73.,  112.     The  effective  force  was  no  doubt  much  less.     Grant  places  it 
at  38,000  ;  i  Grant,  366.     Force  (180)  puts  it  at  about  40,000. 
4  Force,  113-116. 


i862]         FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  65 

That  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  which,  under 
General  Buell,  was  marching  across  the  country 
lying  between  Nashville  on  the  Cumberland  and 
Savannah  on  the  Tennessee  to  form  a  junction 
with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  consisted  of  five 
divisions,  under  Thomas,  A.  D.  McCook,  Nelson, 
Crittenden,  and  Wood,  all  excellent  officers.  These 
divisions  numbered  about  37,000  men.1  They  carried 
with  them  a  full  complement  of  artillery,  and  a  small 
force  of  cavalry. 

The  march  from  Nashville  had  been  made  with- 
out other  interruption  than  that  occasioned  by  the 
enemy's  having  burned  the  bridge  over  Duck  River. 
This  caused  a  delay  of  some  twelve  days.  The  march 
had  been  made  steadily,  but  without  haste.  The 
troops  had  covered  about  fifteen  miles  a  day.2  No 
intimation  from  Halleck  of  the  desirability  of  uniting 
with  the  force  under  Grant  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  had  been  made  to  Buell,  for  the  excellent 
reason  that  Halleck  himself  was  not  concerned  about 
Grant's  situation,  and  did  not  imagine  him  to  be  in 
danger.  And,  in  fact,  it  was  not  until  his  advance 
had  arrived  at  Columbia  that  Buell  learned,3  and 
then  only  from  scouts  sent  him  by  Grant,  that 
Grant's  forces  were  on  the  west  side  of  the  Tennes- 
see ;  up  to  that  time  he  had  supposed  them  to  be  at 
Savannah,  where  Halleck  had  repeatedly  told  him 
that  Grant  was.4  But  the  information  that  Grant's 
forces  were  on  the  further  side  of  the  river  did  not 
arouse  any  anxiety  in  Buell's  mind,  for  he  was  told 

1 1  Van  Home,  99.  *  n  W.  R.,  47,  58. 

*  Buell  in  the  New  York  World  of  February  18,  1865.      «/£.,  42,  43. 

VOL.  II. — 5 


66  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

at  the  same  time1  that  Grant  was  in  a  very  strong 
position,  and  he  had  a  right  to  suppose  that,  if  the 
facts  were  otherwise,  he  would  be  duly  informed  of 
the  actual  state  of  things  by  Halleck.  Had  he 
known  Halleck  better,  he  certainly  would  not  have 
relied  so  confidingly  either  on  his  judgment  or  his 
carefulness.  But  Halleck  was  his  superior  officer ; 
it  was  Halleck's  business  to  know  whether  the  force 
under  Grant  was  safe  in  its  present  position,  or 
whether  it  would  not  be  safe  until  Buell  should  join 
it;  and  Halleck  having  never  intimated  that  he  had 
any  doubt  as  to  Grant's  safety,  Buell  pursued  his 
march  to  Savannah  with  primary  regard  to  the  com- 
fort and  efficiency  of  his  soldiers.  The  truth  is,  that 
the  object  of  Buell's  march,  as  it  was  understood 
both  by  him  and  by  Halleck,  was, — to  use  Buell's 
own  words,  which  are  very  just, — "  not  to  succor 
General  Grant's  army,  but  to  form  a  junction  with 
it  for  an  ulterior  offensive  campaign."  As  he  ap- 
proached Savannah,  it  occurred  to  him,  and  he  made 
the  suggestion  to  Halleck,  that  it  might  be  well  for 
him  to  halt,  and  to  concentrate  his  divisions  at 
Waynesborough,  a  town  some  thirty  miles  from 
Savannah.  From  Waynesborough  a  road  runs 
southwest  to  a  point  on  the  river  opposite  Ham- 
burg, a  town  on  the  west  side  of  the  Tennessee 
some  ten  miles  above  Pittsburg  Landing.  Buell 
thought  it  might  be  best,  perhaps,  that  his  force 
should  cross  there,2  and  Halleck  at  once  fell  in  with 

1  New  York  World,  February  18,  1865  ;  22  W.  R.,  29. 

*  Buell's  letter  to  Halleck  is  not  in  the  War  Records.  See  i  Van  Home, 
102.  Buell,  in  all  probability,  knew  nothing  of  the  estimate  which  Grant 
had  formed  of  the  strength  of  the  Confederates  at  Corinth. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SH1LOH.  67 

this  suggestion.1  Nothing  could  show  more  deci- 
sively than  this  how  far  Halleck  was  from  thinking 
that  Grant's  army  was  in  imminent  danger.  Luck- 
ily, however,  for  the  three  generals  concerned,  and 
for  the  cause  they  served,  Halleck's  reply  did  not 
reach  Buell  until  after  his  troops  had  passed  through 
Waynesborough  on  their  march  to  Savannah. 

The  leading  division,  Nelson's,  arrived  at  Savannah 
on  Saturday,  April  5th,  about  noon.2  Nelson  and 
one  of  his  brigadiers,  Ammen,  saw  General  Grant 
that  afternoon.  Ammen  suggested  that  the  division 
should  cross  the  river  at  once,  and  proceed  to  Pitts- 
burg  Landing.  But  Grant  declined  the  offer,  and 
promised  to  send  boats  for  them  "  Monday  or  Tues- 
day, or  some  time  early  in  the  week,"  remarking, 
"  There  will  be  no  fight  at  Pittsburg  Landing ;  we 
will  have  to  go  to  Corinth."  *  That  day  he  wrote  to 
Halleck,  announcing  the  arrival  of  Nelson's  division, 
and  added  :  "  I  have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an 
attack  (general  one)  being  made  upon  us,  but  will  be 
prepared  should  such  a  thing  take  place."  4  Yet 
the  very  same  day  he  estimated  "  the  number  of  the 
enemy  at  Corinth  and  within  supporting  distance  of 
it "  to  be  not  "  far  from  80,000  men."  5  His  own 
force,  as  we  have  seen,  was  not  much  more  than 
half  that  number.  One  would  suppose  that  he 

1  ii  W.  R.,  94. 
*  10  W.  R.,  330. 

3^.,  33L 

4  Ib. ,  89.  On  the  6th,  however,  Grant  wrote  to  Buell  that  he  had  been 
"looking  for"  an  attack,  but  did  not  believe  it  "  could  be  made  before 
Monday  or  Tuesday."  109  W.  R.,  232.  If  this  be  so,  his  lack  of  prep- 
aration on  Sunday  to  receive  an  attack  is  very  culpable. 

6  ii  W.  R.,  94. 


68  THE  STOR  Y  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 


would  have  welcomed  the  immediate  reinforcement 
of  Nelson's  division. 

Sherman,  on  whom  Grant  seems  to  have  relied  to 
attend  to  matters  at  the  Landing  when  he  himself 
was  in  Savannah,1  though  he  sent  out  reconnoitring 
parties  from  time  to  time,2  shared  to  the  full  the 
confidence  of  his  chief.  "I  do  not  apprehend," 
wrote  he  to  Grant 3  on  the  5th,  "  anything  like  an 
attack  on  our  position."  Sherman,  however,  sus- 
pected the  proximity  of  small  bodies  of  the  enemy.4 
General  Prentiss  also,  on  Saturday  evening,  sent  out 
a  force  of  ten  companies  to  reconnoitre,  and,  on  the 
strength  of  the  report  of  the  commanding  officer,  he 
despatched  at  three  o'clock  the  next  morning  an 
entire  brigade  to  find  out  exactly  what  was  the  force 
of  the  enemy.  These  troops  came  in  contact  with 
the  advance  of  the  Confederate  army  under  Hardee, 
and  about  six  o'clock  were  driven  back  with  loss.5 

For,  on  this  Sunday  morning,  April  6,  1862,  the 
army  of  Johnston  was  pressing  forward  in  line  of 
battle,  confident  of  victory.  About  seven  o'clock 
the  artillery  opened  fire.6  The  Union  troops,  sud- 
denly awakened  to  the  unexpected  and  unwelcome 
fact  that  they  were  attacked  in  great  force,  formed  at 
once  in  their  several  camps ;  but  there  being  no  pre- 
vious understanding  for  concerted  and  sustained 
action,  they  were  for  the  first  few  hours  practically 
at  the  mercy  of  their  antagonists.  Their  various 
encampments  had  been  selected  without  any  ref- 


1  I  Grant,  334 ;  n  W.  R.,  91,  93,  94.  *Ib.,  93. 

*/*.,  87.  5  10  W.  R.,  277,  278. 

3  Ib.,  93,  94.  «/£.   401. 


1862]         FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHJLOH.  69 

erence  to  an  emergency  like  this.  The  peculiar 
feature  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  consisted  in  the  fact 
that  the  Union  army  was  not  in  the  least  prepared  to 
receive  an  attack, — that  it  was  not  even  in  order  of 
battle.  The  resistance  therefore  which  it  offered  to 
the  advance  of  the  Confederate  army  was  necessarily 
of  a  fragmentary  and  disconnected  character, — each 
body  of  troops  making  the  best  defence  it  could, 
often  isolated  from  the  other  bodies  of  troops  in  its 
vicinity,  and  therefore  exposed  to  having  its  flanks 
turned  by  the  well-supported  lines  of  the  Confeder- 
ate army.1  Add  to  this,  that  for  some  two  or  three 
hours  after  the  battle  began  there  was  no  command- 
ing general  on  the  ground,  and  that  each  division- 
commander,  being  naturally  absorbed  in  getting  his 
own  troops  ready  to  resist  the  sudden  and  formid- 
able assault  of  the  enemy,  was  obliged  to  trust  to 
such  representations  as  he  could  make  on  the  spur 
of  the  moment  to  obtain  the  supports  and  con- 
nections needed  for  his  flanks  and  rear.  Besides  all 
this,  a  large  part  of  the  troops,  particularly  in  Sher- 
man's and  Prentiss's  divisions,  were  absolutely  with- 
out military  experience ;  they  had  in  fact  begun 
their  education  as  soldiers  while  in  their  camps  at 
Pittsburg  Landing.  At  the  same  time,  the  Union 
army  was  composed  of  excellent  material;  there 
were  a  great  many  gallant  officers  and  brave  men  in 
its  ranks ;  and  the  peculiar  features  of  the  battle- 
field, a  great  part  of  which  was  covered  with  woods, 
with  large  cleared  spaces  between,  and  which  was 
intersected  by  deep  ravines,  afforded  many  opportu- 

1  Force,  124. 


70  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

nities  of  which  an  army  standing  on  the  defensive 
could  avail  itself.  The  course  which  the  battle 
took  was  just  what  might  under  these  conditions 
have  been  expected. 

The  Union  army  was  encamped  between  the  Ten- 
nessee River,  on  which,  about  two  miles  south  of 
Pittsburg  Landing,  the  left  of  the  army  rested,  and 
Owl  Creek,  which,  at  the  furthest  point  occupied, 
was  about  three  miles  west  of  the  river,  and  which 
constituted  a  perfect  protection  for  the  right.  The 
army,  in  a  general  way,  faced  south,  or,  rather,  some- 
what to  the  west  of  south.  Three  brigades  of  Sher- 
man's division  were  on  the  right  of  the  position, — 
near  and  to  the  westward  of  Shiloh  Church,  from 
which  the  battle  takes  its  name.  Prentiss's  division 
was  in  the  centre,1  but  half  a  mile  distant  from  these 
three  brigades  of  Sherman's.  Separated  from 
Prentiss  by  three-fifths  of  a  mile,  and  resting  on  the 
river  was  another  brigade  (Stuart's)  of  Sherman's 
division.8  It  was  upon  these  troops,  separated  by 
these  gaps,8  that  the  first  shock  fell.  Behind  Sher- 
man's division  lay  McClernand's, — behind  Prentiss's 
was  Hurlbut's, — in  the  rear  of  these  was  the  division 
of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace.4 

The  first  formations  of  the  Union  army  under 
Sherman  and  Prentiss  quickly  crumbled  away  be- 
fore the  well-supported  charges  and  heavy  firing  of 
their  antagonists.  But  these  troops,  or  rather  a  con- 

'ioW.  R.,  278. 

*fl>.,  258. 

8  The  existence  of  these  gaps  was  more  or  less  masked  by  woods. 
4  The  division  of  Lewis  Wallace  was  at  Crump's  Landing,  a  few  miles  to 
the  rear. 


1 86  2]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  71 

siderable  part  of  them,  fell  back  to  new  positions, 
and  the  time  which  the  Confederates  necessarily  con- 
sumed in  taking  advantage  of  their  success,  enabled 
the  divisions  of  McClernand,  Hurlbut,  and  Wallace 
to  get  under  arms,  and  to  prepare  in  some  measure 
for  the  battle  that  was  upon  them. 

Sherman's  division,  severely  shaken  by  the  first 
volleys,  naturally  retired  on  that  of  McClernand ; 
Hurlbut  sent  a  brigade  (Veatch's)  to  their  assist- 
ance ;  and  these  troops,  constituting  the  right  of  the 
Federal  army,  fought  gallantly  and  stubbornly  dur- 
ing the  whole  day  without  any  co-operation  from,  or 
even  connection  with,  the  troops  constituting  the 
centre  of  the  army,  from  which  they  were  separated 
by  a  wide  gap.  The  result  of  such  a  conflict,  of 
course,  could  not  be  doubtful ;  the  left  of  the  line 
was  always  exposed  to  be  turned ;  the  failure  of 
some  of  Sherman's  raw  regiments  to  meet  the  as- 
saults of  the  enemy  frequently  exposed  McClernand's 
right l ;  and,  in  spite  of  every  effort  of  these  brave 
generals,  acting,  as  they  did,  in  entire  concert  with 
each  other,  their  troops,  though  sometimes,  and  even 
at  the  close  of  the  day,  repulsing  their  adversa- 
ries with  great  loss,2  were  finally  forced  to  fall  back 
to  a  position  in  which  they  covered  the  bridge  over 
Snake  Creek,  by  which  Lewis  Wallace's  division  was 
expected  to  come  up  from  Crump's  Landing.3  Mc- 
Clernand, in  his  report,  says  that  his  last  position 
was  the  eighth  which  he  had  occupied  since  the 
fight  began.4 

1  10  W.  R.,  117.  *  lb.,  250. 

*/£.,  118,  517,  521.  4/<$.,  119. 


72  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

Prentiss's  division,  composed  of  very  raw  troops, 
was  badly  broken  by  the  first  onset  of  the  enemy, 
and  fell  back  behind  the  two  remaining  brigades  of 
Hurlbut's  division,  but  afterwards,  being  rallied, 
it  formed  on  Hurlbut's  right,  though  not,  of  course,  in 
its  original  strength.1  To  this  force  W.  H.  L.  Wal- 
lace joined  his  own  command,  some  of  his  troops 
forming  on  Prentiss's  right.2  These  three  bodies 
constituted  the  centre  of  the  army,  and,  about  10 
A.M.,  took  up  an  exceedingly  strong  position,  which 
they  held  against  the  repeated  assaults  of  the  Con- 
federates for  five  or  six  hours.3  It  was  in  directing 
one  of  these  assaults  that  General  Johnston,  about 
half-past  two  o'clock,  received  a  mortal  wound.4 
The  Confederates  called  this  position  the  Hornets' 
Nest,5  and  made  the  mistake  of  repeatedly  assault- 
ing it  in  front,  only  to  be  as  often  beaten  back  with 
severe  loss.  Finally,  after  four  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon, Bragg,  who  commanded  on  the  Confederate 
right,  finding  further  direct  attacks  to  be  useless, 
pushed  his  troops  past  the  front  line  of  the  Federal 
position.6  This  was  the  more  easy,  inasmuch  as 
Stuart's  brigade,  on  the  extreme  Federal  left,  had 
already  fallen  back.7  Hurlbut,  finding  himself 
flanked,  reluctantly  gave  way,  and  retired  to  the 
Landing.8  This  exposed  Prentiss's  left,  and  obliged 
him  to  change  front.9  Soon  afterwards,  about  five 

1 10  W.  R.,  203,  204,  278. 

8  Ib.,  278.     Hurlbut  seems  not  to  have  known  that  Wallace's  troops  were 
on  Prentiss's  right.     Ib.,  204. 
3 Ib.,  149,  204. 

4 !/>.,  387,  405,  466,  569.     McClernand,  117,  is  in  error. 
&  Johnston,  622.  ^  Ib.,  204,  259. 

«  10  W.  R.,  466.  *  Ib.,  279,  204.  *Ib.,  279. 


1 862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SH1LOH.  73 

o'clock,1  the  Confederates  under  Polk  having,  in 
connection  with  the  left  wing  under  Hardee,  dis- 
posed of  Sherman  and  McClernand,  turned  to  their 
right  and  attacked  Wallace.2  The  divisions  of  Pren- 
tiss  and  Wallace  were  thus  attacked  in  front  and 
on  both  flanks.  Their  commanders,  both  deter- 
mined and  capable  men,  felt  the  importance  of  main- 
taining as  long  as  possible  their  advanced  position, 
fearing,  naturally,  the  effect  of  a  retreat  on  their 
raw  troops,  and  being  also  desirous  to  defer  to  the 
last  moment  the  inevitable  conflict  at  the  Landing. 
After  five  o'clock,  however,  it  was  plain  that  they 
were  being  surrounded,  and  in  the  endeavor  to  with- 
draw his  command  Wallace  was  killed.  All  but 
four  of  his  regiments  extricated  themselves,  but  the 
command  was  thoroughly  broken  up  and  disorgan- 
ized.3 Prentiss  was  forced  to  surrender  with  about 
2200  men  between  five  and  half -past  five  o'clock.4 
This  ended  the  resistance  of  the  Federal  centre. 

As  for  Stuart's  isolated  brigade  on  the  extreme 
Federal  left,  its  commander  maintained  his  position 
till  after  3  P.M.,5  and  succeeded  finally  in  bringing 
his  command  to  the  Landing,  though  constantly 

1  10  W.  R.,  409. 
J  Ib.,  409. 

3  i  Grant,  346. 

4  Prentiss  fixes  the  hour  at  5.30  P.M. — 10  W.  R.,  279  ;  but  Colonel  A.  R. 
Chisolm,  aide-de-camp  to  Beauregard,  in  a  letter  dated  Morristown,  N.  J., 
May  3,  1887,  says  he  brought  Prentiss  to  Beauregard's  headquarters  at  that 
hour,  which  would  show  that  the  surrender  had  occurred  shortly  before. 
Some  regiments,  however,   did   not  surrender  until  after  5.30  P.M.     See 
Colonel  Shaw  in  14  A.   T.,  69.     Polk  (10  W.  R.,  409)  fixes  the  hour  at 
shortly  after  5  P.M.     General  Wheeler  fixes  the  hour  "  approximately  "  at 
4  P.M.     24  S.  H.  S.,  130,  131. 

6 10  W.  R.,  204. 


74  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

flanked  by  his  antagonists,  and  losing  more  than 
half  of  his  men.1 

These  fights  were  all  of  the  same  general  charac- 
ter. A  body  of  Union  troops  would  take  up  a  posi- 
tion and  make  a  stout  defence  there  for  a  while,  but 
would  always,  sooner  or  later,  be  compelled,  by  the 
advance  of  the  Confederates  past  one  or  perhaps 
both  flanks,  to  retire  further  to  the  rear,  where  a 
similar  process  would  be  repeated.  Experiences 
like  these  were  invariably  attended  with  consider- 
able loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  and,  also,  with  a 
great  deal  of  straggling,  for  none  but  the  steadiest  and 
bravest  soldiers  could  stand  such  discouraging  en- 
counters without  losing  faith  in  their  leaders  and 
confidence  in  themselves.  Hence  there  were  many 
fugitives,  demoralized,  undisciplined  runaways,  not 
all,  by  any  means,  irreclaimable  cowards,  but  men 
who  had  lost,  not  unnaturally,  confidence  in  their 
generals  and  all  hope  of  a  successful  termination  of 
the  day.  These  men  crowded  to  the  rear,  and  were 
especially  to  be  seen  under  the  high  bluff  which 
lines  the  river  near  and  below  the  Landing.  Their 
numbers  have  been  estimated  all  the  way  from  5000 
to  15,000.2  Efforts  were  made  from  time  to  time  to 
rally  them,  but  they  would  not  budge  from  their 
shelter.  They  were  thoroughly  cowed  and  demoral- 
ized. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  the  troops  who  kept 
up  the  fight  were  the  choicest  in  the  army,  men 
whom  no  amount  of  adversity  could  daunt,  who  not 
only  obstinately  resisted  the  assaults  against  them, 

1  10  W.  R.,  258,  259.  9/^.,  292,  333  ;  i  Grant,  344. 


1 86  2]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  75 

but  also  carefully  watched  for  opportunities  (which 
were  often  presented)  for  dealing  return  blows.  The 
Confederates  had  to  pay  dearly  for  their  successes  ; 
but  they  recognized  fully  the  extreme  importance  of 
securing  their  victory,  and  hesitated  at  no  sacrifice  of 
life.  Elated  by  the  constant  advance  of  their  own 
forces,  and  determined  to  break  up  completely  the  re- 
sisting fragments  of  the  Federal  army,  the  Confeder- 
ate troops,  eager,  hopeful,  in  fact  confident  of  success, 
ably  and  gallantly  led  by  their  officers,  pushed  on 
relentlessly  over  the  bloody  field  of  Shiloh  from 
early  morning  till  the  late  afternoon. 

General  Grant,  at  his  breakfast  in  Savannah,  heard 
the  sound  of  heavy  firing  at  the  Landing.1  He  at 
once  ordered  Nelson  to  march  with  his  division  up 
the  river  on  the  east  side,  to  a  point  opposite  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  in  readiness  to  be  ferried  over.  He 
then  started  up  the  river  himself  in  his  own  steamer, 
stopping  at  Crump's  Landing  to  direct  Lewis  Wallace 
to  be  ready  to  march  to  Pittsburg  with  his  division 
on  receipt  of  orders.  Finding,  on  his  arrival  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  some  time  after  eight  o'clock,2  that 
the  battle  was  being  hotly  contested,  he  sent  a  staff- 
officer  to  Wallace  to  order  him  to  march  at  once  to 
the  front.  He  then  rode  to  the  battle-field,  saw  Sher- 
man at  about  10  A.M.,8  soon  afterwards  saw  Prentiss, 
whom  he  found  at  the  Hornets'  Nest,  and  whom  he 
ordered  to  maintain  that  position  at  all  hazards,4  then, 
with  his  mind  full  of  the  terrible  scenes  of  disorder 

1  i  Grant,  336. 

8 16.,  336  ;  10  W.  R.,  185.     It  is  doubtful  if  he  could  have  arrived  much 
before  nine  o'clock  ;   Hannaford,  252,  n. 

$  I  Sherman,  244.  *  10  W.  R.,  278,  279. 


76  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

and  defeat  which  he  had  just  witnessed,  wrote,  about 
noon,1  an  urgent  appeal  to  Buell.  He  asked  him  to 
get  his  troops  upon  the  field  at  once.  This,  he  said, 
— evidently  looking  on  the  battle  as  otherwise  lost, — 
might  "  possibly  save  the  day  to  us."  He  added  that 
the  enemy's  force  was  estimated  at  over  100,000 
men.  About  half-past  twelve 2  he  returned  to  the 
Landing,  and  went  on  board  his  headquarters  steamer, 
where,  about  1  P.M.,  Buell  came  to  see  him.3  Grant 
returned  to  the  front  soon  after  2  P.M.4  About  three 
o'clock  he  was  with  Sherman.5  He  may  also  have 
visited  during  the  afternoon  the  other  division-com- 
manders.6 Towards  the  close  of  the  day  he  assisted 
in  posting  the  retreating  troops  so  as  to  cover  the 
Landing.7  He  seems  to  have  given  few  orders,  and 
in  fact  to  have  done  little  during  the  day  except  to 
show  himself,  and  thus  help  to  maintain  confidence. 
To  return  now  to  the  progress  of  the  fight.  Hurl- 
but,  it  will  be  remembered,  about  four  o'clock8  with- 
drew his  command  from  the  position  which  he,  to- 
gether with  Prentiss  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  had  so 
long  held,  and  fell  back  to  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Landing.  Here  he  formed  his  troops  on  a  line  run- 
ning west  from  the  river,  covering  the  Landing  and 
supporting  a  battery  of  heavy  guns.9  General  Grant 
ordered  him  to  take  charge  of  all  the  troops  that 
might  arrive  on  this  part  of  the  field.  Stuart's  bri- 
gade of  Sherman's  division  had  already  fallen  back 

1  ii  W.  R.,  95  :  109  W.  R.,  232  ;  i  B.  and  L.,  492. 
3  10  W.  R.,  186.         '  i  Grant,  343  ;  Force,  131. 

3  i  B.  and  L.,  492.       7  10  W.  R.,  130,  204,  259. 

4  10  W.  R.,  186.         8  /£.,  204,  279. 

5  /£.,  250.  »/£.,  204. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  77 

to  this  line.1  To  the  right  of  Hurlbut's  troops  the 
division  of  McClernand  and  another  brigade 2  of 
Sherman's  division  (Buckland's),  constituting  the 
right  of  the  Federal  army,  after  having,  about  4.30 
P.M.,  successfully  repulsed  a  very  fierce  attack,  had 
taken  up  their  last  position.3  A  half-mile  or  more  in 
front  of  the  line  occupied,  or  rather  partially  occu- 
pied, by  these  troops,  the  divisions  of  Prentiss  and 
W.  H.  L.  Wallace  were  at  this  time,  five  o'clock,  still 
bravely  maintaining  their  position,  and  engaging  the 
attention  of  the  main  part  of  the  Confederate  army. 
As  long  as  they  held  out,  no  general  attack  could  be 
made  on  the  Union  lines  near  the  Landing.  It  was 
not  till  half-past  five  o'clock 4  that  they  were  over- 
whelmed, that  Prentiss  and  over  2000  of  his  men  were 
obliged  to  surrender,  that  Wallace  was  killed  and  his 
command  broken  up,  and  that  the  way  was  opened 
for  an  attack  on  the  troops  which  held  the  last  line 
of  the  Federal  army  near  the  Landing.  But,  half  an 
hour  before  this  catastrophe,  at  five  o'clock,  the  first 
regiments  from  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had 
climbed  the  steep  bank  of  the  river  above  the  Land- 
ing,8 and  by  half-past  five  6  had  taken  their  places  in 
the  line  of  battle.  Hardly  had  they  got  into  posi- 
tion when  they  were  fiercely  assailed. 

Bragg,  who,  on  the  death  of  Johnston,  was  the 
ranking  Confederate  officer  on  the  right  of  their  line, 

1  10  W.  R.,  259. 

*  The  other  two  brigades  of  Sherman's  division  had,  by  this  time,  been 
broken  up.     It.,  250. 

*  It.,  118,  205,  517,  521. 
4  Ante,  73,  n.  4. 

6  10  W.  R.,  323,  339. 


78  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

lost  no  time,1  after  disposing  of  his  prisoners,  in  or- 
dering his  available  forces  to  push  forward  and  com- 
plete the  defeat  of  the  Federals.  But,  as  he  says 
himself,  "  the  sun  was  about  disappearing," 2  and 
"  little  time  was  left "  in  which  to  finish  the  work  of 
the  day.8  Ruggles,  who  commanded  one  of  his  divi- 
sions, while,  in  obedience  to  an  order  received  from 
Bragg  subsequent  to  the  surrender  of  Prentiss,  as- 
sembling his  forces,  received  an  order  from  Beau- 
regard  to  withdraw  his  troops,  and  accordingly  retired 
"just  as  night  set  in."4  Withers,  who  commanded 
Bragg's  other  division,  carried  two  brigades — those 
of  Chalmers 5  and  Jackson 6 — into  action  at  once,  so 
hastily,  in  fact,  that  Jackson's  troops  had  not  filled 
their  cartridge-boxes.  These  two  brigades,  assisted 
by  one  battery,  but  otherwise  unsupported,  made  the 
last  assault  on  the  Union  lines  that  was  made  on  that 
terrible  day. 

There  were,  as  has  been  stated,  some  heavy  guns 
in  position,  near  the  Landing.  To  these  Colonel 
Webster,  of  General  Grant's  staff,  added  such  other 
pieces  as  were  available,  and  got  together  in  all  up- 
wards of  twenty  guns.7  Two  Federal  gunboats  in 
the  river,  the  Lexington  and  Tyler,  opened  a  flank- 
ing fire  on  the  assailants,  but,  owing  to  the  height  of 


1  ioW.  R.,  466,  533.  Chalmers  (550)  is  in  error  in  fixing  the  hour  at  4  P.M., 
as  he  says  it  was  after  the  surrender  of  Prentiss,  *'.  e.,  about  5.30  P.M.  See 
Withers,  533. 

*  The  sun  set  at  6.25  P.M.     16  S.  H.  S.,  311. 

1  10  W.  R.,  466. 

4  Ib.,  472. 

'/*.,  550. 

'/*.,  555. 

1  i  Grant,  345.     Force  (155)  puts  the  number  much  higher. 


1 86  2]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  79 

the  bluff  near  the  river,  their  guns  received  such  an 
elevation  that  the  shells  fell  a  long  way  inside  the 
bank.  In  front  of  the  battery  was  a  deep  ravine 
(known  as  Dill's  Branch),  which  for  a  short  distance 
from  the  river  was  filled  with  water  and  was  im- 
passable, but  to  the  westward  of  this  presented  no 
obstacle  save  the  steepness  of  its  northern  slope,  on 
the  crest  of  which  the  Federal  guns  and  supporting 
infantry,  now  consisting  of  a  portion  of  Ammen's 
brigade  of  Nelson's  division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,1  were  stationed. 

Down  into  this  ravine  the  gallant  soldiers  of  Chal- 
mers and  Jackson  rushed,  and  up  the  steep  slope  on 
its  further  side  they  climbed,  only  to  receive  the 
terrible  fire  of  the  battery  and  the  destructive  vol- 
leys of  Ammen's  fresh  and  steady  infantry.  To  this 
fire  they  could,  from  their  position,  make  no  effective 
reply.2  Again  and  again  they  attempted  to  scale 
the  crest,  and  again  and  again  they  were  forced  back 
into  the  ditch.  They  continued  the  struggle  till 
darkness  came  on,  when  they  were  withdrawn  to  a 
suitable  position  for  the  night.3 

That  this  attack  might  have  succeeded  if  it  had 
been  made  before  the  troops  from  Buell's  army  ar- 
rived, is  by  no  means  improbable.  We  know  that 
the  infantry  force  stationed  by  General  Grant  in 
support  of  the  battery  was  a  very  small  one,  for  he 
says  so  himself,4  and  that  that  infantry  must  have 


1  10  W.  R.,  323,  326. 

5  Hence  the  loss  in  Ammen's  brigade  was  very  small. 

3  10  W.  R.,  550,  551,  555. 

«/£.,  109;  cf.  323,  334. 


8o  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

been  much  exhausted  and  more  or  less  disorganized 
owing  to  the  events  of  the  day.  The  resistance 
which  it  could  have  opposed  to  the  attacks  of  Chal- 
mers and  Jackson  could  not  have  been  a  very  strenu- 
ous resistance.  It  is  true  that  the  attack,  made  as  it 
was  by  two  brigades  only,  one  of  which  was  entirely 
out  of  ammunition,  was  not  a  very  formidable  attack. 
But  it  cannot  be  denied  that  there  would  have  been 
a  very  fair  chance  of  that  attack  succeeding  had  it 
been  made  before  the  reinforcements  from  Buell's 
army  arrived.  Had  it  succeeded,  and  had  the  Land- 
ing been  seized  and  occupied  by  the  Confederates, 
they  could  easily  have  prevented  any  troops  of 
Buell's  from  joining  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and 
that  army,  or  what  was  left  of  it,  might  have  been 
forced  to  surrender. 

Buell's  troops  were  most  certainly  late  in  arriving, 
but  this  was  in  no  respect  their  fault.  Instead  of 
there  being  steamers  ready  to  transport  the  men 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  Pittsburg  Land- 
ing as  soon  as  they  should  arrive  at  Savannah,  Gen- 
eral Grant's  arrangements  were  so  defective  that  he 
had  to  order  Nelson,  who  commanded  the  leading 
division,  to  march  through  the  swamp  on  the  east- 
ern side  of  the  river  to  a  point  opposite  the  Landing,1 
where  Grant  could  manage  to  get  the  men  across  on 
boats.  It  was  hours  before  Nelson — although  he 
was  confessedly  one  of  the  most  active  and  energetic 
officers  in  the  service — could  procure  a  guide  through 
the  swamp ;  even  then,  the  guns  had  to  be  left  be- 
hind, and  the  march  was  a  severe  one  for  the  in- 

1  ii  W.  R.,  95. 


i862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  81 


fantry l ;  so  that,  as  we  have  seen,  it  was  not  until 
5  P.M.  that  the  head  of  the  column,  consisting  of 
Ammen's  brigade,  arrived  at  Pittsburg  Landing.2 

Shortly  before  dark  General  Beauregard  gave  or- 
ders for  the  cessation  of  further  assaults.  He  has 
been  severely  criticised  for  this,  but  it  seems  to  us 
that  nothing  could  have  been  accomplished  by  the 
Confederates  at  that  time  of  the  afternoon. 

The  Union  army  held  that  night  a  line  running  west 
from  the  river  and  covering  the  bridge  over  Snake 
Creek  over  which  Lewis  Wallace's  division  came  up 
a  little  after  nightfall.  The  extreme  right  was  held 
by  the  remains  of  Sherman's  division.  Probably  not 
more  than  12,000  men  of  Grant's  army,  including 
Lewis  Wallace's  division,  were  with  the  colors. 

Much  has  been  written  and  much  speculation  in- 
dulged in  as  to  the  probable  fate  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  in  certain  contingencies.  It  has  been 
urged  by  the  friends  of  General  Johnston  that,  if 
he  had  lived,  he  would  have  organized  an  attack 
upon  Grant's  position  at  the  Landing  before  the  ar- 
rival of  the  fresh  troops  from  Buell's  army.3  But  that 
Johnston  could  have  attacked  Grant  at  the  Landing 
before  he  had  overcome  the  resistance  of  Prentiss 
and  Wallace  cannot  be  supposed  ;  and  we  know  that 
before  their  resistance  was  overcome  Ammen's  bri- 
gade was  in  position  at  the  Landing.  There  is  nothing 
to  show  that  Prentiss  and  Wallace  could  have  been 
sooner  routed  if  Johnston  had  not  been  killed. 

It  has  been  strongly  urged  by  Bragg  and  Hardee 

1  10  W.  R.,  331,  332. 

*  Ib.,  323,  339.  '  Johnston,  633  et  seq. 


VOL.    II. — 6 


82  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

that  they  could  have  organized  a  force  which  would 
have  overcome  all  resistance  had  not  Beauregard 
ordered  a  halt.1  We  may  admit  that  Beauregard 
erred  in  calling  off  his  troops ;  he  certainly  should 
not  have  done  so  except  on  the  advice  of  his  corps- 
commanders,  who  were  all  good  officers  and  were  on 
the  spot ;  there  was  for  him  everything  to  gain  and 
little  to  risk  by  continuing  the  battle,  especially  as 
he  knew  nothing  of  the  arrival  of  the  troops  from 
Buell's  army.2  But  we  do  not  believe  that  any  force 
which  could  have  been  got  together  at  that  time  in 
the  afternoon  by  the  Confederate  generals  could 
have  overcome  the  resistance  of  the  remnants  of 
Grant's  army  and  of  the  fresh  troops  of  Buell's  com- 
mand. Many  of  the  Confederate  regiments  had  been 
practically  broken  up  and  rendered  useless  for  the 
time  being,  and  there  were  also  many  stragglers. 
The  confusion  caused  by  the  prolonged  fighting  and 
the  heavy  losses  was  also  very  marked.  Out  of  con- 
sideration for  his  soldiers,  who  were  very  tired,  and 
being  desirous  of  giving  them  as  much  time  as  pos- 
sible for  rest  and  reorganization  in  view  of  a  renewal 
of  the  battle  the  next  morning,  Beauregard  ordered, 
near  dusk,  a  cessation  of  further  efforts.3 

In  regard  to  General  Grant's  management  in  this 
severe  action,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  he  at  no  time 
made  any  attempt  to  unite  the  disconnected  portions 
of  his  army  and  establish  a  line  of  battle.'  It  may 

1  Johnston,  630  et  seq. 

5  i  Beauregard,  306,  n.  ;  10  W.  R.,  387. 

3  This  question  is  ably  treated  by  General  Jordan  in  16  S.  H.  S.,  297  et  seq. 

4  This  might  have  been  done,  one  would  suppose,  on  the  line  examined 
by  Colonel  McPherson.     Ante,  57,  n.  6. 


1 862]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  83 

be  that  this  could  not  have  been  effected,  even  con- 
sidering that  for  five  or  six  hours  Sherman  and  Mc- 
Clernand  on  the  right,  Wallace,  Prentiss,  and  Hurlbut 
in  the  centre,  and  Stuart  on  the  left,  maintained  them- 
selves in  their  separated  positions.  But  it  is  certain 
that  General  Grant  made  no  effort  to  accomplish  any 
such  result.  In  fact,  he  can  hardly  be  said  to  have 
undertaken  to  perform  on  this  day  the  functions 
of  a  commander  of  an  army.  He  left  the  division- 
commanders  entirely  to  themselves.  Sherman  and 
McClernand  consulted  together,  and  decided  for 
themselves  what  positions  to  hold,  and  what  new 
lines  of  defence  to  take  up  * ;  Hurlbut  decided  for 
himself  how  long  it  was  wise  to  stay  in  the  centre2; 
and,  after  he  had  retired,  Prentiss  and  Wallace  con- 
sulted together,  and  agreed  to  hold  their  positions 
at  all  hazards.3  In  their  accounts  of  these  move- 
ments, which  were  the  important  movements  of  the 
day,  the  division-commanders  make  no  reference  to 
any  orders  or  suggestions  received  from  the  com- 
manding general.  Grant,  it  is  true,  assisted  in  post- 
ing the  defeated  troops  so  as  to  protect  the  Landing, 
if  possible.4  But  this  seems  to  have  been  about  the 
extent  of  his  active  participation  in  the  battle.  It 
is  evident  from  all  the  accounts, — Grant's  included, 
— that  the  battle  of  Sunday  was  fought  by  the 
Union  army  without  any  directing  head.  Fortunate 
was  it  for  the  Union  cause  that  five  such  gallant  and 
capable  division-commanders  were  on  the  field.  They 
did  all  that  could  be  done  in  the  circumstances  in 


1  10  W.  R.,  117,  119,  250.  J  Ib.,  279. 

*  Ib.,  204.  *  /£.,  130,  204,  259. 


84  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.      [1862 

which  they  were  placed.  But  it  cannot  be  supposed 
that  their  efforts  would  not  have  been  better  em- 
ployed and  therefore  more  successful  had  they  found 
in  Grant  a  general  who  was  capable  of  assuming  the 
entire  control  and  direction  of  a  great  battle.  Grant, 
however,  was  not  a  general  of  this  sort.  He  had 
neither  the  ability  nor  the  experience  for  such  a 
task.  He  was  a  resolute  and  obstinate  man,  person- 
ally a  very  brave  man,  and  a  hard  fighter,  but  he 
was  not  equal  to  an  emergency  of  this  magnitude. 
His  only  hope  of  ultimate  success  was  that  the 
separated  bodies  into  which  his  army  was  divided 
might  be  able  to  protract  their  resistance  until  the 
arrival  of  Lewis  Wallace's  division,1  or  of  some  part 
of  Buell's  army.  Whatever  might  be  the  chances, 
however,  he  was  determined  to  hold  out  to  the  last ; 
and  this  unfaltering  courage  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
manding general  unquestionably  contributed  to  the 
stubbornness  and  resolution  which  characterized  the 
fighting  of  the  Union  army  on  this  bloody  day. 

The  battle  of  Shiloh  was  fought  by  the  Confeder- 
ates with  the  greatest  energy  and  courage,  but  the 
original  plan  was  not  carried  out.  That  plan  was 
to  turn  the  Federal  left,  so  as  to  cut  the  Union  army 
off  from,  the  Tennessee  River  and  force  it  back  upon 
Owl  Creek,  in  which  event  it  was  hoped  that  it 
would  be  obliged  to  surrender.2  When  the  Confed- 

1  This  division  did  not  come  upon  the  field  until  after  the  battle  was  over, 
— Wallace  having  at  first  taken  a  road  which  brought  him  too  far  to  the 
westward,  so  that,  on  learning  of  the  defeat  of  the  army,  he  found  it  neces- 
sary to  retrace  his  steps,  and  to  take  another  and  more  direct  road  to  Pitts- 
burg  Landing.  10  W.  R.,  169-190  ;  i  Grant,  336-338  ;  351,  n. 

*  10  W.  R.,  397. 


1862]         FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  85 

erate  army  advanced  to  the  attack,  its  line  of  battle 
ran  from  northwest  to  southeast,1  so  that  the  left  of 
the  line  first  became  engaged.  This  must  have 
caused  some  concentration  on  that  part  of  the  line, 
whereas,  to  carry  out  the  programme  required,  of 
course,  that  the  right  of  the  Confederate  army  should 
be  strengthened.  No  attempt,  however,  seems  to 
have  been  made  to  do  this,  or  even  to  force  Stuart, 
whose  brigade  constituted  the  Federal  left,  promptly 
from  his  position.2  It  is  not  easy  to  see  why  the 
Confederates  could  not  have  pushed  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  action,  instead  of  at  four  in  the 
afternoon,3  a  large  force  northward  on  the  road  from 
Hamburg,  which  runs  nearly  parallel  with  the  river, 
and  so  have  begun  the  fight  by  attacking  Stuart, 
and  by  also  turning  the  left  flank  of  Hurlbut's  divi- 
sion. In  this  way  they  would  have  carried  out  their 
plan  of  battle  to  the  letter,  would  have  saved  them- 
selves great  loss  of  life  and  great  delay,  and,  very 
possibly,  would  have  obtained  possession  of  the 
Landing  in  time  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  any  troops 
from  Buell's  army,  a  thing  which  would  in  all  prob- 
ability have  secured  to  them  a  complete  victory. 
But  instead  of  doing  this,  the  attack  on  Stuart  was 
entrusted  to  a  comparatively  small  force,4  and  the 
grave  mistake  was  made  of  assailing  in  front  the 
strong  position  held  by  Hurlbut,  Prentiss,  and  Wal- 
lace (known  as  the  Hornets'  Nest).5  This  was  per- 
sisted in  for  several  hours.  It  was  on  this  part  of 


1  See  Map  No.  II,  Plate  XIV.,  Part  III.,  Official  Atlas. 
»ioW.  R.,  258.  «/£.,  258. 

J Ib.,  466,  533.  '/£.,  466. 


86  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

the  field  and  while  directing  one  of  these  attacks 
that  General  Johnston  received  the  wound  from 
which,  about  half-past  two  o'clock,  he  died.1  His 
loss  was  no  doubt  a  great  one  to  his  army,  for  he 
was  a  fine  soldier  and  an  inspiring  leader  of  men. 

It  must,  however,  be  said  that  Johnston  did  not 
attempt  on  this  day  to  fill  the  r6le  of  commander  of 
the  army.  He  devoted  himself  entirely  to  the  opera- 
tions on  the  right  of  the  line,2  and  left  to  Beauregard 
the  general  direction  of  the  action.  This  general 
direction  Beauregard  unquestionably  exercised  be- 
fore as  well  as  after  Johnston's  death.3  There  may 
have  been  a  brief  delay  caused  by  this  event,  but  the 
evidence  is  the  other  way.  It  is  true  that  both 
Bragg 4  and  Hardee 5  so  state ;  but  Bragg's  state- 
ment is  not  borne  out  by  his  account  of  the  move- 
ment by  which  the  Federal  position  at  the  Hornets' 
Nest  was  turned,8  or  by  the  accounts  given  by  Gen- 
erals Cheatham 7  and  Withers  8  of  that  operation ; 
while  as  for  Hardee's  statement,  it  is  contained  in  a 
report  which  he  did  not  write  for  nearly  a  year,  and, 
as  he  represents  himself  to  have  been  at  the  time  on 
the  left  of  the  line,  he  could  not  have  known  any- 
thing of  his  own  personal  knowledge  as  to  the  effect 
of  Johnston's  death  on  the  operations  on  the  right. 
It  is  moreover  plain  from  their  reports  that  both 
these  officers  were  actuated  by  a  desire  to  exalt  the 
importance  of  Johnston's  services  at  the  expense  of 


1 10  W.  R.,  387,  405,  569.     McClernand(ii7)isinerror.  s  fl>.,  569. 

*/£.,  548,  558,  569,  624.  */£.,  466. 

*/£.,  407,  438,  451,  454,  626,  627.  T  Ib.,  439. 

*/<*.,  469-  8/<*.,533. 


1862]         FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  87 

those  of  Beauregard.  Polk,1  on  the  other  hand,  claims 
that  the  news  of  Johnston's  fall  "  increased,  instead 
of  abated  "  the  ardor  of  the  soldiers.  The  truth 
probably  is,  that  the  delay  caused  by  the  death  of 
Johnston  was  a  small  matter,  but  that  the  loss  of  his 
personal  direction  and  example  was  a  somewhat 
serious  one. 

During  the  night,  the  remainder  of  Nelson's  di- 
vision arrived,  and  also  the  division  of  Crittenden. 
That  of  McCook  came  up  early  in  the  morning,  mak- 
ing about  20,000  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 
land on  the  field.  Of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
the  division  of  Lewis  Wallace,  numbering  over  5000 
men,  was  fresh ;  the  divisions  of  McClernand  and 
Hurlbut,  though  much  reduced,  still  preserved  their 
organization  ;  Sherman's  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's 
divisions  were  broken  up,  but  some  of  their  regi- 
ments, or  fragments  of  regiments,  stepped  bravely 
into  line,  ready  for  the  next  day's  battle.  Some  of 
these  troops  were  attached  to  Buell's  command.2 

Both  Grant  and  Buell  determined  to  take  the 
offensive  as  early  as  possible.  The  latter  pushed 
Nelson  forward  at  five  o'clock,  and  then  placed  Crit- 
tenden's  division  on  his  right.  When  McCook  came 
up,  his  division  took  post  on  Crittenden's  right. 
The  whole  line  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  long,  its  left  resting  on  the 
Tennessee.  On  its  right  came  the  troops  of  Hurl- 
but,  McClernand,  and  Lewis  Wallace,  under  the 
immediate  command  of  General  Grant,  at  least  dur- 
ring  the  last  part  of  the  action.3  Buell,  from  first 

1  10  W.  R.,  409.  *  Ib.,  105,  149,  305.  8  I  Grant,  350,  351. 


88  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

to  last,  took  the  personal  direction x  of  his  own 
troops,  and  handled  them  in  masterly  fashion. 
These  troops  of  Buell's  had  all  been  subjected  for 
months  to  careful  instruction  and  thorough  disci- 
pline, and  their  behavior  on  the  field  won  the  ad- 
miration of  their  comrades  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  General  Sherman  especially  speaking 
warmly  of  their  appearance  and  doings.2 

The  Confederate  army  was  no  match  for  the 
Union  army  on  this  second  day  of  the  battle.  It 
had  lost  on  the  previous  day  about  8000  men,  besides 
stragglers.  It  had  now  not  many  more  than  20,000 
men  in  line,  all  of  whom  were  in  organizations  which 
had  been  greatly  shattered  by  the  casualties  of  the 
battle  of  Sunday  ;  the  loss  of  so  many  valuable  offi- 
cers had  completely  changed  the  structure  of  many 
battalions.  The  General-in-Chief,  also,  Albert  Sid- 
ney Johnston,  had  fallen.  On  the  other  hand,  Grant 
brought  to  the  attack  more  than  25,000  fresh  troops, 
all  of  them  in  a  good  state  of  drill  and  discipline, 
besides  the  remnants  of  his  other  divisions,  the  in- 
domitable soldiers  who  had  defended  themselves  on 
Sunday  with  such  firmness  against  a  series  of  fierce 
and  successful  assaults,  and  who  now  embraced  with 
eagerness  the  opportunity  of  returning  their  in- 
debtedness to  their  antagonists. 

Beauregard  appreciated  the  situation  with  perfect 
clearness.  He  saw  that  he  could  not  hope  to  win, 
but  that  he  might  count  on  his  veteran  troops  to 
make  it  hard  for  his  adversary  to  defeat  him.  His 

1  10  W.  R.,  304,  324,  325,  336,  358,  369. 
*  /}.,  251  ;  so  also  Wallace,  Ib.,  172. 


1862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  89 

corps-commanders  well  seconded  his  efforts.  His 
troops  were  bravely  and  skilfully  handled.  They 
made  no  final  or  critical  stand  anywhere.  If  too 
hard  pushed,  they  retreated ;  but  they  lost  no  op- 
portunity of  dealing  return  blows, — of  concentrating 
on  any  isolated  body  of  Federal  troops  which  might 
in  its  ardor  have  advanced  too  far, — of  taking  ad- 
vantage of  any  gap  in  the  long  Union  line.1  Be- 
tween 3  and  4  P.M.  the  Confederate  army  had  fallen 
back  beyond  Shiloh  Church ;  and  here  General 
Grant  saw  fit  to  put  a  stop  to  the  Federal  advance. 
The  camps  had  all  been  recovered, — the  positions  of 
Sunday  morning  retaken, — but  the  Federal  army 
was  fatigued, — Grant's  troops  with  marching  and 
fighting,  Buell's  with  marching, — and  Grant  himself, 
who  commanded  the  army,  was  so  worn  out  with 
the  terrible  strain  of  the  two  days'  fight,  that  he  had 
not  the  energy  to  order  a  pursuit.  The  battle  of 
Sbiloh  was  over. 

The  losses  had  been  very  great,  considering  the 
numbers  of  the  troops  engaged.  Of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  8114  were  killed  and  wounded,  and 
2830  captured  or  missing ;  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum- 
berland 2048  were  killed  and  wounded,  and  55  cap- 
tured or  missing;  making  a  total  of  10,162  killed 
and  wounded,  and  2885  captured  and  missing ;  in 
all  13,047.2  The  Confederates  lost  nearly  as  many 
killed  and  wounded,  9740,  and  959  missing;  in  all 
10,699.3  The  loss  in  artillery  was  about  equal, 
taking  the  two  days  together.4 

1 10  w.  R.,  304, 325.  *  n.,  396. 

*  Ib.,  105,  108.  4  Force,  181. 


90  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

There  was  no  reason  why  General  Grant  should 
not  promptly  and  unremittingly  have  followed  up 
his  beaten  antagonist.  Two  more  divisions  of  Buell's 
army,  those  of  Wood  and  Thomas,  were  directly  in 
the  rear, — part  of  Wood's,  in  fact,  was  in  the  fight  of 
Monday, — adding  more  than  12,000  men  to  the  20,- 
000  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  already  on 
the  field.  The  division  of  Lewis  Wallace  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  in  fine  order ;  and  in  a 
day  or  two  considerable  accessions  might  be  ex- 
pected from  the  other  divisions  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee.  It  was  a  case  where  the  enemy  were  in 
full  retreat,  and  that,  too,  after  having  lost  very 
heavily  in  one  battle  and  been  defeated  in  the  sec- 
ond ;  there  could  have  been  no  doubt  at  all  in  the 
mind  of  any  military  man  that  the  Union  army,  so 
largely  composed  as  it  now  was  of  fresh  and  victori- 
ous troops,  was  in  vastly  better  condition  and  spirits 
than  the  Confederate  army  could  possibly  be  in. 
A  general  who  was  equal  to  the  task  of  seeing 
the  facts  in  the  sober  light  of  strong  probability 
would  have  felt  not  only  justified  but  obliged  to 
act  with  vigor  in  this  state  of  things.  But  Grant 
did  not  act  at  all.  He  utterly  failed  to  seize  the 
opportunity. 

And  no  better  opportunity  than  this  was  ever 
presented  to  a  Federal  general  during  the  war. 
Bragg,  the  morning  after  the  battle,  reported  to 
Beauregard  that  his  troops  were  "  utterly  disorgan- 
ized and  demoralized  " ;  that  the  road  was  "  almost 
impassable  "  ;  that  there  were  "  no  provisions  and 
no  forage  "  ;  that  the  "  artillery  was  being  left  all 


1 86  2]        FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  gi 

along  the  road." 1  Breckinridge,  who  commanded 
the  rear-guard,  wrote  that  evening  to  Bragg :  "  My 
troops  are  worn  out,  and  I  don't  think  can  be  relied 
on  after  the  first  volley.  There  is  two  days'  food 
enough  for  the  men,  but  the  horses  are  sinking  rap- 
idly for  want  of  forage."  z 

With  the  Confederate  army  in  this  condition,  it  is 
not  difficult  to  conjecture  what  would  have  been  the 
result  of  a  vigorous  pursuit  if  made  by  Grant  at  the 
head  of  the  40,000  troops,  most  of  them  fresh,  which 
fortune  had  placed  at  his  disposal.  What  Grant's 
army  was  actually  doing  at  this  time,  so  far  as  could 

be  seen  by  a  Confederate  officer  sent  out  with  a  flag 

•/ 

of  truce,  was  thus  reported  to  Beauregard's  chief -of - 
staff 3 :  "  He  [the  officer]  says  that,  as  far  as  he  could 
observe,  they  [the  Federals]  seemed  to  be  burying 
dead,  looking  after  wounded,  and  putting  their  camps 
to  rights."  * 

In  regard  to  this  matter,  General  Grant  says5 : 
"  I  wanted  to  pursue,  but  had  not  the  heart  to  or- 
der the  men  who  had  fought  desperately  for  two 
days,  lying  in  the  mud  and  rain  whenever  not  fight- 
ing, and  I  did  not  feel  disposed  to  positively  order 
Buell,  or  any  part  of  his  command,  to  pursue.  Al- 
though the  senior  in  rank  at  the  time,  I  had  been  so 
only  a  few  weeks.  Buell  was,  and  had  been  for 
some  time  past,  a  Department-commander,  while  I 
commanded  only  a  district."6  The  truth  is,  that 
Grant  entirely  failed  to  rise  to  the  height  of  this 

'nW.  R.,398.  » Ib.,  403. 

*  Ib.,  400.  *  The  italics  are  ours.  6  I  Grant,  354. 

•See  Grant  to  Buell,  109  W.  R.,  233  ;  n  W.  R.,  96.    The  despatch  from 
Halleck  referred  to  in  this  letter  does  not  seem  to  have  been  preserved. 


92  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

occasion,  and  his  excuses  are  of  no  weight  whatever. 
The  division  of  Wallace  and  the  five  divisions  of 
Buell  had  undergone  no  hardships  worth  mention- 
ing; and  on  them,  as  General  Grant  well  knew, 
would  have  fallen  the  fatigue  of  the  pursuit ;  and 
when  it  was  possible  to  complete  the  defeat  of  the 
enemy  by  ordering  immediate  and  vigorous  action,  it 
is  inexcusable  for  Grant  to  mention  the  fact  that 
Buell  had  been  under  his  command  only  a  few  weeks. 
Buell,  as  Grant  well  knew,  was  the  last  man  in  the 
army  to  disobey  his  military  superior.  Grant,  in 
fact,  does  not  mean  to  be  understood  as  fearing  that 
Buell  would  disobey  him  if  he  gave  the  order;  he 
only  means  to  say  that  he  felt  some  embarrassment, 
in  view  of  Buell's  late  position  in  the  service,  in 
giving  him  the  order.  But  how  can  a  feeling  of  this 
kind,  so  entirely  opposed  to  the  principles  of  military 
duty,  exonerate  the  officer  in  charge  from  exerting 
all  his  official  powers  to  carry  out  the  plan  which 
commends  itself  to  his  judgment  ? 

A  reconnoissance  made  by  Sherman  the  day  after 
the  battle  showed  that  the  Confederates  were  re- 
treating on  Corinth.  The  Union  army  thereupon 
devoted  itself  to  repairing  damages,  and  waited  for 
General  Halleck,  the  head  of  the  Department,  to 
come  from  St.  Louis  and  assume  command  in  person. 
This  officer  arrived  at  Pittsburg  Landing  on  April 
llth.  He  at  once  began  to  take  measures  to  in- 
crease the  size  of  his  army,  before  moving  upon  the 
enemy. 

General  Pope,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  con- 
ducting operations  against  New  Madrid  and  Island 


i862]        FORT  DONELSON  AND  SHILOH.  93 

No.  10  on  the  Mississippi  River,1  brought  them,  by 
a  series  of  skilfully  contrived  and  well-conducted 
movements,  to  a  successful  termination  on  the  8th 
of  April,  capturing  the  Confederate  garrison,  some 
7000  men,  with  all  their  guns  and  stores.  He  was 
then  sent  to  besiege  Fort  Pillow,  a  post  about 
seventy  miles  farther  down  the  river,  but  he  had  not 
completed  his  examination  of  the  position  when  he 
was  ordered  to  join  the  army  under  Halleck.  This 
he  did  on  April  21st.  He  brought  with  him  some 
21,000  men.2  Other  reinforcements  raised  Halleck's 
force  to  over  100,000  men.3 

On  the  1st  of  May  a  force  of  upwards  of  15,000 
men  under  General  Van  Dorn  reached  Beauregard 
from  Memphis.  These  troops  had  seen  a  good  deal 
of  service  in  Missouri. 

About  the  28th  of  April  the  Union  army  began 
to  move  slowly  and  cautiously  towards  Corinth,4 
and  in  a  little  over  a  week  the  place  was  partially 
invested.  From  time  to  time  during  the  next  four 
weeks  the  lines  were  advanced,  fresh  positions  taken, 
and  the  situation  rendered  continually  more  and 
more  unsafe  for  the  Confederates.  Finally,  on  May 
30th,  Beauregard  evacuated  the  place.5  He  with- 
drew with  over  52,000  men,6  carrying  off  all  his 
artillery  and  the  greater  part  of  his  stores.  The 
evacuation  was  effected  without  the  knowledge  of 
the  Federal  general,  and  was  skilfully  and  thoroughly 
carried  out  in  all  respects.  Beauregard  retired  to 

1  Ante,  53.  4  Ib.,  135  et  seq. 

9  ii  W.  R.,  146.  5  Ib.,  22$  ;  10  W.  R.,  668. 

*  Ib.t  146,  148,  151.  6ioW.  R.,  780. 


94  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

Tupelo  in  Mississippi,  a  place  about  fifty  miles  south 
of  Corinth,  which  he  had  selected  as  affording 
excellent  water  supply  and  possessing  healthful  sur- 
roundings.1 His  army  had  been  reduced  consider- 
ably by  sickness  while  at  Corinth,  and  the  sanitary 
advantages  of  Tupelo  were  well  suited  to  restore  the 
health  of  the  troops.2  In  a  very  short  time  the  Con- 
federate army  was  as  large  and  formidable  as  ever. 

The  evacuation  of  Corinth  necessitated 3  that  of 
Fort  Pillow,  which  was  abandoned  on  June  3d.4 
This  opened  the  way  for  the  advance  of  the  Federal 
gunboats  down  the  Mississippi.  Admiral  Davis,  who 
had  succeeded  Foote  in  command,  totally  defeated 
the  Confederate  fleet  in  front  of  Memphis  on  June 
6th,  and  that  city,  one  of  the  most  considerable  in 
the  South,  was  at  once  occupied  by  Federal  troops. 
The  Mississippi  River  was  now  open  as  far  as  Vicks- 
burg,  where  the  bluffs  rendered  possible  the  con- 
struction of  works  which  would  close  the  river  to  a 
hostile  armament.  Beauregard  had,  as  early  as  April 
21st,  given  orders  for  the  erection  of  suitable  fortifi- 
cations there.5  This  place,  and  Port  Hudson,  some 
200  miles  below,  were  now  the  only  points  on  the 
Mississippi  River  held  by  the  Confederates, — New 
Orleans  having  fallen  on  the  24th  of  April,  when 
Admiral  Farragut  made  his  famous  passage  of  the 
forts  below  the  city. 

The  spring  campaign  of  the  western  Federal  ar- 

1  i  Beauregard,  400  ;   10  W.  R.,  783. 
»  10  W.  R.,  776,  783. 

3  i   Beauregard,  373,  giving  letter  from  Beauregard  to  Villepigue  dated 
May  28th. 

4  ii  W.  R.,  579.  *  /£.,  430. 


1 86  2]         FORT  DO  NELSON  AND  SHILOH.  95 

mies  was  over.  It  had  certainly  accomplished  a 
great  deal,  but  it  had  not  accomplished  all  that  might 
justly  have  been  expected.  It  was  assuredly  a  great 
thing  to  have  gained  control  of  Kentucky  and  of 
western  and  middle  Tennessee,  and  to  have  opened 
the  Mississippi  River  as  far  as  Vicksburg.  But  the 
Confederate  army  of  the  West  still  remained  intact. 
To  destroy  this  army  was  now  the  remaining  task  of 
General  Halleck.  This  task  he  had  really  never  at- 
tempted to  perform,  and  even  now,  when  he  was  at 
the  head  of  more  than  100,000  excellent  troops, 
commanded  by  some  of  the  most  skilful  generals  in 
the  service  of  the  United  States,  he  deliberately 
turned  aside  from  its  accomplishment.  It  was  pos- 
sible to  follow  up  the  army  of  Beauregard  in  June, 
1862,  as  closely  as,  in  April,  1865,  Grant  and  Meade 
followed  up  the  army  of  Lee.  But  Halleck  was 
satisfied  with  what  had  been  done.  He  was  inca- 
pable of  realizing  that,  so  long  as  the  army  of  Beau- 
regard  was  left  unharmed, — in  truth,  until  it  should 
be  destroyed, — it  was  perfectly  possible  for  it  to 
assume  the  offensive  and  to  recover  much,  and  no 
one  could  say  how  much,  of  what  now  appeared  to 
be  lost  to  the  Confederacy.  He  was  blind  to  the 
lessons  of  the  great  masters  in  the  art  of  war.  He 
utterly  failed  to  see  that,  with  an  army  twice  as 
large  as  that  of  his  opponent,  as  his  army  now  was? 
it  was  within  his  power  to  crush  the  Confederate 
cause  in  the  West.  But  how  he  dispersed  his  forces, 
and  what  were  the  schemes  which  approved  them- 
selves to  his  judgment,  we  reserve  for  another  chap- 
ter. It  is  time  that  we  returned  to  Virginia. 


96  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  I. 

(p.  57,  n.  6.)  The  following  extract  from  a  lecture 
recently  delivered  by  Major  (now  Lieutenant-Colonel) 
Arthur  L.  Wagner,  U.  S.  Army,  before  the  Military 
Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  and  printed  in 
the  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  for 
March,  1898,  page  231,  is  directly  in  point : 

"  At  Shiloh,  the  first  desperate  and  bitter  struggle 
of  the  war,  where,  as  Lannes  said  of  Montebello,  the 
bones  crashed  like  glass,  no  use  was  made  of  in- 
trenchments ;  though,  according  to  General  Sher- 
man, the  position  could,  at  a  later  period  of  the  war, 
have  been  rendered  impregnable  in  a  single  night. 
Though  the  pick  and  spade  had  been  but  little  used 
in  the  West,  General  Grant  tells  us,  in  his  Memoirs,1 
he  had  taken  the  subject  of  intrenchments  under 
consideration  soon  after  resuming  command  in  the 
field,  but  his  only  military  engineer  had  reported  un- 
favorably upon  the  project.  l  Besides  this,'  he  says, 
'the  troops  with  me,  officers  and  men,  needed  disci- 
pline and  drill  more  than  they  did  experience  with 
the  pick,  shovel,  and  axe.  Reinforcements  were  ar- 
riving almost  daily,  composed  of  troops  that  had 
been  hastily  thrown  together  into  companies  and 
regiments — fragments  of  incomplete  organizations — 

1  I  Grant,  357. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  1.  97 

the  men  and  officers  strangers  to  each  other.  Under 
all  these  circumstances,  I  concluded  that  drill  and 
discipline  were  worth  more  to  our  men  than  fortifica- 
tions.' General  Sherman  says  :  '  We  did  not  fortify 
our  camps  against  an  attack,  because  we  had  no  or- 
ders to  do  so,  and  because  such  a  course  would  have 
made  our  raw  men  timid.' l 

"  With  all  due  respect  to  the  illustrious  command- 
ers quoted  above,  these  reasons  do  not  seem  to  be  at 
all  adequate.  If  the  men  were  untrained  and  undis- 
ciplined, if  their  organization  was  imperfect,  and  offi- 
cers and  men  were  strangers  to  each  other,  there  was 
all  the  more  reason  why  the  raw  troops  should  have 
been  given  the  physical  and  moral  support  of  in- 
trenchments  in  a  camp  which  they  were  expected  to 
occupy  for  some  days.  If  the  position  could  have 
been  quickly  made  impregnable,  the  loss  of  time 
from  drill  would  have  been  very  slight ;  and  as  to 
the  men  being  made  timid  by  the  use  of  intrench- 
ments,  it  may  be  well  questioned  whether  the  troops 
would  have  fought  less  stubbornly  if  they  had  been 
protected  by  breastworks  while  their  assailants  were 
in  the  open.  The  true  reason,  it  seems  to  me,  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  words  of  General  Grant,  that  the  pick 
and  spade  had  not  yet  been  used  to  any  extent  in  the 
West ;  and  he  and  Sherman  doubtless  neglected  the 
use  of  intrench ments  for  the  same  reason  that  Lee 
did,  a  few  months  later,  at  Antietam  ;  namely,  that 
the  utility  of  hasty  intrenchments  on  the  field  of  bat- 
tle was  not  yet  appreciated." 

It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  this  criticism  is  more 

1  I  Sherman,  229. 

VOL.  II. — 7 


98 


THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR. 


remarkable  for  its  sound  sense  or  for  the  modera- 
tion of  its  language.  The  excuses  of  Grant  and 
Sherman  can  hardly  be  said  to  deserve  such  respect- 
ful consideration. 


CHAPTEK  II. 

THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.1 

FOET  MONKOE,  which  General  McClellan  had  se- 
lected as  his  base  of  operations,  was  a  very  strong 
and  large  work,  situated  at  the  southeastern  ex- 
tremity of  the  peninsula  between  the  York  and 
James  rivers,  and  about  seventy  miles  from  Rich- 
mond. When  he  first  conceived  the  idea  of  a  move- 
ment up  the  peninsula,  General  McClellan  pictured 
his  army  as  supported  on  either  flank  by  a  Federal 
fleet,  not  only  carrying  the  needed  supplies,  but 
able,  by  transporting  his  detachments  at  will  to 
points  far  in  the  rear  of  any  opposing  bodies  of  the 
enemy,  to  compel  the  prompt  and  bloodless  evacua- 
tion of  each  and  every  line  of  defence  which  his  ad- 
versaries might  take  up,  until  his  army  should  reach 
the  immediate  neighborhood  of  Richmond.  There 
he  expected  to  fight  his  great  battle,  and,  in  winning 
it,  to  destroy  his  enemy's  main  army,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  capture  the  seat  of  government  of  the 
Confederate  States. 

But  when,  in  the  middle  of  March,  1862,  General 
McClellan  began  sending  his  troops  to  Fort  Monroe, 

1  See  Map  III.,  facing  page  216. 

99 


ioo  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

the  opportunity  for  carrying  out  this  attractive  pro- 
gramme had  passed  away.  The  Merrimac  had  made 
her  appearance,  and  had  destroyed  the  Congress  and 
the  Cumberland;  and,  while  the  chief  reliance  of 
the  United  States  naval  authorities  was  the  little 
ironclad  Monitor,  the  attention  of  the  whole  fleet 
was  necessarily  devoted  to  making  preparations  for 
the  next  appearance  of  the  formidable  Confederate 
vessel.  It  was  out  of  the  question  for  the  Federal 
general  to  think  of  using  the  James  as  a  line  of 
supply ;  the  Merrimac  might  at  any  time  run  out  of 
the  harbor  of  Norfolk  and  close  the  mouth  of  the 
James.  There  was,  to  be  sure,  good  ground  to 
think  that  she  would  be  stopped  in  her  northward 
progress  should  she  attempt  to  run  by  the  fort  to- 
wards the  mouth  of  the  York ;  but  this  was  the 
best  that  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough,  who  com- 
manded the  Federal  fleet  in  Hampton  Roads,  could 
promise,  or,  indeed,  hope  for,  so  far  as  the  Merrimac 
was  concerned.1 

Nor  was  the  York  River  open  to  the  Federal 
forces.  It  was  well  known  that  the  Confederates 
had  erected  formidable  batteries  at  Yorktown,  on 
the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  also  on  the  opposite 
shore  at  Gloucester,  where  the  river  is  only  a  thou- 
sand yards  wide,  thus  effectually  closing  to  the  Fed- 
eral forces  this  avenue  of  communication  and  supply. 
McClellan  at  first  thought  that  these  works  might 
be  carried  by  a  combined  land  and  naval  attack,  and 
he  evidently  supposed  that  in  such  an  attack  the 

1  Goldsborough's   testimony,  i  C.  W.  (1863),  634.     See  General  J.   C. 
Palfrey's  paper  in  i  M.  H.  S.  M.,  io$ftstf. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  101 

navy  would  play  the  principal  part.  He  wrote  to 
the  Secretary  of  War *  that  unless  the  navy  concen- 
trated upon  the  York  River  all  their  most  powerful 
batteries,  he  would  be  obliged  to  resort  to  siege 
operations,  and  that  these  might  consume  many 
weeks,  whereas  with  the  full  co-operation  of  the  navy 
the  reduction  of  Yorktown  ought  not  to  require 
many  hours.  In  this  statement  of  the  results  to  be 
expected  from  an  attack  by  the  navy,  McClellan 
showed  that  he  had  given  no  serious  consideration 
to  the  problem  presented.2  The  height  at  which 
the  enemy's  batteries  were  placed, — those  at  York- 
town  being  sixty  or  seventy  feet,3  and  those  at 
Gloucester  thirty  or  forty  feet 4  above  the  water, — 
rendered  a  naval  attack  perilous  in  the  extreme  for 
the  ships  engaged,  and  there  was  scarcely  a  chance 
of  a  successful  result.  The  most  that  could  be  hoped 
for  was  that  some  of  the  vessels  might  run  the 
gauntlet  of  the  forts,  but  this  alone  could  not  com- 
pel their  evacuation.5  Moreover,  the  demands  made 
upon  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough  were  so  great  that 
he  had  no  force  to  spare  for  any  such  attack,  had 
one  been  deemed  advisable.6 

Of  all  this  General  McClellan  was  fully  aware 
before  he  went  to  the  Peninsula 7 ;  but  with  his 
characteristic  persistence  (to  which  we  have  already 

1  March  19,  1862  ;  5  W.  R.,  57,  58. 

*  i  M.  H.  S.  M.,  in,  where  the  subject  is  carefully  examined  by  General 
J.  C.  Palfrey. 

i  C.  W.  (1863),  630. 

12  W.  R.,  338. 

i  M.  H.  S.  M.,  142  ;  14  W.  R.,  80,  81. 

Barnard  to  McClellan,  March  20,  1862  ;  McClellan's  O.  S.,  247. 

See  Part  I.,  245,  267-269. 


102  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

called  attention)  in  adhering  to  his  original  plan 
even  when  circumstances  had  so  changed  that  the 
scheme  no  longer  presented  the  features  which  had 
first  attracted  him,  he  still  determined  to  transport 
his  army  to  the  Peninsula,  and  the  2d,  3d,  and 
4th  corps  were  sent  there  during  the  month 
of  March.  McClellan  had  no  knowledge  of  any 
Confederate  works  except  those  at  Yorktown  and 
Gloucester ;  he  had  no  accurate  information  of  the 
topography  of  the  region  lying  between  Yorktown 
and  the  James;  and  he  assumed  that  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  fortifications  at  Yorktown  he  would 
find  no  part  of  the  Peninsula  in  a  state  of  defence. 
He  was  not  one  of  those  generals  who  have  the 
faculty  of  divining  his  adversary's  positions  and 
intentions ;  his  imagination — and  he  had  a  great 
deal  of  imagination — found  its  sole  employment  in 
the  consideration  of  his  own  schemes.  He  never 
seems  to  have  suspected  that  his  antagonists — skil- 
ful and  able  men  as  he  knew  them  to  be — would 
never  consent  to  leave  their  garrison  of  Yorktown 
in  the  fatally  exposed  situation  in  which  Lord  Corn- 
wallis  found  himself  when  he  was  surrounded  by 
the  armies  of  Washington  and  Rochambeau.  He 
calculated,  by  a  rapid  march  from  Fortress  Monroe 
on  a  road  leading  up  the  middle  of  the  Peninsula 
to  a  place  known  as  the  Half-way  House,  to  throw  a 
large  body  of  troops, — the  4th  corps,  under  Keyes, 
— in  rear  of  Yorktown,  and  then  to  commence  siege 
operations,  which  could  hardly  fail  ultimately  of  a 
successful  result.  If  any  unusual  difficulty  should 
be  experienced  in  these  operations,  he  purposed 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  103 

landing  the  1st  corps  on  the  left  bank  of  the  York,  or 
on  the  Severn  in  rear  of  Gloucester,  so  that  that  post 
might  be  attacked  simultaneously  with  Yorktown.1 

But  these  projects  met  with  an  immediate  check. 
Reyes's  march  was  arrested  by  strong  works  con- 
structed along  the  line  of  the  Warwick  River  and 
its  adjacent  marshes,  which  effectually  stopped  the 
Half-way  House  movement.  It  was  necessaiy  to 
make  a  thorough  examination  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion. It  was  soon  found  that  he  had  established  a 
strong  line  of  intrenchments  extending  from  York- 
town  on  the  north  to  the  mouth  of  the  Warwick 
River  on  the  south, — clear  across  the  Peninsula. 

Just  at  this  moment,  when  McClellan,  who  had 
brought  up  in  front  of  the  lines  of  Yorktown  the 
2d,  3d,  and  4th  corps,  was  about  to  direct  the  1st 
corps  upon  Gloucester,  as  soon  as  it  should  arrive 
from  Alexandria,  he  was  informed  that  the  Presi- 
dent, in  view  of  the  defenceless  state  in  which 
Washington  had  been  left,  had  decided  to  detain 
the  1st  corps  for  the  present  in  the  neighborhood  of 
the  Capital.2  This  action  was  taken  by  Mr.  Lincoln 
as  soon  as  he  received  the  report  of  Generals  Hitch- 
cock and  Thomas 3 ;  and  we  are  free  to  say  that,  so 
far  as  General  McClellan  was  concerned,  the  Presi- 
dent's action  was  perfectly  warranted  by  the  neglect 
of  that  officer  to  comply  with  his  orders  in  regard  to 
leaving  a  sufficient  force  for  the  garrison  of  the  Capi- 
tal. Whether  the  President's  action  was  or  was  not 


1 12  w.  R.,  s. 

*  These  troops  were  afterwards  stationed  near  Fredericksburg. 
1  See  Part  I.,  254. 


104  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

wise  from  a  military  point  of  view  is,  of  course,  an- 
other question,  the  consideration  of  which  we  will 
reserve  for  the  present.1 

McClellan,  however,  felt  that  he  had  received  an 
undeserved  blow,2  and  that  the  success,  or,  at  any 
rate,  the  brilliant  success,  of  his  operations  was 
seriously  endangered  by  the  withdrawal  from  his 
command  of  such  a  large  force  as  McDowell's  corps. 
There  was,  as  he  looked  at  it,  nothing  for  him 
now  to  do  but  to  commence  siege  operations  against 
some  one  or  more  points  in  the  Confederate  lines. 
The  works  at  Yorktown  were  naturally  selected,3 
and  the  erection  of  powerful  batteries,  whose  fire 
would  render  them  untenable,  was  promptly  begun. 
If  these  operations  should  be  skilfully  and  energet- 
ically pushed  forward,  the  result,  although  necessarily 
deferred  for  some  weeks,  could  not  be  doubtful  in 
the  end.  Yorktown  must  fall,  and  with  it  the 
whole  Confederate  line,  as  far  as  the  James  River. 

But  a  more  enterprising  general  than  McClellan 
would  not  easily  have  been  satisfied  to  await  the 
result  of  a  siege.  He  would  have  attempted  in  ear- 
nest to  find  some  weak  place  in  the  enemy's  works. 
There  was  every  chance  that  such  a  place  could 
be  found,  for  the  Confederate  lines  were  five  miles 
long4  and  very  insufficiently  guarded,  Magruder, 
who  commanded  when  McClellan  first  arrived,  not 
having  more  than  13,000 5  men  under  him  at  that 

1  See  note  i,  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

*  See  McClellan 's  O.  S.,  308,  310,  313 

3  Barnard's  Report ;   12  W.  R.,  318. 

4  i  M.  H.  S.  M.,  145. 

*  Johnston's  Narrative,  1 1 1 ,  n. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  105 

time.  It  is  true  that  he  was  soon  after  considerably 
reinforced  ;  but  it  probably  was  possible,  during  the 
first  half  of  April  at  any  rate,  to  break  the  Confed- 
erate lines  at  some  points.1  There  was  every  reason 
why  the  attempt  should  be  made;  for  the  weather 
was  very  rainy,  the  mud  was  very  deep,  and  the 
men  were  losing  their  health  every  day  they  stayed 
in  the  boggy  and  marshy  land.  The  operations  of 
a  siege  can  never  be  understood  by  the  mass  of  an 
army,  which  of  course  has  little  or  nothing  to  do 
until  the  breach  is  made  and  an  assault  is  ordered. 
The  intervening  time  is  spent  in  unwholesome  and 
depressing  surroundings ;  there  is  a  general  cessa- 
tion of  the  regular  military  exercises  practised  in 
the  camps  of  winter,  which  do  so  much  to  keep  up 
the  health  and  spirits  of  the  troops;  every  one  is 
on  the  watch ;  the  enemy  is  supposed  to  be  vigilant, 
and  always  to  be  meditating  some  coup  ;  the  soldiers 
are  disgusted  with  their  own  inactivity.  Every  wise 
commander  will  try  his  best  to  find  a  way  of  escape 
from  such  a  state  of  things  as  necessarily  existed  in 
General  McClellan's  army  during  the  siege  of  York- 
town. 

But  General  McClellan  was  neither  an  enterpris- 
ing man  nor  a  "fighting"  general.  He  had  a  consti- 
tutional aversion  to  the  risks  inseparable  from  all 
military  operations.  He  shrank  from  the  test  of 
battle.  It  was  in  vain  that  the  President,  to  whom 
he  appealed  to  change  the  decision  which  deprived 
him  of  McDowell's  corps,  told  him  that  he  must 

1  "  No  one  but  McClellan  could  have  hesitated  to  attack."    Johnston  to 
Lee,  April  22,  1862  ;  14  W.  R.,  456.     So  Allan,  15.     Cf.  12  W.  R.,  601. 


io6  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 


"strike  a  blow,"  that  he  "must  act."1  It  is  not 
that  McClellan  should  be  blamed  for  not  ordering 
an  assault  which  in  his  own  judgment  was  decidedly 
unlikely  to  succeed, — and  he  certainly  was  advised 
by  his  chief -of -engineers  that  it  was  not  practicable 
to  break  the  enemy's  lines  across  the  isthmus,  or  to 
take  Yorktown  by  assault.2  But  he  never  seems  to 
have  made  his  reconnoissances  with  the  desire  of 
finding  out  where  an  assault  was  practicable,  and, 
accordingly,  one  is  not  surprised  that  he  did  not  suc- 
ceed in  finding  any  such  place. 

The  affair  at  Lee's  Mill,  on  the  16th  of  April,  was 
the  only  one  where  anything  like  an  assault  was  at- 
tempted, and  it  is  plain  from  the  reports  that  had 
the  able  officer  who  had  charge  of  the  operation- 
General  William  F.  Smith 3 — been  permitted  to  make 
his  arrangements  for  a  serious  and  determined  as- 
sault, instead  of  a  mere  reconnoissance,  the  Confed- 
erate line  at  that  point  would  have  been  broken, 
and  it  would  have  been  perfectly  practicable  for 
General  McClellan  to  pour  thousands  of  troops 
through  the  gap  thus  made,  thereby  rendering  that 
part  of  the  Confederate  line  entirely  untenable. 
But  the  whole  scope  of  the  operation  was  reduced 
by  General  McClellan  to  that  of  a  mere  inquiry  into 
the  state  of  the  enemy's  works,  and,  naturally  enough, 

1  12  W.  R.,  15. 

s  Barnard's  Report  ;  12  W.  R.,  318. 

3  Familiarly  known  in  the  army  as  General  Baldy  Smith.  Keyes,  Smith's 
corps-commander,  told  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  that  he 
"had  seen,  on  many  occasions,  a  disposition  on  his  [Smith's]  part  to  try  to 
break  through  the  enemy's  line  with  his  division,  or  a  portion  of  it,"  and  he 
"had,  on  several  occasions,  told  General  Smith  not  to  attempt  it. "  I  C. 
W.  (1863),  599. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  107 

nothing  of  importance  was  effected.1  The  troops, 
who  behaved  most  gallantly,  carried  the  enemy's 
front  intrenchments  and  occupied  them  nearly  an 
hour,  but  it  was  not  deemed  best  to  push  the  ad- 
vantage, and  they  were  withdrawn.  One  cannot 
help  believing  that  greater  enterprise  and  courage 
on  the  part  of  the  commanding  general  would  have 
been  rewarded  by  a  striking  success.2 

Although  President  Lincoln  would  not  consent  to 
reverse  his  action  in  respect  to  the  retention  near 
"Washington  of  the  greater  part  of  McDowell's  corps, 
he  yielded  to  General  McClellan's  entreaties  so  far  as 
to  send  him  the  division  of  Franklin.  McClellan  re- 
quested this  reinforcement  for  the  express  purpose  of 
investing  and  attacking  Gloucester.  He  asked  for 
two  divisions,  but  expressed  himself  willing  to  under- 
take this  task  with  that  of  Franklin  alone.  Franklin 
arrived  on  the  22d  of  April,  having  been  delayed 
from  various  causes.  By  that  time  it  was  supposed 
that  the  Confederates  had  reinforced  the  garrison  of 
Gloucester ;  nevertheless,  preparations  were  made  for 
landing  Franklin's  troops  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
York  River,  three  or  four  miles  below  the  post; 
but,  owing  to  the  shallowness  of  the  water,  the  mat- 
ter was  found  more  difficult  than  had  been  expected, 
and  before  the  troops  could  be  disembarked,  the 
evacuation  of  Yorktown  had  rendered  the  operation 
useless.3 

1  Smith's  Report ;  12  W.  R.,  366  ;  Webb,  63. 

5  See  the  Reports  of  Magruder,  12  W.  R.,  406,  407  ;  Cabell,  Ib.,  413  ; 
and  others.  See,  also,  General  J.  C.  Palfrey's  examination  of  this  subject 
in  i  M.  H.  S.  M.,  145. 

8  Report  of  Colonel  Alexander,  12  W.  R.,  134.     Cf.  Webb,  61. 


io8  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 


Meantime  the  preparations  for  concentrating  on 
the  defences  of  Yorktown  a  fire,  both  direct  and 
vertical,  which  should  render  the  works  untenable, 
were  pushed  forward  with  great  energy.  Heavy 
ordnance  was  shipped  from  the  Northern  arsenals 
to  meet  all  the  requirements  of  the  able  officers  who 
directed  the  siege,  General  Fitz-John  Porter,  who 
had  the  superintendence  of  the  operations,  General 
Barnard,  the  chief  engineer  of  the  army,  and  Gen- 
eral Barry,  the  chief-of-artillery.  Early  in  May  the 
arrangements  were  substantially  completed ;  the  bat- 
teries were  to  open  on  the  5th  ;  and  it  was  confi- 
dently expected  that  the  Confederates  could  not 
possibly  sustain  for  more  than  a  few  hours  the 
terrible  fire  of  the  Union  siege-guns  and  mortars. 
On  the  night  of  the  3d,  however,  Johnston  evacuated 
his  lines,  leaving  behind  him  all  his  heavy  guns 
and  large  quantities  of  ammunition  and  supplies,  and 
retired  on  Williamsburg ;  and,  the  next  day,  the 
Federal  troops  occupied  Yorktown. 

The  Confederate  generals  had  not  expected  to 
detain  their  antagonists  so  long  in  the  Peninsula. 
General  Johnston,  who  had  fallen  back  from  the 
Rapidan  to  Richmond  with  the  bulk  of  his  forces 
early  in  April,  as  soon  as  it  was  known  that  the 
Union  army  had  landed  at  Fortress  Monroe,  had 
been  entrusted  by  President  Davis  with  the  com- 
mand of  the  troops  in  the  Peninsula  and  at  Norfolk, 
then  under  Magruder  and  Huger.1  He  had  visited 
Yorktown,  and,  while  approving  fully  of  Magruder's 
dispositions,  had  recognized  that  the  Federal  gen- 

1  1 8  W.  R.,  846. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  109 

eral  might  turn  the  position  by  capturing  the  bat- 
teries and  ascending  the  York  River,  if  indeed  he 
did  not  succeed  in  carrying  by  assault  some  weak 
place  in  the  line  to  the  south  of  Yorktown.1 

Johnston,  accordingly,  advocated,  on  his  return  to 
Richmond  about  the  middle  of  April,  that  no  more 
troops  should  be  sent  to  the  Peninsula,  where  the  con- 
ditions were  very  unfavorable  for  the  health  of  the 
men,  but,  rather,  that  all  the  available  Confederate 
forces  should  be  concentrated  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Richmond,  so  that  it  might  be  possible  to  attack 
McClellan  on  his  arrival  with  an  army  equal  or  su- 
perior in  numbers  to  his  own.  He  urged  that 
troops  be  brought  from  the  Atlantic  coast,  and  that 
when  Magruder  should  be  forced  to  evacuate  the 
lines  of  Yorktown,  Norfolk  also  should  be  aban- 
doned, and  its  garrison,  under  General  Huger,  should 
be  brought  to  Richmond.  In  these  views  General 
Johnston  was  seconded  by  General  G.  "W.  Smith.2 

Randolph,  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War,  on 
the  other  hand,  and  General  Lee,  who  had  on  the 
13th  of  March  been  entrusted  with  the  conduct, — 
under  the  President, — of  all  the  military  operations 
in  the  Confederacy,3  recommended  that  Johnston's 
army  be  sent  to  reinforce  Magruder ;  and  President 
Davis,  after  a  long  hearing,  finally  so  decided.4 


1  Johnston's  Narrative^  112,  113. 

1  /<*.,  113-115  ;  Smith's  C.  W.  P.,  41  et  seq. 

8  5  W.  R.,  1099. 

4  General  Smith  states  that  the  loss  to  the  Confederates  in  the  trenches 
near  Yorktown  from  "  exposure,  impure  water,  and  consequent  disease" 
was  very  great.  Smith's  C.  W.  P.,  44.  See  Hill  to  Randolph,  April  21, 
1862  ;  14  W.  R.,  454.  Also  Hill's  Report,  12  W.  R.,  606. 


no  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

Hence  when  McClellan's  preparations  had  rendered 
Yorktown  untenable,  the  whole  Confederate  army, 
instead  of  Magruder's  command  only,  was  obliged 
to  fall  back  to  Richmond. 

The  Confederates  retired  in  fairly  good  order  and 
condition.  The  Federal  advance-guard  came  up 
with  them  on  the  5th  of  May,  and  an  obstinately 
contested  and  bloody  action  was  fought  at  "Williams- 
burg,  in  which  the  Federals  lost  five  guns,  although 
the  encounter  terminated  on  the  whole  somewhat  in 
their  favor. 

General  McClellan  did  not  arrive  on  the  field  of 
Williamsburg  until  the  action  was  practically  over. 
He  had  stayed  at  Yorktown  to  give  his  personal 
attention  to  the  embarkation  of  the  divisions  of 
Franklin,  Sedgwick,  Porter,  and  Richardson,  which 
were  to  proceed  up  the  York  River  towards  West 
Point  (where  the  York  is  formed  by  the  confluence 
of  the  Pamunkey  and  Mattapony  rivers),  and  thence 
a  short  distance  up  the  Pamunkey  to  a  point  known 
as  Eltham's  Landing,  nearly  opposite  West  Point. 
Here  they  were  to  land ;  and  when  they  had  con- 
centrated, they  were  to  move  upon  Johnston's  array 
and  its  trains  as  they  were  retreating  from  York- 
town.  But,  owing  to  the  shallowness  of  the  water 
and  other  causes,1  it  took  a  long  time  to  get  Frank- 
lin's troops  on  board  the  transports,  and  it  was  not 
until  the  7th  that  they  disembarked,  joined  only  by 
one  brigade  of  Sedgwick's  division.  They  were  very 
short  of  provisions  and  forage  ;  and,  before  the  other 

1  See  Franklin's  letter  in  McClellan's  O.  S.,  336;  also  12  W.  R.,  614 
et  seq. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  m 

troops  could  arrive,  they  were  attacked  by  the  Con- 
federates under  G.  "W.  Smith,  whose  only  object  was 
to  hinder  any  movement  of  the  Federal  force  towards 
the  roads  on  which  the  army  of  Johnston  was  mov- 
ing. This  object  was  accomplished,  and  the  retreat- 
ing Confederates  passed  on  unhindered  towards 
Richmond.  Thus  the  flanking  movement,  on  which 
General  McClellan  had  apparently  counted  to  win 
for  him  a  decided  advantage,  had  secured  only  a 
comparatively  easy  advance  of  his  right  wing  as  far 
as  West  Point. 

The  left  wing  and  centre  followed  the  retreating 
Confederates  very  leisurely.  On  the  16th  McClellan 
established  his  headquarters  at  White  House  on  the 
Pamunkey. 

Meantime  the  Confederates  had  met  with  a  serious 
loss  in  the  capture  of  Norfolk  and  the  destruction  of 
their  famous  ironclad.  The  evacuation  of  Yorktown 
had  rendered  Norfolk  an  easy  prey  to  the  Federal 
forces,  which  on  May  10th  occupied  the  place  and 
its  defences.  The  Merrimac  was  found  to  draw  too 
much  water  to  go  up  the  river,  and  it  was  of  course 
out  of  the  question  for  her  to  keep  the  sea,  now  that 
the  only  port  where  she  could  procure  supplies  was 
closed  to  her.  Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  May 
llth,  she  was  blown  up  by  her  commander,  Commo- 
dore Tattnall.1  The  James  River  was  now  open  to 
the  Federal  fleet  to  a  point  about  seven  or  eight 
miles  from  Richmond.  There,  on  high  ground  known 
as  Drewry's  Bluff,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  a 
fort  had  been  constructed,  and  obstructions  had  been 

1  Soley,  78,  79. 


ii2  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

placed  in  the  channel.  A  fleet  under  Commodore 
Rodgers,  consisting  of  the  Galena  and  other  iron- 
clads, attempting  to  silence  the  work  and  pass  up 
the  river,  was  defeated  on  the  15th  of  May  after  a 
four  hours'  contest.1  But  up  to  that  point  the  James 
was  open  to  the  Federal  vessels. 

Let  us  now  cast  a  glance  at  the  general  situation. 

The  rivers  between  which  lay  the  Peninsula  were 
both  available  for  the  operations  of  the  United 
States  forces.  The  Federal  fleet,  now  that  the  Her- 
rimao  was  destroyed,  held  the  undisputed  control  of 
the  sea  and  of  all  navigable  waters.  The  army  of 
General  McClellan  was  being  supplied  at  White 
House  on  the  Pamunkey  with  forage,  provisions, 
and  ammunition  brought  by  water  from  Washing- 
ton and  New  York.  Scarcely  sixty  miles  away,  on 
the  Rappahannock,  opposite  Fredericksburg,2  lay  the 
corps  of  McDowell,  30,000  strong,  awaiting  only  the 
arrival  of  Shields's  division  of  Banks's  corps  before 
it  should  receive  the  order  to  march  south  and  take 
part  in  the  capture  of  Richmond.  McClellan's  army 
could  be  pushed  forward  from  White  House  as  a 
base  to  the  north  of  Richmond,  in  which  case  the 
small  Confederate  force  under  General  Anderson 
which  now  confronted  McDowell  would  be  placed 
between  two  fires,  and  unless  reinforced  with  the 
bulk  of  Johnston's  army,  obliged  to  retreat.  The 
junction  with  McDowell's  command  could  then  be 
effected  without  difficulty.  Or,  if  it  should  be 

1  12  W.  R.,636  ;  see,  also,  14  W.  R.,  177-179.  The  isth  of  May,  1862, 
was  Thursday. 

*  The  city  was  occupied  by  one  brigade  of  Union  troops.  18  W.  R.,  170, 
171  ;  Schriver  to  King. 


THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  113 

thought  advisable  for  McClellan  to  advance  along 
the  south  side  of  the  Peninsula,  a  base  of  supplies 
could  easily  be  arranged  for  his  army  on  the  north 
side  of  the  James.  Or,  the  river  might  be  crossed, 
and  City  Point  might  with  equal  ease  be  selected  as 
the  base  of  supplies.  Petersburg  was  absolutely  un- 
defended,1 and  could  be  occupied  without  opposi- 
tion. Any  troops  which  the  administration  could 
spare  from  the  forces  charged  with  the  defence  of 
the  Capital  might  be  sent  by  water  to  join  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  This  last  line  of  operations  was  in 
truth  the  one  which  promised  the  best  results.  If 
Petersburg  should  be  occupied  in  force  by  the  Fed- 
erals, it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  Confederates  could 
expect  long  to  retain  their  hold  on  Richmond. 

In  fact,  in  every  way,  the  situation  was  undenia- 
bly a  threatening  one  for  the  Confederates.  Small 
progress  had  been  made  with  the  fortifications 
around  Richmond.  The  army,  though  always  ready 
for  a  fight,  had  lost  in  numbers  and  moral  by  its 
experience  in  the  trenches  near  Yorktown,  through 
the  effect  of  inaction,  malaria,  and  unwonted  hard- 
ships caused  by  the  heavy  rains  and  the  swampy 
land.  Its  condition  was  not  improved  by  having 
been  compelled  to  evacuate  its  position  and  retreat 
before  its  antagonist.  The  discipline  was  exceed- 
ingly lax.  "  Stragglers,"  wrote  Johnston  to  Lee  on 
May  9th,  "cover  the  country,  and  Richmond  is  no 
doubt  filled  with  the  '  absent  without  leave.'  .  .  . 
The  men  are  full  of  spirit  when  near  the  enemy,  but 
at  other  times,  to  avoid  restraint,  leave  their  regi- 

1  14  W.  R.,  493,  495  ;  2  B.  &  L.,  386,  n. 

VOL.  II. — 8 


ii4  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 


ments  in  crowds.  To  enable  us  to  gather  the  whole 
army  for  battle  would  require  a  notice  of  several 
days."  > 

The  Confederate  authorities,  both  civil  and  mili- 
tary, were  also  well  aware  that  McClellan's  army, 
apart  from  McDowell's  corps,  outnumbered  that  of 
Johnston  nearly  three  to  two,  the  latter  being  only 
about  50,000  strong.  Johnston  urged  on  General 
Lee,  who,  under  President  Davis,  had  control  of  the 
military  operations  of  the  Confederacy,  the  absolute 
necessity  "  of  concentrating  near  Richmond  all  the 
troops  within  reach.  ...  If  the  President,"  said 
he,  "  will  direct  the  concentration  of  all  the  troops 
of  North  Carolina  and  eastern  Virginia,  we  may  be 
able  to  hold  middle  Virginia  at  least.  If  we  permit 
ourselves  to  be  driven  beyond  Richmond,  we  lose 
the  means  of  maintaining  this  army.  ...  A 
concentration  of  all  our  available  forces  may  enable 
us  to  fight  successfully.  Let  us  try." 2 

The  tone  of  this  letter  from  the  front  is  certainly 
not  hopeful.  In  Richmond,  preparations  were  made 
for  the  instant  removal  of  the  military  papers.3 
Even  Mr.  Davis  spoke  in  a  letter  to  Johnston  of  the 
"  drooping  cause  of  our  country."  *  It  is  clear  that 
the  leading  men  in  the  Confederacy  believed  the 
military  situation  to  be  one  of  extreme  gravity. 
And,  in  fact,  it  seems  reasonably  certain  that  if  the 
force  at  the  disposal  of  the  United  States  Govern- 

1  14  W.  R.,  503.  Cf.  Hill  to  Randolph,  /<$.,  506,  and  Hill's  Report,  12 
W.  R.,  606. 

8  14  W.  R.,  506,— May  10,  1862.  See,  also,  D.  H.  Hill  to  Randolph, 
Ib.,  544. 

3  Ib.,  504,— same  date.  4/£.,  508,  May  n,  1862. 


1 86 2]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  115 

merit  in  the  middle  of  May,  1862,  had  been  exerted 
with  good  judgment,  Richmond  would  soon  have 
fallen,  and  Virginia,  and  perhaps  North  Carolina, 
been  wrested  from  the  Southern  Confederacy.1 

Leaving  now,  for  the  moment,  the  story  of  the 
operations  of  the  army  under  the  immediate  com- 
mand of  General  McClellan,  let  us  see  what  was 
being  done  in  other  parts  of  Virginia. 

When  McClellan  left  Washington  to  take  the  field 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  relieved  from  the  responsibility  of  directing  the 
other  forces  of  the  United  States,  and  was  strictly 
confined  to  the  command  of  the  Army  (or  Depart- 
ment) of  the  Potomac,2  on  the  ground  that  this  task 
required  all  his  attention.  The  Government  should 
now  have  entrusted  to  some  competent  officer, — Gen- 
eral McDowell,  for  instance, — the  control  of  all  the 
other  forces  in  the  Virginia  theatre  of  war,  so  as  to 
have  ensured  unity  of  design  and  action  in  their  man- 
agement. Instead  of  doing  this,  they  divided  the 
theatre  of  war  into  Departments,  so  called,  and  put 
in  control  of  each  an  officer  of  high  rank.  The  re- 
gion lying  west  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  constituted 
one  of  these  districts,  called  the  Mountain  Depart- 
ment, and  to  this  General  Fre'mont  was  assigned.3 
Early  in  April  two  Departments  were  carved  out  of 
the  Department  of  the  Potomac, — that  of  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  which  included  the  District  of  Columbia, 
which  was  entrusted  to  General  McDowell,  and  that 
of  the  Shenandoah,  which  was  given  to  General 
Banks.4  The  President  and  Secretary  of  War  re- 

1  Cf.  Allan,  59.      s  See  Part  I.,  255.      3  5  W.  R.,  54.      4i8W.  R.,  43. 


n6  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

served  to  themselves  the  general  control  of  military 
operations  in  all  parts  of  the  country,  and  the  gen- 
erals in  command  of  the  Departments  were  instructed 
to  report  directly  to  the  Secretary. 

In  addition  to  the  blame  which  deservedly  rests 
upon  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Stanton  for  the  unneces- 
sary division  of  the  theatre  of  war  into  separate  dis- 
tricts, the  assumption  by  these  two  civilians  of 
military  command  has  afforded  great  opportunity 
for  harsh  and  sarcastic  criticism.1  And,  in  truth,  to 
a  certain  extent,  the  conduct  of  the  President  and 
Secretary  deserves  severe  criticism,  as  we  shall  soon 
have  occasion  to  see.  But  when  it  is  remembered 
how  very  little  experience  in  war  was  possessed  by 
any  of  the  generals,  and  especially  when  we  bear  in 
mind  that  the  grievous  shortcomings  of  General  Mc- 
Clellan  must  have  been  patent  to  the  eyes  of  the 
chiefs  of  the  administration,  we  cannot  wonder  at 
their  reserving  to  themselves  the  general  superintend- 
ence of  affairs.  Had  they  confined  themselves  to 
this,  and  this  only,  had  they  abstained  strictly  from 
undertaking  to  plan  campaigns,  and  especially  had 
they  always  kept  themselves  open  to  advice  from  the 
military  men  in  charge  of  the  immediate  operations, 
it  is  quite  possible  that  they  would  have  managed 
well  enough.  That  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Stanton 
intended  to  do  their  best  for  the  success  of  General 
McClellan's  campaign,  cannot,  in  our  opinion,  be 
seriously  doubted ;  that  they  were  utterly  without 
an  intelligent  grasp  of  the  fundamental  principles 
by  which  the  conduct  of  all  military  operations 

1  See  Swinton,  122. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  117 

should  be  regulated,  is,  in  our  opinion,  equally 
plain. 

Returning  now  to  the  actual  situation  of  affairs  * : 
Fremont's  main  body  was  at  and  near  a  place  in  the 
heart  of  the  Alleghanies  called  Franklin,  about  forty 
miles  in  a  straight  line  west  of  New  Market,  a  town 
on  the  Shenandoah  Valley  turnpike  nearly  thirty 
miles  southwest  of  Strasburg.  One  brigade  of  his 
army  under  Milroy,  numbering  about  3500  men,2 
had  pushed  through  the  mountains,  and,  about  the 
1st  of  May,  appeared  near  McDowell,8  a  village  about 
twenty-five  miles  northwest  of  Staunton,  a  town  at 
the  southern  or  upper  end  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley. 
It  was  supposed  that  Fremont  could  put  about 
15,000  men  into  the  field  in  this  region.  Banks's 
headquarters  were  at  New  Market,  but  he  occupied 
Harrisonburg4  with  some  19,000  men, — the  divisions 
of  Williams  and  Shields  and  some  cavalry.  The  rest 
of  his  corps  was  guarding  his  communications.  Mc- 
Dowell, with  30,000  men,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  op- 
posite Fredericksburg.5 

Jackson,  after  his  defeat  at  Kernstown  on  March 
23d,6  had  fallen  back  to  Swift  Run  Gap,  in  the  Blue 
Ridge,  eighteen  miles  southeast  of  Harrisonburg, 
ready  to  move  on  Banks's  communications  should  he 
attempt  an  advance  on  Staunton.  He  had,  on  the 
1st  of  May,  over  8000  men  with  him.7  A  force  of 
3000  Confederates,  under  Edward  Johnson,8  was  ob- 
serving Milroy,  and  a  division  under  Ewell,  8000 

1  See  Map  IV.,  facing  page  132.  *  Ante,  112. 

s  15  W.  R.,  7.  •  See  Part  I.,  253. 

*i8W.  R.,  123.  '  18  W.  R.,  879. 

4  Gordon,  164.  *  Allan's  Jackson,  66. 


n8  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

strong,1  was  at  or  near  Gordonsville.  Jackson's 
total  force  thus  amounted  to  some  19,000  men. 

There  were  two  weak  points  in  the  distribution  of 
the  Federal  forces. 

In  the  first  place,  there  was  no  excuse  for  keeping 
the  15,000  men  under  Fremont  out  of  the  field  of 
active  operations.  By  far  the  larger  part  of  his  com- 
mand should  have  been  employed  to  augment  the 
force  under  Banks,  which  was  originally  fixed  at 
about  23,000  men,  but  which,  owing  to  the  deten- 
tion of  the  brigades  of  Abercrombie  and  Geary  and 
other  troops  on  or  near  the  line  of  the  Manassas  Gap 
railway,  had  now  fallen  far  below  that  figure.  These 
troops,  in  fact,  had  now  been  added  to  the  force 
under  McDowell,  so  that  Banks's  corps  consisted  on 
May  1st  almost  entirely  of  the  divisions  of  Williams 
and  Shields,  and  Shields's  division  was  on  the  1st  of 
May2  ordered  to  join  McDowell.  The  column  in 
the  Valley  ought,  therefore,  to  have  been  augmented 
at  once  by  the  greater  part  of  the  troops  under  Fre- 
mont, who  were  wholly  useless  where  they  were. 
But  to  do  this  would,  in  all  probability,  have  aroused 
jealousies  and  created  misunderstandings.  The  ad- 
ministration, in  fact,  had  tied  its  own  hands  by  the 
creation  of  these  independent  Departments  within 
the  limits  of  the  theatre  of  war. 

In  the  second  place,  Banks,  with  his  small  force, 
was  at  Harrisonburg,  a  great  deal  too  far  to  the 
front.  In  fact  this  was  the  opinion  of  the  Secretaiy 
of  War,  who,  on  the  very  day  when  Shields  was  or- 
dered to  join  McDowell,  directed  Banks  to  fall  back 

1  Allan's  Jackson,  68.  *  18  W.  R.,  121. 


i862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  119 

to  Strasburg.1  Strasburg  was  selected  because  it 
was  the  western  terminus  of  the  Manassas  Gap  rail- 
road,2 and  it  was  naturally  considered  undesirable  to 
retreat  behind  that  line  of  intercommunication  be- 
tween the  force  under  McDowell  and  that  under 
Banks. 

Banks,  however,  was  extremely  unwilling  to  re- 
treat. He  was  a  civilian,  possessed  of  some  familiar- 
ity with  militia  organization, — in  fact  he  had  done  a 
good  deal,  when  Governor  of  Massachusetts,  to  put 
the  militia  of  that  State  on  a  sound  footing, — and  he 
was  a  brave  and  even  a  pugnacious  man.  He  wanted 
nothing  better  than  to  fight  a  battle.  He  knew  little 
about  the  theory  or  practice  of  war,  but  he  was 
always  ready  for  a  fight.  Unfortunately,  in  an 
emergency  of  this  kind,  his  stolid  courage  was  not 
only  out  of  place,  but  it  imperilled  the  safety  of  his 
command. 

General  Lee,  who  was  at  this  time  in  general 
charge  of  the  military  operations  of  the  Confederacy, 
recognized  fully  that  the  real  danger  lay  in  a  move- 
ment upon  Richmond  by  the  force  under  General 
McDowell.  Federal  troops  were  arriving  near  Fred- 
ericksburg  in  the  latter  part  of  April  in  considerable 
numbers ;  and  it  was  a  serious  question  with  General 
Lee  whether  it  would  not  be  best  to  attempt  to  de- 
feat them.3  On  the  other  hand,  Lee  saw  that  "  to 


1  18  W.  R.,  122. 

2  At  this  time,  however,  the  road  was  not  completed  beyond  Front  Royal, 
which  was  about  a  mile  south  of  the  main  line,  and  connected  with  it  by  a 
branch  railroad. 

3  Jackson  to  Lee,   18  W.  R.,  863  ;  Lee  to  Jackson,  /£.,  865  ;  Lee  to 
Ewell,  Ib.,  866. 


izo           THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

strike  a  speedy  blow  at  Banks  "  would  "  tend  to  re- 
lieve the  pressure  on  Fredericksburg."  *  Jackson, 
who  was  directly  opposed  to  Banks,  although  he 
somewhat  exaggerated  the  strength  of  Banks's 
army,  was  in  favor  of  an  attempt  to  drive  Banks 
from  the  Valley.  He  wrote  to  Lee  on  the  28th  of 
April,2  asking  for  5000  more  men,  and  saying :  "  Now, 
it  appears  to  me,  is  the  golden  opportunity."  On 
the  next  day  he  laid  his  plans  before  Lee,3  and  that 
officer,  while  feeling  compelled  to  deny  him  the  rein- 
forcements he  desired,  saw  that  the  end  which  he 
had  in  view  could  be  gained  in  this  way,  and  accord- 
ingly authorized  him  to  make  use  of  the  troops  of 
Ewell  and  Johnson,  and  to  proceed  as  he  might 
think  best.4  At  this  time,  May  1st,  Johnston  was 
still  holding  McClellan  before  the  lines  of  Yorktown, 
and  Richmond  could  not  be  considered  as  being  in 
immediate  danger. 

Jackson's  first  movement  was  intended  to  disem- 
barrass himself  of  Milroy's  force.  Bringing  Ewell 
up  to  Swift  Run  Gap  to  watch  Banks,  he  himself, 
by  a  skilfully  contrived  movement  which  was  well 
calculated  to  conceal  his  real  object,  marched  by 
way  of  Conrad's  Store,  Port  Republic,  and  Brown's 
Gap  to  Mechum's  Station  on  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad,  on  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  whence 
he  proceeded  by  rail  to  Staunton,  which  place  he 
reached  on  May  4th.  Here  he  was  joined  by  the 
brigade  of  General  Edward  Johnson.  He  then 

J  Lee  to  Ewell,  18  W.  R.,  859  ;  Lee  to  Jackson,  Ib.,  859. 

1  Jackson  to  Lee,  Ib.t  870. 

'/*.,  872.  *  Ib.,    875,  878. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  121 

marched  on  McDowell,  where  Milroy's  brigade,  now 
reinforced  by  that  of  Schenck,  awaited  him,  and  a 
smart  action  was  fought  on  the  8th.  The  Federal 
generals  tried  to  overwhelm  the  advance-guard  of 
Jackson's  forces,  but  were  finally  compelled  to  retire, 
having,  however,  inflicted  a  severer  loss  on  their  an- 
tagonists than  that  which  they  themselves  suffered.1 
Schenck,  who  was  in  command,  "fell  back  by  grad- 
ual stages  to  Franklin,  taking  advantage  of  the 
rugged  country  to  hold  the  pursuers  in  check."2 
Jackson  followed  him  as  far  as  that  place,  but  find- 
ing Fremont  in  force  and  well  posted,  he  gave  up 
further  efforts  in  this  direction,  and,  on  May  12th, 
fell  back  to  McDowell,  and  from  thence  to  Lebanon 
Springs,  where  a  road  to  Harrisonburg  branches  off 
from  the  road  to  Staunton.  Here  he  rested  a  day, 
and,  on  the  17th,  began  his  march  towards  Har- 
risonburg. 

By  these  operations  Jackson  had,  for  the  time  be- 
ing, got  rid  of  Fremont's  interference  with  his  pro- 
jected movement  against  Banks.  It  is  true,  he  had 
not  defeated,  still  less  broken  up,  any  part  of  Fre- 
mont's forces.  The  conduct  of  the  Federal  generals 
and  of  their  troops  had  been  in  every  way  satisfac- 
tory and  creditable,  and  quite  as  successful  as  could 
have  been  expected.  Still,  for  the  present,  the  way 
was  open  for  an  attack  on  Banks's  isolated  column  ; 
and,  in  the  meantime,  fortune  had  interposed  to  favor 
Jackson's  projects. 

When  Jackson  began  his  march  against  Milroy, 
Banks  had  a  force  of  some  19,000  men.  But  now, 

1  Allan's  Jackson,  78,  n.  2  Ib.,  79. 


122  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

while  Jackson  was  pursuing  Schenck  and  Milroy 
into  the  mountains,  Shields's  division  of  11,000  men1 
had  been  taken  from  Banks's  command,  and  sent  to 
Fredericksburg.  Banks  in  fact  had  at  Strasburg, 
where  he  arrived  on  May  13th,  only  6800  men,  in- 
fantry and  cavalry,  with  16  guns.3  Some  1500 
more  were  at  and  near  Front  Royal  and  other  sta- 
tions on  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad.  Upon  these 
troops  Jackson  could  bring  a  force  of  more  than 
double  their  numbers.  It  required  no  special  mili- 
tary aptitude  to  seize  such  an  opportunity  as  this. 
Jackson  in  fact  aimed  at  nothing  less  than  capturing 
Banks's  entire  command. 

When  Jackson  left  Swift  Run  Gap,  Ewell,  as  we 
have  seen,  occupied  it,  to  guard  against  any  offensive 
movement  which  might  be  undertaken  by  Banks ; 
and  when  Jackson  retired  from  Franklin  he  ordered 
Ewell  forward,  so  that  they  might  join  forces  on  the 
Valley  turnpike,  and  together  overwhelm  Banks. 
On  his  arrival  at  New  Market  on  May  20th,  Jackson 
was  joined  by  one  brigade  of  Ewell's  division.  But 
here  the  Confederate  general,  with  an  astuteness 
which  merits  all  praise,  left  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
turnpike,  and  on  the  21st,  turning  abruptly  to  the 
right,  crossed  the  Massanutton  Mountain  and  the 
South  Fork  of  the  Shenandoah  into  the  Page  or 
Luray  Valley,  through  which  the  Federal  general 
had  not  expected  his  adversary  to  advance.  At  the 
bridge  he  found  Ewell's  other  brigades.  The  march 
was  resumed  on  the  22d,  and  the  neighborhood  of 
Front  Royal  was  reached  that  evening.  Here  Colo- 

1  18  W.  R.,  134.  *  15  W.  R.,  524. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  123 

nel  Kenly  was  stationed,  with  the  1st  Maryland  regi- 
ment of  nearly  a  thousand  men,  guarding  the  station 
of  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad,  and  the  bridge  which 
carries  it  over  the  Shenandoah  River.  Jackson's 
march  had  not  only  been  made  swiftly,  but  secretly. 
No  Federal  pickets  had  been  encountered.  The 
duty  of  watching  the  Luray  Valley  appears  to  have 
been  utterly  neglected. 

On  the  23d  the  Confederates  advanced,  and  in  the 
afternoon  made  their  dispositions  for  the  attack. 
Kenly  at  first  attempted  to  hold  his  ground,  but, 
finding  himself  largely  outnumbered,  had  no  re- 
source but  to  abandon  the  post,  which  with  a  large 
amount  of  stores  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
His  command  retired  on  the  road  to  Winchester,  but 
was  headed  off  by  the  Confederate  cavalry,  and,  on 
their  infantry  coming  up,  nearly  the  entire  force  was 
captured. 

Banks  had  expected  that  Jackson  would  move 
upon  him,  but  he  certainly  did  not  anticipate  the 
celerity  and  secrecy  which  characterized  this  rapid 
advance  of  his  antagonist.  On  the  22d  he  wrote  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,1  stating  his  situation  fully, 
and  expressing  his  inability  to  hold  his  position  with 
his  present  force.  On  the  evening  of  the  23d  he 
learned  at  Strasburg  of  the  disaster  which  had  be- 
fallen Kenly  at  Front  Royal.  Early  in  the  morning 
of  the  24th  he  proposed  to  "  stand  firm,"  2  but, 
shortly  after,  he  became  satisfied  that  he  could  not 
hold  Strasburg,3  and  he  fell  back  towards  Winches- 
ter with  his  trains.  Jackson,  moving  from  Front 

1  15  W.  R.,  524.  2  Ib.,  526.  3 16.,  527. 


i24  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

Royal,  was  on  his  flank,  and  made  every  exertion  to 
reach  the  turnpike  before  him ;  but  so  exhausted 
were  his  troops  with  their  long  and  rapid  marches, 
that  the  whole  of  Banks's  column  preceded  the  pur- 
suing Confederates,  who  managed  only  to  pick  up  a 
few  wagons  and  stragglers.  Even  this  might  have 
been  prevented  if  Banks  had  not,  with  foolhardy 
obstinacy,  refused  to  credit  the  information  brought 
him,  and  to  take  the  advice  of  those  educated  offi- 
cers who  (like  Gordon,  commanding  one  of  his  bri- 
gades) urged  him  in  the  evening  of  the  23d  to  fall 
back  to  Winchester  with  all  speed.  Banks  was  in- 
deed loath  to  retreat.1  But  circumstances  were  too 
much  for  him,  and  he  finally  gave  the  order,  just  in 
time  to  save  his  command  from  being  destroyed  by 
the  superior  forces  with  which  Jackson  was  hurry- 
ing forward  to  cut  him  off.  On  the  evening  of  the 
24th  the  rear-guard  of  the  Federal  army  was  hard 
pressed  by  the  Confederates  under  Jackson  himself, 
but  Gordon's  brigade  repulsed  every  attack  with  ad- 
mirable steadiness  and  coolness.2 

The  next  morning,  the  25th,  at  Winchester,  Banks, 
instead  of  continuing  his  retreat,  which  he  was 
strongly  urged  to  do,8  and  although  he  was  perfectly 
aware  that  "  the  enemy's  force  was  overwhelming," 4 
"determined  [to  use  his  own  language]  to  test  the 
substance  and  strength  of  the  enemy  by  actual 
collision,"  and  made  his  dispositions  on  the  heights 
south  of  the  town  to  receive  Jackson's  attack.  His 

1  See  Gordon,  191-193. 

*  Ib.,  219-224  ;  Allan's  Jatksen,  107. 

3  Gordon,  225. 

4  Banks's  Report,  15  W.  R.,  549.     See  Gordon,  248,  249. 


1 86 2]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  125 

force  consisted  of  about  6500  men  of  all  arms.  It 
made  a  gallant  defence,  but  the  Confederate  supe- 
riority in  numbers  was  too  great  to  admit  of  doing 
more  than  holding  the  position  for  a  few  hours. 
Finally  the  Federal  right  was  turned,  and  the 
soldiers  of  Banks  were  obliged  to  abandon  their 
position.  In  tolerable  order  they  made  the  best  of 
their  way  through  the  streets  of  Winchester ;  then, 
in  a  state  of  considerable  disorganization,  they  re- 
treated to  Martinsburg,  reaching  it  that  afternoon. 
After  a  brief  rest  the  troops  resumed  their  march 
for  the  Potomac,  which  was  crossed  at  Williamsport 
without  interruption  during  the  early  morning  hours 
of  the  26th. 

There  was  no  pursuit  worth  speaking  of.  Jack- 
son's infantry  were  too  much  fatigued  with  their 
previous  marches,  and  perhaps  with  the  labors  of 
the  battle,  where  also  their  loss  had  been  considerable, 
to  press  with  any  vigor  upon  the  Federal  rear-guard. 
His  cavalry  lost  valuable  time  through  the  fault  of 
their  commander,1  and  accomplished  little.  Only  the 
stragglers  were  picked  up. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  25th,  Jackson  "  placed 
his  army  in  camp  at  Stephenson's,  five  miles  north  of 
Winchester." 2  Here  he  remained  until  the  morning 
of  the  28th,  when  he  pushed  a  small  force  upon 
Charlestown.  On  the  29th  he  moved  forward  with 
his  whole  army  to  Halltown,  and  menaced  Harper's 
Ferry.  He  had  found  at  Winchester  large  quantities 
of  small  arms,  ammunition,  medical  stores,  and  other 

1  15  W.  R.,  706.     See  Allan's  Jackson,  115. 
9  Allan's  Jackson,  123. 


126  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

supplies,  and  it  took  several  days  to  make  up  the 
trains  in  which  these  acquisitions  could  be  trans- 
ported, and  to  get  the  convoys  fairly  started  for  the 
South.  He  may  also  have  thought  that,  by  threaten- 
ing an  invasion  of  Maryland  and  the  North,  he  would 
induce  the  Federal  Government  to  change  its  plans 
for  the  uninterrupted  prosecution  of  the  campaign 
against  Richmond.1 

But,  in  point  of  fact,  this  object  had  been,  un- 
known to  him,  already  attained.  President  Lincoln 
and  his  Secretary  of  War,  when  they  heard  of 
Jackson's  advance  down  the  Valley  and  attack  on 
the  Federal  force  at  Front  Royal,  ordered  McDow- 
ell, on  the  afternoon  of  May  24th,  "  laying  aside  for 
the  present  the  movement  on  Richmond,  to  piit 
20,000  men  in  motion  at  once  for  the  Shenandoah, 
moving  on  the  line  or  in  advance  of  the  line  of  the 
Manassas  Gap  railroad,"  with  the  object  of  captur- 
ing the  forces  of  Jackson  and  Ewell.2  Similar  or- 
ders were  at  the  same  time  sent  by  telegraph  to 
Fremont,  who  was  at  Franklin,  and  who  was  not 
only  "  directed  to  move  against  Jackson  at  Harrison- 
burg,  and  operate  against  the  enemy  in  such  way  as 
to  relieve  Banks,"3 — a  movement  obviously  called 
for  under  the  circumstances, — but  was  informed  on 
the  next  day  *  that  the  object  was  "  to  cut  off  and 
capture  this  rebel  force  in  the  Shenandoah."  Mc- 
Clellan  was  notified,5  on  the  24th,  that  the  President 
had  suspended  McDowell's  movements  to  join  him. 

1  Allan's  Jackson,  124,  citing  Dabney's  Life  of  Jackson,  386.  There  are 
apparently  no  despatches  or  letters  bearing  on  this  point  in  the  War 
Records. 

*i8W.  R.,  219.       3  15  W.  R.,  643.       *  Ib.,  644.       *I2W.  R.,30. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  127 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  this  substitution  of  a 
scheme  for  the  capture  of  Jackson's  force  in  place  of 
the  plan  of  uniting  McDowell's  command  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac 1  was  adopted  on  the  day  be- 
fore the  battle  of  Winchester,  and  five  days  before 
Jackson's  main  force  made  its  appearance  near 
Harper's  Ferry.2  It  is  therefore  not  correct  to  say 
that  the  action  taken  by  Mr.  Lincoln  in  thus  aban- 
doning, for  the  time  being,  the  plan  of  overwhelming 
the  Confederate  force  at  Richmond  by  the  union  of 
McDowell's  40,000  men  to  the  army  of  General 
McClellan  was  induced  by  "  Jackson's  apparition  at 
Winchester  and  his  sudden  advance  to  Harper's 
Ferry."3  The  President's  decision  was  formed  be- 
fore these  events  took  place ;  and  while  it  is  no 
doubt  true  that  "  a  desperate  push  upon  Harper's 
Ferry "  was  apprehended,4  the  character  of  the 
movements  prescribed  to  McDowell  and  Fremont 
shows  conclusively  that  their  object  was  nothing 
less  than  the  capture  of  the  daring  Confederate 
general.  For  the  defence  of  the  line  of  the  Potomac, 
troops  were  ordered  from  Baltimore  and  other  places. 
To  ensure  Jackson's  withdrawal  from  the  frontier  it 
was  simply  necessary  to  order  Fremont  to  move  into 
the  Valley.  It  is,  in  truth,  only  too  plain  that  the 
administration  thought  that  there  was  a  chance  here 
for  a  very  pretty  strategical  operation,  which  was  in 
their  judgment  likely  to  result  in  an  important  suc- 
cess. The  motive  was,  in  fact,  similar  to  that  which 

1  Ante,  112. 

*  Jackson's  Report,  15  W.  R.,  707. 

3  Swinton,  125  ;  Webb,  92. 

4  Lincoln  to  McClellan,  12  W.  R.,  30. 


iz8          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.         [1862 

had,  in  March,  induced  Mr.  Lincoln  to  detach  Blen- 
ker's  division  from  McClellan's  army  and  give  it  to 
Fremont,  to  enable  him  to  capture  Knoxville.1 

The  new  scheme  found  no  favor  among  the  mili- 
tary men.  McClellan,  as  was  but  natural,  was  bit- 
terly opposed  to  it,  although  he  refrained  from 
sending  in  any  remonstrance.  McDowell  did  not 
try  to  conceal  his  amazement  and  regret.  "The 
President's  order,"  wrote  he  to  the  Secretary,  "  is  a 
crushing  blow  to  us."  2  He  explained  to  the  Presi- 
dent that,  so  far  as  helping  Banks  was  concerned, 
"  no  celerity  or  vigor  "  would  "  avail "  anything. 
He  pointed  out  that  "  the  line  of  retreat  of  "  Jack- 
son's "  forces  up  the  Valley  "  was  shorter  than  his 
to  go  against  him.  "  I  feel,"  said  he,  "  that  it 
throws  us  all  back,  and  from  Richmond  north  we  shall 
have  all  our  large  masses  paralyzed,  and  shall  have 
to  repeat  what  we  have  just  accomplished." 3  Fre"- 
mont,  short  of  supplies,  in  a  country  where  the 
mountain  roads  had  been  rendered  almost  impassable 
by  a  protracted  storm,  was  in  no  condition  to  move 
at  any  unusual  rate  of  speed.  The  direct  road  to  Har- 
risonburg  had  been  obstructed  by  Jackson  when  he 
fell  back  from  Franklin  on  the  12th  of  May.  The 
only  road  open  to  Fremont  was  by  way  of  Peters- 
burg and  Moorefield,  involving  a  long  detour  to  the 
north,  and  this  would  bring  him  on  the  Valley  turn- 
pike at  Strasburg  and  not  at  Harrison  burg.4  It  was 

1  See  Part  I.,  255,  n.  2.  *  18  W.  R.,  220. 

s  Ib.,  220.  See  also  his  letter  to  Wadsworth, — 1 8  W.  R.,  22 1, — in  reply  to 
Wadsworth's  to  him  of  the  23d,  Ib.,  216. 

4  Fremont's  Report,  15  W.  R.,  10,  n  ;  Schurz  to  Lincoln,  18  W.  R.,  379  ; 
Lincoln  to  Fremont,  15  W.  R.,  644  ;  Fremont  to  Lincoln,  Ib.,  644,  645. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  129 

no  doubt  good  policy  to  order  Fremont  to  the 
Valley  ;  this  was  certain  to  bring  about  the  retreat 
of  Jackson ;  but  as  for  the  task  of  capturing  Jack- 
son's force  in  concert  with  McDowell,  to  which 
Fremont  was  so  hastily  and  thoughtlessly  assigned, 
it  was  one  of  enormous  difficulty. 

But  Mr.  Lincoln  and  Mr.  Stanton  were  not  in  the 
mood  for  taking  advice  from  the  generals.  They 
got  Mr.  Chase,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to  pro- 
ceed to  Fredericksburg,  and  "  explain  the  grounds  of 
the  President's  order  "  to  General  McDowell,1  and, 
probably,  to  give  that  officer  the  benefit  of  his 
knowledge  of  strategy  and  his  military  experience. 
McDowell,  however,  did  not  care  for  these  explana- 
tions. He  knew  his  duty  as  a  soldier,  and  promptly 
obeyed  his  orders. 

The  "  fortune  of  war  "  for  a  time  seemed  to  favor 
this  unpromising  scheme.  The  facts  were  precisely 
as  McDowell  and  Fremont  had  stated  them ;  the 
distances  were  as  great,  the  roads  were  as  bad,  the 
difficulties  of  transportation  and  supply  over  cross- 
country and  mountainous  paths  were  as  formidable 
as  had  been  represented.  But  Jackson's  inaction 
gave  the  scheme  a  chance  of  success.  He  was  rest- 
ing his  troops  at  Halltown,  and  making  a  feeble 
demonstration  against  Harper's  Ferry.  It  was  not 
until  the  evening  of  the  29th  that  he  heard  of 
Fremont's  march  towards  Strasburg,  and  not  until 
the  next  day  that  intelligence  reached  him  of  the 
movement  of  McDowell  towards  Front  Royal.2  On 
that  day  he  retired  to  Winchester  with  his  main 

1  18  W.  R.,  220,  228-230.         5  Allan's  Jackson,  130,  n. 
VOL.  n.— 9 


1 30          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

body.  Here  he  was  eighteen  miles  from  Strasburg. 
But  his  rear-guard  was  twenty-five  miles  behind. 
The  van  of  McDowell's  force  under  Shields  had  at 
that  moment  captured  Front  Royal,  which  is  twelve 
miles  east  of  Strasburg,  and  Fremont  was  at 
Wardensville,  only  twenty  miles  away  to  the  west- 
ward.1 Jackson  was  unquestionably  in  a  position 
of  great  danger.  But  Shields  occupied  precious 
time  in  posting  his  troops  to  resist  possible  attacks 
when  he  should  have  moved  forward,  and  Fremont 
was  delayed  by  the  fatigue  of  his  men,  by  bad 
roads,  and  by  stormy  weather.  Neither  of  the 
Federal  generals  was  informed  of  the  positions  of 
the  enemy  or  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  co-operating 
force.  Jackson,  on  his  part,  displayed  the  most 
untiring  energy  and  unfaltering  decision,  and,  hav- 
ing also  the  undisturbed  possession  of  the  admirable 
Valley  turnpike,  succeeded,  on  June  1st,  in  making 
good  his  retreat  from  Strasburg  between  the  two 
Federal  armies. 

Fremont  decided  to  pursue  the  enemy  up  the  Shen- 
andoah  Valley.  McDowell  ordered  Shields  to  march 
by  the  Luray  Valley,  the  road  through  which — a 
very  bad  one — ran  on  the  easterly  side  of  the  South 
Fork  of  the  Shenandoah.  By  destroying  the  bridges 
over  this  river  Jackson  prevented  the  Federal  col- 
umns from  uniting  with  each  other  until  at  least 
fifty  miles  had  been  traversed  by  them.  He  him- 
self retired  by  the  Valley  turnpike,  and  his  cavalry, 
under  the  celebrated  Ashby,  retarded  the  Federal 
pursuit  by  every  means  in  their  power.  Finally, 

'Allan's  jfackson,  131,  132. 


1862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  I3i 

on  June  8th,  at  a  place  called  Cross  Keys,  Jackson 
halted  to  accept  battle  from  Fremont,  who  had  fol- 
lowed closely  behind  him.  The  brigades  of  Tyler 
and  Carroll,  of  Shields's  division,  had  arrived  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  river  at  the  little  town  of  Port 
Republic,  but  were  powerless  to  assist  their  allies, 
as  Jackson  had  secured,  after  a  sharp  skirmish  with 
Carroll,  the  only  bridge  which  could  connect  the 
operations  of  the  two  Federal  armies.  Fremont's 
attack  at  Cross  Keys  was  fierce,  but  not  well  sus- 
tained, and  it  did  not  succeed. 

Had  Shields's  division  been  concentrated  at  Port 
Republic,  it  is  quite  possible  that  a  junction  might 
have  been  effected  between  it  and  Fremont's  army. 
But  Shields  had  halted  half  of  his  command  at 
Columbia  Bridge,  to  guard  against  a  possible  irrup- 
tion into  the  Valley  by  Longstreet, — a  report  that 
such  a  move  was  contemplated  having  been  too 
easily  credited  by  him.1  When  Shields  heard  of 
Carroll's  affair  at  the  bridge  he  ordered  him  and 
Tyler  back  as  far  as  Conrad's  Store,  and  he  himself 
marched  thither  as  rapidly  as  he  could  from  Luray.2 
Tyler,  however,  who  commanded,  was  not  quick 
enough  in  making  his  arrangements  to  retire3;  and 
seeing  the  enemy  moving  on  him,  decided  to  hold 
his  ground.  The  Confederates  advanced  in  haste, 
and  at  first  in  insufficient  force,  and  Tyler's  men,  be- 
ing well  posted  and  withal  excellent  troops,  repulsed 
them  with  severe  loss.  Finally,  however,  the  advent 
of  reinforcements  to  his  opponents  obliged  the  Fed- 
eral commander  to  withdraw,  which  he  did  in  good 

1  15  W.  R.,  686.  » Ib.,  687.  S16.,6g6. 


132          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

order  and  condition.  Had  the  rest  of  Shields's 
division  been  present,  Jackson's  attack  would  in 
all  probability  have  failed.  This  affair,  which  took 
place  on  June  9th,  is  known  as  the  battle  of  Port 
Republic. 

Both  these  actions  were  obstinately  contested ; 
and  the  success  gained  by  Jackson  in  them  was 
due  rather  to  the  skilful  use  which  he  made  of  his 
central  position,  than  to  any  particular  merit  in  his 
tactical  dispositions. 

Here  ended  the  pursuit  of  Jackson.  Shields's 
division  retired  to  Front  Royal,  and  was  subse- 
quently brought  back  to  Manassas.  Fremont  fell 
back  to  Mount  Jackson  on  the  Valley  turnpike.1 

It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  narrative  that,  had 
President  Lincoln  refrained  from  interfering,  Mc- 
Dowell, whose  march  from  Fredericksburg  upon 
Richmond  had  been  fixed  for  the  26th  of  May,  could 
have  effected  his  purpose  of  uniting  his  corps  of 
40,000  men  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  without 
other  opposition  than  could  have  been  offered  by 
Anderson's  brigade,2  supported,  so  far  as  General 
Johnston  thought  advisable,  by  troops  from  the  main 
Confederate  army  covering  Richmond ;  and  it  will 
hardly  be  contended  that  the  union  of  the  Federal 
armies  could  have  been  prevented.  That  this  con- 
centration of  150,000  men  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  Richmond  would  have  compelled  its  speedy  evac- 
uation, is  certainly  very  probable.  It  was,  at  any 
rate,  obviously  the  true  course  for  the  Federal  au- 
thorities to  take.  That  this  course  was  not  taken 

1  I  C.  W.,  1863,  266.  *Ante,  112. 


1862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  133 

was  due  entirely  to  the  action  of  President  Lincoln, 
who,  contrary  to  the  urgent  remonstrances  of  the 
generals  charged  with  the  conduct  of  operations 
against  Richmond,  broke  up  deliberately  one  of  the 
most  promising  combinations  for  the  defeat  of 
the  Confederates  and  the  capture  of  their  capital 
that  fortune  was  ever  likely  to  afford  to  the  Federal 
cause.  In  this  course  the  President  was  sustained  by 
two  members  at  least  of  his  Cabinet,  Mr.  Stanton  and 
Mr.  Chase. 

To  return  now  to  the  Peninsula.  While  the  op- 
erations above  described  had  been  going  on  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  Johnston  had  leisurely  fallen 
back  to  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond,  followed, 
still  more  leisurely,  by  McClellan.  Between  May 
20th  and  24th,  Keyes's  corps,  the  4th,  crossed  the 
Chickahominy  by  the  ford  near  Bottom's  Bridge, 
which  the  enemy  had  destroyed.  The  3d  corps 
soon  followed,  under  Heintzelman,  and  the  bridge 
was  immediately  rebuilt.  The  other  three  corps, 
the  2d,  5th,  and  6th,1  took  position  on  the  north 
side  of  the  Chickahominy,  the  5th  under  Fitz 
John  Porter,  in  advance,  then  the  6th  under  Frank- 
lin, then  the  2d  under  Sumner.  Trestle-bridges 
were  immediately  commenced,  and  rapidly  pushed 
to  completion,  to  establish  free  communication  be- 
tween these  corps  and  the  3d  and  4th  corps,  under 
Heintzelman  and  Keyes.  The  Federal  army  was 
thus  divided  by  the  Chickahominy,  a  stream  in- 
significant in  itself,  but  which  was  often  swelled  by 

1  The  $th  and  6th  corps  were  organized  about  May  I5th.  See  Webb, 
84,  n. 


i34          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

rains  so  as  to  overflow  its  bed  and  to  flood  the 
marshy  and  boggy  land  through  which  it  flowed. 
It  constituted,  in  fact,  a  very  formidable  obstruction 
to  the  intercommunication  which  ought  always  to 
exist  without  possibility  of  interruption  between  all 
parts  of  an  army  in  the  field. l 

Although  the  full  extent  of  this  danger  could  not 
have  been  appreciated  by  General  McClellan  when 
he  first  took  up  his  position  athwart  the  Chickahom- 
iny,  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  realized,  to  a  certain 
extent,  the  disadvantages  of  this  course,  and  that  he 
would  have  preferred  to  establish  his  base  of  sup- 
plies on  the  James  River.2  But  the  Government  re- 
fused to  allow  McDowell  to  join  McClellan  by  water, 
and  insisted  on  his  marching  on  Richmond  by  way 
of  the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  Railroad.3 
This  obliged  McClellan,  when  he  approached  Rich- 
mond, to  take  up  a  position  on  both  sides  of  the 
Chickahominy,  so  that  he  might  extend  his  right 
wing  to  co-operate  with  McDowell's  advancing  col- 
umn; and  now,  although  McDowell  had  been  sent 
off  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  McClellan  made  no 
change  in  his  arrangements.  The  base  of  the  army 
was  established  at  White  House,  on  the  Pamunkey, 
up  to  which  point  that  river  was  navigable  for  ves- 
sels bringing  supplies ;  and  from  thence  the  Rich- 
mond and  York  River  Railroad  was  made  use  of  to 
convey  them  to  the  army. 

These  arrangements  were  sufficiently  convenient, 
but  they  were  not  as  secure  from  the  interference  of 

»I2W.  R.,25.     Cf.  i  M.  H.  S.  M.,  176. 

s  12  W.  R.,  28.  S/J.,  27. 


i86z]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  135 

the  enemy  as  was  desirable  ;  and  General  McClellan 
determined  to  send  out  an  expeditionary  force  to 
clear  the  region  north  of  the  Chickahominy  and  east 
of  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad.  Greneral  Fitz- 
John  Porter  was  entrusted  with  this  task,  and  on 
the  27th  of  May  he  performed  it  to  the  entire  satis- 
faction of  the  general  commanding,  having  routed 
near  Hanover  Court  House  the  brigade  of  the  Con- 
federate general,  Branch,  and  inflicted  on  it  severe 
loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners.  This  success 
rendered  McClellan's  communications  secure  for  the 
moment,  and  he  seems  to  have  thought  no  more,  for 
the  time  being  at  any  rate,  of  establishing  his  army 
on  the  James.1 

The  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the 
immediate  neighborhood  of  Richmond  had  long 
been  considered  by  its  commander  as  certain  to  in- 
volve a  great  battle.  As  early  as  the  19th  of  March 
McClellan  had  written2  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  he  expected  to  fight  a  decisive  battle  between 
West  Point  and  Richmond,  to  give  which  battle  the 
enemy  would  concentrate  all  their  available  forces. 
On  the  10th  of  May  he  again  wrote  to  Mr.  Stanton: 

"  From  the  information  reaching  me  from  every 
source,  I  regard  it  as  certain  that  the  enemy  will 
meet  me  with  all  his  force  on  or  near  the  Chicka- 
hominy. ...  I  shall  fight  the  rebel  army  with 
whatever  force  I  may  have,  but  duty  requires  me  to 
urge  that  every  effort  be  made  to  reinforce  me  with- 
out delay  with  all  the  disposable  troops  in  eastern 
Virginia,  and  that  we  concentrate  all  our  forces  as 

1  See  Note  2  at  the  end  of  this  chapter.  *  5  W.  R.,  57. 


136          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

fast  as  possible  to  fight  the  great  battle  now  impend- 
ing, and  to  make  it  decisive.  It  is  possible  that  the 
enemy  may  abandon  Richmond  without  a  serious 
struggle,  but  I  do  not  believe  he  will,  and  it  would 
be  unwise  to  count  upon  anything  but  a  stubborn 
and  desperate  defence,  a  life-and -death  contest.  I 
see  no  other  hope  for  him  than  to  fight  this  battle, 
and  we  must  win  it.  ...  Those  who  entertain 
the  opinion  that  the  rebels  will  abandon  Richmond 
without  a  struggle  are,  in  my  judgment,  badly  ad- 
vised, and  do  not  comprehend  their  situation,  which 
is  one  requiring  desperate  measures." * 

On  the  other  side,  Johnston,  as  we  have  seen,2 
had,  about  the  middle  of  April,  not  only  strongly 
recommended  retaining  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate 
army  near  Richmond,  where  it  would  not  be  sub- 
jected to  unnecessary  losses,  but  also  augmenting  it 
with  all  the  available  force  of  the  Confederacy.  On 
the  very  same  day  on  which  McClellan  wrote  his 
letter  to  Stanton,  Johnston  wrote  to  Lee,  who,  under 
Davis,  had  the  general  charge  of  the  military  opera- 
tions in  the  Confederacy : 

"If  the  President  will  direct  the  concentration  of 
all  the  troops  of  North  Carolina  and  eastern  Vir- 
ginia, we  may  be  able  to  hold  middle  Virginia  at 
least.  If  we  permit  ourselves  to  be  driven  beyond 
Richmond,  we  lose  the  means  of  maintaining  this 
army." 3 

Neither  of  the  rival  commanders  obtained  what 


1 12  w.  R.,  26. 

*  Ante,  109. 

3  14  W.  R.,  506;  ante,  114.     Cf.  Johnston's  Narrative,  113,  127,  142. 


1 862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  137 

he  asked  for,  because  neither  of  them  possessed  the 
confidence  of  his  Government.  President  Lincoln, 
as  we  have  seen,  diverted  McDowell's  corps  to  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  President  Davis  declined  to 
order  to  Richmond  the  forces  defending  the  cities  of 
the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts.1  But  the  situation  was 
a  far  more  urgent  one  for  the  defenders  than  for 
the  assailants  of  the  Confederate  capital.  It  might 
reasonably  be  expected  that  when  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  campaign  should  be  terminated,  McClellan 
would  receive  the  reinforcements  he  demanded,  and 
in  the  meantime  he  was  presumably  strong  enough 
to  maintain  his  position.  For  the  same  reason  it 
was  obviously  Johnston's  policy  to  fight  his  adver- 
sary at  once,  if  he  proposed  fighting  him  at  all ;  and 
the  situation  of  the  Federal  army  on  both  banks  of 
the  Chickahominy  offered  to  him  a  tempting  op- 
portunity. 

Johnston,  as  we  need  hardly  say,  had  kept  himself 
informed  of  McDowell's  movements.  So  long  as  it 
was  reported  that  that  officer  was  about  to  move 
southward,  Johnston  had  revolved  in  his  mind  and 
almost  brought  to  a  head  a  plan  for  an  attack  on 
that  part  of  McClellan's  army  which  lay  north  of 
the  Chickahominy  River,  but  as  soon  as  he  found 
that  McDowell  had  moved  off  to  the  Valley,  he 
abandoned  this  scheme,  and  devoted  himself  to  the 
more  obvious  and  also  more  feasible  project  of  de- 
stroying the  two  Federal  corps,  the  3d  and  4th, 
which  McClellan  had  pushed  across  the  Chickahominy 
and  had  caused  to  take  position  within  a  few  miles 

1  Johnston's  Narrative,  127. 


138          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

of  Richmond.1  Of  these  troops,  the  4th  corps,  un- 
der Keyes,  was  in  the  advance.  Casey's  division 
occupied  some  rifle-pits  and  a  redoubt  about  three 
quarters  of  a  mile  west  of  Seven  Pines,  a  tavern  on 
the  Williamsburg  Stage  road.  The  other  division, 
under  Couch,  was  a  little  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
Casey's.  Heintzel man's  corps,  the  3d,  had  not  ad- 
vanced much  beyond  the  Chickahominy.  In  fact 
Hooker's  division  was  guarding  White  Oak  Bridge 
and  the  passes  of  White  Oak  Swamp  lying  to 
the  southward,  and  the  division  of  Kearny  was  at 
Bottom's  Bridge.  Kearny  was  more  than  five  miles 
from  Casey's  advanced  line,  and  Hooker  more  than 
seven  miles  from  it.  Each  of  these  four  divisions 
numbered  about  8500  men.2  It  is  apparent  that 
General  Heintzelman,  who  was  in  command  of  both 
corps,  had  not  sufficiently  concentrated  the  force  at 
his  disposal. 

The  ground  to  the  south  of  the  Williamsburg 
road  was  swampy,  and  protected,  partially,  at  least, 
the  left  of  the  Federal  lines.  But  that  to  the  north 
of  the  road,  up  as  far  as  Fair  Oaks  Station  on  the 
York  River  railroad,  was  practicable.  At  Fair  Oaks 
there  was  a  battery  and  two  regiments  of  Couch's 
division,  protecting  a  depot  of  supplies  at  that  place. 

An  opportunity  was  thus  presented  to  the  Con- 
federate general  of  overwhelming  by  superior  num- 
bers the  corps  of  Keyes,  before  it  could  be  supported 
by  that  of  Heintzelman.  The  latter  corps,  more- 
over, was  certain  to  be  drawn  into  the  action,  and  it 

1  See  Map  V.,  facing  page  156. 

4  14  W.  R.,  204  ;  Smith,  172.     But  see  12  W.  R.,  753,  881.  QI?. 


1862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  139 

was  more  than  likely  that  it  would  find  it  impossible 
to  maintain  itself  after  the  4th  corps  had  been 
routed.  It  was,  no  doubt,  to  be  expected  that  General 
McClellan  would  throw  the  2d  corps  across  the 
river,  to  operate  on  the  left  of  the  advancing  Con- 
federates, and  thus  render  it  impracticable  for  them 
to  press  their  advantage  to  its  natural  result ;  but  a 
rain-storm  of  extraordinary  violence,  which  began  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  30th  and  continued  all  night, 
swelled  the  Chickahominy  to  such  an  extent  that  it 
became  unfordable,1  and  that  McClellan's  recently 
constructed  bridges  were  rendered  unsafe  for  the 
passage  of  troops  and  guns. 

Johnston's  plan  of  attack  was  a  simple  and  effect- 
ive one.  Three  roads  run  eastward  from  Richmond. 
The  northern  one,  called  the  New  Bridge  or  the 
Nine-Mile  road,  runs  east  about  five  miles  to  a 
place  called  Old  Tavern,  where  it  branches, — one 
branch  running  north  about  a  mile  and  a  half  to 
New  Bridge,  and  the  other  running  southeast  about 
the  same  distance  to  Fair  Oaks  Station  on  the  Rich- 
mond and  York  River  railroad.  The  next  road, 
which  is  between  one  and  two  miles  south  of,  and 
generally  parallel  to,  the  Nine-Mile  road,  is  the 
Williamsburg  Stage  road.  Between  these  roads 
runs  the  Richmond  and  York  River  railroad.  South 
of  the  Williamsburg  road,  and  trending  to  the 
southeast,  is  the  Charles  City  road.  Between  these 
two  last-mentioned  roads  the  country  was  in  many 
places  rough,  swampy,  extremely  difficult  for  the 
passage  of  infantry,  and  well-nigh  impracticable  for 

1  Johnston  to  Smith,  14  W.  R.,  563. 


i4°          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

artillery.     Cavalry  could   not  be  employed  in  this 
region  with  any  effect. 

Johnston's  original  plan  *  was  to  push  out  one 
column,  consisting  of  the  six  brigades  of  Longstreet's 
division,  about  14,000  men,2  on  the  New  Bridge  road ; 
another  column,  consisting  of  the  four  brigades  of 
D.  H.  Hill's  division,  about  9500  men,3  on  the  Wil- 
liamsburg  road ;  and  another,  consisting  of  the 
three  brigades  of  Huger's  division,  about  5000  men,4 
on  the  Charles  City  road.  Johnston  expected,  by 
using  both  the  Nine-Mile  road  and  the  Williams- 
burg  Stage  road,  to  concentrate  a  large  force, — ten 
brigades, — say  23,500  men, — in  front  and  a  little  to 
the  north  of  the  Federal  troops,  numbering  about 
16,000  or  17,000  men,  at  Fair  Oaks  and  Seven 
Pines.  The  troops  on  the  Charles  City  road,  about 
5000  men,  under  Huger,  he  proposed  should  advance 
until  they  reached  a  point  where  they  could,  by 
crossing  the  intervening  space,  assist  their  comrades 
who  were  fighting  north  of  them.  He  also  proposed 
to  advance  a  strong  column  consisting  of  five  bri- 
gades under  Whiting,  to  follow  Longstreet's  division 5 
on  the  Nine-Mile  road  to  the  point  (Old  Tavern) 
where  the  road  to  New  Bridge  branches  off,  so  as 
to  be  able  to  fend  off  any  attempt  on  the  part  of 
any  Federal  troops,  who  might  cross  the  Chicka- 
hominy  by  Sumner's  bridges,  to  march  to  the  relief 
of  their  comrades  on  the  south  side  of  the  river. 
This  division  of  Whiting  could  also,  if  occasion  re- 

1  See  Smith,  18-22. 

»i4W.  R.,  530. 

*/£.,  531.         4Smith,  173.         'Mason  to  Whiting,  14  W.  R.,  564. 


1862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  141 

quired,  be  sent  to  reinforce  Longstreet,  and  its  place 
could  be  taken  by  the  reserve  division  of  Magruder, 
consisting  of  six  brigades.  General  G.  W.  Smith 
was  put  in  general  charge  of  this  portion  of  the  army. 

Johnston  regarded  it  as  so  certain  that  he  would 
be  able  to  concentrate  an  overwhelming  force  on  the 
advance  lines  of  the  Union  troops,  that  he  deter- 
mined to  entrust  to  Longstreet  the  general  manage- 
ment of  the  attack,  and  to  station  himself  on  the 
left,  near  the  New  Bridge  road,  where  he  could  bet- 
ter supervise  the  task  of  preventing  any  attack  upon 
Longstreet  by  Federal  troops  coming  from  the  north 
side  of  the  river.1 

However  promising  General  Johnston's  plan  of 
battle  was,  it  needed  for  its  successful  accomplish- 
ment that  the  clearest  and  most  positive  instructions 
should  be  issued  to  those  entrusted  with  its  execu- 
tion. The  battle  was  to  be  an  offensive  one ;  the 
movements  by  which  the  troops  were  to  be  brought 
upon,  the  ground  were  to  be  combined  movements 
of  columns  separated  from  each  other  by  woods  and 
swamps;  the  officers  who  were  to  conduct  these 
operations,  although  they  had  been  in  service  for  a 
twelvemonth,  were  new  to  the  business  of  carrying 
out  such  co-operative  movements.  Hence  it  would 
have  been  only  common  prudence  to  issue  writ- 
ten orders,  and  to  make  them  as  full  and  in  as 
great  detail  as  the  nature  of  the  case  admitted.  And, 
what  was  as  important  as  anything  else,  especially 
considering  that  at  that  period  the  Confederate  army 
had  not  been  organized  into  corps,  all  questions  of 

1  Johnston's  Narrative,  134;  Smith,  26. 


i42          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

relative  authority  should  have  been  definitely  set- 
tled beforehand.  But  Johnston's  instructions  to 
Longstreet  were  verbal  only1 ;  and  that  officer,  as 
Johnston  soon  discovered,2  misunderstood  them  in 
at  least  one  most  important  respect.  Moreover,  in 
the  only  two  orders  which  Huger  received,  nothing 
was  said  about  his  being  placed  under  Longstreet,3 
and  this  question  of  command  had  to  be  settled  be- 
tween them  on  the  very  morning  of  the  battle.4  The 
orders  to  Huger,  which  are  dated  on  the  30th,  it 
must  also  be  noted,  contain  no  intimation  that  a 
general  battle  was  to  be  fought  the  next  day ;  there 
is  merely  the  remark  that,  if  he,  Huger,  should  find 
no  strong  body  in  his  front,  it  would  be  well  to  aid 
General  Hill,  if  he  should  be  engaged  on  Huger's  left. 
Longstreet's  whole  division  of  six  brigades  was, 
on  the  night  of  May  30th,  either  just  to  the  north  of 
the  New  Bridge  road,  or  on  it,  and  could,  with  perf ect 
ease,  have  marched  out  to  Old  Tavern  and  Fair  Oaks 
early  the  next  morning.  Instead  of  doing  this,  Long- 
street,  having  misunderstood  his  orders,  moved  all  his 
division  south,  to  the  junction  of  the  Williamsburg 
and  Charles  City  roads.  Here  he  had  a  conference 
with  Huger,  and  apparently  assumed  control  of  his 
movements,  but  evidently  failed  to  give  him  definite 
instructions.5  Three  brigades  of  his  own  division, 

1  Longstreet's  Report,  12  W.  R.,  939  ;  Johnston's  Narrative,  133. 

'Johnston  to  Smith,  June  28,  1862,  in  Smith,  19.  Longstreet  in  his  book 
does  not  state  explicitly  what  his  orders  were. 

»I2  W.  R.,  937,  938. 

4  Ib.,  942. 

s  Ib. ,  937,  938,  942.  For  a  discussion  of  Huger's  operations,  see  Smith, 
64  ft  seq.  Longstreet  says  in  his  book  that  Huger  ranked  him,  but  refused 
to  take  command  of  the  right  wing.  Longstreet,  91,  92. 


i862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  143 

under  Wilcox,  Longstreet  placed  on  the  Charles 
City  road,  where  Huger's  three  brigades  already 
were,  and  from  which  they  could  reach  the  scene 
of  the  expected  action  only  by  making  a  difficult 
march  over  swampy  and  treacherous  ground.  Why 
this  disposition  was  made  does  not  appear.1  To 
D.  H.  Hill's  four  brigades  was  assigned  the  task  of 
leading  the  attack  on  the  Williamsburg  road.  They 
were  supported  by  the  brigades  of  R,.  H.  Anderson 
(commanded  by  Jenkins)  and  Keinper,  both  under 
R.  H.  Anderson.  The  other  brigade  of  Longstreet's 
division,  Pickett's,  he  kept  in  reserve.  Of  the  thir- 
teen brigades  under  his  control,  therefore,  he  pro- 
posed to  put  only  six  in  action  at  the  outset. 

These  arrangements  were  obviously  very  faulty ; 
and  when  it  is  added  that  Longstreet  delayed  mak- 
ing the  attack  until  after  1  P.M.,  it  is  plain  enough 
that  he  showed  himself  unequal  to  the  task  of  util- 
izing the  large  force  which  the  commanding  general 
had  placed  at  his  disposal.2 

Soon  after  one  o'clock,  D.  H.  Hill's  division  "  moved 

1  Longstreet's  Report,  12  W.  R.,  940  ;  Wilcox's  Report,  ib.,  986.  Long- 
street  says  in  his  book  (p.  92)  that  he  gave  these  three  brigades  to  Huger, 
"  the  better  to  harmonize" — surely  a  very  extraordinary  reason. 

J  The  delay  was  caused,  so  Longstreet  and  Hill  say,  by  waiting  for  Huger  ; 
but  it  is  not  alleged  by  Longstreet  that  he  gave  any  orders  to  Huger.  John- 
ston says  that  "  Longstreet,  unwilling  to  make  a  partial  attack,  instead  of 
the  combined  movement  which  had  been  planned,  waited  from  hour  to  hour 
for  General  Huger's  division."  But  the  first  order  which  Johnston  had  given 
Huger  simply  directed  him  "to  be  ready,  if  an  action  should  be  begun  on  " 
his  "  left,  to  fall  upon  the  enemy's  left  flank  "  (12  W.  R.,  938)  ;  and  this  was 
followed  by  a  second  order  stating  that  the  first  one  was  of  "  too  positive  "  a 
character.  These  orders,  taken  together,  show  clearly  that  it  was  for  Huger 
to  wait  for  Longstreet,  not  for  Longstreet  to  wait  for  Huger.  The  treatment 
of  Huger  by  Johnston  and  Longstreet  seems  to  us,  we  are  constrained  to  say, 
anything  but  fair.  See  Wilcox's  postscript  to  his  Report,  12  W.  R.,  989. 


144          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

off,"  as  that  officer  says  in  his  Report,  "  in  fine  style." 
They  drove  in  the  pickets  of  Casey's  division  and 
their  supports  without  difficulty ;  and  on  being 
checked  at  the  first  line  of  works,  west  of  Seven 
Pines,  Hill  promptly  sent  one  of  his  brigades — Rains's 
— to  the  south  of  the  road,  thus  taking  the  Federal 
troops  in  flank,  and  compelling  the  evacuation  of  the 
lines.  The  task  of  the  Confederates  in  this  part  of 
the  battle  was  the  easier,  because  eight  of  the  thir- 
teen regiments  of  Casey's  division  were  "  raw  "  regi- 
ments.1 The  other  five,  however,  composing  the 
brigade  of  Naglee,  constituted  a  serviceable  organi- 
zation, and  many  of  the  "  raw  "  troops  behaved  credit- 
ably. The  ground  was  difficult,  and  the  Confederate 
troops,  though  led  with  great  energy  and  displaying 
great  gallantry,  could  make  but  slow  progress. 
Couch's  division  was  brought  up  to  the  support  of 
Casey's,  and  the  contest  was  maintained  with  great 
obstinacy  by  these  troops  for  some  hours.  Finally, 
however,  the  centre  of  the  line  was  broken,2and  Couch 
himself,  with  four  regiments,  was  separated  from  the 
main  body  and  obliged  to  retire  to  Fair  Oaks,  where 
he  joined  the  troops  stationed  there,  and  fell  back  to- 
wards Sumner's  bridges,  in  hopes  of  being  joined 
by  a  portion  of  the  2d  corps.  The  fighting  went 
on  without  interruption  on  the  Williamsburg  road, 
the  divisions  of  Casey  and  Couch  being  at  last  sup- 
ported by  one  of  the  divisions  of  the  3d  corps 
under  Kearny.  This  reinforcement  re-established 
for  a  time  the  Federal  line  of  battle ;  and  Berry's 
brigade,  advancing  on  the  south  of  the  road,  by  taking 

1  12  W.  R.,  755,  916.  »  lb.,  880. 


1 86 2]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  145 

the  Confederates  in  flank,  compelled  them  to  retire 
with  loss.  Hill  then  applied  to  Longstreet  for  as- 
sistance, and  the  latter  sent  him  R.  H.  Anderson's 
brigade  of  two  regiments.  With  this  assistance  the 
Federal  line  was  finally  driven  back.  Their  troops 
bivouacked  for  the  night  at  a  point  about  a  mile 
and  a  half  east  of  Seven  Pines,  and  the  fight  on  the 
Williamsburg  road  was  ended  somewhere  about  half- 
past  six  o'clock  in  the  evening. 

But  this  long,  obstinate,  and  bloody  contest  was 
not  all  of  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  When  Couch 
with  his  four  regiments  and  one  battery  was  forced 
away  from  his  command  and  obliged  to  retire  towards 
the  bridges  which  Sumner  had  thrown  across  the 
Chickahominy,  he  had  not  to  wait  long  for  assistance. 
Sumner,  one  of  the  most  gallant  and  energetic  officers 
in  the  Federal  army,  having  received  orders  at  1  P.M. 
to  be  in  readiness  to  cross  the  river,  moved  at  once 
down  to  the  bridges,  and,  at  2.30  P.M.,  crossed  the 
river  with  Sedgwick's  division  and  Kirby's  battery 
on  what  was  known  as  Sumner's  Upper  Bridge,  and 
marched  directly  to  the  scene  of  action.  The  bridge 
was  very  unsteady,  and  it  took  a  long  time  for  the 
troops  to  cross  it.  The  road  on  the  south  side  of  the 
river  was  exceedingly  bad,  and  in  spite  of  the  ardor 
of  the  men  and  the  energy  of  the  commanding  gen- 
eral, progress  over  the  miry  and  boggy  ground  was 
necessarily  very  slow.  It  was  not  until  after  five 
o'clock  that  Sedgwick's  division  reached  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Fair  Oaks  Station. 

It  so  happened  that  just  about  this  time  Johnston, 
having  received  advices  from  Longstreet  requesting 


146          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

assistance  in  order  to  complete  his  victory  on  the 
Williamsburg  road,  had  determined  to  send  him 
Whiting's  division.  These  troops,  on  moving  south 
or  southeast  towards  the  scene  of  Longstreet's  fight, 
were  greeted  by  a  cannonade  coming  from  a  point  to 
the  north  or  northeast  of  their  position.  All  of 
Whiting's  division,  except  the  brigade  of  Hood, 
which  pursued  its  march  with  the  object  of  connect- 
ing with  and  assisting  Longstreet,  were  halted  to 
make  head  against  this  new  enemy.  Thinking  that 
their  adversaries  could  be  none  other  than  the  few 
regiments  under  Couch  which  had  been  cut  off  from 
the  main  body  of  the  4th  Federal  corps,  the  fresh 
troops  of  Whiting  attacked  them  fiercely.  They  little 
suspected  the  truth.  Johnston  himself,  as  he  frankly 
admits,  did  not  suspect  it.  He  says l  that  he  was  con- 
fident that  the  Federal  troops  opposing  his  were 
those  whose  camps  he  had  just  passed,  and  therefore 
could  not  have  come  from  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy.  But  Whiting's  men  soon  found  that 
they  had  to  deal  with  a  formidable  force.  Their 
charges  were  repulsed  with  great  loss.  Of  their  four 
brigadiers,  Hatton  was  killed,  Hampton  wounded, 
Pettigrew  wounded  and  taken  prisoner.  The  men 
of  Sedgwick's  division  were  well  handled,  and  came 
into  action  with  that  high  and  determined  spirit 
which  usually  accompanies  troops  who  believe  that 
it  is  upon  their  arrival  in  time  and  their  boldness  in 
action  that  the  fate  of  the  day  depends.  They  not 
only  repulsed  all  attacks  made  upon  them,  but,  at  the 
close  of  the  engagement,  by  a  gallant  and  successful 

1  Johnston's  Narrative,  137,  138. 


1 862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  147 

charge,  acquired  the  right  to  call  the  field  their 
own. 

About  seven  o'clock  General  Johnston  was  severely 
wounded,  and  Major-General  Gustavus  W.  Smith 
succeeded  him  in  the  command  of  the  Confederate 
army.  But  before  this  happened,  Johnston  had  an- 
nounced l  to  his  officers  that  the  battle  was  over  for 
the  day.  It  was,  in  fact,  too  dark  for  either  side  to 
undertake  further  operations.  We  are,  therefore, 
warranted  in  considering  the  battle  of  May  31st  as 
having  been  fully  finished  before  the  Confederate 
general  was  disabled.  But  if  we  would  obtain  a 
correct  idea  of  the  battle  of  May  31st,  we  must  go 
on,  and  see  in  what  condition  both  armies  were  on 
the  morning  of  June  1st.  The  fighting  on  that  day 
throws  much  light  on  this  matter. 

General  G.  W.  Smith,  on  whom,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  command  of  the  Confederate  army  devolved 
after  General  Johnston  had  been  wounded  and 
obliged  to  leave  the  field,  naturally  desired  to  con- 
tinue the  battle.  He  ordered  Longstreet,  whose 
troops  had  been  so  successful  the  day  before,  to  re- 
new the  engagement,  and  to  direct  his  attack  towards 
the  north,  that  is,  towards  the  railroad,  instead  of 
pushing  farther  east,  towards  Bottom's  Bridge.  This 
would  bring  Longstreet's  troops  in  contact  with 
Richardson's  division  of  Sumner's  corps  (which  had 
crossed  the  afternoon  before,  but  had  not  got  into 
action),  supported  by  Birney's  brigade  of  Kearny's 
division  of  the  3d  corps.  This  movement  was  to  be 
supported,  so  soon  as  it  should  be  fully  developed, 

1  Johnston's  Narrative,  138. 


i48  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

by  an  attack  by  Whiting's  division  1  (aided,  if  neces- 
sary, by  troops  from  Magruder's  division)  upon 
Sedgwick's  division  of  Sumner's  corps  and  the  small 
force  under  Couch. 

These   orders    were   probably   the  best    the   cir- 
cumstances admitted  of.     The  division  of  Whitingr, 

O7 

which  had  lost  heavily  the  evening  before,  —  three 
out  of  the  four  brigadiers  in  action  having  been 
killed  or  wounded, — was  assuredly  not  the  force 
which  an  experienced  officer  would  select  to  initiate 
the  battle  of  the  morning.  It  was  known  that  only 
a  part  of  Longstreet's  command  had  been  engaged 
the  day  before ;  that  the  three  brigades  under  Huger, 
the  three  under  Wilcox,  and  Pickett's  brigade  had, 
as  yet,  hardly  fired  a  shot,  and  it  was  presumed  that 
the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill,  though  it  had  suffered 
greatly,  was  elated  by  its  success.  Then,  as  to  the  di- 
rection of  Longstreet's  attack,  it  would  seem,  on  the 
whole,  that  Smith  correctly  indicated  it.  The  Fed- 
eral division  of  Richardson,  which  (strengthened  by 
Birney's  brigade)  connected  on  its  right  with  that  of 
Sedgwick,  and  was  on  the  line  of  the  railroad,  faced 
south  or  nearly  south ;  it  was  therefore  in  a  position 
to  flank  any  movement  which  Longstreet  might 
make  towards  the  defeated  troops  of  Keyes's  corps 
in  the  direction  of  Bottom's  Bridge ;  while  Smith, 
whose  available  force  under  Whiting  was  held  in 
check  by  Sedgwick's  division,  was  manifestly  unable 
to  support  any  such  movement  should  it  be  made. 
In  fact  the  connection  between  the  right  wing  and 
centre  of  the  Confederate  army  was  none  too  close 

1  Smith,   129. 


1862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  149 

as  it  was.1  Smith,  therefore,  it  would  seem,  was 
right  in  ordering  Longstreet  to  commence  the  battle 
of  June  1st  by  an  attack  on  the  Federal  force  on  the 
line  of  the  railroad,  even  although  Longstreet's  right 
might  be  assailed  by  the  defeated  troops  of  the 
4th  corps.2 

Longstreet's  performance  of  his  orders  on  this 
morning  of  June  1st  was  singularly  lacking  in  energy 
and  dash.  Huger's  division,  or  at  least  Armistead's 
and  Mahone's  brigades  of  that  division,  together  with 
Pickett's  brigade,  attacked  Richardson,  and,  after  an 
hour's  heavy  firing,  were  repulsed  with  severe  loss ; 
and  this  movement  seems  to  have  been  all  that  was 
attempted.  Longstreet  made,  in  fact,  no  serious  ef- 
fort to  carry  the  Union  lines.  He  does  not,  in  his 
Report,  even  claim  to  have  made  an  attack,  but  only 
to  have  repelled  an  attack  made  upon  his  position 
by  the  Federals.3  In  this  statement  he  is  in  error, 
for  the  brigades  above  mentioned  did  advance  upon 
the  Federal  troops  ;  but  his  language  shows  conclu- 
sively that  he  had  no  intention  on  that  morning  of 
taking  the  offensive,  in  compliance  with  his  orders. 
He  seems,  in  fact,  to  have  been  laboring  under  the 
impression  that  he  was  himself  in  imminent  danger  of 
being  overwhelmed  by  a  greatly  superior  force.  His 
notes  to  Smith  during  the  forenoon  are  curious  read- 
ing, considering  that  the  Federal  generals  were  not 

1  Smith  to  Longstreet ;  Smith,  134. 

2  Longstreet,  104. 

3  12  W.  R.,  940.     So  Hill  in  his  Report,  it.,  945.        But  see  Pickett's 
Report,  ib.,  982.      Richardson's    Report,    ib.,   766,    gives  an  account  of 
the  counter-charge  made  by  the  Federal  troops  after  they  had  repelled  the 
assault  on  them. 


ISO  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

dreaming  of  attacking  their  antagonists,  but  were 
only  anxious  to  hold  their  own  until  the  arrival  of 
General  McClellan.  Longs treet  says  that  all  his 
troops,  save  one  brigade,  are  engaged  in  action  ;  that 
the  entire  Federal  army  seems  to  be  opposed  to  him ; 
that  unless  some  diversion  is  made  in  his  favor,  his 
troops  cannot  stand  the  successive  attacks  of  the 
enemy.  An  hour  later  he  asks  urgently  for  rein- 
forcements ;  says  again  that  the  entire  Federal  army 
seems  to  be  opposed  to  him,  and  that  he  cannot  hold 
out  unless  he  gets  help. * 

These  appeals  for  help  induced  General  Smith  to 
send  orders  to  the  troops  which  were  stationed  along 
the  upper  Chickahominy  to  march  to  Longstreet's 
assistance ;  but,  believing  (as  he  did)  that  an  attack 
by  Longstreet's  command  ought  to  precede  any  of- 
fensive movement  of  the  centre  and  left  of  the  Con- 
federate army,  he  remained  quiet  with  "Whiting's 
division  until  he  should  hear  what  Longstreet  could 
accomplish  on  the  right  when  these  fresh  troops  had 
reached  him. 

In  this  waiting  attitude  both  sides  passed  the 
morning  of  the  1st  of  June.  General  McClellan 
arrived  on  the  ground  early  in  the  forenoon,  but 
made  no  changes  in  the  dispositions  of  the  Federal 
forces  and  gave  no  orders  looking  to  an  attack. 
About  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  General  Lee 
arrived  at  General  Smith's  headquarters,  and,  in 
compliance  with  an  order  of  President  Davis,  as- 
sumed command  of  the  Confederate  army.  He 
allowed  the  troops  to  remain  where  they  were  dur- 

1  Smith,  135,  136. 


1862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  151 

ing  the  remainder  of  the  day,  and  in  the  night  with- 
drew them  to  their  former  positions  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  Richmond. 

Thus  ended  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  or  Seven 
Pines.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  Johnston  added  nothing 
to  his  reputation  by  his  conduct  of  this  affair.  The 
engagement  was  planned  and  brought  on  by  him ;  and 
while  it  is  true  that  it  was  not  fought  by  his  chief 
lieutenant  in  the  way  in  which  he  intended  it  should 
be  fought,  it  is  equally  true  that  the  miscarriage  of 
Johnston's  plan  might  easily  have  been  prevented  by 
more  explicit  instructions  and  more  careful  supervi- 
sion.1 The  4th  corps  of  the  Federal  army  was  so 
far  in  advance  that  it  was  exposed  to  an  attack  by 
largely  superior  numbers  before  it  could  be  supported 
by  the  3d  corps,  or  by  any  troops  which  might  come 
from  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  thir- 
teen brigades  which  Johnston  entrusted  to  Long- 
street  were  amply  sufficient  for  the  task  of  striking 
a  decisive  blow  on  the  isolated  corps  of  Keyes.  The 
means  by  which  Johnston  intended  that  the  concen- 
tration of  this  formidable  force  should  be  effected 
were  amply  sufficient  for  the  purpose.  But,  owing 
to  Johnston's  lack  of  explicitness  and  Longstreet's 
incapacity  to  see  for  himself  how  the  desired  object 
could  best  be  accomplished,  the  concentration  of  the 
Confederate  forces  was  never  carried  out,2  and  the 

1  Cf.  i  M.H.  S.  M.,  182. 

3  The  orders  sent  by  Longstreet  to  Wilcox  were  contradictory,  and  their 
execution  took  so  much  time  that  Wilcox's  division  did  not  begin  to  arrive 
till  5  P.M.  Only  one  regiment  appears  to  have  been  engaged.  As  for  Hu- 
ger,  he  remained  on  the  Charles  City  road  waiting  for  orders  which  Long- 
street  never  sent  him.  See  12  W.  R.,  938,  986,  989.  One  of  Huger's 


152  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CJVIL  WAR.       [1862 

blow  which  fell  upon  Reyes's  corps,  instead  of  being 
an  overwhelming  blow,  was  delivered  with  such  a 
small  force  that  even  that  poorly  organized  body  of 
troops  maintained  their  ground  with  stubbornness, 
fell  back  without  general  disorganization,  and,  with 
the  assistance  of  only  one  of  the  divisions  of  the 
3d  corps,  Kearny's,  definitely  brought  their  adver- 
sary's success  to  an  end  by  the  close  of  the  after- 
noon. In  other  words,  while  the  Federal  forces 
engaged  on  the  Williamsburg  road  were  defeated, 

C->      O  O  ' 

they  were  not  routed,  as  they  would  veiy  likely  have 
been  had  Johnston's  programme  been  carried  out  to 
the  letter.  The  Confederates  captured  10  guns, 
6000  muskets,  5  colors,  and  347  prisoners,1  but  such 
a  moderate  result  as  this  was  by  no  means  what  had 
been  expected  by  their  commander. 

Then,  in  the  action  of  Fair  Oaks,  the  advent  of 
Sumner  at  the  head  of  Sedgwick's  division  had  en- 
tirely disconcerted  Johnston's  plan  of  crushing  the 
resistance  of  the  Federal  forces  near  Seven  Pines  by 
bringing  Whiting's  division  down  upon  their  right 
flank,  which  might  well  have  turned  the  defeat  of 
the  Federals  under  Keyes  and  Heintzelman  into  a 
rout.  The  appearance  of  Sumner  with  his  fresh 
troops  just  as  the  flanking  movement  began  was 
dramatic  indeed.  The  Confederates  attacked  their 
new  foes  with  the  impatient  determination  and  reck- 
less audacity  which  the  emergency  demanded,  but 
they  were  met  with  the  steadiness  of  admirably  dis- 
ciplined troops,  and  their  headlong  valor  availed 

brigades  seems  to  have  followed  Wilcox's  division  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
3ist.  '  12  W.  R.,  935,  941. 


i862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  153 

them  nothing.  In  fact,  the  moment  their  adversa- 
ries saw  them  in  the  confusion  which  always  waits 
upon  an  unsuccessful  assault,  they  instantly  took  the 
offensive  in  their  turn,  and  by  a  bold  charge  drove 
the  defeated  Confederates  from  the  contested  field  to 
their  first  positions. 

The  fighting  at  this  battle  showed  that  the  troops 
on  both  sides  had  become  soldiers.  The  advance  of 
the  Confederates  under  Hill  was  gallant  and  persist- 
ent ;  the  resistance  of  Keyes,  Casey,  and  Couch  was 
obstinate,  and  there  were  some  attempts  on  their  part 
to  recapture  the  positions  from  which  they  had  been 
driven.1  These  attempts,  it  is  true,  were  unsuccess- 
ful, but  the  fact  that  they  should  have  been  made 
at  all  shows  with  what  resolute  determination  the 
contest  was  waged.  Keyes  says  in  his  Report  that 
"of  the  nine  generals  of  the  4th  corps  who  were 
present  on  the  field,  all,  with  one  exception,  were 
wounded,  or  his  horse  was  hit,  in  the  battle." 2  The 
losses  on  both  sides  were  large  for  the  numbers  en- 
gaged,— that  of  the  Federals  slightly  exceeding 
5000,3  of  whom  about  650  were  missing,  while 
Longstreet  lost  4851,4  and  Whiting  1283,5  making  a 
total  of  6134.  The  Confederate  loss  was  the  heav- 
ier, as  they  were  the  attacking  party. 

It  has  been  claimed  by  General  Johnston6  and  his 
friends  that  if  he  had  not  been  wounded,  the  Con- 
federate success  of  the  31st  of  May  would  probably 
have  been  completed  on  the  1st  of  June.  But  there 


1  12  W.  R.,  934,  954,  958,  980.  4  Ib.,  942. 

*  Ib.,  878.  »  13  W.  R.,  506. 

3  Ib.,  762.  "  Johnston's  Narrative,  141. 


iS4  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

is  no  sufficient  reason  for  this  opinion.  The  great 
opportunity  for  a  decisive  success  had  been  lost  on 
the  morning  of  May  31st.  The  situation  of  the 
Confederate  army  on  June  1st  hardly  admitted  of  a 
sufficient  concentration  being  effected  to  strike  a 
very  important  blow.  With  the  Federal  corps  of 
Porter  arid  Franklin  on  the  upper  Chickahominy, 
where  the  river  is  smaller  and  more  easily  passable, 
it  is  hardly  probable  that  any  Confederate  general 
would  have  ventured  to  concentrate  a  very  large 
force  near  Fair  Oaks  and  beyond  Seven  Pines.  And 
although  the  lower  trestle-bridges  could  not  be  used, 
the  railroad  bridge  was  still  standing.1  The  Fed- 
erals had  also  thrown  over  the  river  near  the  site  of 
New  Bridge,  a  pontoon-bridge,  which  was  in  work- 
ing order  on  the  morning  of  June  1st,2  and  troops 
could  have  been  sent  over  it  to  strengthen  Sumner, 
or  to  occupy  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  and  thus  pre- 
vent a  concentration  against  Sumner.3  We  have  seen 
that  the  position  assumed  by  Richardson  prevented 
Longstreet  from  advancing  farther  towards  Bottom's 
Bridge,  and  made  it  necessary  for  that  officer,  if  he 
would  resume  the  offensive  at  all,  to  begin  by 
driving  Richardson  from  his  position.  And  any 
movement  of  this  kind  would  expose  the  right  of 
Longstreet's  line  to  being  attacked  by  the  remnant 
of  Keyes's  corps  and  by  a  part  of  Heintzelmau's  also. 
It  may  be,  perhaps,  that  Johnston  would  have  rein- 
forced Whiting  with  Magruder's  six  brigades,  or 
some  of  them,  and  would  then  have  attacked  Sedg- 

'12  W.  R.,  114. 

*/*.,  112.  *  Allan,  51    55  ;  12  W.  R.,  113. 


1 862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  155 

wick  and  Couch,  and  he  does  in  his  Narrative  indi- 
cate that  he  would  have  done  so  * ;  but,  in  the  first 
place,  these  brigades  were  scattered  along  the  upper 
Chickahominy  guarding  the  crossings z ;  and  if  he 
had  removed  them  from  their  positions,  and  brought 
them  to  Fair  Oaks,  any  attack  they  might  have 
made  on  Sedgwick  and  Couch  would  probably  have 
been  checked  at  once  by  the  advent  of  troops  from 
Franklin  and  Porter  by  way  of  New  Bridge  or  the 
upper  bridges.  It  is  probable  that  Johnston  thought 
that  more  might  have  been  accomplished  in  the  way 
of  following  up  on  June  1st  the  defeat  of  the  4th 
and  3d  Federal  corps  begun  on  the  day  before; 
but  we  have  seen  that  with  Richardson's  powerful 
division  assisted  by  the  fresh  brigade  of  Birney  on 
the  line  of  the  railroad,  the  remains  of  these  corps 
could  feel  perfectly  secure  against  further  attack. 
In  fine,  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose 
that  Johnston  would  have  accomplished  more  than 
G.  W.  Smith  did,  unless,  indeed,  Longstreet  would 
have  exerted  himself  more  for  the  former  than  he 
did  for  the  latter  general.3 

On  the  other  hand,  an  opinion  has  always  been 
largely  entertained  in  the  North  that  the  Confederates 
were,  at  the  close  of  the  two  days'  fight,  more  or  less 
demoralized,  what  with  their  severe  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded  and  the  change  of  leaders,  and  that 
McClellan  would  have  won  an  easy  victory  had  he 
vigorously  attacked  them.4  But  there  is  nothing  to 


1  Johnston's  Narrative,  141.  'Smith,  156. 

aSee  G.  W.  Smith's  review  of  the  evidence  in  Smith,  153-158. 
4  Webb,  116,  117,  186 ;  2  Comte  de  Paris,  71. 


156  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

indicate  any  such  condition  of  demoralization,  and 
there  was  no  cause  why  such  a  condition  should 
have  existed.  The  Confederates,  although  decid- 
edly successful  on  their  right,  had  been,  it  is  true, 
rudely  checked  on  their  left ;  but,  in  the  battle  con- 
sidered as  a  whole,  they  not  only  had  not  been 
beaten,  but  they  had  driven  their  antagonists  from 
their  intrenchments  in  one  part  of  the  field,  and 
they  had  guns,  small  arms,  and  colors  to  show  as  the 
trophies  of  their  victory.  It  may  well  be  admitted 
that  had  there  been  no  uncertain  and  dangerous 
Chickahominy  to  complicate  the  question,  McClel- 
lan  had  a  fine  opportunity  offered  him  of  bringing 
on  a  great  battle,  in  which  the  chances,  considering 
his  superiority  in  numbers,  would  have  been  decid- 
edly in  his  favor.  But  there  was  the  Chickahominy 
to  be  considered,  and  the  very  inadequate  means  of 
crossing  it  which  then  existed,  and  the  absolute 
necessity  of  maintaining  an  unbroken  communica- 
tion with  the  base  of  supplies.  McClellan  may  per- 
haps have  been  too  careful,  but  there  is  much  to  be 
said  against  any  movement  which  puts  in  peril  the 
hold  of  a  large  army  upon  its  base  of  supplies. 

The  net  result  of  the  battle,  in  spite  of  the  captured 
trophies,  was  undoubtedly  favorable  to  the  Federal 
arms.  The  retirement  of  the  Confederates  to  their 
original  positions  was  naturally  interpreted  by  the 
Federal  troops  as  an  acknowledgment  either  of  defeat, 
or  inability  to  make  a  sustained  and  successful  re- 
sistance in  the  open  field  to  the  advance  of  the 
United  States  forces.  The  mvral  of  the  Federal 
army  had  been  on  the  whole  heightened.  Simmer's 


1 86  2]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  157 

2d  corps  was  naturally  elated.  The  reputation 
of  the  4th  corps,  which  had  unjustly  suffered  from 
the  first  reports  of  the  action,  was  afterwards  in 
great  part  re-established.  The  troops  of  the  3d  corps, 
— the  division  of  Kearny, — had  acquitted  themselves 
with  great  credit.  It  remained  for  General  McClellan 
to  utilize  the  force  at  his  disposal,  to  lead  this  large 
army  of  brave  men,  all  of  wrhom  were  devoted  to 
him,  to  the  achievement  of  the  success  which  it 
would  seem  was  really  at  this  period  of  the  cam- 
paign within  his  grasp. 

The  new  commander  of  the  Confederate  army, 
General  Robert  E.  Lee,  was  a  man  of  marked  dis- 
tinction. His  father,  General  Henry  Lee,  was  a 
famous  officer  in  the  Revolutionary  War,  familiarly 
known  as  "Light  Horse  Harry."  Robert  E.  Lee 
had  been  graduated  at  the  Military  Academy  of 
West  Point  in  the  class  of  1829,  had  entered  the 
engineer  corps,  had  served  as  chief  engineer  of  the 
army  in  General  Scott's  campaign  from  Vera  Cruz  to 
the  City  of  Mexico,  and  had  won  by  his  services  in 
that  post  the  unqualified  commendation  of  his  chief 
and  the  hearty  admiration  of  the  army.  To  his 
fertile  brain  and  daring  courage  Scott  declared  that 
he  was  indebted  for  the  plans  and  expedients  by 
which  the  natural  difficulties  of  the  route  were 
surmounted,  and  the  troops  led  from  victory  to  vic- 
tory. At  the  time  of  his  appointment  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  General 
Lee  was  fifty -five  years  of  age,  in  perfect  health,  vig- 
orous, robust,  and  of  a  commanding  presence.  His 
character,  public  and  private,  was  of  the  highest.  In 


158  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

intellect,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  he  was  superior 
to  the  able  soldier  whom  he  succeeded ;  indeed 
Joseph  E.  Johnston  possessed  as  good  a  military 
mind  as  any  general  on  either  side  ;  but  in  that  for- 
tunate combination  of  qualities, — physical,  mental, 
and  moral, — which  go  to  make  up  a  great  com- 
mander, General  Lee  was  unquestionably  more  fa- 
vored than  any  of  the  leaders  in  the  Civil  War. 
He  possessed  at  once  the  entire  confidence  of  his 
Government  and  the  unquestioning  and  enthusiastic 
devotion  of  the  army.  He  had  no  rival,  either  in 
the  councils  of  the  Richmond  War  Department,  or 
in  the  colloquies  around  the  camp-fires.  Lee's  posi- 
tion was  unique ;  no  army-commander  on  either  side 
was  so  universally  believed  in, — so  absolutely  trusted. 
Nor  was  there  ever  a  commander  who  better  de- 
served the  support  of  his  government,  and  the  affec- 
tion and  confidence  of  his  soldiers. 

In  spite  of  the  example  which  had  been  so  recently 
afforded  him  of  the  treacherous  character  of  the 
Chickahominy  River,  General  McClellan  made  no 
immediate  preparations  for  transferring  his  army  to 
the  James.  He  employed  his  troops  in  building 
bridges  to  connect  the  wings  of  his  army.  These 
bridges  had  to  be  long  enough  to  cross  not  only  the 
Chickahominy  itself,  but  the  bogs  and  marshes 
through  which  it  flowed,  and  their  construction  was 
a  task  of  no  ordinary  labor  and  difficulty.  It  was, 
moreover,  aggravated  by  the  bad  weather  which 
prevailed  during  the  first  half  of  June.  It  consumed 
nearly  three  weeks  l ;  and  during  these  weeks  the 

1  12  W.  R.,  115. 


1862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  159 

army  made  no  forward  movement  of  any  conse- 
quence. McClellan  indeed  changed  the  positions  of 
his  corps ;  the  2d  corps  was  permanently  established 
on  the  south  side  of  the  river ;  the  6th  was  brought 
over  and  took  post  on  the  right  of  the  2d ;  only 
the  5th  remained  on  the  north  side.  The  troops 
on  the  south  side  were  moved  forward  a  certain  dis- 
tance, and  Porter's  advance  lines  occupied  Mechanics- 
ville  on  the  north  of  the  Chickahominy.  Elaborate 
field-works  were  constructed,  which  completely  cov- 
ered the  positions  of  the  army  on  the  south  side  of 
the  river,  from  Grolding's  farm  to  White  Oak  Swamp. 
This  part  of  the  position  of  the  Federal  army  was 
thus  rendered  practically  unassailable.1  On  the  north 
side,  works  were  thrown  up  behind  Beaver  Dam 
Creek,  and  the  approaches  from  the  south  side  were 
"  strongly  defended  by  intrenchments." 2 

In  response  to  McClellan's  urgent  appeals  for  re- 
inforcements, McCall's  division,  9500  strong,  was  sent 
to  him  in  the  first  half  of  June.  It  was  added  to 
Porter's  corps  and  was  stationed  near  Mechanics ville, 
behind  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  He  also  received  some 
11,000  men  from  Baltimore  and  Fort  Monroe.  On 
the  20th  of  June  the  army  reached  an  aggregate  of 
105,445  men.8  There  was  no  immediate  prospect  of 
a  further  increase  in  numbers. 

At  this  time  the  bridges  across  the  Chickahominy 
had  been  completed.4  The  weather  was  fine.5  It  was 

1  13  W.  R.,  490  ;  cf.  ib.,  20. 
5/J.,4ox>. 

8  14  W.  R.,  238  ;  2  B.  &  L.,  315.     General  Webb  estimates  the  effective 
force  at  92,500  men.     Webb,  120. 
4  Barnard's  Report  ;  12  W.  R.,  115.  '  I  M.  H.  S.  M.,  208. 


160  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

obviously  McClellan's  opportunity  to  strike.  The 
Confederates,  as  he  must  have  known,  were  receiv- 
ing reinforcements  day  by  day.  Jackson  and  his 
victorious  troops  had  not  yet  returned  from  the  Val- 
ley, but  it  was  certainly  to  be  expected  that  their 
arrival  would  not  long  be  delayed,  now  that  the 
Federal  forces  in  that  region  were  not  threatening 
an  advance.  It  was  plain  that  the  movement  on 
Richmond  ought  to  be  made  at  once,  before  the 
army  of  General  Lee  should  be  strengthened  by  the 
arrival  of  Jackson's  command.  Whatever  chances 
there  were  of  such  a  movement  succeeding,  existed 
obviously  in  greater  strength  now  than  after  Jack- 
son should  have  joined  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia. It  is  true  that  a  battle,  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of  the  word,  was  hardly  to  be  looked  for.  The 
Confederate  works  around  Richmond — for  it  was 
not  to  be  supposed  that  the  Confederates  had  been 
idle — must  be  assaulted  or  turned.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  as  we  know  now,  these  works  were  not  very 
strong 1 ;  but  strong  or  weak,  they  must  be  taken 
in  some  way,  if  success  was  to  crown  the  operations 
of  the  campaign.  Whether  the  Federal  commander 
proposed  to  proceed  by  regular  approaches,2  or  by 
bombarding  the  city,3  or  in  any  other  way,  the  sooner 
General  McClellan  began,  the  better  chance  he  had 
of  success. 

Nor  was  this  all.  The  situation  of  McClellan's 
army  athwart  the  Chickahominy  was  necessarily  an 
unsafe  one.  The  difficulty  with  it  was  this, — that 

'D.  H.  Hill;  2  B.  &  L.,  362. 

*  Lee's  Report  ;  13  W.  R.,  490  ;  Lee  to  Jackson,  14  W.  R.,  589,  590. 

1  Lee  to  Jackson,  14  W.  R.,  602  ;  cf.  2  B.  &  L.,  366. 


1 862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  161 

the  line  of  communication  with  the  base  of  supplies 
was  not  directly  covered  by  the  position  of  the  army, 
inasmuch  as  the  York  River  railroad  ran  in  a  north- 
easterly direction  some  twelve  miles  from  the  Chicka- 
hominy  to  White  House.  Hence,  a  movement  in 
force  by  the  Confederates  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Chickahominy  would  at  once  put  the  communica- 
tions of  the  Federal  army  in  imminent  peril.  The 
great  bulk  of  McClellan's  forces  were  necessarily  on 
the  south  side  of  the  river.  He  could  gain  nothing 
by  pushing  forward  his  right  wing  OH  the  north 
bank  ;  and  yet  the  more  troops  he  threw  across  to 
the  south  bank,  the  more  difficult  he  made  it  for 
himself  to  protect  his  line  of  supplies.  He  was, 
in  truth,  in  a  precarious  situation,  and  he  knew 
it.1  And  he  could  hardly  have  supposed  that  he 
would  be  allowed  to  remain  long  undisturbed  in 
that  position. 

McClellan,  in  fact,  had  already  received  a  warn- 
ing— an  unmistakable  hint  of  his  adversary's  inten- 
tion. Lee  had  not  been  in  command  a  fortnight 
when  he  determined  to  ascertain  the  character  and 
strength  of  the  Federal  line  of  communications.  He 
entrusted  this  task  to  his  chief  cavalry  officer,  the 
famous  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  whose  talents  were 
at  this  time  coming  to  the  notice  of  the  authorities. 
Stuart,  with  a  force  of  1200  men  and  two  guns,  rode 
out  to  the  north  of  Richmond  on  the  llth  of  June ; 
encountered  and  defeated  a  small  Federal  force  near 
Old  Church  ;  then,  heading  for  the  York  River  rail- 
road, reached  Tunstall's  Station  without  opposition, 


1 12  w.  R.,  53. 

VOL.  II. — II 


162  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

after  having  seen  for  himself  the  nature  of  the  re- 
gion lying  north  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  the  in- 
sufficiency of  the  arrangements  of  the  Federal  general 
for  the  protection  of  his  line  of  supplies.  This  was 
the  object  of  the  expedition ;  and  when  Stuart  reached 
the  railroad,  it  had  been  accomplished.  He  had  now, 
however,  to  get  back  again  to  camp ;  and,  recogniz- 
ing that  it  would  be  well-nigh  impossible,  or  at  least 
extremely  perilous,  to  return  by  the  way  by  which 
he  had  come,  he  determined  to  make  the  circuit  of 
McClellan's  army,  a  feat  which,  in  spite  of  great 
obstacles  and  dangers,  he  successfully  accomplished. 
A  few  days  after  this,1  McClellan  took  the  wise 
precaution  of  sending  a  number  of  transports,  laden 
with  ammunition,  subsistence,  and  supplies  of  all 
sorts,  from  White  House  and  Yorktown  to  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Harrison's  Landing  on  the  James  River, 
to  provide  for  the  temporary  necessities  of  the  army 
in  the  contingency  of  his  being  forced  to  give  up  his 
present  base  of  supplies  and  establish  a  new  one  on 
the  river.  That  he  contemplated  making  this  change 
of  position  in  case  of  necessity  is  well  known,2  and  he 
had  caused  reconnoissances  to  be  made  by  the  topo- 
graphical engineers  of  the  region  between  the  rail- 
road and  White  Oak  Swamp.  General  Averell, 
also,  had  had  examinations  made  by  cavalry  officers 
in  his  command  of  the  roads  leading  to  the  James 
River.3  From  the  data  furnished  by  these  officers 
maps  were  prepared  for  use  in  case  the  movement 
to  the  James  should  be  decided  on.  In  addition  to 


1  13  W.  R.,  19  ;  McClellan's  O.  S.,  411  ;  12  W.  R.,  159,  169. 
*  Webb,  128.  *2  B.  &L.,  431. 


1 86 2]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  163 

these,  there  was  the  map  of  Henrico  County,  Vir- 
ginia,1 on  which  considerable  reliance  could  be 
placed.  In  spite  of  all  these  facilities,  however,  the 
roads  were  not  all  designated  on  any  of  the  maps.2 
The  task  of  mapping  out  the  region  between  the 
Chickahominy  and  the  James  had  not  been  thor- 
oughly and  systematically  performed.3  Nor  was 
this  all.  The  country  was  a  very  difficult  one  for 
the  movements  of  a  large  army  and  its  trains.  The 
roads,  such  as  they  were,  were  often  very  boggy, 
sometimes  almost  impassable.  It  is  true  there  was 
often  a  choice  of  roads  ;  but  when  a  bridge  had  to 
be  crossed,  there  was  usually  but  one  approach  to  it. 
The  army  lay — for  the  most  part — between  the 
Chickahominy  and  White  Oak  Swamp.  The  bridge 
over  White  Oak  Swamp  had  been  destroyed.  If 
the  army  was  to  move  to  the  James  River,  this 
bridge  must  be  rebuilt,  and  the  approaches  to  it 
rendered  practicable  for  the  passage  of  the  immense 
trains  of  supplies  and  the  innumerable  guns  and 
wagons  of  the  artillery.  Similar  preparations 
were  needed  at  other  points  on  the  route  to  the 
James.  None  of  these  things  had  been  done.  Very 
possibly  the  doing  of  them  would  have  warned  Lee 
of  the  intention  of  McClellan,  which  he  seems  to 
have  early  formed,  if  he  should  be  forced  to  retire 
from  his  position  on  the  Chickahominy,  to  fall  back 


1  12  W.  R.,  153. 

3  /£.,  64,  119  ;  13  W.  R.,  193,  228  ;  2  B.  &  L.,  379,  407,  408. 

3  Letter  to  the  writer  from  General  H.  L.  Abbot,  February  17,  1895  : 
"  These  reconnoissances  would  have  been  carried  to  the  James  River,  had 
it  not  been  known  that  this  would  have  given  Lee  an  inkling  of  the  inten- 
tion to  move  in  that  direction."  Cf.  Humphrey's  Report,  12  W.  R.,  153. 


164  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

to  the  James,  near  Malvern  Hill,  and  not  to  retreat 
to  Fortress  Monroe.  But  the  omission  to  attend  to 
these  matters  was  certain  to  cause  delay  and  embar- 
rassment in  case  the  movement  to  the  James  should 
be  undertaken  in  face  of  an  active  and  aggressive 
enemy. 

General  Lee,  it  may  well  be  imagined,  had  not 
been  idle  during  this  month  of  June.  He  had  been 
more  successful  than  his  predecessor  in  obtaining 
reinforcements  from  other  parts  of  the  Confederacy. 
Somewhere  about  15,000  men  had  been  brought  up 
from  North  Carolina  under  General  Holmes,1  and  at 
least  5000  more  under  General  Bipley  had  arrived 
from  South  Carolina.8  Six  regiments  from  Georgia 8 
under  General  Lawton  were  sent  to  join  Jackson  in 
the  Valley.  These  and  other  troops  added  some 
25,000  men  at  least  to  the  Confederate  force  in 
Virginia,  raising  it  to  about  90,000  men. 

The  Confederate  general  now  determined  to  take 
the  offensive.  The  co-operation  of  Jackson's  com- 
mand being  evidently  essential  to  the  success  of  such 
a  movement,  the  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  rein- 
force it,  so  that  that  active  officer  might  be  able  to 
dispose  definitely  of  the  Federal  troops  which  had 
forced  him  to  retreat  from  Winchester  to  Port  Re- 
public. For  this  purpose,  not  only  was  Lawton's 
Georgia  brigade  sent  to  him,  as  above  stated,  but  two 
brigades  of  Smith's  division  were  also  transferred 

1  2  B.  &  L.,  217.  In  an  abstract  of  the  force  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  (14  W.  R.,  645),  on  July  2Oth,  the  strength  of  the  North  Carolina 
troops  is  given  at  15,801.  Cf.  Johnston's  Narrative,  142. 

*  2  B.  &  L.,  217. 

s  14  W.  R.,  589;  28.  &L..2I8. 


r862]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  165 

from  the  vicinity  of  Richmond  to  the  Shenandoah 
Valley.1  This  was  about  the  llth  of  June.  Soon 
afterwards,  however,  it  appearing  certain  that  the 
Federal  troops  in  the  Valley  had  retired  and  given 
up  further  operations  for  the  time  being,  Jackson  was 
ordered  on  the  16th  to  make  arrangements  for  unit- 
ing his  force  with  the  main  army  as  soon  as  he  could.2 
The  original  plan  was,  that  he,  leaving  a  small  force 
to  watch  the  country  and  guard  the  passes,  should 
move  south  to  Ashland  on  the  Richmond  and  Fred- 
ericksburg  railroad,  and  from  thence,  with  the  assist- 
ance, perhaps,  of  a  part  of  Stuart's  cavalry,  sweep 
down  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy  upon 
the  communications  of  the  Federal  army,  while  Lee's 
army  should  attack  it  in  front.3 

On  June  17th,  Jackson,  with  his  accustomed 
promptness,  put  his  troops  in  march  towards  Rich- 
mond, leaving  his  cavalry  and  one  battery  near  Harri- 
sonburg.  His  command  consisted  of  three  divisions, 
containing  ten  brigades,  with  eight  batteries, — per- 
haps 25,000  men  in  all.  Preceding  his  command, 
and  riding  on  horseback  the  last  fifty  miles  for  fear 
of  being  recognized  as  a  passenger  on  the  train, — 
such  was  the  excessive  caution  which  was  habitual 
to  him, — he  attended  a  council  of  war  in  Richmond 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  23d,  at  which  were  present, 
besides  himself  and  General  Lee,  Generals  Longstreet, 
D.  H.  Hill,  and  A.  P.  Hill.4  Here  he  was  informed 


1  14  W.  R.,  589. 
"/£.,  602. 

3  lb.,  589. 

4  See  account  of  this  council  by  D.  H.  Hili  in  2  B.  &  L,.,  347. 


166  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

that  another  plan  had  been  decided  on.1  The  four 
commands  of  Longstreet,  Jackson,  and  the  Hills,  ac- 
companied by  Stuart's  cavalry,  were  to  operate  on 
McClellan's  communications  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  while  the  divisions  of  Magruder  and 
Huger  were  to  hold  the  lines  in  front  of  Richmond 
on  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy.2  Holmes's 
division  was  to  guard  the  southern  approaches  to 
Richmond,  and  to  take  such  part  in  the  subsequent 
movements  as  occasion  might  offer.  This  was  the 
general  scheme.3 

Coming  now  more  to  the  details,  it  was  expected 
that  Jackson,  whose  troops  were  coming  down  from 
the  north,  would  outflank  any  and  all  lines  of  de- 
fence which  the  Union  troops  on  the  north  side  of 
the  river  had  constructed,  and  which  naturally  faced 
west,  so  that  all  such  lines  would  have  to  be  aban- 
doned without  a  contest,  and  the  road  would  be  open 
for  the  troops  of  Longstreet  and  the  Hills  to  join 
those  of  Jackson, — unless,  indeed,  the  Federal  com- 
mander should  decide  to  throw  up  intrenchments 
facing  north,  and  make  a  resolute  stand  on  the  north 
side  of  the  river.  It  was  almost  certain  that  the 
communications  of  the  Federal  army  with  White 
House  would  be  severed ;  nothing  but  a  withdrawal 
of  the  entire  Union  army  to  the  north  side  of  the 
river — and  this,  in  view  of  McClellan's  apparent  un- 

1  Longstreet,  120.  "  The  suggestion  was  offered  that  the  enemy  had  proba- 
bly destroyed  the  bridges  and  ferries  on  the  Pamunkey  along  the  line  of  his 
rear,  which  might  leave  Jackson  in  perilous  condition  if  the  front  attack 
should  be  delayed."  We  confess  ourselves  unable  to  see  the  force  of  this 
"  suggestion." 

•  13  W.  R.,  490,  498. 

*  See  Map  VI.,  facing  page  212. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  167 

willingness  to  risk  a  great  battle,  was  hardly  to  be 
looked  for — could  avail  to  maintain  them  against 
the  attack  of  such  a  powerful  force.  It  was,  how- 
ever, equally  evident  that  if  McClellan — after  the 
bulk  of  the  Confederate  army  should  have  crossed 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river — should,  either  before 
or  after  a  contest,  withdraw  all  his  troops  to  the  south 
side  of  the  river,  break  down  the  bridges,  and  assault 
the  lines  of  Richmond  with  the  greater  part  of  his 
force,  he  would  stand  an  excellent  chance  of  success.1 
In  such  an  event  he  would  of  course  have  to  estab- 
lish a  new  base  on  the  James,  but  this  could  very 
possibly  be  managed  with  the  aid  of  the  fleet.  But 
General  Lee  on  this  occasion,  as  several  times  after- 
wards during  the  war,  correctly  divined  his  adver- 
sary's probable  course,  so  far  at  least  as  to  assume  that 
he  would  not  use  this  opportunity,  offered  by  the  ab- 
sence of  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate  army  from  the 
lines  of  Richmond,  for  making  an  attack  on  the  city. 
Then  there  was  this  further  question.  It  was  clear 
that  McClellan  would  have  to  abandon  his  present 
position  ;  but  in  regard  to  his  subsequent  movements, 
— whether  he  would  retreat  down  the  Peninsula,  or 
try  to  establish  a  new  base  on  the  James  River  at 
some  convenient  spot,  such  as  Harrison's  Landing, — 
General  Lee  was  entirely  at  fault.2  Had  Lee  not 
been  convinced  that  McClellan  would  fail  to  seize 
this  opportunity  for  assaulting  Richmond,  he  would 
not  have  dared  to  carry  the  bulk  of  his  army  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy ;  but  he  would 

1  13  W.  R.,  662  ;   D.  H.  Hill,  in  2  B.  &  L..  362. 
s  But  see  D.  H.  Hill,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  385,  386. 


168  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

never  have  dreamed  of  doing  this  at  all  if  he  had 
thought  it  probable  that  McClellan,  when  his  com- 
munications with  White  House  were  severed,  would 
retreat  to  Harrison's  Landing ;  he  would  have  left  it 
to  Jackson  alone,  or  assisted  by  a  small  force  of 
cavalry,  to  operate  on  the  communications  of  the 
Federal  army,  while  the  main  body  of  the  Confed- 
erate army  and  the  greater  portion  of  Stuart's  cavalry 
under  Lee's  personal  direction  would  attack  the  Fed- 
eral position  in  front,  or  move  by  way  of  the  Charles 
City  and  parallel  roads  upon  Malvern  Hill.  This 
was  the  plan  which,  as  we  have  seen,  he  had  appar- 
ently at  first  decided  on ;  and  it  would  certainly 
seem  more  likely  that  the  Federal  general  would 
seek  to  establish  for  his  army  a  new  base  on  the 
James  River,  which  was  entirely  at  his  disposal,  be- 
ing controlled  by  the  Federal  fleet,  and  which  offered 
the  enormous  advantage  for  subsequent  operations  of 
a  choice  between  its  north  and  south  banks,  than 
that  he  would  retreat  to  Fortress  Monroe,  and  ad- 
journ indefinitely  the  further  progress  of  the  cam- 
paign against  Richmond.  But  Lee  considered  it  so 
probable  that  McClellan  would  choose  this  latter 
course,  that  he  took  the  mass  of  his  army  with  him 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  so  that  he 
could  fall  in  great  force  upon  the  Federal  army  when 
it  should  cross  Bottom's  Bridge  and  the  railway 
bridge  on  its  retreat  down  the  Peninsula.1  Hence, 
when  it  was  afterwards  found  that  McClellan  was 
not  going  to  fall  back  across  the  Chickahominy,  but 
was  going  to  the  James,  to  the  neighborhood  of  Mai- 

1  See  Lee's  Report  ;  13  W.  R.,  493,  494  ;  Lee's  Lee,  162. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  169 

vern  Hill  and  Harrison's  Landing,  the  Confederate 
troops,  some  of  whom  (as  we  shall  soon  see)  had 
followed  the  river  as  far  down  as  Bottom's  Bridge, 
had  to  retrace  their  steps  and  cross  at  New  Bridge 
and  Sumner's  Upper  (or  Grapevine)  Bridge,  in  or- 
der to  attack  the  rear-guard  of  the  Federal  army. 
The  interruption  of  the  Confederate  movement,  thus 
caused,  was  of  the  utmost  benefit  to  the  commander 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  it  gave  him  at  least 
twenty-four  hours  to  get  the  troops  and  trains  started 
for  the  James,1  while  the  Confederate  army  became 
so  dislocated  that  General  Lee  was  unable  after- 
wards to  concentrate  it  for  a  decisive  blow  until  his 
adversary  had  established  himself  on  the  well-nigh 
impregnable  position  of  Malvern  Hill.2  But  we  are 
anticipating. 

Some  rumors  of  the  formidable  combinations  of 
the  Confederate  leaders  reached  the  ears  of  the  Union 
commander.  On  June  23d,  General  Porter  was  di- 
rected to  send  out  a  force  to  watch  his  right  flank 
towards  Walnut  Grove  and  Bethesda  Church,  and 
was  informed  that,  in  case  he  should  be  attacked  in 
large  force,  the  commanding  general  counted  upon 
him  to  hold  his  own  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  against  superior  numbers,  long  enough  to 
enable  "  the  decisive  movement "  to  be  made  which 
would  "determine  the  fate  of  Richmond." 3  The  same 
day  General  Casey  was  sent  to  White  House,  to  take 
command  of  the  depot  of  supplies  there,  and  to  pro- 
tect "the  railway  and  telegraphic  communications 
between  that  point  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac." 4 

1  Webb,  137.  •  Allan,  136.  s  14  W.  R.,  247.  *  ft.,  248. 


iyo  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

These  orders  indicate  that  General  McClellan 
thought  it  not  unlikely  that  the  enemy  might  attack 
Porter  and  threaten  the  communications ;  that  he 
himself  was  on  the  point  of  attacking  the  lines  in 
his  own  immediate  front  with  the  expectation  of 
compelling  the  evacuation  of  Richmond ;  and  that 
he  then  expected  to  maintain  communication  with 
his  present  base  of  supplies  during  this  final  move- 
ment.1 The  next  day,  the  24th,  he  got  word  from  a 
deserter  that  Jackson  was  marching  from  Gordons- 
ville  to  Frederick's  Hall,  and  was  intending  to  at- 
tack his  rear  on  the  28th.2  Mr.  Stanton,  on  being 
inquired  of,  replied  by  telegram  on  the  25th  that  his 
information  also  led  him  to  "  suspect  that  Jackson's 
real  movement  now  is  toward  Richmond." ! 

McClellan,  nevertheless,  proceeded  to  carry  out 
his  offensive  movement.  His  bridges  and  intrench- 
ments  were  now  completed.  He  ordered  Heintzel- 
man  to  advance  his  picket  line  on  the  Williamsburg 
road.  This  was  successfully  done  on  the  25th  * ; 
and,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  McClellan  tele- 
graphed to  Washington  from  the  field  to  announce 
the  success  of  the  movement,5  not  because  it  was  so 
important  a  thing  in  itself,  but  because  it  opened  the 
way  for  a  more  decisive  step  which  was  to  be  taken 
the  next  day. 

On  returning  to  his  headquarters,  however,  he  re- 
ceived further  information  of  Jackson's  movements, 


1  At  the  same  time,  large  quantities  of  forage  and  subsistence  were  loaded 
at  White  House  on  transports,  to  be  sent,  if  needed,  to  the  James.  12  W. 
R.,  159,  160. 

*  12  W.  R.,  49.  *  Ib.,  49,  50  ;  13  W.  R.,  95. 

8  Ib.,  49.  *  12  W.  R.,  50. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  171 


which  convinced  him  that  the  enemy  were  intending 
to  take  the  offensive  in  great  force  and  with  the  ut- 
most promptitude.  At  once  he  sent  to  Mr.  Stanton 
one  of  his  characteristic  communications.  He  tele- 
graphed the  Secretary1  that  he  thought  that  Jack- 
son was  going  to  attack  his  right  and  rear ;  that  the 
enemy's  force  was  stated  at  200,000  men ;  that  he 
regretted  his  inferiority  in  numbers,  but  felt  himself 
in  no  way  to  blame  for  it ;  and  that  if  a  disaster 
should  result,  "  the  responsibility  for  it  could  not  be 
thrown  on  his  shoulders,  but  must  rest  where  it  be- 
longed," i.  e.,  on  the  President  and  Secretary.  To 
this  unmilitary  and  offensive  communication  the 
Secretary  replied,2  not  noticing  the  implied  censure 
on  himself,  but  sending  McClellan  his  best  wishes 
for  success.  Mr.  Lincoln,  however,  could  not  refrain 
from  protesting  in  a  serious  and  dignified  note  against 
the  insinuation  that  he  had  not  done  his  best  to  sup- 
port the  army.3  And  it  is  not  out  of  place  here  to 
state  that,  whatever  errors  of  judgment  and  conse- 
quent mistakes  the  President  and  Mr.  Stanton  may 
have  fallen  into,  their  patriotism,  and  their  sincere 
desire  for  the  success  of  General  McClellan  and  his 
army,  cannot  seriously  be  questioned. 

To  return  now  to  the  Confederates.  Jackson, 
when  asked  at  the  council  on  the  23d  when  his 
troops  would  be  ready  to  co-operate,  replied  that 
they  would  be  ready  at  daylight  of  the  26th,  and  he 
adhered  to  this  assurance  even  after  Longstreet  had 
expressed  the  opinion  that  this  date  was  too  early  a 
one.4  Jackson,  in  fact,  was  mistaken ;  his  march 

1 12  w.  R.,  51.  '  n.  259. 

*  14  W.  R.,  258,  259.  4  2  B.  &  L.,  347. 


172  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

was  delayed  by  the  fallen  trees  with  which  the  Fed- 
eral troops  had  obstructed  the  roads,  and  by  the 
great  fatigue  of  his  men  ;  and  when,  after  waiting 
till  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  the  van  of  Lee's  army 
crossed  to  the  northern  side  of  the  Chickahominy 
and  approached  Mechanicsville,  the  Union  troops 
had  not  yet  had  their  right  flank  turned  by  Jack- 
son's advance  from  the  north.  The  Confederates, 
under  the  lead  of  A.  P.  Hill,  a  daring  and  energetic 
but  inconsiderate  officer,  pushed  the  Federals  hard, 
and  their  outposts  retired  to  their  intrenched  line 
behind  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  a  little  to  the  east  of 
Mechanicsville,  where  they  felt  secure  against  any 
direct  attack.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  nothing  had 
been  heard  of  Jackson,  and  notwithstanding  the 
evident  strength  of  the  Federal  position,  Hill  at- 
tacked fiercely  and  recklessly.  He  was  repulsed 
with  great  slaughter,  mainly  by  McCall's  division  of 
Porter's  corps,  without  having  made  the  smallest 
impression  on  the  Federal  lines.  The  action  was 
not  over  till  quite  late  in  the  evening.1 

General  McClellan  spent  a  part  of  this  evening  of 
the  26th  in  conferring  with  Generals  Franklin  and 
Smith  at  the  former's  headquarters  near  the  Chicka- 
hominy, on  the  south  side,  and,  later  in  the  evening, 
he  consulted  with  General  Porter  at  his  headquarters 
near  Gaines's  Mill,  on  the  north  side.  It  was  now 
known  that  a  large  part  of  Lee's  army  had  crossed 
to  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy  with  the 
expectation  of  uniting,  the  next  day,  with  Jackson's 

1  See  D.  H.  Hill,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  352  ;  F.  J.  Porter,  it.,  328-331  ;  13  W.R., 
623. 


1 86 2]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  173 

command,  which  had  come  down  from  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley,  when  the  whole  force  would  move 
upon  the  communications  of  the  Federal  army  with 
White  House.  If  this  plan  should  be  persisted  in, 
it  would  almost  certainly  be  successful,  unless  the 
greater  part  of  the  Federal  army  should  also  cross  to 
the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  fight  a 
great  battle.  This  could  certainly  be  done,  and 
there  was  assuredly  a  fair  chance  of  a  successful 
result.1  But  thus  to  bring  the  issue  of  the  cam- 
paign to  the  test  of  a  great  battle  was  not  in  accord- 
ance with  General  McClellan's  disposition.  Then 
there  was  this  consideration  :  now  that  four  fifths  of 
Lee's  army  were  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy, would  it  not  be  possible,  and,  if  possible, 
would  it  not  be  the  best  thing  which  McClellan 
could  do,  to  advance  boldly  on  Richmond  ?  Porter, 
who  would  probably  find  it  impracticable  to  cross 
the  next  morning  to  the  south  side  of  the  river  in 
the  presence  of  such  a  superior  force,  would  indeed 
have  to  remain  at  least  for  a  day  on  the  north  side 
of  it,  unless  he  should  find  it  feasible  to  elude  the 
enemy  and  join  the  main  body.  If  he  remained  on 
the  north  side,  he  would  very  probably  have  to  sus- 
tain the  shock  of  the  larger  part  of  the  Confederate 
army,  and  it  was  certainly  not  unlikely  that  he 
would  be  overwhelmed.  But  in  the  meantime 
McClellan  might  carry  the  lines  of  Richmond.  If 
he  succeeded  in  taking  Richmond,  he  would  of  course 
have  to  make  some  arrangement  with  the  fleet  for 
the  speedy  establishment  of  a  new  base  on  the 

1  See  12  W.R.,  59,  where  McClellan  discusses  the  objections  to  this  course. 


174  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

James;  but  after  so  great  a  success,  surely  this 
might  be  counted  upon.  For  a  few  days,  at  any  rate, 
there  would  be  DO  deficiency  of  supplies,  for  the 
stock  on  hand  happened  to  be  unusually  large,  and 
the  Confederate  stores  in  Richmond  would  of  course 
be  available.  The  three  generals  advised  this  course. 
McClellan  had  just  received  a  report  from  the 
chief  of  his  Secret  Service  corps,1  which  gave  the 
numbers  of  Lee's  army  at  180,000  men,  and  stated 
that  there  were  205  guns  in  the  works  around  Rich- 
mond. This  report  may  have  had  some  influence  in 
inducing  him  to  decide  against  the  advice  of  his 
favorite  generals.  But  apart  from  this,  McClellan 
could  not  but  see  that  if  he  should  be  unsuccessful 
in  carrying  the  lines  of  Richmond,  and  should  also 
fail  from  any  reason  to  establish  within  a  reasonable 
time  a  new  base  on  the  James  River,  he  assuredly 
would  find  himself  in  a  dangerous  situation.  The 
Confederates,  by  recrossing  the  Chickahominy  at 
Long  Bridge  while  the  Federal  army  was  in  front 
of  or  in  Richmond,  would  be  able  to  reach  Malvern 
Hill  and  adjacent  points  long  before  he  could  possi- 
bly do  so.  And  it  might  not  be  practicable  to  select 
a  convenient  spot  higher  up  the  James  River,  which 
would  answer  all  needed  requirements.  Taking  all 
into  account,  McClellan  decided  to  refrain  from  at- 
tacking Richmond ;  and  he  determined  that  when 
he  should  be  forced  to  abandon  his  base  at  White 
House,  he  would  fall  back  to  the  James  and  estab- 
lish a  new  base  there,  from  which  to  recommence 
offensive  operations  when  occasion  might  offer.2 

1  12  W.  R.,  269. 

1  /£.,  60.     Cf.  Webb,  187,  188  ;  2  Comte  de  Paris,  105,  106. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  175 

It  was  too  late,  after  this  decision  had  been  ar- 
rived at,  for  Porter  to  effect  a  withdrawal  of  his 
troops  and  guns  to  the  south  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  in  presence  of  his  aggressive  and  powerful 
foes.1  But,  as  active  operations  by  the  other  Fed- 
eral corps  were  not  to  be  undertaken  the  next  day, 
Porter  certainly  had  a  right  to  expect  that  enough 
troops  could  be  spared  from  the  intrenchments  south 
of  the  Chickahominy  to  reinforce  him  to  such  a  de- 
gree that  he  could  maintain  himself  till  nightfall, 
in  his  carefully  prepared  position  of  Gaines's  Mill, 
against  any  attack  which  Lee's  army  could  make. 
But  this  obvious  duty  of  reinforcing  Porter,  McClel- 
lan  did  not  perform.  He  sent  to  Porter  before  the 
battle  two  batteries  only.2  Instead  of  exerting  him- 
self to  ensure  success  in  the  conflict  which  was  now 
so  likely  to  be  forced  on  Porter,  McClellan  (as  we 
shall  soon  see)  was  induced  to  believe  that  his  lines 
south  of  the  Chickahominy  were  seriously  threat- 
ened,3 and  accordingly  refrained  from  sending  Porter 
the  troops  which  would  have  enabled  him  to  hold 
his  ground  and  repulse  the  Confederates. 

At  daybreak  of  June  27th,  news  having  reached 
General  McClellan  that  Jackson  had  joined  the 
other  Confederate  troops  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  Porter  was  ordered  to  withdraw 
McCall's  division  from  Beaver  Dam  Creek  to  the 
selected  position  of  Gaines's  Mill, — a  task  which  was 
successfully  accomplished,  although  the  troops  were 
hard  pressed  by  their  pursuing  foes.  Porter's  corps, 

1  13  W.  R.,  21.     See  Franklin,  i  C.  W.  (1863),  624. 
8  2  B.  &  L.,  335  ;  13  W.  R.,  237. 
*I2  W.  R.,  57. 


176  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

— the  5th, — was  thus  concentrated.  It  consisted  of 
three  divisions  of  infantry,  six  regiments  of  cav- 
alry, and  20  batteries  of  artillery, — in  all  about  30,- 
000  men.1  It  was  a  formidable  force ;  the  men  were 
well  disciplined ;  they  were,  to  a  reasonable  extent, 
inured  to  war ;  and  they  were  well  commanded. 
Porter  himself  was  an  officer  of  the  old  army,  a 
graduate  of  West  Point,  who  had  seen  service  in 
Mexico  under  Scott,  and  he  was  known  through- 
out the  army  as  a  clear-headed,  brave,  and  skilful 
general. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  now  fairly 
embarked  in  an  aggressive  campaign.  It  had,  so 
thought  the  officers  and  men  composing  it,  stood  on 
the  defensive  long  enough.  The  enemy,  who  had 
for  weeks  been  encamped  within  sight  of  the  steeples 
of  Richmond,  were  now  to  be  attacked, — to  be  forced 
to  retreat  from  the  neighborhood  of  the  capital, — to 
be  routed, — perhaps  to  be  captured.  A  stern  and 
resolute  spirit  pervaded  Lee's  army.  The  men  had 
a  clear  and  definite  object  before  them,  and  they 
meant  to  attain  it  at  whatever  cost.  Their  ranks 
were  full,  and  they  had  every  confidence  in  their 
leaders;  they  knew  that  McClellan  could  not  pos- 
sibly maintain  himself  where  he  was,  and  they 
thought  that  there  was  every  probability  of  defeat- 
ing him  when  he  should  be  obliged  to  retreat. 
Hence  the  bloody  repulse  suffered  by  A.  P.  Hill  at 
Beaver  Dam  Creek  on  the  26th  had  no  discouraging 
effect  either  on  his  troops 2  or  on  the  army  generally ; 

1  2  B.  &  L.,  314,  337,  n. 

*  But  see  D.  H.  Hill,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  361. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  177 

and  when,  early  the  next  morning,  McCall  retired 
to  Gaines's  Mill,  the  spirits  of  the  Confederate  sol- 
diers rose  to  a  high  point  of  confidence  and  elation. 

About  noon,  the  pursuing  Confederates  discov- 
ered Porter's  position,  a  short  distance  east  of 
Powhite  Creek,  a  small  stream  which  empties  into 
the  Chickahominy.  On  this  stream  Gaines's  Mill  is 
situated,  from  which  the  battle  got  its  name.  Por- 
ter's lines,  which  were  naturally  strong,  and  had  been 
made  more  formidable  by  digging  rifle-pits,  and  by 
felling  trees  in  front  of  them,  were  in  the  shape  of 
a  semicircle,  having  its  extremities  resting  on  the 
Chickahominy.  Everything  had  been  carefully  ar- 
ranged and  provided  for,  so  far  as  was  possible,  con- 
sidering the  number  of  troops  at  Porter's  disposal. 
His  batteries  were  judiciously  placed,  and  his  troops 
skilfully  disposed.  With  adequate  reserves,  to  take 
the  place  of  exhausted  or  depleted  regiments,  the 
position  was  one  that  might  certainly  have  been 
held,  at  least  during  an  afternoon,  by  such  well-disci- 
plined troops  as  Porter  had,  commanded  by  an 
officer  of  his  ability. 

The  battle  began  about  two  o'clock  with  a  furi- 
ous assault  by  A.  P.  Hill,  who  was  finally  repulsed 
with  great  loss.  The  Confederates  were  almost  in- 
variably 1  the  assailants ;  nothing  could  exceed  their 
gallantry  and  determination  ;  but  for  hours  their 
efforts  were  absolutely  fruitless.  It  seemed  for  a 
long  while  that  the  Federal  positions  could  not  be 
carried.  General  Lee,  in  fact,  was  so  impressed  with 
the  successful  resistance  made  by  Porter  that  he  im- 


1  But  not  always  ;  13  W.  R.,  432,  837. 

VOL.    II.— 12 


178  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.      [1862 

agined  that  u  the  principal  part  of  the  Federal  army 
was  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chickahominy."  He 
speaks  in  his  report  of  "  the  superior  force  of  the 
enemy,"  and  says  that  at  one  time  "  it  became  appar- 
ent that  the  enemy  was  gradually  gaining  ground." ' 
Porter's  troops,  however,  though  admirably  hand- 
led, were  not  numerous  enough  to  oppose  a  suffi- 
cient resistance  at  all  points  of  their  line.  Jackson 
and  D.  H.  Hill  were  attacking  them  on  their  north 
front,  A.  P.  Hill  and  Longstreet  on  their  west 
front.  When  Slocum's  division,  which  McClellan 
sent  from  Franklin's  corps  after  the  fight  began, 
reached  the  field  at  4  P.M.,*  Porter  had  exhausted 
his  reserves.  Slocum's  brigades  were  immediately 
sent  to  the  weak  places  in  the  line,  and  the  Fed- 
eral resistance  was  protracted  for  some  two  hours. 
Towards  evening,  however,  General  Lee,  on  the 
arrival  of  fresh  troops,3  ordered  a  general  advance. 
The  Federal  lines  were  broken  near  their  centre, 
the  Confederates  poured  in,  turning  the  right  of  the 
troops  which  constituted  Porter's  left,  and  also 
making  it  imperative  fflr  those  on  the  right  of  his 
line  to  abandon  their  positions.  There  was  more  or 
less  confusion,  22  guns  were  either  captured  or  left 
on  the  field,4  and  some  2800  prisoners,5  of  whom  about 
1200  were  wounded  men,6  were  taken  by  the  victori- 
ous Confederates.  But  the  greater  part  of  the  troops 

1  13  W.  R.,492. 
S2  B.  &  L.,  339. 

3  13  W.  R.,  493. 

4  2  B.  &  L. ,  340. 

•  13  W.  R.,41. 

*  This  is  on  the  supposition  that  the  proportion  of  killed  to  wounded  was 
the  same  in  the  Federal  as  in  the  Confederate  army.     Cf.  13  W.  R.,  506. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  179 

fell  back  in  good  order,  and  made  repeated  stands.1 
The  appearance  on  the  field  of  two  brigades  from 
Simmer's  corps  assisted  greatly  to  check  the  pur- 
suit of  the  Confederates.  During  the  night  and 
early  morning,  all  the  Federal  troops  were  quietly 
withdrawn  to  the  south  bank  of  the  Chickahominy, 
and  the  bridges  over  the  stream  in  that  vicinity  were 
destroyed.  The  Federal  loss  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing  is  given  as  6837  * ;  that  of  the  Confed- 
erates in  killed  and  wounded  must  have  been  at 
least  6000.3 

No  one  can  read  the  accounts  of  this  action  with- 
out coming  to  the  conclusion  that  10,000  or  15,000 
more  men  sent  to  Porter  would  have  enabled  him  to 
hold  his  own  till  nightfall,  and  then  to  have  effected 
the  withdrawal  of  his  command  with  entire  safety. 
And  it  is  quite  possible  that  if  McClellan  had  sent 
the  brigades  of  French  and  Meagher  from  Sumner's 
corps  an  hour  or  two  earlier,  the  battle  would  have 
been  gained.  But  General  McClellan  adopted  the 
plan  of  asking  his  corps-commanders  if  they  could 
spare  any  of  their  troopg  to  go  to  Porter's  assist- 
ance ;  Franklin  promptly  sent  one  of  his  two  divi- 
sions, that  of  Slocum;  towards  the  close  of  the 
afternoon  Sumner  was  willing  to  spare  the  two  bri- 
gades of  French  and  Meagher ;  but  Heintzelman 
and  Keyes  thought  it  dangerous  to  weaken  their 
lines.4  The  demonstrations  which  Magruder  and 

1  "Although  swept  from  their  defences,  .  .  .  the  well-disciplined 
Federals  continued  in  retreat  to  fight  with  stubborn  resistance."  Jackson's 
Report,  13  W.  R.,  556.  Cf.  Lee's  Report,  ib. ,  493. 

9/£.,4i. 

J  2  B.  &  L.,  342,  n.  ;  cf.  Allan,  94,  n. 

4  12  W.  R.,  57-59- 


i8o  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

Huger  made  in  compliance  with  Lee's  orders  suc- 
ceeded perfectly  in  their  object ;  the  corps-command- 
ers (except  Franklin,  who,  having  sent  Slocum's 
division,  had  no  troops  to  spare)  were  deceived  or 
in  doubt  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  and  not 
unnaturally  preferred  to  keep  as  many  of  their 
troops  with  them  as  they  could.  McClellan  con- 
tented himself  with  adopting  their  views,  and  ac- 
cordingly Porter  was  beaten.  There  was  also  another 
course  open  to  McClellan.  An  attack  on  Magruder's 
lines  might  very  possibly  have  had  the  effect  of  ar- 
resting the  attack  on  Porter.1  Magruder  himself 
believed  that  his  lines  might  have  been  carried.2  At 
any  rate  the  situation  of  Porter  was  so  serious,  and 
the  importance  of  preventing  his  defeat  was  so  ma- 
terial to  the  success  of  McClellan's  operations,  that 
it  is  surprising  that  McClellan  did  not  adopt  one 
or  the  other  of  these  expedients.  It  is  true  that  the 
result  of  the  battle  of  Graines's  Mill,  although  a  de- 
feat, was  not  a  serious  disaster  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac ;  but  this  was  not  due  to  any  nice  calcula- 
tions on  the  part  of  General  McClellan  as  to  the 
number  of  troops  which  Porter  required.  He  knew 
that  to  make  Porter  reasonably  secure,  more  troops 
were  needed ;  he  did  not  send  them,  because  he  was 
deceived  by  one  of  the  ordinary  artifices  of  war. 

On  the  evening  of  the  27th,  after  the  battle,  Mc- 
Clellan informed  his  corps-commanders 8  of  his  inten- 
tion to  fall  back  to  Harrison's  Landing  on  the  James 
River,  and  issued  his  orders  accordingly.  It  is  not  easy 

1  Cf.  i  M.  H.  S.  M.,  212,  213  ;  Allan,  96. 

*  13  W.  R.,  662. 

1  12  W.  R.,  60  ;  i  C.  W.  (1863),  355. 


j 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  igi 

to  see  why  lie  should  not  have  come  to  this  decision, 
and  announced  it,  at  midnight  of  the  26th,  for  he 
must  have  known  then  that  his  communications  with 
White  House  would  be  irrecoverably  lost  unless  he 
should  take  the  most  energetic  measures  to  preserve 
them,  and  he  had  then  made  up  his  mind  to  stand 
strictly  on  the  defensive.  Much  might  have  been 
done  during  the  27th  to  prepare  the  roads  and  bridges 
for  the  movement  of  the  army  across  White  Oak 
Swamp,  and  thence  to  the  James.  But  although  Mc- 
Clellan  early  made  preparations  to  abandon  his  depot 
at  White  House,  and  issued  orders  on  the  26th  to  have 
all  stores  that  were  not  needed  for  immediate  use 
put  on  board  ship,1  and  had  the  herd  of  2500  beef- 
cattle  brought  down  from  White  House  to  Savage 
Station  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,2  it  was  not  until 
the  evening  of  the  27th  that  he  decided  to  put  his 
trains  in  motion  for  the  James,3  and  that  final  orders 
were  given  to  Colonel  Ingalls,  the  officer  in  charge 
of  the  stores  at  White  House,  to  break  up  the  depot 
there,  and  remove  the  property  by  water  to  the 
James  River.4  It  certainly  would  seem  that  much 
precious  time  was  lost  by  this  delay. 

McClellan  had,  however,  recognized  the  import- 
ance of  destroying  the  bridges  across  the  Chicka- 
hominy.  The  upper  bridges  were  destroyed  on  the 
26th  and  27th,5  and  orders  were  issued  on  the  27th 

1  12  W.  R.,  169.  The  depot  of  supplies  at  Despatch  Station,  east  of  the 
Chickahominy,  was  also  broken  up  on  the  26th,  and  the  stores  removed  to 
Savage  Station.  Ib.,  169. 

*  76.,  169,  170. 
1  Ib.,  160. 

*  Ib.,  1 60. 

*  Ib.,  118. 


i82  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

to  destroy  the  railroad  bridge  and  Bottom's  Bridge, 
in  case  of  an  attack.1  They  were  both  burnt  on  the 
morning  of  the  28th.2 

Thus  ended  the  first  act  in  the  drama  of  the 
"  Seven  Days'  Battles."  It  left  General  Lee  in  undis- 
puted possession  of  the  north  bank  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy.  The  only  Federal  force  of  any  consequence 
on  that  side  of  the  river  had  been  beaten  and  driven 
away.  This  success  had  been  won,  however,  only 
after  a  bloody  battle,  in  which  the  Confederates  had 
suffered  a  loss  (which  they  could  ill  afford)  of  some 
6000  officers  and  men.  We  can  hardly  suppose 
that  General  Lee  attacked  at  Gaines's  Mill  because  he 
deemed  the  driving  of  Porter  from  his  strong  position 
an  essential  preliminary  to  the  success  of  his  plan  of 
breaking  up  the  communications  of  the  Federal  army 
with  White  House;  for  he  must  have  known,  as 
soon  as  he  saw  that  Porter  was  (as  it  were)  clinging 
with  both  hands  to  the  Chickahominy,  that  General 
McClellan  had  decided  to  leave  his  communications 
to  their  fate.  General  Lee  undoubtedly  ordered 
the  attack  because  he  thought  he  saw  an  opportunity 
of  dealing  a  very  severe  blow  at  his  antagonist.  No 
one  can  say  that  he  was  not  justified  in  expecting  a 
great  success ;  and  had  he  been  able  to  concentrate 
his  troops  earlier  in  the  day  and  to  get  them  all  on 
the  ground  at  the  same  time,  he  might  well  have  had 
a  much  greater  success  than  he  actually  obtained. 
As  it  was,  however,  his  expectations  had  not  been 
satisfied.  Porter  had,  indeed,  been  beaten ;  prison- 
ers, guns,  and  colors  attested  the  victory  of  the  Con- 

1  13  W.  R.,  216.  *  /£.,  192,  200. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  183 

federates;  but  no  impression  of  any  moment  had 
been  made  upon  the  moral  of  the  Federal  army, — 
even  upon  that  of  the  defeated  troops  of  the  5th 
corps.  The  truth  was,  that  both  armies  had  ac- 
quired during  the  past  year  an  admirable  steadiness 
and  cohesion  ;  the  men  had  become  accustomed  to 
military  life,  to  obedience,  to  discipline;  they  had 
learned  to  trust  their  superiors ;  they  were  used  to 
patient  endurance  of  hardship,  of  disaster  even ; 
they  had  begun  to  admire  the  soldierly  virtues ;  they 
were  proud  of  the  gallant  officers  who  led  them ; 
they  were  not  to  be  easily  dismayed ;  even  after  de- 
feat they  were  always  ready  to  resume  the  offensive. 
Hence  a  partial  success  was  not  by  any  means  always 
the  forerunner  of  other  successes;  and  partial  suc- 
cesses were  throughout  the  war  far  more  common 
than  complete  successes. 

To  return  now  to  General  Lee.  Finding  on  the 
morning  of  the  28th  that  all  of  Porter's  troops  had 
recrossed  the  Chickahominy  and  had  broken  down 
the  bridges  behind  them,  he  pushed  Ewell  down  the 
river  as  far  as  Bottom's  Bridge.  As  we  have  pointed 
out  above,  he  was  expecting  McClellan  to  cross  the 
river  at  the  lower  bridges  and  attempt  to  retreat  to 
Fort  Monroe.  But  he  waited  in  vain  for  any  move- 
ment of  this  sort  on  the  part  of  the  Federal  army. 
During  the  day  of  the  28th,  the  Confederates  re- 
paired some  of  the  upper  bridges  across  the  Chicka- 
hominy, and  made  preparations  to  cross  over  to  the 
south  side. 

General  McClellan,  as  we  have  seen,  issued  his 
orders  for  the  movement  of  his  army  to  the  James 


184  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.      [1862 

River  on  the  evening  of  the  27th.  The  army  lay 
between  the  Chickahominy  on  the  north  and  east, 
and  White  Oak  Swamp  on  the  south.  On  the  west 
it  was  protected  by  strong  works,  so  that,  so  long  as 
an  adequate  force  was  retained  in  them,  no  irruption 
of  the  enemy  from  the  direction  of  Richmond  was  to 
be  feared.  The  first  thing  to  do  was  to  make  ar- 
rangements for  crossing  White  Oak  Swamp,  or  rather 
for  crossing  White  Oak  Swamp  Creek,  through  which 
the  waters  of  the  swamp,  which  itself  was  not  pas- 
sable for  troops,  empty  into  the  Chickahominy. 
The  old  bridge  over  this  creek  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  Federal  troops  when  they  took  up  position 
north  of  the  swamp,  and  it  was  now  necessary  to  re- 
build it,  for  it  was  only  over  this  bridge,  and  across 
a  ford  known  as  Brackett's  Ford,  a  mile  and  a 
quarter  west  of  the  bridge,  that  the  army  and  trains 
could  make  their  way  to  the  James  River.  Orders 
were  accordingly  issued  on  the  night  of  the  27th  to 
the  engineer  officers  to  rebuild  the  bridge  on  the 
site  of  the  old  one,  and  to  construct  a  new  one  at 
Brackett's  Ford.  The  old  bridge  was  finished  on 
the  morning  of  the  28th,  and  the  new  one  at  Brack- 
ett's Ford  by  the  evening  of  the  same  day.1 

The  next  step  was  to  send  a  sufficient  number  of 
troops  across  the  creek  to  take  up  a  defensive  posi- 
tion to  the  south  of  it,  where  the  Charles  City  and 
other  roads  from  Richmond  debouch,  so  as  to  pro- 
tect the  march  of  the  rest  of  the  army  to  the  James 
River.  Keyes,  who  commanded  the  4th  corps,  was 
assigned  to  this  duty.  He  received  his  orders  at 

1  12  W.  R.,  118,  119  ;  13  W.  R.,  192. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  185 

1  A.M.  of  the  28th,  and  before  noon  he  had  crossed 
the  creek  and  taken  up  a  position  four  miles  south 
of  the  bridge,  where  he  observed  the  Charles  City, 
New  Market,  and  Quaker  roads,1  and  thus  ensured  a 
safe  passage  to  Malvern  Hill  for  the  trains  and  the 
reserve  artillery,  as  well  as  for  the  5th  corps, 
which  had  suffered  so  heavily  in  the  action  of  the 
day  before.  Morell's  division  of  this  corps  crossed 
the  creek  that  afternoon  and  took  up  position  a  mile 
and  a  half  to  the  north  of  Keyes's  troops.2  Sykes's 
division  did  not  move  till  6  P.M.,  and  after  a  short 
halt  crossed  at  Brackett's  Ford  early  in  the  morning 
of  the  29th.3  McCalPs  division  followed  that  of 
Sykes,  and  soon  after  noon  of  the  29th  wras  across 
the  creek.4 

The  reserve  artillery  of  the  army  under  Colonel 
Hunt  crossed  the  creek  during  the  night  of  the  28th 
and  went  into  camp  the  next  morning  near  the  junc- 
tion of  the  New  Market  and  Charles  City  roads.5 

The  great  herd  of  2500  beef -cattle  crossed  early 
in  the  morning  of  the  29th,  and  at  daylight  of  the 
30th  was  driven  to  the  James  River,  reaching  its 
destination  without  loss.6 

The  trains  of  the  army,  consisting  of  some  3600 
wagons  and  700  ambulances,7  were  started  as  soon  as 
possible  after  midnight  of  the  27th,  and  "  on  the 


1  13  W.  R.,  192. 
1  /£.,  274. 
3/<J.,  350. 

4  /<$.,  389. 

5  /<*.,  237. 

*  12  W.  R.,  170  ;  "  29,"  on  the  I3thline  from  the  foot  of  the  page,  should 
be  "  28." 


1 86  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

afternoon  of  the  29th  were  all  safely  across  White 
Oak  Swamp."1 

During  the  whole  of  the  28th  the  two  corps  of 
Heintzelman  and  Sumner,  with  Smith's  division  of 
Franklin's  corps,  held  the  Union  lines  south  of  the 
Chickahominy,  so  that  no  intelligence  could  be 
gained  of  the  Federal  movements  by  the  Confederate 
generals,  Magruder  and  Huger.  Nor  could  General 
Lee  on  the  north  side  of  the  river  discover  what 
McClellan  was  doing.  As  he  says  himself :  "  The 
country  was  densely  wooded  and  intersected  by  im- 
passable swamps,  at  once  concealing  his  [the  ene- 
my's] movements  and  precluding  reconnoissances. 
.  .  .  The  bridges  over  the  Chickahominy  in  rear 
of  the  enemy  were  destroyed,  and  their  reconstruc- 
tion was  impracticable  in  the  presence  of  his  whole 
army  and  powerful  batteries.  We  were  therefore 
compelled  to  wait  until  his  purpose  should  be  de- 
veloped." a 

Meantime,  however,  Stuart  on  the  morning  of  the 
28th  was  sent  with  his  cavalry  to  break  up  the 
York  River  Railroad,8  and  he,  accompanied  by  E  well's 
division,  reached  Despatch  Station,  tore  up  the  track, 
and  made  some  captures.  He  then  proceeded  with 
his  cavalry  alone  to  White  House,  reaching  its  neigh- 
borhood by  nightfall.  All  the  next  day,  the  29th, 
Stuart  spent  at  White  House,  provisioning  his  com- 
mand, and  completing  the  destruction  of  those  sup- 

1  12  W.  R.,  160. 

'I3W.  R.,494- 

*  Longstreet  (130)  says  that  General  Lee  sent  Stuart  and  Ewell  on  this 
mission  ' '  under  the  impression  that  the  enemy  must  reopen  connection  with 
his  base  on  the  Pamunkey." 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  187 

plies  which  the  Federal  quartermaster-general  had 
not  been  able  to  remove  or  destroy,1 — doubtless  an 
agreeable,  but,  under  the  circumstances,  a  very  un- 
wise occupation  of  most  precious  time.  Whether 
the  Federals  saved  a  larger  or  a  smaller  amount  of 
their  stores,  and  even  whether  the  Confederates 
captured  more  or  less  of  them,  were  matters  of  small 
consequence  compared  with  the  assistance  which 
Stuart  and  his  cavalry  could  render  to  the  rest  of 
the  army  in  its  attempt  to  turn  the  retreat  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  into  a  rout.  Hence  Stuart 
should  have  been  at  hand,  where  he  could  be  de- 
spatched at  once  in  pursuit  of  the  retiring  Federals, 
as  soon  as  the  direction  of  their  retreat  had  been 
ascertained.  But  General  Lee,  like  the  greater  part 
of  the  generals  in  the  Civil  War,  made  little  account 
of  having  his  cavalry  act  in  co-operation  with  the 
main  army ;  it  was  not  until  the  30th  that  he  ordered 
Stuart  to  recross  the  Chickahominy,  and  reunite  his 
command  to  that  of  Jackson;  and  (to  finish  now 
with  this  subject)  Stuart,  though  he  moved  with  his 
accustomed  celerity,  was  unable  to  bear  any  part  in 
the  attempts  to  break  up  the  orderly  retreat  of  the 
Union  army,  and,  in  fact,  did  not  join  Lee  until  after 
the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill  had  ended  in  the  defeat 
of  the  Confederates.2 

General  Lee  was  not  able  to  make  up  his  mind 
that  his  antagonist  was  withdrawing  to  the  James 
until  the  night  of  the  28th,  when  the  signs  of  a  gen- 
eral movement  in  the  Federal  camp  had  become 
apparent,  and  he  issued  no  orders  until  the  morning 

1  13  W.  R.,  515-517.  *  /<*.,  497- 


188  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

of  the  29th.  He  had  with  him  on  the  north  side 
of  the  Chickahominy  the  commands  of  Longstreet, 
Jackson,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  D.  H.  Hill.  South  of  the 
river,  in  the  works  in  front  of  Richmond,  was  the 
division  of  Magruder,  and,  on  his  right,  that  of  Huger. 
Lee  was  now  satisfied  that  the  Union  army  had 
either  abandoned  its  works,  or  must  be  on  the  point 
of  so  doing,  in  order  to  take  up  its  march  to  the 
James.  He  determined  to  press  it  simultaneously 
in  flank  and  rear.  Magruder  was  ordered  to  ad- 
vance down  the  Williamsburg  road,  while  Jackson 
and  D.  H.  Hill  were  to  cross  the  Chickahominy  at 
Sumner's  Upper  (or  Grapevine)  Bridge,  and  march 
on  Savage  Station.  Here,  or  in  this  vicinity,  their 
united  commands  could  attack  the  rear-guard  of  the 
Federal  army,  which  (it  might  be  expected)  would 
be  found  covering  the  passage  of  troops  and  trains 
over  White  Oak  Swamp.  Then  Longstreet,  with 
whom  was  A.  P.  Hill,  was  ordered  to  ascend  the 
north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  as  far  as  New 
Bridge,  which  Magruder  had  opportunely  repaired 
during  the  28th,  and  march  south  by  the  Nine-Mile 
and  other  roads  till  he  reached  the  Darbytown  road, 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Charles  City  cross-roads, 
where  he  might  expect  to  be  joined  by  Huger,  who 
was  directed  to  march  from  the  lines  of  Richmond 
down  the  Charles  City  road.  These  troops  (it  was 
expected)  would  strike  the  right  flank  of  the  Fed- 
eral army  as  it  was  marching  from  White  Oak 
Swamp  to  Malvern  Hill,  and  it  was  hoped  that  by 
a  vigorous  attack  this  retreat  could  be  converted 
into  a  rout.  These  orders  were  eminently  appro- 


1 86 2]          THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  189 

priate  to  the  situation,  so  far  as  they  went ;  they 
should,  as  it  seems  to  us,  have  provided  for  Stuart's 
cavalry  to  precede  Longstreet's  march ;  but  still, 
even  without  the  cavalry,  and  even  although  a  whole 
day  had  been  lost  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  there  was  good  reason  to  expect  that,  with 
good  luck,  and  a  display  of  proper  energy  on  the  part 
of  the  corps-  and  division-commanders,  some  successes, 
and  perhaps  of  considerable  moment,  over  the  retiring 
Federal  army  might  be  obtained  by  the  Confederates. 
But  General  Lee's  army  was  now  so  much  scat- 
tered, and  its  parts  were  so  separated  from  each 
other  by  natural  obstacles,  that  he  had  need  in  this 
emergency  of  more  than  the  ordinary  amount  of  good 
fortune  to  enable  him  to  reap  a  substantial  harvest 
from  the  opportunities  which  were  now  presented 
to  him.  Certain  results,  and  those  of  a  character  to 
encourage  the  Confederate  soldiers  and  reassure  the 
public  mind  in  Richmond,  were  as  a  matter  of  course 
to  be  expected.  The  army  of  General  McClellan 
was  certain  to  march  toward  the  James,  and  to  be 
followed,  or  pursued,  if  that  term  be  preferred,  by 
the  army  of  General  Lee.  General  Lee,  to  be  sure? 
knew  very  well  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
marching  to  the  James,  not  because  it  was  pursued 
by  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  but  because  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  for  McClellan  to  secure  a 
new  base  of  operations  as  soon  as  possible.  But  for 
the  public  and  the  soldiers  it  was  enough  to  know 
that  the  Confederate  army  was  pursuing  the  Federal 
army.  It  was  exceedingly  likely  that  the  Union 
commander  would  not  choose  to  encumber  his  march 


i9o  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

with  all  his  sick  and  wounded ;  hence  a  consider- 
able number  of  prisoners  would  in  all  probability  be 
taken.  It  was  also  very  possible  that  the  Federal 
commander  would  not  be  able  to  find  transportation 
for  the  immense  quantity  of  provisions  and  forage 
with  which  his  government  had  so  liberally  supplied 
the  needs  of  his  army ;  many  of  these  stores,  there- 
fore, would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates. 
There  would  also  be  stragglers,  and  plenty  of  them 
too,  to  be  picked  up.  Many  muskets  would  be 
thrown  away  by  tired  and  lazy  soldiers  ;  some  guns 
and  many  wagons  would  be  sure  to  stick  fast  in  the 
mud,  where  they  could  be  added  to  the  long  list  of 
captures.  But  while  these  trophies  and  acquisitions 
were  practically  certain  to  be  gained,  General  Lee 
was  perfectly  well  aware  that  the  Federal  army 
would  lose  nothing  of  the  least  consequence  in  los- 
ing these  things.  What  he  was  aiming  at  was  some- 
thing far  more  important  than  anything  of  this  kind. 
It  was  to  effect  the  rout  of  the  Federal  army.  For 
this  he  relied,  first,  on  his  dispositions,  which,  as  we 
have  just  said,  were,  with  the  exception  of  his  in- 
structions, or  lack  of  instructions,  to  his  cavalry,  ex- 
cellent, and,  secondly,  on  the  demoralization  which 
he  expected  to  find  produced  in  the  Federal  army 
by  the  enforced  change  of  position  from  the  Chicka- 
hominy  to  the  James,  made  after  the  loss  of  a  battle, 
and  interrupted  and  interfered  with  by  an  active 
and  resolute  foe,  always  pursuing,  and  sometimes 
intercepting  the  march  of  the  retreating  trains  and 
columns. 

The  first  operation  ordered  was,  it  will  be  remem- 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  191 

bered,  the  advance  of  Magruder's  strong  division 
from  the  lines  of  Richmond  towards  Savage  Station, 
where  the  rear-guard  of  the  Union  army  might  fairly 
be  expected  to  be,  even  as  late  as  the  29th.  Jack- 
son's powerful  corps  was  to  cross  the  Chickahominy 
and  co-operate  in  this  movement.  But  Jackson 
found  the  bridge  over  which  he  must  cross  the 
Chickahominy  so  thoroughly  destroyed  that  it  took 
him  all  day  to  repair  it,  and  Magruder  was  obliged 
to  act  alone.  Fortune,  however,  favored  him ;  for 
the  Federal  defensive  force,  which  should  have  con- 
sisted of  the  corps  of  Heintzelman  on  the  Federal 
left,  that  of  Sumner  in  the  centre,  and  that  of  Frank- 
lin on  the  right,  was  most  unexpectedly  broken, 
partly  by  the  withdrawal  of  Heintzelman's  corps 
to  cross  White  Oak  Swamp,  which  exposed  Sum- 
ner's  left,  and  partly  by  the  retirement  of  Slocum's 
division  of  Franklin's  corps  in  the  same  direction. 
General  McClellan  was  not  on  the  ground,  and 
the  senior  corps-commander,  Sumner,  who  ought 
promptly  to  have  assumed  command  in  his  absence, 
evidently  did  not  do  so.  Heintzelman  saw  no  need 
of  his  remaining  near  Savage  Station  ;  he  thought 
there  were  troops  enough,  and  more  than  enough, 
there  already ;  so  he  went  off.  Slocum  left,  having 
asked  and  obtained  permission  from  McClellan 
himself  to  take  his  division  across  the  swamp  in 
view  of  its  losses  at  Graines's  Mill ;  a  request  that 
should  have  been  addressed  to  his  corps-commander 
and  not  to  the  commanding  general.  The  conse- 
quence of  these  defections  was  that  for  a  time 
Sumner's  left  was  in  the  air,  and  that  there  was 


i92  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

a  serious  gap  between  his  right  and  the  other  divi- 
sion of  Franklin's  corps,  that  of  W.  F.  Smith.  But 
Magruder  was  not  quick  enough  to  take  advantage 
of  these  weak  points  in  his  adversary's  position; 
he  acted  with  great  circumspection ;  he  even  sent  to 
Huger  for  reinforcements,  thereby  interfering  with 
the  movement  of  that  officer  down  the  Charles  City 
road ;  finally,  in  the  afternoon,  he  attacked,  first  at 
Allen's  Farm,  and  then  at  Savage  Station.  The 
action  was  fought  with  some  spirit,  but  the  Con- 
federates were  repulsed  without  difficulty  and  the 
Federal  rear-guard  was  free  to  resume  its  march. 
It  has  often  been  said,  and  it  is  certainly  true, 
that  had  Jackson  been  there  the  action  at  Savage 
Station  would  have  been  a  very  different  affair ;  it 
would  not,  however,  necessarily  have  been  a  defeat 
for  the  Union  troops,  for  it  would  have  been  per- 
fectly possible  to  recall  Heintzelman  and  Slocum 
had  Sumner  and  Franklin  been  hard  pressed. 

During  this  day  of  the  29th,  the  ammunition, 
stores,  and  supplies  of  all  kinds  which  had  been 
collected  at  Savage  Station,  which  could  not  be 
carried  away,  were  set  on  fire  and  partially,  at  least, 
destroyed ;  and  the  engines  and  cars  were  run  into 
the  Chickahominy.  There  was  a  field-hospital  near 
Savage  Station  in  which  were  left  those  sick  and 
wounded  men  who  could  not  be  safely  carried  with 
the  army.  They  are  said  to  have  numbered  2500. 

During  the  night  the  Federal  troops  retired  by 
General  McClellan's  orders  across  White  Oak 
Swamp.  Richardson's  division  of  Sumner's  corps 
was  the  rear-guard  of  this  portion  of  the  army,  and 


1 86 2]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  193 

he  crossed  the  bridge  and  destroyed  it  about  10  A.M. 
of  the  30th. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  now  with  all  its 
artillery  and  trains  south  of  White  Oak  Swamp. 
The  roads  to  Malvern  Hill  were  unobstructed  ex- 
cept by  the  trains,  and  to  give  them  the  time  needed 
for  them  to  complete  their  movement  to  the  James 
the  army  was  obliged  to  take  up  a  defensive  posi- 
tion during  the  whole  of  the  30th.  To  Franklin, 
with  one  of  his  divisions,  that  of  Smith,  assisted  by 
Richardson's  division  of  Sumner's  corps,  was  as- 
signed the  task  of  preventing  the  enemy  from  cross- 
ing White  Oak  Swamp  Creek ;  Slocum's  division 
of  Franklin's  corps,  Sedgwick's  division  of  Sumner's 
corps,  and  Heintzelman's  two  divisions,  together 
with  McCall's  division  of  the  5th  corps,  were  di- 
rected to  hold  the  debouches  of  the  Charles  City, 
Darbytown,  and  New  Market  roads,  thus  covering 
the  Quaker  Road,  over  which  the  trains,  soon  after 
leaving  the  neighborhood  of  the  swamp,  must  pro- 
ceed in  the  direction  of  Malvern  Hill  and  the  James 
River.  Near  the  river,  and  in  a  line  at  right  angles 
to  it,  stood  the  5th  corps,  ready  to  prevent  any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Confederates  to  seize 
Malvern  Hill.  The  5th  corps  was  supported  by 
the  4th.  These  arrangements  were  made  by  McClel- 
lan  in  person.  He  then  left  the  field  for  the  James 
River.  So  far  as  the  disposition  made  by  him  of  the 
2d,  3d,  and  6th  corps  was  concerned,  it  was  cer- 
tainly judicious 1 ;  in  fact,  it  was  obviously  such  as 

1  It  may,  however,  be  remarked  that  the  divisions  composing  the  different 
corps  were  not  united  under  their  own  corps-commanders. 

VOL.  II. — 13 


i94  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

the  situation  called  for ;  but  it  may  well  be  ques- 
tioned if  one  of  the  two  corps — the  4th  and  5th— 
which  McClellan  kept  near  the  James  River  ought 
not  to  have  been  recalled,  and  placed  within  sup- 
porting distance  of  the  troops  on  whom  the  enemy 
was  expected  to  make  a  most  formidable  attack, — 
an  attack  on  the  success  of  which  his  hopes  of 
breaking  up  the  Federal  army  obviously  rested. 
One  corps,  it  would  seem,  would  have  sufficed  to 
hold  the  roads  to  Malvern  Hill  bordering  on  the 
river,  especially  as  the  fire  of  Federal  gunboats  com- 
manded the  approaches  from  this  direction. 

About  noon,  Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill,  who  had 
crossed  the  Chickahominy  during  the  night  and  had 
marched  through  Savage  Station,  reached  White 
Oak  Swamp  Creek,  to  find  the  bridges  destroyed, 
and  Franklin  prepared  to  dispute  their  crossing. 
About  the  same  hour  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill 
arrived  by  the  way  of  the  Darbytown  road,  to  find 
Heintzelman's  corps  and  McCall's  division  ready  to 
oppose  their  further  progress.  Huger,  who  had 
finally  got  his  division  together,  and  had  marched 
in  pursuance  of  his  orders  down  the  Charles  City 
road,  found,  on  approaching  the  scene  of  action  on 
Longstreet's  left,  that  the  road  had  been  greatly 
obstructed  by  the  enemy1  and  that  his  progress 
must  be  very  slow.  Slocum  and  Sedgwick  were 
ready  to  make  head  against  him  as  soon  as  he  should 
begin  an  attack.  Magruder,  who  had  been  ordered 
to  support  Longstreet,  was  subsequently  ordered  to 
support  Holmes,  who  had  been  directed  to  march 

1  13  W.  R.,  99,  789. 


1 86 2]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  195 

from  the  southern  defences  of  Richmond  by  the 
New  Market  road  ;  but  before  he  had  succeeded  in 
joining  him,  Magruder  was  ordered  back  to  support 
Lougstreet  and  did  not  get  into  action  during  the 
day. 

It  was  General  Lee's  intention  that  in  this  battle, 
which  is  known  indifferently  as  that  of  Frayser's 
Farm,  Nelson's  Farm,  or  Glendale,  all  his  divisions 
should  participate.  He  expected  that  Huger  would 
push  through,  or  turn,  the  obstructions  in  his  way, 
and  would  take  his  place  on  Longstreet's  left ;  that 
Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill,  assisted  by  Huger,  would 
make  a  formidable  assault  on  that  part  of  the  Fed- 
eral army  which  was  directly  in  front  of  them,  fac- 
ing westward ;  and  that  Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill 
would  be  able  to  cross  White  Oak  Swamp  Creek, 
overcome  the  enemy  in  their  front,  and  come  in  on 
the  right  and  rear  of  the  troops  which  were  oppos- 
ing Longstreet,  A.  P.  Hill,  and  Huger,  thus  gaining 
for  the  Confederates  an  excellent  chance  for  a  vic- 
tory. He  doubtless,  also,  expected  that  the  united 
commands  of  Holmes  and  Magruder  would  reach 
the  Federal  line  of  retreat  by  occupying  Malvern 
Hill,  in  which  case  the  rout  of  the  Union  army  ought 
to  be  completed. 

But  Jackson  exhibited  on  this  day  none  of  his 
customary  energy  and  enterprise.  He  confined  him- 
self to  cannonading  the  Federal  troops  who  were 
south  of  the  creek.  Finding  the  principal  bridge  de- 
stroyed, one  would  naturally  suppose  that  he  would 
have  attempted  to  discover  fords  higher  up  the 
creek  where  he  could  cross ;  but  although  Munford's 


196  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

cavalry  actually  did  cross  at  Brackett's  Ford,  and 
secure  a  brief  lodgment  on  the  south  bank,  Jackson 
made  no  attempt  to  follow  up  the  advantage.1  His 
inactivity  has  been  severely  criticised  by  both  friends 
and  foes.2  In  the  words  of  Colonel  Allan, — "  Jack- 
son's comparative  inaction  was  a  matter  of  surprise 
at  the  time,  and  has  never  been  satisfactorily  ex- 
plained. Some  have  attributed  it  to  physical  ex- 
haustion, and  the  demands  of  the  campaign  had  been 
severe;  but  it  is  best  to  set  it  down  as  one  of  the 
few  great  mistakes  of  his  marvellous  career." s 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  cause,  the  troops  of 
Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill  remained  all  day  on  the 
north  side  of  White  Oak  Swamp  Creek  and  took 
no  part  in  the  fighting.  Huger,  also,  found  the 
obstructions  in  the  roads  insurmountable,  and  he 
remained  out  of  the  battle.  Only  Longstreet  and 
A.  P.  Hill  advanced  to  the  attack,  but  their  splen- 
did courage  and  persistence  proved  almost  too 
much  for  the  troops  to  which  they  were  opposed. 
The  division  of  McCall,  which  held  the  centre  of 
the  Federal  line,  after  a  gallant  and  protracted  re- 
sistance, was  broken,  and  a  part  of  his  troops  were 
routed  and  driven  from  the  field.  But  Hooker's 
and  Kearny's  divisions  of  Heintzel man's  corps,  on 
the  flanks  of  McCall,  stood  firm,  and,  with  the  as- 
sistance of  Sedgwick's  division,  and  other  troops 
which  the  inactivity  of  Huger  and  Jackson  enabled 

'Colonel  Munford,  who  commanded  the  detachment,  says:  "I  never 
understood  why  he  did  not  try  the  ford  where  I  had  crossed."  Stuart,  82,  n. 

*2  Dabney,  206-208  ;  Longstreet  in  2  B.  &  L.,  402,  403;  D.  H.  Hill, 
il>.,  389  ;  Franklin,  ib.,  381  ;  25  S.  H.  S.,  2ii. 

'Allan,  121.      See  2  Henderson,  60-70. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  197 

Slocum  and  Richardson  to  spare  from  their  divisions, 
re-established  the  line  in  great  part,  and  at  any  rate 
effectually  prevented  the  Confederates  from  reach- 
ing the  Quaker  Road,  on  which  the  Federal  trains 
were  moving  to  Malvern  Hill.  The  action  was 
obstinately  fought  by  both  sides.  No  strategical 
advantage  was  gained  by  the  Confederates,  nor  did 
they  inflict  a  greater  loss  of  men  than  they  suffered. 
They  captured,  however,  14  cannon,  and  some  hun- 
dreds of  prisoners. 

To  the  south,  near  Malvern  Hill,  Holmes  made  a 
demonstration  against  the  Federal  positions,  but 
encountered  such  a  severe  fire  of  artillery  that  his 
troops  precipitately  retired  in  disorder,  leaving  two 
guns  on  the  field.1 

That  General  Lee  was  badly  served  by  two  of 
his  lieutenants, — Jackson  and  Huger, — in  this  action, 
cannot  be  gainsaid.2  Had  they  participated  in  the 
battle,  the  result  might  certainly  have  been  very 
different.  Huger's  division  was  stronger  than  that 
of  Slocum,  to  which  it  was  to  have  been  opposed. 
The  troops  under  Jackson  and  D.  H.  Hill  would  cer- 
tainly have  outnumbered  the  divisions  of  Smith  and 
Richardson,  which  constituted  Franklin's  command. 
But  Jackson  had  to  get  over  the  fords,  and  deploy, 
and  advance  on  the  south  side  of  the  creek,  and 
this,  in  presence  of  such  able  officers  as  Franklin, 
Smith,  and  Richardson,  would  not  have  been  an  easy 
matter.  It  is  useless  to  speculate  on  the  result  of 
such  a  contest.3  But  it  is  easy  to  see  that  General 

1 13  W.  R.,  910,  911  ;  2  B.  &  L.,  390. 

s  Allan,  121.  3See  Franklin's  remarks  in  2  B.  &  L.,  381. 


198  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

Lee  lost,  through  the  inefficiency  of  Jackson  and 
Huger,  a  great  many  of  his  chances  of  success. 

In  this  battle  General  Lee  commanded  in  person 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  stationing  himself 
where  the  fighting  was  going  on,  and  where  he 
could  superintend  the  operations  of  Longstreet  and 
A.  P.  Hill.  General  McClellan,  on  the  other  hand, 
after  giving  in  the  morning  certain  directions  to  his 
corps-commanders,  but  apparently  without  handing 
over  the  command  to  any  one  of  them,  rode  down 
to  Malvern  Hill,  and  even  as  far  as  Haxall's  Land- 
ing, and  conferred  with  Captain  Rodgers  of  the  navy 
in  regard  to  the  place  where  the  army  had  bet- 
ter finally  be  stationed.  All  his  information  as  to 
the  details  and  results  of  this  most  important  battle 
was  obtained  for  him  by  his  aides.1  It  is  almost  in- 
credible that  any  intelligent  man  should  have  acted 
as  General  McClellan  acted  on  this  critical  day  of 
the  30th  of  June.  He  had,  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
29th,  ordered  Fitz-John  Porter  to  move  with  his 
corps  "  that  night  by  the  direct  road  to  the  elevated 
and  cleared  lands  (Malvern  Hill)  on  the  north  bank 
of  Turkey  Creek,  there  to  select  and  hold  a  position 
behind  which  the  army  and  all  its  trains  could  be 
withdrawn  with  safety."  And  "  Keyes  was  to  move 
by  a  different  road  and  form  to  "  Porter's  "  right  and 
rear." 2  There  was  therefore  no  reason  why  McClellaii 
should  have  left  his  post  to  go  to  Malvern  Hill ; 
Porter  could  attend  to  the  task  of  laying  out  the  posi- 
tion as  well  as  he  could  himself.  And  as  for  conferring 

O 

with  the  naval  officers,  that  duty  could  certainly 

1  12  W.  R.,  64-67.  *  2  B.  &  L.,  407. 


1 86 2]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  199 


have  been  entrusted  to  the  chief -of -engineers  of  the 
army,  General  Barnard.  If  Jackson,  by  one  of 
those  unexpected  and  bewildering  manoauvres  of 
which  he  gave  several  examples  in  his  brief  career, 
had  gained  a  dangerous  advantage  over  McClellan's 
corps-commanders,  who  shall  say  that  they  would 
not  have  needed  their  general  ?  If  his  army  had 
been  beaten  on  that  day,  McClellan  would  have 
been  cashiered,  and  justly.  That  the  Federal  corps- 
commanders, —  although  cordially  and  efficiently 
co-operating  with  each  other, — acted  on  this  day 
without  a  head,  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that,  at 
night,  Franklin  (as  he  says  himself)  "took  the  re- 
sponsibility of  moving  "  his  "  command  to  the  James 
River." 1  He  informed  Generals  Heintzelman  and 
Sumner  of  his  decision,2 — and  a  very  wise  decision 
it  undoubtedly  was, — yet  Sumner  afterwards  com- 
plained because  he  was  by  Franklin's  action  obliged 
to  fall  back.3  Heintzelman  also  seems  to  have  felt 
aggrieved  on  being  informed  that  Franklin  had 
decided  to  leave  his  position.4  Fortunately  for  the 
welfare  of  the  army,  these  corps-commanders  acted 
as  they  ought  to  have  done,  but  it  is  not  always 
that  good  sense  is  found  controlling  men's  conduct 
in  such  emergencies ;  it  is  never  safe  for  an  army, 
in  presence  of  the  enemy,  to  be  without  its  com- 
manding general.5  It  is  true,  everything  turned  out 
well,  or  fairly  well,  for  the  Federal  cause ;  but  it 
was  due  to  no  foresight  of  McClellan's  that  Jackson 

1  13  W.  R.,  431. 

9  2  B.  &  L.,  379.  </£.,  101. 

8 13  W.  R.,  51.       5  See  Heintzelman's  testimony  in  i  C.  W.  (1863,)  358. 


200  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

did  not  exert  himself  to  cross  the  creek,  and  that 
Huger  did  not  make  his  way  to  the  battle-field ; 
and  had  the  three  corps  been  routed  on  this  day  in 
the  absence  of  their  commander,  what  could  have 
shielded  McClellan  from  the  condemnation  of  the 
army  and  the  public  ? 

The  battle  of  Glendale  (or  Frayser's  Farm)  closed 
the  second  act  in  the  drama  of  the  "  Seven  Days' 
Battles."  The  attempt  to  break  up  the  orderly  re- 
treat of  the  Federal  army  there  failed,  just  as  the 
attempt  of  the  day  before  at  Savage  Station  to  crush 
the  rear-guard  failed.  General  Lee's  opportunity 
of  striking  the  army  of  his  antagonist  a  fatal  blow 
during  its  change  of  base  had  now  passed  away. 
The  critical  period  of  the  movement  was  over. 

During  the  evening  and  night  of  the  30th  of  June 
the  Federal  force  which  had  maintained  itself  at 
Glendale  fell  back  without  molestation  and  in  good 
order  to  Malvern  Hill,  reaching  this  position  soon 
after  daylight  of  July  1st.  As  soon  as  it  was  light 
enough  to  see,  the  troops  were  assigned  to  their 
proper  places  by  McClellan,  assisted  by  Porter,  who 
had  been  on  the  ground  with  his  corps  since  9  A.M. 
of  the  previous  day,  and  Barnard,  the  chief-of-engi- 
neers.  Besides  the  5th  corps,  the  4th  corps  was 
also  here,  and  the  reserve  artillery.  Here,  also,  were 
the  trains  of  the  army,  and  the  great  herd  of  beef- 
cattle.  Here  the  wearied  troops  of  the  2d,  3d, 
and  6th  corps  rested  and  awaited  the  attack  of  the 
enemy. 

The  position  of  Malvern  Hill  was  one  of  great 
natural  strength,  and  it  had  been  thoroughly  ex- 


i862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN. 


amined  by  Fitz-John  Porter,  who  had,  as  we  have 

said,  been  there  since  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning: 

*  & 

of  'the  30th,  and  whose  ability  for  such  a  task  as 
this  had  been  abundantly  demonstrated  by  the  excel- 
lent dispositions  he  had  made  of  his  own  corps  at  the 
battle  of  Gaines's  Mill  on  the  27th  of  June.  The 
whole  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  now  united.  Not 
a  single  regiment  had  been  cut  off.  All  the  artillery 
of  the  army,  except  about  50  pieces,  nearly  all  of 
which  had  been  taken  in  action,  was  here, — some 
250  guns  in  all.  There  had  been  time  for  General 
Hunt  to  post  the  reserve  artillery,  and  this  task  he 
had  finished  with  his  well-known  skill.  All  the 
forenoon  was  spent  in  posting  the  troops  and  guns, 
rectifying  the  lines,  reconnoitring  the  approaches 
by  which  the  Confederates  must  advance  if  they 
proposed  again  to  try  the  issue  of  battle,  and  rest- 
ing. There  was  abundance  of  time  for  everything, 
and  there  was  every  reason  for  thankfulness  and 
for  confidence  in  the  Federal  camp.  To  use  the 
language  of  Gen.  D.  H.  Hill,  the  Federal  troops  were 
"  strongly  posted  on  a  commanding  hill,  all  the  ap- 
proaches to  which  could  be  swept  by  artillery,  and 
were  guarded  by  swarms  of  infantry  securely  shel- 
tered by  fences,  ditches,  and  ravines.  Tier  after 
tier  of  batteries  were  grimly  visible  on  the  plateau, 
rising  in  the  form  of  an  amphitheatre.  One  flank 
was  protected  by  Turkey  Creek,  and  the  other  by 
gunboats.  We  [i.e.,  the  Confederates]  could  only 
reach  the  first  line  of  batteries  by  traversing  an  open 
space  of  from  300  to  400  yards,  exposed  to  a  mur- 
derous fire  of  grape  and  canister  from  the  artillery, 


202  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

and  musketry  from  the  infantry.  If  that  first  line 
were  carried,  another  and  another,  still  more  diffi- 
cult, remained  in  the  rear." l 

General  Hill  states  that  even  before  he  was  aware 
of  the  strength  of  the  Federal  position  he  had  ex- 
pressed to  Generals  Lee,  Longstreet,  and  Jackson 
his  disapprobation  of  a  further  pursuit,  and  that  an 
examination  of  the  position  satisfied  him  that  an 
attack  on  it  "  could  not  but  be  hazardous  to  "  the 
Confederate  "arms."2  There  may  perhaps  have 
been  some  hesitation  even  in  General  Lee's  mind  as 
to  ordering  an  assault,  for  Longstreet  says  that  at  a 
little  after  3  P.M.  he  was  given  to  understand  that 
the  enemy's  position  was  considered  too  strong  to 
admit  of  an  attack.3  Be  this  as  it  may,  however, 
General  Lee  decided  to  assault  the  Federal  position. 

The  country  which  surrounded  Malvern  Hill  was 
"broken  and  thickly  wooded,  and  was  traversed 
nearly  throughout  by  a  swamp,  passable  at  but  few 
places  and  difficult  at  those."  *  Of  this  country  the 
Confederate  officers  were,  furthermore,  entirely  igno- 
rant. It  took  nearly  the  whole  day  to  get  their 
troops  into  position.  The  difficulties  of  the  ground 
were  such  that  their  artillery  could  not  be  brought 
up  in  sufficient  quantity  to  make  any  impression  on 
the  Federal  lines.  The  attack  had  to  be  made  over 
an  open  space,  which  was  not  only  swept  by  the 
Federal  batteries  on  the  heights,  but  was  within 

1  13  W.  R.,  627  ;  see  also  Jackson's  Report,  i6.,  557  ;  Lee's  Report,  ib., 
496. 

*  Ib.,  628;  cf.  2  B.  &L.,  391. 

•13  \V.  R.,  760. 

4  Lee's  Report,  13  W.  R.,  496. 


1 862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  203 

range  of  the  fire  from  their  formidable  gunboats  in 
the  James  River.  The  ground  was  so  broken,  and 
the  different  bodies  of  the  Confederate  troops  were 
necessarily  so  separated  and  hidden  from  each  other, 
that  concert  of  action  was  practically  impossible ; 
and  yet  without  concert  of  action  success  was  mani- 
festly out  of  the  question. 

It  was  given  out  that  the  signal  for  a  general  ad- 
vance should  be  a  shout  from  Armistead's  brigade 
of  Huger's  division,  which  was  to  begin  the  action 
by  an  assault  on  the  works  immediately  in  its  front. 
Under  the  impression  that  he  heard  this  signal, 
D.  H.  Hill,  late  in  the  afternoon,  pushed  forward  his 
division,  only  to  find  his  troops  unsupported,  and, 
in  spite  of  their  gallant  efforts,  they  were  repulsed 
with  great  loss.  Jackson  ordered  out  two  divisions 
to  assist  Hill,  but  they  could  not  come  up  in  time 
to  be  of  any  assistance.  Finally,  the  division  of 
Huger, — the  only  division  in  the  Confederate  army 
that  had  not  been  engaged  in  the  previous  combats, 
— sprang  forward,  supported  by  that  of  Magruder, 
and  a  desperate  assault  was  made  on  the  Federal 
left.  But  in  spite  of  the  most  daring  courage  on 
the  part  of  officers  and  men,  they  were  driven  back 
with  great  slaughter.  The  Confederate  batteries 
which  attempted  to  cover  these  assaults  were  sub- 
jected to  a  concentrated  fire  from  the  Union  guns, 
and  speedily  forced  from  the  field.  There  were  also 
other  isolated,  useless,  and  unsuccessful  attempts, 
each  resulting  in  a  bloody  repulse.  The  failure  of 
the  Confederates  was  complete ;  for,  although  at 
some  points  their  infantry  almost  reached  the  bat- 


204           THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 


teries,  and  the  supporting  Federal  regiments  were 
relieved  from  time  to  time  and  other  troops  sent  to 
take  their  places  by  the  vigilant  officers  who  directed 
the  fighting  of  the  Union  troops,  absolutely  no  im- 
pression was  made  on  the  Federal  lines.1  The  ac- 
tion lasted  only  from  four  o'clock  till  dark,  but  the 
Confederates  lost  somewhat  over  5000  men  killed 
and  wounded.2  The  Federal  loss  has  been  estimated 
at  about  one  third  of  that  number.3 

That  General  Lee  should  have  expected  to  drive 
the  Union  army  from  such  a  strong  position  as  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  which  he  could  see  (as  he  tells  us  in  his 
Report)  was  crowned  with  formidable  batteries  and 
occupied  by  a  large  army,  has  always  been  a  subject 
of  wonder,  especially  when  we  know  that  he  had 
not  been  able  to  station  his  artillery  to  advantage, 
and  that  his  army  was  so  broken  up  by  the  nature 
of  the  ground  that  it  could  hardly  act  as  a  unit. 
Add  to  this,  that  it  was  evident  that  all  assaults 
must  be  made  over  open  ground,  where  the  troops 
would  inevitably  be  exposed  to  the  severest  artillery 
and  musketry  fire.  We  repeat,  it  is  not  easy  to  be- 
lieve that  General  Lee  expected  his  troops  under 
such  disadvantageous  conditions  to  drive  their  en- 
emies from  this  strong  position.  Yet  we  must  be- 
lieve that  he  did  expect  success,  or  he  would  not 
have  ordered  the  attack.  The  truth  probably  is, 
that  he  entirely  mistook  the  temper  of  the  Federal 
troops.4  He,  in  a  way,  deceived  himself  by  looking 

1  Webb,  167.  *  Allan,  135.  *  Swinton,  163. 

4  "  It  was  this  belief  in  the  demoralization  of  the  Federal  army  that  made 
our  leader  risk  the  attack."     D.  H.  Hill,  2  B.  &  L.,  391.     Cf.  Allan,  136. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  205 

at  the  events  of  the  last  few  days  as  if  they  were 
incidents  accompanying  the  victorious  career  of  an 
army  that  had  driven  its  antagonist  from  point  to 
point  in  a  series  of  successful  combats,  until  the  re- 
treating foe  had  made  a  last,  but  despairing,  stand 
for  existence.  This  was,  no  doubt,  the  way  in  which 
the  public,  North  as  well  as  South,  looked  at  the 
whole  campaign  ;  even  such  a  careful  writer  as  Colo- 
nel Allan  says :  "  80,000  Confederates  had  attacked 
this  [the  Federal]  army  of  105,000  men  in  its  chosen 
[sic]  position,  and  had  driven  it  from  Mechanicsville 
and  Cold  Harbor  across  the  Chickahominy  and 
thence  to  the  James  River."  *  But  these  statements 
are  misleading.  The  Federal  position  athwart  the 
Chickahominy  was  not  "  chosen "  as  a  position  to 
be  defended ;  it  was  taken  up  because  reinforce- 
ments were  expected  from  Fredericksburg.  When 
General  Lee  was  seen  to  be  determined  to  break 
up  his  communications  with  White  House,  General 
McClellan  made  no  effort  to  maintain  them;  and 
though  with  an  illogical  procrastination  he  delayed 
for  twenty-four  hours  giving  the  order  to  march, — 
a  delay,  by  the  way,  which  cost  him  all  the  fighting 
at  Savage  Station,  Glendale,  and  Malvern  Hill, — he 
had  nevertheless  fully  made  up  his  mind  to  retire 
to  the  James.  The  movement  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  from  the  Chickahominy  to  the  James 
was  not  the  result  of  the  Confederate  attacks  on 
it ;  the  movement  was  dictated  by  the  absolute 
necessity  of  establishing  a  new  base  of  supplies ; 
and  it  would  have  gone  on  all  the  more  rapidly 

1  Allan,  148. 


206  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

and  smoothly  if  the  Confederate  army  had  not 
undertaken  to  interfere  with  it.  The  marching 
away  of  the  Federal  army  after  each  engagement  was 
not  because  it  had  been  beaten ;  it  was  simply  going 
on  with  the  movement  to  the  James.  All  this  is 
surely  very  plain ;  yet  it  seems  pretty  certain  that 
General  Lee  (like  Colonel  Allan)  took  a  different 
and  a  thoroughly  mistaken  view  of  the  whole  situa- 
tion on  the  day  of  Malvern  Hill.  He  found  out  his 
error  by  the  time  the  action  was  over.  The  Federal 
position  on  Malvern  Hill  was  wisely  selected  ;  the 
troops  and  guns  were  skilfully  posted  on  it ;  the 
lines  were  firmly  and  handsomely  held ;  the  assail- 
ants, apparently  expecting  to  find  irresolution  and 
weakness,  were  met  by  coolness  and  determination ; 
and  the  result  of  the  action  was  never  for  a  moment 
in  doubt.1 

Porter  and  Hunt,  after  the  battle,  advised  McClel- 
lan  to  hold  the  position,  and,  if  possible,  to  resume 
the  offensive.2  Sumner,  though  not  volunteering 
his  advice,  was  of  the  same  opinion.8  It  is  said  that 
some  of  Stonewall  Jackson's  division-commanders 
thought  it  likely  that  McClellan  would  take  the 
offensive  the  next  morning,  and  that  in  their  opin- 
ion their  army  was  in  no  condition  to  resist  him.4 
It  would  certainly  seem  that  it  might  have  been 


1  "The  author,  as  an  eye-witness,  can  assert  that  never  for  an  instant 
was  the  Union  line  broken,  or  their  guns  in  danger."     Webb,  167. 
9  2  B.  &  L.,  422,  423. 

3  i  C.  W.  (1863),  366. 

4  "  The  fourteen  brigades  that  had  been  so  badly  repulsed  were  much 
demoralized.     But   there  were  six  divisions  intact,  and   they  could   have 
made  a  formidable  fight  on  the  2d."     D.  H.  Hill,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  394. 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  207 

arranged  to  supply  the  Union  army  at  Malvern 
Hill  with  provisions  and  ammunition,  at  any  rate 
for  a  time.  Bat  Captain  Rodgers  of  the  navy  was 
of  opinion  that  transports  could  not  safely  be 
brought  up  the  river  above  City  Point,  owing  to 
the  channel  being  commanded  from  the  opposite 
shore.1  Hence  McClellan,  who  was  anxious  only  to 
find  a  safe  and  permanent  location  for  his  army, 
and  was  in  no  mood  to  undertake  the  offensive  at 
this  moment,  ordered  the  troops  to  fall  back  to 
Harrison's  Landing.  The  retreat  was  effected  the 
next  day  without  interruption ;  but  the  soldiers 
were  by  this  time  greatly  exhausted  by  marching 
and  fighting,  and  undoubtedly  these  constant  move- 
ments away  from  Richmond,  followed  as  the  army 
had  been  all  the  time  by  its  watchful  and  aggressive 
foe,  must  have  had  a  discouraging  influence  on  the 
troops.  Fortunately  for  them,  however,  the  Con- 
federate soldiers  were  equally  weary,  and  their  last 
effort  had  been  so  unsuccessful  that  another  assault 
was  hardly  to  be  apprehended.  The  march  to  Har- 
rison's Landing  was  made  in  a  heavy  rain,  and  the 
roads  were  unusually  bad ;  nevertheless  the  artillery 
and  trains  were  safely  transported,  and  on  the  even- 
ing of  July  2d  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  suc- 
cessfully effected  its  memorable  change  of  base  from 
the  Pamunkey  to  the  James.  Within  a  day  or  two 
proper  positions  were  taken  up,  the  neighboring 
heights  were  fortified,  and  the  situation  of  the  army 
was  rendered  secure  and  comfortable. 

The  total  loss  of  the  Federals  in  these  seven  days 

1  12  W.  R.,  65,  70. 


208  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 


of  marching  and  fighting  was  1734  killed,  8062 
wounded,  and  6053  missing ;  in  all,  15,849.*  Of 
those  reported  missing,  half,  perhaps,  were  killed 
or  wounded.  The  total  loss  of  the  Confederate 
army  was  3286  killed,  15,909  wounded,  and  940 
missing, — in  all,  20,1 35.2  The  greater  loss  suffered 
by  the  Confederates  is  easily  accounted  for.  In  all 
the  engagements  they  were  the  attacking  party. 
The  Union  army  lost  52  guns;  the  Confederate 
army  lost  only  two.  Colors  were  captured  by  both 
sides,  but  not  many.  The  successes  in  battle  had 
been  pretty  equally  divided.  The  Confederates  had 
won  the  battle  of  Graines's  Mill  on  the  27th  of  June. 
They  had  been  unsuccessful  at  Allen's  Farm  and 
Savage  Station  on  the  29th.  The  battle  of  Glendale 
on  the  30th  was  a  veiy  severe  action ;  but  while  the 
Confederates  routed  one  of  the  Federal  divisions  and 
captured  some  guns,  the  battle  was  really  without 
any  decisive  tactical  success  for  them,  and,  strategi- 
cally, it  was  undoubtedly  a  success  for  their  oppo- 
nents.3 On  the  field  of  Malvern  Hill,  July  1st,  the 
Confederates  had  suffered  a  total  repulse,  with  very 
severe  loss.  Here  the  fighting  ended. 

Nevertheless,  the  moral  and  political  effect  of  the 
whole  series  of  movements  and  battles  was  entirely 
to  the  advantage  of  the  Confederates.  "  Facts  are 
stubborn  things " ;  and  there  was  no  denying  that, 
by  these  operations,  General  McClellan  had  been 
forced  to  give  up  his  position  on  the  Chickahominy, 
where  he  was  within  sight  of  the  steeples  of  Rich- 
mond, and  to  retire,  followed, — pursued,  in  fact, — by 

»2B.  &L..3J5.  */£.,3i7.  »/3.,375,n. 


1 86 2]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  209 

his  enemies,  to  the  river  James,  to  a  point  twenty  or 
thirty  miles  from  the  Confederate  capital.  His 
losses  in  men,  particularly  the  number  of  "  missing," 
aggregating,  as  it  did,  over  6000,  the  destruction  of 
so  many  valuable  stores  at  White  House  and  on  the 
railroad,  his  losing  over  fifty  guns, — all  these  things 
affected  the  minds  of  people,  North  and  South. 
The  abrupt  change  of  the  part  played  by  the  Fed- 
eral general  from  the  role  of  the  invader  to  that  of 
the  retreating  and  pursued  enemy  was  too  dramatic 
not  to  arrest  general  attention.  It  was  in  vain  that 
careful  observers  pointed  out  to  the  Northern  public 
that  the  Union  army  had  fought  as  bravely,  and,  on 
the  whole,  as  successfully,  as  its  adversary,  that  it 
had  lost  fewer  men,  and  that  it  was  now  in  a  much 
better  position  in  a  strategical  sense  than  it  was  be- 
fore the  "  Seven  Days'  Battles "  began ;  these  con- 
siderations sounded  like  attempts  at  excuse  and 
palliation,  and  they  were  impatiently  disregarded. 
And  though  the  popular  criticism  was  not  fully  war- 
ranted, it  yet  had  to  be  admitted  by  the  best  friends 
of  McClellan  and  the  most  sanguine  supporters  of  the 
war  in  the  North  that  the  Peninsular  campaign  up 
to  this  point  had  resulted  in  failure,  and  that  there 
was  no  probability  of  a  speedy  renewal  of  offensive 
operations  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  joy  in  Richmond  knew  no 
bounds.  General  Lee  was  the  hero  of  the  hour,  as 
he  deserved  to  be.  By  boldly  anticipating  his  an- 
tagonist in  taking  the  initiative  the  moment  Jack- 
son's arrival  from  the  Valley  enabled  him  to  do  so, 
he  had,  by  attacking  the  line  of  communications  of 


VOL.  II. — 14 


210  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

the  Federal  army  with  White  House,  forced  McClel- 
lan  either  to  fight  him  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  or  to  retire  from  the  neighborhood 
of  the  capital  in  search  of  a  new  base  of  operations. 
McClellan  chose  the  latter  course ;  and  in  the  difficult 
and  perilous  movement  which  this  choice  rendered 
imperative,  Lee  was  able  to  inflict  losses  upon  and 
to  make  captures  from  his  adversary,  who  was  com- 
pelled by  the  necessity  of  the  case  to  retire  to  a  point 
on  the  James  River  several  marches  from  Richmond. 
The  Confederate  cause  was  relieved  from  a  pressing 
danger,  and  the  public  gratitude  was  deep  and  hearty. 
General  Lee  himself,  it  may  be  remarked,  was  far 
from  being  satisfied  with  his  success.  "  Under  ordi- 
nary circumstances,"  he  says  in  his  Report,1  "  the 
Federal  army  should  have  been  destroyed."  It  is 
not  easy  to  see  why  such  an  expectation  should  have 
been  cherished.  General  Lee  began  the  campaign  by 
putting  himself  in  a  position  where,  owing  to  the  situa- 
tion of  the  ground,  he  could  not  observe  the  move- 
ments of  his  antagonist.  Nor  was  this  all.  The 
larger  part  of  his  army  was  separated  from  that  of 
his  adversary  by  an  unfordable  river,  so  that  his 
antagonist  inevitably  had  the  start  of  him  in  any 
movement  of  over  twenty -four  hours.  In  fact,  if  Mc- 
Clellan had  given  his  orders  for  the  retreat  to  the 
James  at  midnight  of  the  26th  instead  of  waiting 
(for  no  reason  whatever)  until  midnight  of  the  27th, 
— in  other  words,  if  he  had  recognized  as  early  as 
the  facts  warranted  that  his  communications  with 
White  House  were  lost,  and  that  the  sooner  he 

'I3W.  R.,497- 


1862]         THE  PENINSULAR  CAMPAIGN.  211 

started  for  the  James  the  better, — General  Lee  would 
not  have  been  able  to  catch  up  with  him  at  all.  This 
delay  was  McClellan's  great  fault  in  this  campaign. 
It  certainly  imperilled  the  safety  of  his  army.  Lee's 
errors  consisted,  first,  in  not  clearly  recognizing  that 
a  much  smaller  force  than  that  which  he  assembled 
on  the  north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  would  have 
compelled  the  abandonment  of  the  Federal  com- 
munications with  the  Pamunkey,1  and  secondly,  that 
McClellan's  most  probable  recourse  in  that  emergency 
would  be  to  seek  a  base  near  Malvern  Hill.  If  he 
had  correctly  viewed  these  elements  of  the  problem 
before  him,  he  would  have  retained  the  greater  part 
of  his  army  in  the  lines  of  Eichmond,  and  thus  would 
have  been  able  by  means  of  his  cavalry  to  interfere 
most  seriously  with  the  possession  by  the  Federal 
troops  of  the  roads  to  the  James  River,  and  also  to 
bring  a  much  larger  force  to  bear  upon  the  Federal 
columns  on  their  flank  march  to  the  James,  than  he 
actually  succeeded  in  doing.  It  is  true  that,  had  he 
adopted  this  course,  Porter  would  not  have  been 
beaten  at  Gaines's  Mill ;  but  the  actual  loss  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners  inflicted  on  this  corps  was  the 
only  damage  sustained  by  the  Federal  army  from  this 
defeat.  The  5th  corps,  by  its  prompt  movement  to 
Malvern  Hill,  secured  that  all-important  position; 
and,  on  the  day  of  the  battle,  it  held  its  own  as 
tenaciously  as  if  it  had  never  been  defeated  at  all. 
The  loss  suffered  at  Graines's  Mill  was  a  matter  of 
very  small  consequence  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
But  if  General  Lee  had  had  at  Savage  Station  and 

1  But  see  Longstreet,  152. 


212  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

Glendale  25,000  more  men  under  his  hand,  these 
actions  might  very  possibly  have  turned  out  very 
serious  defeats  for  the  Federal  army.  That  his 
force  on  these  two  critical  occasions  was  so  inade- 
quate to  the  needs  of  the  opportunities  presented, 
was  mainly  due  to  his  having,  on  the  26th  and  27th 
of  June,  put  the  greater  part  of  his  army  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  in  the  belief  that 
McClellan  would  retreat,  not  to  the  James,  but  to 
Fortress  Monroe. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  II.  213 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  II. 

1.  (Ante,  page  104)  That  General  McClellan  had 
in  our  judgment  no  just  ground  of  complaint  against 
the  Administration  because  the  President  detained 
McDowell's  corps  in  the  neighborhood  of  Washing- 
ton, on  learning  from  the  report  of  Generals  Hitch- 
cock and  Thomas  that  General  McClellan  had  not 
left  for  the  defence  of  the  Capital  the  force  which 
the  corps-commanders  had  considered  necessary,  we 
have  distinctly  stated.  The  question  whether  the 
detention  of  McDowell's  corps  was  or  was  not  under 
the  circumstances  wise  from  a  military  point  of  view, 
we  reserved  for  further  consideration.1 

It  has  been  strongly  urged  by  writers  of  authority2 
that,  inasmuch  as  the  success  of  McClellan's  plans 
depended,  in  his  own  view  of  the  military  problem 
before  him,  upon  his  being  able  to  dispose  of  the 
corps  of  McDowell,  it  would  have  been  on  the  whole 
better  for  the  Government  to  send  it  to  him,  so  as 
to  give  his  campaign  every  chance  of  success.  This 
would,  of  course,  have  involved  taking  the  risk  of 
an  attack  on  Washington  with  its  insufficient  garri- 
son; but  then  it  might  certainly  be  said  that  the 
stronger  McClellan's  army  was,  the  more  likely  it 

1  See  Parti.,  246,  252,  254. 

8  Webb,  58,  180  ;  Swinton,  105. 


2i4          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR. 


was  that  the  Confederate  Government  would  con- 
centrate all  their  forces  to  resist  his  advance  and  save 
Richmond  from  capture. 

This  argument  is  really  the  same  as  that  advanced 
by  General  McClellan  himself  to  justify  his  diso- 
bedience of  orders  in  the  matter  of  the  troops  to  be 
left  for  the  defence  of  the  Capital.  Washington,  he 
maintained,  could  be  better  defended  by  a  vigorous 
movement  on  Richmond  than  in  any  other  way.  The 
Government,  on  the  other  hand,  as  we  have  seen, 
held  a  different  opinion,  and  insisted  that  a  force, 
the  size  of  which  was  fixed  by  the  opinion  of  the 
corps-commanders,  should  be  left  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  protecting  the  Capital.  In  our  judgment,  taking 
account  of  the  great  uncertainty  which  must  always 
attend  offensive  military  operations  undertaken  by 
inexperienced  commanders  in  control  of  armies  which 
are  put  into  the  field  for  the  first  time,  and  consider- 
ing the  immense  importance  from  a  political  as  well 
as  a  military  point  of  view  of  retaining  a  secure  hold 
on  Washington,  the  Government  was  perfectly  right. 

Now,  had  anything  occurred  since  McClellan  went 
to  the  Peninsula  which  materially  changed  the  situa- 
tion ?  We  think  this  question  must  be  answered 
in  the  negative.  McClellan,  though  needing  Mc- 
Dowell's corps  for  his  flank  movement  on  Gloucester, 
by  which  he  expected  to  compel  the  speedy  evacua- 
tion of  the  lines  of  Yorktown,  could  nevertheless 
accomplish  his  ends  by  siege  operations.  He  wrote 
on  April  20th  to  the  Secretary  of  War :  "  As  it  is, 
I  will  win,  but  I  must  not  be  blamed  if  success  is 
delayed.  I  do  not  feel  that  I  am  answerable  for  the 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  II.  215 

delay  of  victory."  1  It  is  clear  from  this,  as  well  as 
from  all  the  evidence,  that  he  did  not  conceive  that 
the  safety  of  his  army  was  in  any  way  dependent  on 
McDowell's  corps  being  sent  to  him,  but  only  that 
he  could  achieve  his  end  much  sooner  if  he  should 
receive  this  reinforcement.  Had  it  been  a  question 
of  the  safety  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  Gov- 
ernment might  very  possibly  have  deemed  it  best  to 
incur  some  temporary  risk,  even  in  the  vital  matter 
of  protecting  the  Capital.  But  that  was  not  the 
case  here. 

It  may  be  remarked  in  this  connection  that  it  was 
one  thing  to  send  McDowell's  corps  to  Fortress  Mon- 
roe, when  McClellan's  army  was  lying  in  front  of 
works  which  he  himself  considered  too  strong  to  be  as- 
saulted successfully,  and  was  dependent  for  its  daily 
supplies  on  the  presumed  inability  of  the  Merrimac 
to  defeat  the  Monitor, — for  all  its  food  and  forage 
came  to  it  by  water, — and  quite  another  thing  to 
send  McDowell  from  Fredericksburg  to  Richmond, 
when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  emerged  from 
its  precarious  position  on  the  Peninsula,  and  was 
threatening  the  Confederate  capital.  For  the  diver- 
sion of  McDowell's  corps  on  the  24th  of  May  to  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  there  was,  in  our  judgment,  no 
sufficient  excuse.  At  that  moment,  Jackson  was 
actively  engaged  in  pursuing  Banks  down  the  Val- 
ley ;  and  had  the  Federal  Government  been  able  to 
direct  the  movements  of  both  the  hostile  armies,  no 
more  opportune  time  could  have  been  selected  than 
this  for  the  concentration  of  the  bulk  of  the  United 


1  McClellan's  O.  S.,  283. 


216  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR. 


States  forces  in  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond. 
Jackson,  assuredly,  was  at  that  moment  not  concern- 
ing himself  with  the  defence  of  Richmond,  but  with 
the  tempting  project  of  driving  Banks  to  and  across 
the  Potomac  ;  hence  there  was  every  chance  that  the 
advent  of  McDowell  on  the  Chickahominy  would 
have  enabled  McClellan  to  deal  with  Johnston's 
army  before  it  could  have  been  reinforced  from 
Jackson's  command.  As  for  the  other  troops  which 
Lee  obtained  before  he  began  the  Seven  Days'  Bat- 
tles, they  were,  on  May  24th,  hundreds  of  miles 
away. 

2.  (Ante,  page  135.)  Three  days  before  Porter's 
expedition  to  Hanover  Court  House,  McClellan  had 
been  informed  that  the  movement  of  McDowell  to 
join  him  had  been  suspended,  and  that  that  officer 
had  been  ordered  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  He 
must  have  known  perfectly  well  that  it  was  alto- 
gether uncertain  when  this  operation  would  be  ter- 
minated, and  when  McDowell  would  be  ready  to 
join  him,  if,  indeed,  he  ever  would  be.  He  was  also 
fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  line  of  the  railroad, 
for  the  greater  part  of  the  distance  between  White 
House  and  the  Chickahominy,  was  not  covered  by 
the  position  of  the  army.  He  knew  that  the  results  of 
Porter's  victory  could  not  be  expected  to  be  perma- 
nent ;  and  that  it  was  in  the  power  of  the  enemy 
at  any  time,  by  making  a  serious  demonstration 
on  White  House,  to  endanger  the  position  of  the 
army.  He  knew,  moreover,  that  to  ensure  prompt 
and  adequate  intercommunication  between  the  sepa- 
rated wings  of  his  army  he  would  have  to  throw 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  II.  217 


nearly  a  dozen 1  bridges  across  the  swampy  and 
treacherous  Chickahominy.  Why,  with  all  these 
facts  in  mind,  General  McClellan  did  not  at  once 
change  his  base  from  the  Pamunkey  to  the  James, 
where  his  depots  of  supplies  would  be  under  the 
protection  of  the  fleet,  and  could  be  moved  from 
point  to  point  so  as  to  conform  to  the  changing  posi- 
tions of  the  army,  has  always  puzzled  those  who 
have  studied  this  campaign.2  He  says  himself  that 
as  "the  order  for  the  co-operation  of  General  Mc- 
Dowell was  simply  suspended,  not  revoked,"  he  was 
"  not  at  liberty  to  abandon  the  northern  approach  " 
to  Richmond.3  Granting  that  this  was  so, — which 
is  by  no  means  certain, — why  could  he  not  have 
requested  permission  from  the  Government  to  change 
his  base  of  operations  to  the  James  River?  The 
truth  probably  is  that,  at  that  moment,  General  Mc- 
Clellan did  not  appreciate  the  desirability  of  making 
this  change  in  his  campaign,  and  he  therefore  re- 
mained where  he  was,  although  the  reason  which  had 
induced  him  to  advance  by  way  of  the  Pamunkey, 
— the  expected  co-operation  of  McDowell's  com- 
mand,— no  longer  existed. 
1 12  w.  R.,  30. 

*  Webb,  87  ;  Swinton,   140. 
3  12  W.  R.,  31. 


CHAPTER  III. 

LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE  IN  THE  EAST. 

THUS  were  the  Federal  aggressive  campaigns  in 
the  spring  of  1862  brought  to  a  close.  McClellan, 
withdrawn  from  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond, 
was  resting  with  his  army  within  the  lines  of  Harri- 
son's Lauding  on  the  James  River,  waiting  until  he 
should  receive  sufficient  reinforcements  to  enable  him 
again  to  take  the  offensive.  Halleck,  apparently 
satisfied  with  the  barren  success  of  the  capture  of 
Corinth,  dispersed  his  fine  army  of  more  than  100,- 
000  men,  allowed  the  Confederates  to  recruit  their 
strength  without  molestation,  and  gave  Bragg  (who 
had  succeeded  Beauregard,  whose  health  required  a 
leave  of  absence)  all  the  leisure  he  needed  to  devise 
plans  for  the  recovery  of  the  States  of  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky  by  a  force  still  formidable  in  numbers, 
and  which  had  not  been  disorganized  by  its  retire- 
ment from  Corinth.  For  a  time,  both  in  the  East 
and  in  the  West,  the  war  was  at  a  standstill ;  the 
force  of  the  Federal  attack  had  apparently  spent 
itself ;  an  opportunity  was  presented  to  the  Confed- 
erates in  the  West  of  retrieving  their  disasters  ;  and 
the  distrust  which  the  Washington  administration 
entertained  toward  McClellan  made  it  doubtful 

218 


1862]           LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.        ^      219 

whether  he  would  be  permitted  to  resume  his  cam- 
paign against  Richmond.  But  before  we  proceed 
to  describe  the  operations  of  the  summer,  we  must 
say  a  word  about  the  military  situation  in  the  North. 
The  losses  of  both  the  contestants  in  the  last  few 
months  had  been  great ;  but  while  the  Confederate 
authorities  had  adopted  a  system  of  conscription 
for  filling  the  gaps  in  their  wasted  battalions,  the 
Northern  Government  with  inexcusable  fatuity  had 
in  April  actually  stopped  recruiting,1  and  noth- 
ing was  thought  of,  at  least  in  the  Eastern  States, 
in  the  summer  of  1862,  but  raising  new  organiza- 
tions. Nothing  could  exceed  the  infatuation  of  the 
people  on  this  subject.  The  old  regiments,  which 
had  acquired  military  discipline  and  knowledge  of 
warfare  by  the  arduous  experiences  of  the  camp, 
the  march,  and  the  battle-field,  were  actually  allowed 
to  waste  away  ;  the  invaluable  schools  of  the  soldier 
which  they  furnished  for  the  raw  recruits  were  al- 
most entirely  neglected  ;  few  were  the  accessions  of 
fresh  men  received  by  their  diminished  ranks ;  pop- 
ular enthusiasm  was  mainly  directed  to  the  raising 
and  equipment  of  brand-new  regiments,  none  of 
which  could  possibly  be  of  much  service  until  months 
had  been  passed  in  learning  the  elements  of  military 
life  and  conduct.  In  some  of  the  Western  States  a 
healthier  standard  prevailed ;  in  several  of  them  the 
efforts  of  the  authorities  were  chiefly  directed  to 
the  reinforcement  of  the  existing  organizations ;  and 
the  young  men  who  filled  the  gaps  in  the  lines  of  the 

1  The  order  of  the  War  Department  is  quoted  in  McClellan's  O.  S., 
258. 


220      „    THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

veteran  battalions  of  Illinois  and  Wisconsin  learned 
their  trade  in  half  the  time  which  was  required  to 
make  the  new  regiments  of  Pennsylvania  and  Mas- 
sachusetts capable  of  efficient  service  in  the  field. 

Nor  was  this  the  only  mistake  made  by  the  Federal 
Government  in  the  summer  of  1862.  Levies  of  troops 
engaged  to  serve  only  for  nine  months  were  accepted  ; 
and  several  of  the  Eastern  States  were  unwise  enough 
to  adopt  this  shallow  scheme,  and  to  send  the  flower 
of  their  fighting  men  into  organizations  which  from 
the  necessity  of  the  case  could  hardly  be  made  fit 
for  active  service  until  the  day  of  their  disband ment 
was  plainly  within  sight. 

For  these  mistakes,  or,  to  speak  with  more  cor- 
rectness, for  these  failures  on  the  part  of  the  North, 
and  especially  of  the  Eastern  States,  to  rise  to  the 
clear  and  unmistakable  call  of  duty  in  this  most 
vital  matter  of  recruiting  their  armies  for  the  enor- 
mous task  which  yet  lay  before  them,  the  adminis- 
tration of  President  Lincoln  must  be  held  mainly 
responsible.  Had  he  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
clearly  and  strongly  put  before  the  country  the  true 
course  to  be  pursued,  namely,  that  the  first  thing  to 
do  was  to  fill  up  the  existing  regiments  to  their  full 
strength  by  sending  to  them  men  enlisted  for  three 
years,  there  is  great  reason  to  believe  that  the  coun- 
try would  cheerfully  have  responded  to  the  appeal. 
At  any  rate,  it  was  the  governors  of  the  Northern 
States  who,  in  the  summer  of  1862,  urged  the  Presi- 
dent to  issue  a  call  for  300,000  men ;  the  Adminis- 
tration was  only  too  willing  to  see  the  States  take 
the  initiative  in  what  (it  was  feared)  would  be  an 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  221 


unpopular  measure.  It  is,  of  course,  not  impossible 
that  Mr.  Lincoln  may  have  judged  that  to  demand 
from  the  people  that  the  old  regiments,  which  must 
of  course  be  relied  on  to  do  the  immediate  fighting, 
should  be  filled  up  at  once,  instead  of  assenting  to 
the  adoption  of  the  seemingly  easier,  and  certainly 
more  attractive  course,  of  raising  new  regiments, 
which  could  not  be  expected  to  take  the  field  imme- 
diately, would  be  to  make  a  demand  from  which  the 
patriotism  of  the  people  would  shrink.  If  that  were 
his  opinion,  he  can  hardly  be  blamed  for  acting  upon 
it.  And  yet  it  does  seem  as  if  asking  the  North- 
ern people  to  recruit  their  armies  in  the  most  eco- 
nomical, most  efficient,  and  most  approved  method 
was  not  asking  too  much  of  them ;  and  it  is  our  own 
belief  that  if  the  case  had  been  properly  put  to  them 
they  would  have  responded  with  comparative  unan- 
imity, and  with  a  hearty  devotion  to  the  call  of  their 
country.  The  improvement  in  the  composition  and 
strength  of  the  Northern  armies,  and  particularly  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  would  have  been 
effected  by  filling  up  the  ranks  of  the  old  regiments, 
would  have  been  most  marked.  The  new  recruits, 
after,  of  course,  a  brief  period  spent  in  camps  of  in- 
struction, would  have  been  at  once  brought  under 
the  influence  of  the  scenes  and  experiences  of  actual 
service;  they  would  have  been  placed  under  the 
control  of  veteran  commissioned  and  warrant  offi- 
cers, and  would  have  been  thrown  into  the  comrade- 
ship of  private  soldiers  who  had  had  valuable  ex- 
perience in  real  warfare.  Whatever  could  have  been 
done  to  make  them  soldiers  would  have  been  afforded 


222  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

them  without  stint ;  and  the  result  to  the  Northern 
armies  could  not  but  have  been  far  more  beneficial 
than  the  arrival  among  them  of  full  regiments  of  raw 
troops,  wholly  deficient  in  experience,  and  unable  for 
months  to  compare  in  efficiency  with  the  veteran  bat- 
talions of  1861,  whose  diminished  and  diminishing 
numbers  constituted  a  contrast  painful  to  behold, 
and  anything  but  creditable  to  the  discernment  and 
gratitude  of  the  Northern  people.1 

Let  us  now  return  to  Virginia,  and  see  what  was 
the  military  situation  there  in  the  early  part  of 
July,  1862,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Seven  Days' 
Battles. 

The  army  of  General  Lee  was  concentrated  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Richmond ;  Jackson,  it  will  be  re- 
membered, when  he  left  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in 
the  last  part  of  June,  took  with  him  all  his  force  ex- 
cept a  few  troops  whom  he  left  at  Harrisonburg. 
The  communication  between  Richmond  and  the  Val- 
ley by  the  Virginia  Central  railroad  remained  un- 
broken. The  Federal  commander  at  Fredericksburg 
had  indeed  been  able  to  destroy  the  bridge  over  the 
North  Anna  River  on  the  Richmond  and  Fredericks- 
burg  railroad,  but  that  over  the  South  Anna,  on  the 
Virginia  Central  railroad,  had  not  been  touched.2 
No  doubt  it  was  well  guarded.  The  all-important 
junction  of  this  railroad  with  the  Orange  and  Alex- 
andria railroad  at  Gordonsville  was  also  defended, 
as  was  Charlottesville,  from  which  place  one  branch 

1  Cf.  McClellan  to  Governor  Morgan  of  New  York,  July   15,  1862,  14 
W.  R.,  323  ;  also,  McClellan  to  Governor  Olden  of  New  Jersey,  ib.,  347. 
s  18  W.  R.,  433. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  223 

of  the  road  runs  westwardly  to  Staunton,  in  the  up- 
per part  of  the  Valley,  and  another  south  westwardly 
to  Lynchburg,  where  it  meets  the  East  Tennessee 
and  Georgia  railroad  coming  from  Chattanooga  and 
the  southwest.  The  most  exposed  point  in  this  sys- 
tem was  Gordonsville,  for  as  Gordonsville  was  a  sta- 
tion on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad,  a 
Federal  force  could  advance  upon  it  easily,  and  be 
supplied  directly  from  Alexandria. 

To  understand  the  condition  and  positions  of  the 
United  States  forces  at  this  time,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  go  back  a  little. 

The  Federal  Government,  it  will  be  recollected, 
had,  in  March,  established  three  independent  military 
Departments  in  this  part  of  Virginia :  the  Mountain 
Department,  comprising  the  region  lying  west  of  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  under  General  Fremont,  the  De- 
partment of  the  Shenandoah,  under  General  Banks, 
and  the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock,  under 
General  McDowell.  About  the  middle  of  May  the 
force  under  McDowell  was  augmented  by  Shields's 
division,  which  was  withdrawn  from  the  command 
of  Banks.  The  intention  was  that,  on  May  26th, 
McDowell,  with  the  four  divisions  of  Shields,  Ord, 
King,  and  McCall,  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  under 
Bayard, — at  least  40,000  men  in  all, — should  march 
on  Richmond  and  unite  with  the  army  under  Me- 
Clellan.  On  the  news  of  Jackson's  irruption  into 
the  Shenandoah  Valley,  however,  the  President,  on 
May  24th,  ordered  McDowell  and  Fremont  to  march 
in  opposite  directions  from  their  respective  encamp- 
ments into  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  endeavor,  to- 


224  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

gether,  to  overwhelm  Jackson.  This  plan,  as  we 
know,  failed ;  Jackson,  after  having  driven  Banks's 
diminished  command  across  the  Potomac,  effected 
his  escape  from  the  converging  forces  of  McDowell 
and  Fremont.  As  soon  as  this  was  known,  and  even 
prior  to  the  two  smart  actions  of  Cross  Keys  and 
Port  Republic,  fought  on  June  8th  and  9th,  between 
Jackson's  force  and  the  pursuing  colums  of  Fremont 
and  Shields,  which  closed  this  brief  campaign,  the 
Washington  authorities  determined  to  resume  at  once 
the  plan  which  had  been  interrupted,  and  to  send 
McDowell,  as  soon  as  his  troops  could  be  collected 
together,  to  Richmond,  by  way  of  Fredericksburg.1 
McDowell  himself  was  all  anxiety  to  go.  He  had 
earnestly  and  strenuously  opposed  the  President's 
scheme  of  attempting  to  cut  off  Jackson,2  and  yet  he 
had  been  charged  by  some  of  the  friends  of  Mc- 
Clellan  with  having  originated  the  scheme  from  an 
unwillingness  to  further  McClellan's  success.  Hence 
he  exerted  himself  to  the  utmost  to  collect  his  scat- 
tered divisions,  so  that  he  might  march  on  Richmond 
as  soon  as  possible.3  He  had  correctly  divined  the 
purpose  of  Jackson's  raid, — that  it  was  designed  to 
divert  the  force  destined  to  move  on  Richmond, — 
and  he  now  was  morally  certain  that  Jackson  in- 
tended, after  having  disturbed  the  organization  and 
distribution  of  the  Federal  forces,  as  he  had  to  such 
a  lamentable  extent  done,  to  rejoin  Lee  for  an  attack 
upon  McClellan  before  he,  McDowell,  could  go  to 
his  relief.4 


1  18  W.  R.,  354,  363.  8/£.,39l- 

8  Ib.,  220,  221.  4  16.,  387,  391,  392. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  225 

But  McDowell  could  not  obtain  a  prompt  and 
successful  concentration  of  his  scattered  command. 
One  division  of  his  corps,  that  of  McCall,  was 
at  once,  at  McClellan's  urgent  request,  sent  by 
water  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Of  the 
other  three  divisions,  that  of  Shields  remained  long 
in  the  Valley,  exhausted  and  almost  disorganized  by 
its  forced  marches  and  partial  defeat,  and  that  of 
Ord,  who  was  soon  replaced  by  Ricketts,  was  de- 
tained at  Front  Royal  until  Banks  could  arrange  to 
hold  that  place.1  Banks  in  fact  thought,  as  late  as 
June  19th,  that  the  enemy  intended  to  make  another 
movement  down  the  Valley  and  he  desired  to 
detain  Shields  in  the  Valley,  and  Ricketts  at 
Front  Royal,  for  greater  security.2  It  was  not  till 
the  19th  and  23d  that  the  divisions  of  Ricketts  and 
Shields  arrived  at  Manassas  and  Bristoe  Station.3 
Shields's  division  was  found  to  be  in  such  poor  con- 
dition 4  that  it  was  broken  up  and  the  troops  were 
distributed  in  other  commands.  Two  brigades  were 
sent  to  the  Peninsula ;  the  other  two  were  added  to 
Banks's  corps.  King's  division  was  all  this  time  at 
Falmouth,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  with  a  small 
guard  in  that  city,5  and  his  troops  and  those  of  Rick- 
etts, at  Manassas  Junction,  constituted,  at  the  end  of 
June,  McDowell's  entire  force,  which  numbered  at 
the  outside  about  24,000  men.6 

1  18  W.  R.,  382. 

2  Ib.,  411,  415-417. 

3  Ib.,  410,  427. 
4/£.,43i. 

6 Ib.,  391. 

6  Ib.,  448  ;  cf.  14  W.  R.,  296,  where  Pope  puts  the  number  at  19,000. 

VOL.  II.— 15 


226  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 


In  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  near  Middletown  and 
Strasburg,1  was  the  command  of  Banks,  and  all  of 
Fremont's  troops  who  were  not  in  the  Kanawha  Val- 
ley under  General  Cox.  Banks's  force  had  been 
strengthened  by  two  brigades  which  had  been  at 
and  near  Harper's  Ferry,  and  were  now  consolidated 
in  a  division  under  General  Sigel.  These  troops  and 
Banks's  old  command,  a  division  under  Williams, 
numbering  in  all  about  12,000  or  13,000  men,2  were 
in  good  condition.  It  was  quite  otherwise  with  the 
troops  of  Fremont  then  in  the  Valley,  which  con- 
sisted chiefly  of  Blenker's  former  division.  This 
division  had  had  an  unlucky  history.  Detached  from 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  eve  of  the  com- 
mencement of  the  Peninsular  Campaign,3  the  troops 
were  several  weeks  in  reaching  their  destination  in 
Fremont's  Department,  and  they  suffered  unusual 
hardships  and  even  losses  on  the  march.4  In  their 
recent  crossing  of  the  mountains  in  the  attempt  to 
cut  off  Jackson  they  were  greatly  hindered  and  dis- 
tressed by  the  condition  of  the  roads,  and  the  subse- 
quent forced  marches  told  heavily  on  the  men.  At 
the  close  of  these  unprepared-for  and  trying  experi- 
ences the  division  was  greatly  reduced  in  strength 
and  efficiency.5  It  numbered  about  8000  men.6 

The  ill-success  which  had  attended  the  attempt  of 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War  to  co-ordi- 
nate the  movements  of  three  armies  in  three  differ- 
ent Departments  suggested  to  them  the  desirability 


1  18  W.  R.,  428,  434.  4  18  W.  R.,  81,  83,  88,  93,  96,  101-103. 

9  Ib.,  428,  434  ;  cf,  437.  6  /£.,  379-381,  455- 

•Parti.,  255.  «  7^,448. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  227 

of  uniting  these  commands  under  one  head.  Ac- 
cordingly, on  the  26th  of  June,  an  order l  was  issued 
by  Mr.  Lincoln  consolidating  the  forces  under  Fre- 
mont, Banks,  and  McDowell,  and  the  troops  in 
Washington,  into  one  army,  to  be  called  the  Army  of 
Virginia,  and  placing  at  its  head  Major-General  John 
Pope,  whose  recent  successes  at  New  Madrid  and 
Island  No.  10,  on  the  Mississippi  River,  had  brought 
him  into  considerable  prominence.2 

This  concentration  of  the  three  separate  commands 
under  one  direction  was  certainly  a  wise  measure ; 
but  the  selection  of  a  Western  general  for  the  con- 
trol of  one  of  the  armies  in  Virginia  was  at  that 
stage  in  the  war  a  matter  of  questionable  policy. 
It  would  probably  have  been  better  if  the  Govern- 
ment had  given  the  command  to  McDowell,  who  was 
an  officer  of  excellent  abilities  and  was,  moreover, 
familiar  with  the  country.  All  three  of  the  super- 
seded generals  were  seniors  to  Pope,  and  Fremont 
absolutely  refused  to  serve  under  him.3  His  corps, 
now  styled  the  1st  corps  of  the  Army  of  Virginia, 
was  accordingly  turned  over  to  Sigel,4  whose  place 
as  a  division-commander  under  Banks  was  filled  by 
Augur.5  Banks  and  McDowell  cheerfully  took  their 
orders  from  Pope ;  the  former  as  commanding  the 
2d  corps,  and  the  latter  the  3d. 

General  Pope  assumed  command  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia  on  June  27th,  and  fixed  his  headquarters  in 
Washington,6  where  his  presence  as  a  military  ad- 

»i8W.  R.,435-  4/<*.,444. 

9  See  Map  VII.,  facing  page  320.  K  /£.,  537. 

•18  W.  R.,  437-  •/J.,436. 


228  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 


viser  was,  for  the  time  being,  required  by  the  Presi- 
dent.1 His  task,  as  laid  out  for  him  in  the  order 
constituting  the  new  army,  and  as  understood  by 
himself,  was  threefold:  to  "cover  the  City  of  Wash- 
ington from  any  attacks  from  the  direction  of  Rich- 
mond ;  to  make  such  dispositions  as  were  necessary 
to  assure  the  safety  of  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah ; 
and  at  the  same  time  so  to  operate  on  the  enemy's 
lines  of  communication  in  the  direction  of  Gordons- 
ville  and  Charlottesville  as  to  draw  off,  if  possible,  a 
considerable  force  of  the  enemy  from  Richmond,  and 
thus  relieve  the  operations  against  that  city  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac." 

General  Pope  was  of  opinion  that  the  first  two 
of  these  objects  could  be  best  accomplished  by  with- 
drawing the  corps  of  Banks  and  Sigel  to  the  east 
side  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  "  It  seemed  to  me,"  he  says 
in  his  Report,  "  that  the  security  of  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  was  not  best  attained  by  posting  troops  with- 
in the  Valley  itself,  but  by  concentrating  these  forces 
at  some  point  or  points  from  which,  if  any  attempts 
were  made  to  enter  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah 
from  Richmond,  I  should  be  able  by  rapid  marching 
to  interpose  between  such  force  and  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy  and  cut  off  its  retreat." 3  Banks 4  and 
Sigel5  were  accordingly  (June  28th  and  July  4th) 
directed  to  cross  the  mountains  by  the  Manassas  and 
Luray  Gaps  respectively,  and  to  take  position  near 

1  18  W.  R.,  487.     Cf.  Wool  to  Pope,  ib.,  488. 
»  16  W.  R.,  21. 

3  /*.,  21. 

*  18  W.  R.,  439,  440. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  229 

Sperry  ville.1  At  the  same  time  (July  3d)  McDowell 
was  ordered  to  send  Ricketts's  division  to  Warrenton, 
as  a  support  to  the  corps  of  Banks  and  Sigel,  leaving 
a  small  force  at  Manassas  Junction.2  All  these  troops 
depended  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad 
for  their  supplies.3  As  for  King's  division,  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  insisted  on  its  remaining  at  Falmouth 
"  to  protect  the  crossing  of  the  Rappahannock  at 
that  point,  and  to  protect  the  railroad  thence  to 
Aquia  Creek,  and  the  public  buildings  which  had 
been  erected  at  the  latter  place."4  This  was  con- 
trary to  General  Pope's  judgment.  He  very  natu- 
rally desired  to  have  his  whole  army  concentrated. 
King  was,  moreover,  in  an  exposed  position,  where 
Pope  could  not  succor  him  in  case  he  were  attacked,5 
and  his  force  was  too  large  to  be  promptly  with- 
drawn. The  Government,  however,  was  unwilling 
to  give  up  the  position  of  Fredericksburg,  connected 
as  it  was  by  railroad  with  Aquia  Creek,  where  were 
wharves  and  storehouses,6  the  whole  constituting  a 
base  of  operations  for  a  movement  against  Richmond. 
But  it  would  have  been  wiser  under  the  circum- 
stances to  hold  the  place  with  a  small  force,  which 
could  easily  have  been  withdrawn,  if  threatened,7 
and  to  send  the  bulk  of  King's  division  at  once  to 
Pope,  whose  army  was  none  too  large  to  meet  the 

1  Winchester  and  Front  Royal  were,  however,  retained  and  fortified. 
18  W.  R.,  468,  471. 
2/£.,450. 

3  Ib.,  453  ;  14  W.  R.,  296. 

4  16  W.  R.,  21. 

5  Allan,  179  ;  18  W.  R.,  917. 

6  These  facilities  were,  however,  far  from  being  adequate  to  the  needs  of 
a  large  army;  18  W.  R.,  557,  561,  562.  Ti8W.  R.,  556. 


230  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

possible  emergencies  of  the  campaign.  King  (if  we 
may  anticipate  a  little)  remained  at  Falmouth  until 
some  days  after  the  arrival  at  that  place  of  General 
Burnside  l  with  his  North  Carolina  troops  on  Au- 
gust 3d,  when  he  was  ordered  to  join  Pope.  He  ac- 
complished this  on  the  llth,2  but  not  until  after  the 
first  battle  of  the  campaign  (Cedar  Mountain)  had 
been  fought. 

The  efforts  of  the  Federal  Government  to  restore 
in  northern  Virginia  by  the  26th  of  June  as  favor- 
able a  situation  as  that  which  existed  on  May  26th, 
when  McDowell's  army  of  over  40,000  men  was 
ordered  to  march  from  Fredericksburg  to  join  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  right  wing  of  which  was 
then  north  of  the  Chickahominy,  had  been,  as  we 
have  just  seen,  unsuccessful.  The  divisions  of  King 
and  Ricketts,  if  united,  were  not  strong  enough  to 
warrant  their  undertaking  to  effect  a  junction  with 
McClellan's  army  by  an  overland  march,  considering 
that,  to  defeat  such  an  operation,  General  Lee  might 
be  expected  to  use  to  the  full  the  advantages  of  his 
central  position.  Moreover,  the  Confederate  army 
was  much  stronger  on  June  26th  than  it  had  been  on 
May  26th.  For  not  only  was  the  command  of  Jack- 
son in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  on  May  26th,  but  dur- 
ing the  month  of  June,  Lee  received  large  reinforce- 
ments from  the  Gulf  States,  and  on  June  26th 
Jackson  had  rejoined  the  main  army.  Much  had 
been  lost,  beyond  controversy,  by  breaking  up  the 
plan  which  promised  to  effect  the  union  of  the  armies 
of  McClellan  and  McDowell  before  the  1st  of  June. 

1  18  W.  R.,  528.  »  /£.,  548,  560. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  231 

Whether  Pope,  when  he  had  had  time  to  post  his 
army  to  his  satisfaction  and  to  form  his  plans,  would 
ever  have  entertained  the  project  of  marching  with 
McDowell's  corps,  or  any  other  part  of  his  army, 
upon  Richmond,  and  uniting  with  McClellan,  may 
be  doubted,  but  at  any  rate  he  had  no  opportunity 
to  carry  out  any  such  project.  On  the  very  day  on 
which  he  was  appointed  to  his  new  command  (June 
26th),  Lee  crossed  to  the  north  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  with  the  bulk  of  his  forces.  On  the  next 
day  he  defeated  Porter  at  Gaines's  Mill,  and  McClel- 
lan began  his  retreat  to  the  James  River.  As  soon 
as  news  of  the  first  engagements  arrived  in  Washing- 
ton, Pope  urged  President  Lincoln  to  order  McClel- 
lan to  retire  to  White  House,  or  some  other  point 
north  of  the  Pamunkey.1  But  McClellan  was  al- 
ready committed  to  the  route  to  the  James.  The 
early  days  of  July,  therefore,  saw  McClellan  at  Har- 
rison's Landing  with  some  80,000  men,2  and  Pope 
with  one  division  (King's)  at  Fredericksburg,  an- 
other (Ricketts's)  at  Warrenton,  and  the  two  corps  of 
Sigel  and  Banks  taking  up  their  positions  east  of 
the  Blue  Ridge,  near  Sperryville,  watching  the  gaps, 
— his  entire  active  force,  i.e.,  over  and  above  the  gar- 
rison of  Washington  and  the  detachments  left  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  being  about  47,000  men.3  The 
opportunity  which  had  existed  in  the  latter  part  of 

1  16  W.  R.,  22. 

z  On  July  1 5th  McClellan  gives  the  number  of  88,665  "present  for 
duty"  ;  14  W.  R.,  321  ;  cf.  ib.,  312. 

s  16  W.  R.,  53.  Pope  himself  (ib. ,  20)  puts  his  force  at  only  38,000 
men.  But  the  returns  for  July  31,  1862, — 18  W.  R.,  523, — give  the  force  of 
the  three  corps — "present  for  duty" — as  55,879  men,  including  troops  in 
the  Valley,  Milroy's  brigade,  etc.  Cf.  ib.,  428,  429,  448. 


232  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

May,  when  a  march  of  fifty  or  sixty  miles  from  Fred- 
ericksburg  would  have  united  the  army  of  McDowell 
to  that  of  McClellan,  had  ceased  to  exist.  No  rein- 
forcements could  now  reach  McClellan  except  by 
water.  The  army  operating  against  Richmond  could 
now  expect  no  direct  help  from  the  force  covering 
Washington. 

General  Pope  was  unquestionably  desirous  of  af- 
fording such  assistance  as  he  could  to  General  Mc- 
Clellan. If  he  could  not  march  to  his  assistance,  as 
McDowell  could  have  done  in  May,  he  might  yet 
expect  to  make  such  demonstrations  on  Gordons- 
ville  and  other  points  as  would  induce  Lee  to  weaken 
the  army  which  was  confronting  McClellan.  This 
was,  in  fact,  the  third  of  the  tasks  which  were  en- 
trusted to  Pope  by  the  order  in  which  he  was  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Virginia. 
Accordingly,  no  sooner  did  he  hear  that  McClellan 
had  established  his  army  at  Harrison's  Landing  than 
he  wrote  to  him  a  full  and  friendly  letter,1  giving 
him  an  account  of  his  dispositions  and  plans,  and 
asking  for  his  views.  To  this  McClellan  replied  on 
July  7th,2  in  a  letter  which  was  written  apparently  in 
an  equally  friendly  spirit,  but  which,  from  the  neces- 
sity of  the  case,  contained  no  practical  suggestions  for 
Pope's  conduct.  There  could  not  be,  in  fact,  any  co- 
operation, in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  between 
the  two  armies  of  Pope  and  McClellan.  Whatever 
might  be  done  by  one  to  occupy  the  attention  of  the 
enemy  would  doubtless  relieve  the  pressure  on  the 
other,  but  the  choice  of  movements  to  this  end  must 

1  14  W.  R.,  295.  *  /£.,  306. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  233 

necessarily  be  left  to  the  commander  of  each  army, 
or  to  a  commander  of  both  armies. 

It  being,  therefore,  obviously  out  of  the  question 
for  Pope  to  march  to  the  aid  of  McClellan,  or  to  be 
sent  to  him  by  water,  leaving  the  Capital  and  the 
Valley  exposed,  his  efforts  were  necessarily  confined 
to  attempts  to  seize,  or,  at  least,  to  threaten,  the  im- 
portant points  of  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville  on 
the  Virginia  Central  railroad.  Accordingly,  on  July 
7th  and  again  on  July  12th,  Banks  was  directed  to  oc- 
cupy Culpeper  with  his  cavalry  under  Hatch,  and 
to  throw  out  pickets  for  at  least  twenty  miles  in  the 
direction  of  Gordonsville.1  On  the  14th  Hatch  was 
ordered  to  seize  Gordonsville,  and,  if  possible,  Char- 
lottesville,2 with  his  cavalry.  Hatch,  however,  tak- 
ing with  him  artillery  and  a  wagon-train,  his  march 
lacked  the  expected  celerity  of  movement,  and  the 
operation  failed.  General  Pope  was  greatly  and 
justly  annoyed  by  this  failure  to  take  Gordonsville,3 
for  this  important  capture  might  in  all  probability 
have  been  made  had  Hatch  strictly  carried  out  his 
instructions,  inasmuch  as  Jackson,  who  was  ordered 
by  Lee  on  the  13th  to  proceed  from  Richmond  to 
Gordonsville  with  two  divisions,4  did  not  reach  the 
vicinity  of  the  place  till  the  19th.5  General  Pope's 
object  had,  however,  been  gained,  so  far  as  this  de- 
pletion of  Lee's  army  was  concerned,  and  the  task 
lying  before  General  McClellan  had  become  to  that 
extent  easier  of  accomplishment. 

1  18  W.  R.,  458,  467.     Other  expeditions  in  the  direction  of  Gordonsville 
were  made  from  Fredericksburg.     Ib.,  499,  502,  503,  528,  529,  924,  925. 
8  Ib.,  473,  476.  4  Ib.,  915  ;  16  W.  R.,  176. 

*  Ib.,  481,  484,  485.  *  Ib,  181. 


234  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

The  Federal  authorities,  as  has  been  said,  retained 
their  new  general  in  the  Capital,  to  get  the  benefit  of 
his  advice,  until  a  more  permanent  arrangement 
could  be  made.  Mr.  Lincoln  evidently  felt  keenly 
the  need  of  a  military  adviser  who  should  be  on  the 
spot ;  and  he  naturally  thought  that  some  one  who  had 
had  actual  experience  in  a  large  command  would  be 
likely  to  prove  a  more  competent  guide  than  General 
Hitchcock,  who  had  for  some  months  been  on  duty 
with  the  War  Department,  and  whose  abilities, 
which  were  believed  to  be  considerable,  had  never 
been  tested  in  the  field.  On  the  llth  of  July 
General  Halleck  was  appointed  General-iii-chief,  and 
assigned  to  the  command  of  all  the  land  forces  of  the 
United  States.1  It  is  easy  to  see  how  this  unfortu- 
nate selection  came  to  be  made :  Halleck  was  at 
that  time  the  most  successful  general  in  the  Federal 
service ;  it  was  perfectly  natural  that  he  should  be 
the  choice  of  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War,  to 
whom  his  serious  defects  as  a  military  man  could  not 
have  become  known.  His  appointment  was  also 
satisfactory  to  the  public,  for,  as  so  much  had  been 
effected  under  his  command  in  the  West,  he  was 
generally  credited  with  great  strategic  ability.  All 
this,  as  we  say,  was  perfectly  natural;  neither  the 
Administration  nor  the  public  can  be  criticised  for 
calling  Halleck  to  the  chief  command.2  But  both  the 
people  and  the  President  were  before  long  to  find 
out  how  slender  was  Halleck's  intellectual  capacity, 


1  14  W.  R.,  371. 

*  General  Pope  also  advised  calling  Halleck  to  Washington  ;  16  W.  R., 
22. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  235 

how  entirely  unmilitary  was  the  cast  of  his  mind, 
and  how  repugnant  to  his  whole  character  was  the 
assumption  of  any  personal  and  direct  control  of  an 
army  in  the  field.1 

General  Halleck  was  detained  some  days  in  the 
West,  and  did  not  arrive  in  Washington  until  July 
22d.a  The  first  thing  to  which  his  attention  was 
called,  as  he  says  in  his  Report,3  was  the  question  of 
the  possibility  of  McClellan's  resuming  the  offensive 
from  his  position  at  Harrison's  Landing,  and,  if  this 
should  be  found  impracticable,  the  further  question 
of  the  desirability  of  uniting  his  army  to  that  of 
Pope.  Up  to  this  time  it  had  apparently  been 
assumed  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  re- 
main on  the  James  River  until  it  could  be  reinforced 
sufficiently  to  warrant  another  advance  upon  Rich- 
mond ;  and  a  large  part  of  the  troops  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  North  Carolina  had  been  ordered  up  to 
Virginia  under  General  Burnside  in  the  early  part  of 
July.  They  numbered  some  8000  men,  in  two 
divisions,  under  General  Reno.4  A  body  of  about 
5000  men  under  General  Stevens  shortly  afterwards 
came  up  from  South  Carolina.5  All  these  troops  were 
under  Burnside's  command.  They  were  landed  at 
Newport  News,  near  Fortress  Monroe,  and  the  original 
intention  was  that  they  should  join  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.8  These  troops  constituted  almost  all  the 
forces  east  of  the  Alleghanies  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Government  for  the  purpose  of  reinforcing  Mc- 

1  Cf.  Swinton,  170. 

8  18  W.  R.,  500.  4  9  W.  R.,  409  ;  14  W.  R.,  305. 

3  16  W.  R.,  5.  5  20  W.  R.,  367. 

•9  W.  R.,  404,  405  ;  14  W.  R.,  300  ;  20  W.  R.,  365. 


236  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

Clellan.  As  for  General  Pope's  own  army,  that 
officer,  as  early  as  July  8th,1  was  considering  the  ques- 
tion of  drawing  largely  from,  the  force  in  the  Kana- 
wha  Valley  in  West  Virginia  under  General  Cox, 
who  had,  as  early  as  July  3d,  called  Pope's  attention 
to  the  excellent  condition  of  his  command,  and  had 
requested  active  service.2  Pope,  however,  delayed  a 
month  before  issuing  the  requisite  orders,3  and  Cox's 
command  did  not  reach  the  seat  of  war  until  the 
fighting  in  front  of  Washington  was  practically  over.4 
The  Federal  Government  was  in  fact  at  the  end 
of  its  resources  for  the  time  being.  The  new  levies 
which  were  being  raised  in  obedience  to  the  call  for 
300,000  men,  which  President  Lincoln  issued  about 
July  1st,  in  response  to  the  offer  of  the  governors  of 
the  Northern  States,5  certainly  could  not  take  the 
field  before  September.  McClellan  did  not  hesitate 
to  say  that  the  army  of  General  Lee  numbered  200,- 
000  men.8  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  with  the  ad- 
ditional troops  that  Burnside  could  bring  to  its 
assistance,  would  not  much  exceed  110,000  men,7 
and,  at  the  moment,  there  were  no  other  troops  to 
send  to  Harrison's  Landing.  The  question  was, 
therefore,  forced  upon  Mr.  Lincoln's  mind  in  the  first 
days  of  July,  whether,  assuming  McClellan  to  be 
correct  in  his  estimate  of  the  strength  of  Lee's  army, 
it  was  safe  to  allow  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to 
remain  for  an  indefinite  time  at  Harrison's  Landing ; 
whether  it  would  not  be  more  prudent  to  recall  it  to 

1  1 8  W.  R.,  460,  464. 

*/<*.,45i.  '5N.  &H.,446. 

1  Ib.,  551.  •  12  W.  R.,  51. 

*  Ib.,  698,  722.  '  14  W.  R.,  338. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  237 

the  neighborhood  of  Washington.  For  the  time 
being,  therefore,  the  President  retained  Burnside's 
troops  near  Fortress  Monroe,1  and  awaited  anxiously 
the  arrival  of  General  Halleck  before  committing 
himself  in  either  direction. 

General  Halleck  arrived  in  Washington  on  the 
22d  of  July,  and  on  the  25th  he  visited  the  army  at 
Harrison's  Landing.  He  found  McClellan,  as  he 
stated  in  a  "Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of 
War," 2  at  the  head  of  about  90,000  men,  estimating 
the  force  of  the  enemy  at  "  not  less  than  200,000  " 
men,  and  yet  of  "  opinion  that,  with  30,000  reinforce- 
ments, he  could  attack  Richmond  with  a  good 
chance  of  success."  When  told  that  the  Govern- 
ment could  promise  him  only  20,000  men,  and  that, 
if  he  could  not  take  Richmond  with  that  number, 
his  troops  must  be  withdrawn  from  the  Peninsula 
and  united  with  those  of  General  Pope,  he  said  that 
he  would  move  on  Richmond  even  with  this  small 
addition  to  his  army ;  "  there  was  a  chance,"  he  said, 
and  he  was  "  willing  to  try  it." 3  Such  ill-digested, 
not  to  say  inconsistent,  views  could  not  impress 
General  Halleck,  or  any  one  else,  for  that  matter, 
favorably.  If  General  McClellan  really  believed 
that  Lee  had  200,000  men  in  and  about  Richmond, 
it  was  absurd  for  him  to  expect  success  with  only 
110,000.  For  even  if  he  should  be  able  to  seize 
Petersburg  by  a  coup  de  main,  which  he  told  Halleck 
it  was  his  intention  to  do,  could  he  expect  to  do 
more  than  maintain  himself  there  against  a  force 

1  14  W.  R.,  320. 

s  */>.,  337-  s  />.,  337  :  </•  i  C.  W.  (1863),  437. 


238  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

so  largely  exceeding  his  own  ?  But  we  strongly 
suspect  that  McClellan's,  estimate  of  the  strength  of 
Lee's  army  was  adopted  by  him  in  the  hope  of 
obtaining  such  heavy  reinforcements  as  would  assure 
him  an  easy  victory  over  an  army  which  he  had  no 
sufficient  reason  to  suppose  much  exceeded  100,000 
men.  If  this  was  so,  he  was  doomed  to  grievous 
disappointment ;  for  Halleck,  apparently  impressed 
by  the  inconsistency  between  McClellan's  attitude 
of  willingness  to  proceed  with  only  110,000  men 
and  his  expressed  belief  that  Lee's  army  numbered 
200,000  men,  determined  at  once  to  withdraw  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Peninsula. 

The  order  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  was 
issued  on  August  3d.  On  the  next  day  McClellan 
wrote  a  strong  letter  to  Halleck  remonstrating 
against  his  decision.1  In  this  letter  he  dwells  on 
the  importance  of  retaining  the  position  near  Rich- 
mond, and  urges  that  the  Government  ought  to  col- 
lect troops  from  all  other  parts  of  the  country  to  add 
to  the  numbers  of  his  army.  He  unquestionably 
puts  his  case  with  great  strength.  "  Here,"  he  says, 
"directly  in  front  of  this  army,  is  the  heart  of  the 
rebellion.  It  is  here  that  our  resources  should  be 
collected  to  strike  the  blow  which  will  determine 
the  fate  of  this  nation.  All  points  of  secondary  im- 
portance elsewhere  should  be  abandoned,  and  every 
available  man  brought  here.  A  decided  victory 
here,  and  the  military  strength  of  the  rebellion  is 
crushed.  It  matters  not  what  partial  reverses  we 
may  meet  with  elsewhere ;  here  is  the  true  defence 

1  16  W.  R.,  8. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  239 

of  Washington.  It  is  here,  on  the  bank  of  the 
James  River,  that  the  fate  of  the  Union  should  be 
decided." 

There  was  a  great  deal  of  force  in  these  arguments, 
but  General  Halleck  must  have  been  surprised  that 
they  proceeded  from  the  pen  of  a  man  who  only  a 
few  days  before  had  expressed  himself  as  willing  to 
try  the  chance  of  winning  or  losing  in  this  most  im- 
portant struggle  with  an  army  only  a  little  more  than 
half  as  large  as  that  of  his  antagonist.  The  argu- 
ments in  the  letter  would  have  led  logically  to  an 
avoidance  of  the  critical  conflict  until  the  success  of 
the  Union  army  should  have  been  rendered  reason- 
ably certain  by  its  receiving  very  large  reinforce- 
ments. But  the  ease  with  which  General  McClellan 
had  a  week  before  agreed  to  move  on  Richmond 
with  120,000  men  against  Lee's  200,000  must  have 
considerably  weakened  the  trust  which  Halleck  was 
disposed  to  place  in  the  sound  judgment  and  consis- 
tent policy  of  an  officer  who  was  capable  of  such 
sudden  modifications  of  view  in  such  an  important 
emergency. 

General  Halleck  replied  on  the  6th.1  He  briefly 
stated  the  situation,  as  he  understood  it;  namely, 
that,  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  numbering 
90,000  men,  that  of  General  Pope  40,000,  and  that  of 
General  Lee  200,000  or  over,  as  General  McClellan 
had  represented  it,  it  was  unsafe  to  allow  the  two 
Federal  armies  to  remain  separated  from  each  other, 
in  a  situation  in  which  neither  could  help  the  other 
if  attacked  by  a  superior  force,  as  was  apparently 

1  16  W.  R.,  9. 


24Q  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

quite  possible.  The  suggestion  that  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  might  remain  where  it  was  until  rein- 
forced sufficiently  to  take  the  offensive,  he  met  by 
saying  that  "  the  months  of  August  and  September 
are  almost  fatal  to  whites  who  live  on  that  part  of 
the  James  River."  He,  therefore,  reiterated  his 
decision  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  must  pre- 
pare at  once  to  leave  the  Peninsula,  and  suggested 
Fredericksburg  as  the  place  where  the  two  armies 
could  best  be  united.  Here,  said  General  Halleck, 
the  armies  would  find  a  new  base  on  the  Rappahan- 
nock  River,  nearer  to  Richmond  than  Yorktown, 
and  one  which,  being  "  between  Richmond  and 
Washington,"  "  covers  Washington  from  any  attack 
by  the  enemy." 

This  letter  brings  out  perfectly  Halleck's  weak 
points.  It  is  evidently  written  simply  to  obtain 
"  the  best  of  the  argument."  It  is  conspicuous  by  its 
deliberate  avoidance  of  any  discussion  of  the  real 
issues  raised,  and  by  its  easy  assumption  of  the  truth 
of  unproved  statements,  some  of  which,  at  any  rate, 
he  ought  to  have  recognized  as  grossly  erroneous. 
If  the  relative  numbers  of  the  Federal  and  Confeder- 
ate armies  were  in  reality  as  Halleck  states,  the 
situation  was  a  most  serious  one  for  the  cause  of  the 
Union.  The  question  in  this  condition  of  affairs  was 
whether  any  combinations  possible  to  the  Federal 
commanders  could  prevent  Lee  from  crossing  the 
Potomac  with  100,000  men,  and  threatening  not 
only  Washington,  but  Baltimore,  and  even  Philadel- 
phia. The  game  was  apparently  in  his  hands.  It 
was  no  time  to  be  talking  of  bases  of  operation  for 


i862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  241 


another  invasion  of  Virginia.  The  only  thing  to  be 
done  was  to  cover  Washington  with  all  the  forces 
which  the  United  States  Government  could  collect. 
Nor  would  it  do  to  mass  the  army  at  Fredericksburg, 
for  Fredericksburg  was  not  "between  Richmond 
and  Washington,"  nor  would  its  possession  "  cover 
Washington  from  any  attack  by  the  enemy  " ;  this 
was  an  egregious  fallacy,  which  Halleck  was  very 
soon  to  find  out  to  his  cost,  and  which  the  opera- 
tions of  Generals  Lee  and  Hooker  in  June,  1863, 
were  fully  to  demonstrate.  The  only  thing  to  do 
with  McClellan's  army  was  to  bring  it  right  back 
to  Alexandria,  to  unite  with  Pope's  army,  and  to 
hold  the  line  of  Bull  Run.  But  there  is  not  a  trace 
in  General  Halleck's  letter  of  the  recognition  by 
him  of  such  a  serious  state  of  affairs.  It  is  evident 
enough  that  he  used  McClellan's  enormous  estimate 
of  the  size  of  the  Confederate  army  as  a  convenient 
weapon  which  that  officer  had  rashly  put  into  his 
hands,  by  the  use  of  which  he  could  get  the  better 
of  him  in  argument.  In  fact  it  is  plain  from  their 
conversation  and  correspondence  that  neither  Mc- 
Clellan  nor  Halleck  really  believed  in  the  estimate, 
of  which  each  of  them,  for  reasons  of  his  own,  made 
use,  that  Lee's  army  was  200,000  strong.  We  may 
add  that  it  was  inexcusable  for  McClellan  to  state, 
as  well  as  for  Halleck  to  accept,  such  a  preposterous 
estimate  of  the  size  of  Lee's  army.  There  had  been 
nothing  in  the  recent  struggle  to  indicate  that  Lee's 
forces  much  exceeded  those  of  McClellan. 

As  for  the  alleged  impossibility  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  remaining  on  the  James  River  in  Au- 


VOL.   II.— 16 


242  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 


gust  and  September  on  account  of  the  unhealthiness 
of  the  climate,  there  was  in  reality  no  truth  in  it. 
Letterman,  the  Medical  Director  of  the  army,  in  a 
letter  to  General  Williams,  the  Adjutant-General, 
dated  July  18th,  after  recommending  that  certain 
steps  be  taken  for  the  prevention  of  disease,  con- 
cludes as  follows :  "  I  think,  if  these  suggestions 
be  carried  into  effect,  that  we  may  with  reason  ex- 
pect the  health  of  this  army  to  be  in  as  good  a  state 
as  that  of  any  army  in  the  field." l 

But  General  McClellan  was  not  proposing  to  re- 
main at  Harrison's  Landing,  but  to  cross  the  river 
and  to  move  on  Petersburg.2  This  move  he  had 
contemplated  from  the  first  moment  of  his  deciding 
to  operate  on  the  line  of  the  James3;  and  it  was 
beyond  a  question  the  right  movement  to  make. 
Threatening  Richmond,  as  McClellan  did,  while  he 
remained  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  General  Lee 
could  not  afford  seriously  to  weaken  the  force  with 
which  he  was  covering  the  approaches  to  the  capi- 
tal 4 ;  while  it  was  perfectly  possible  for  McClellan, 
who  possessed  the  control  of  the  James,  to  send  the 
greater  part,  or,  if  he  thought  best,  the  whole,  of  his 
army  by  water  to  City  Point,  from  which  place  a 
direct  road,  only  eight  miles  in  length,  ran  to  Peters- 
burg. A  well-combined  movement  might,  there- 
fore, easily  have  placed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 

1  14  W.  R.,  349.     But  see  Swinton,  171,  n.,  and  265,  n. 

8  14  W.  R.,  337  ;  McClellan's  O.  S.,  482. 

»5  W.  R.,42. 

4  Lee  to  Jackson,  18  W.  R.,  917.  In  this  discussion  we  are  proceeding 
on  the  supposition  that  Lee  had  about  80,000  men,  and  McClellan  about 
90,000. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  243 

in  front  of  Petersburg  two  or  three  days  before  Gen- 
eral Lee  could  possibly  have  assembled  his  army  for 
its  defence ;  and  at  this  time  Petersburg  was  com- 
paratively undefended.1  The  fall  of  Petersburg 
would  unquestionably  have  worked  a  vast  change 
in  the  situation  of  the  contending  forces;  it  is  in 
fact  doubtful  whether  Richmond  could  have  been 
long  held  by  the  Confederates  after  the  capture  of 
Petersburg  by  the  Federals.  At  Petersburg  the 
army  could  have  been  easily  supplied  by  water 
transportation.  The  place  was  perfectly  salubrious, 
even  in  summer,  and  the  troops  could  have  remained 
there  with  entire  comfort  until  sufficiently  reinforced 
to  undertake  further  operations. 

This  plan,  however,  possessed  no  attractions  for 
General  Halleck.  He  refused  to  give  to  it  any  con- 
sideration at  all.  He  never  seems  to  have  realized 
that  the  presence  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the 
James  River  rendered  Washington  secure  by  com- 
pelling Lee  to  retain  the  bulk  of  the  Confederate 
army  near  Richmond.2  Still  less  did  he  perceive  the 
immense  advantage  which  the  control  of  the  James 
River  by  the  Federal  fleet  gave  to  the  invading 
force.  He  persisted  on  withdrawing  McClellan  from 
the  Peninsula ;  and  it  was  not  until  two  years  had 
elapsed,  and  many  bloody  battles  had  been  fought, 
and  many  long  marches  had  been  made,  that  the 
soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  saw  again  the 
waters  of  the  James. 

While  General  Pope  was  in  Washington,  waiting 

1  27  W.  R.,  1018. 

8  Lee  to  Jackson,  18  W.  R.,  916,  917  ;  16  W.  R,,  176. 


244  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

for  General  Halleck  to  arrive,  he  occupied  himself, 
as  we  have  seen,  in  giving  the  necessary  orders  for 
the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  to  the  east  side  of  the  mountains.  He  en- 
countered, as  was  to  have  been  expected,  various 
delays,  and  found  some  of  his  subordinates  more 
anxious  than  he  thought  there  was  any  justification 
for  lest  the  Confederates  should  make  another  raid 
down  the  Valley.1  Whether  he  was  impelled  by 
these  experiences,  or  was  moved  simply  by  his  own 
views  of  his  relations  to  his  new  command,  we  do 
not  know,  but  he  issued  to  his  army  on  the  14th  of 
July  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  addresses  of 
which  we  have  any  record  in  military  history.2 
"  Let  us,"  said  he,  "  understand  each  other.  I  have 
come  to  you  from  the  West,  where  we  have  always 
seen  the  backs  of  our  enemies ;  from  an  army  whose 
business  it  has  been  to  seek  the  adversary,  and  to 
beat  him  when  he  was  found ;  whose  policy  has 
been  attack  and  not  defence.  In  but  one  instance 
has  the  enemy  been  able  to  place  our  Western  armies 
in  a  defensive  attitude.  I  presume  that  I  have  been 
called  here  to  pursue  the  same  system,  and  to  lead 
you  against  the  enemy."  And  there  was  much 
more  of  the  same  sort. 

Nothing  could  have  been  in  worse  taste  than  this 
address.  The  comparison  between  the  courage  and 
achievements  of  the  Western  armies  and  those  of 
his  present  command,  made  by  him,  a  Western  offi- 
cer, was  exceedingly  irritating  to  his  troops.  Noth- 
ing that  he  could  have  done  could  so  effectually 

1  18  W.  R.,  462,  464,  466  ;  also,  483,  485.  *  76.,  473. 


1 86  2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  245 

have  destroyed  the  possibility  of  establishing  him- 
self in  the  confidence  and  respect  of  his  army  as 
this  most  ill-judged  and  unwarrantable  address. 
Especially  was  its  tone  uncalled  for  when  we  con- 
sider the  role  which  Pope  was  obliged,  at  that  time, 
at  any  rate,  to  play.  For,  although  he  might  deem 
it  desirable  to  make  a  demonstration  on  Gordons- 
ville,  or  elsewhere,  he  was  not,  as  one  would  gather 
from  his  address  to  his  soldiers,  about  to  move  on 
Richmond  at  the  head  of  an  invading  force,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  he  had  every  reason  to  expect  that 
he  might  be  obliged  to  contest  the  advance  towards 
Washington  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  so 
soon  as  that  army  should  be  set  free  by  the  removal 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  neighborhood 
of  Richmond.1  That  this  was  his  actual  military 
situation  he  would  seem,  indeed,  for  the  moment, 
to  have  forgotten. 

On  the  return  of  General  Halleck  from  the  Pen- 
insula, General  Pope  left  Washington  for  the  front, 
arriving  near  Sperryville  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
1st  of  August.2  He  at  once  began  to  concentrate 
his  army  with  the  intention  of  moving  in  force  in 
the  direction  of  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville. 
He  had  been  told  by  Halleck  that  it  had  been 
decided  to  withdraw  McClellan's  army  from  the 
Peninsula3  and  to  send  it  to  Fredericksburg  by  way 
of  Aquia  Creek,  and  this  movement  in  the  direction 
of  Gordonsville  may  have  been,  in  part  at  least, 
intended  to  induce  Lee  to  send  troops  there  from 
Richmond,  so  that  McClellan's  withdrawal  would 

>i6W.  R.,  23.  2i8W.  R.,  524.     '  3i6W.  R.,  23. 


246  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

be  more  likely  to  be  unmolested.  Still  it  does  seem 
from  General  Pope's  letters  and  despatches  that  he 
really  expected  to  occupy  Gordonsville.  He  gave 
orders  that  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad 
should  be  put  in  running  order  as  far  as  Culpeper  * 
(a  town  some  ten  miles  beyond  the  crossing  of  the 
Rappahannock),  which  he  had  caused  to  be  occu- 
pied by  a  brigade  of  Banks's  corps.  As  soon  as  the 
railroad  should  be  completed  to  that  point,  he  pro- 
posed advancing  his  whole  army  to  the  line  of  the 
Rapidan,  and  he  wrote  on  August  3d  to  Halleck  that, 
unless  the  force  in  his  front  should  be  heavily  re- 
inforced from  Richmond,  he  expected  to  be  "in 
possession  of  Gordonsville  and  Charlottesville  within 
ten  days."  *  On  the  4th  he  ordered  McDowell  with 
Ricketts's  division  to  advance  from  Warrenton  to 
Culpeper.3  On  the  5th  he  ordered  Banks  to  move 
from  Sperryville  towards  Culpeper.4  His  intention 
at  this  time  was  to  form  his  whole  army  behind 
Robertson's  River,  a  small  stream  which  flows  from 
the  west  into  the  Rapidan  at  the  point  where  the 
railroad  crosses  the  latter  river,  about  twelve  miles 
south  of  Culpeper.  Sigel's  corps  was  to  form  the 
right  of  the  line ;  Banks's  the  centre  ;  and  McDowell's 
the  left.  Then  a  considerable  force  of  the  three 
armies  was  to  be  sent  to  Stanardsville,  a  town  some 
fifteen  miles  southwest  of  Robertson's  River,  which 
should  threaten  Gordonsville  from  the  west  and 
compel  its  evacuation.  General  Pope  was  a  sanguine 
man,  and  on  August  5th  he  wrote  to  General  Hal- 

'18  W.  R.,  520.  *Ib  530. 

9/*.,  527.  */*.,  535-537. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  247 

leek  that,  "  with  the  large  force  of  cavalry  at "  his 
"  disposition,"  he  could  "  easily  make  the  position  of 
Gordonsville  untenable." 1 

This  scheme  came  to  nothing.  It  seems,  in  fact, 
to  have  been  given  up  almost  as  soon  as  it  was  made. 
Banks's  orders  appear  to  have  been  changed ;  he 
arrived  at  Culpeper,  but  not  until  the  evening  of 
the  8th.2  McDowell,  with  Bicketts's  division,  arrived 
on  the  6th.  But  it  was  not  until  the  8th  that  Sigel 
was  ordered  to  march  from  Sperryville  to  Culpeper. 
And  this  order  to  Sigel  was  given,  not  with  a  view 
to  a  forward  movement,  but  because  Bayard,  com- 
manding the  cavalry,  which  were  at  the  front,  re- 
ported on  the  7th 3  that  the  enemy  were  driving  in 
his  pickets.4  If  the  plan  had  any  chance  of  success 
at  all,  a  prompt  concentration  of  the  army  was  cer- 
tainly the  first  thing  to  be  accomplished,  and  General 
Pope  did  not  take  the  steps  to  secure  this  prerequi- 
site condition.  We  mention  this  episode  thus  fully 
because  it  throws  such  a  clear  light  on  General  Pope's 
methods.  We  shall  see  again  and  again,  as  we  follow 
the  incidents  of  this  campaign,  the  same  ill-digested 
plans,  the  same  neglect  in  securing  their  execution, 
the  same  sanguine  view  of  the  future,  followed  as 
suddenly  by  the  same  unexpected  change  for  the 
worse  in  the  military  situation. 

General  Pope  at  this  time  took  steps  to  unite 
King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  to  his  army. 
As  soon  as  Halleck  had  determined  to  withdraw  the 


1  18  W.  R.,  535,  536. 

2 /3.,  548.  »/*.,  544- 

4  16.,  547.     It  may  be  added  that  General  Pope's  Report  makes  no  allu- 
sion to  this  plan  of  seizing  Gordonsville.     16  W.  R.,  24,  25. 


248  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  Peninsula  he  ordered 
Burnside  to  proceed  from  Fort  Monroe  to  Aquia 
Creek  with  his  entire  command.1  Burnside  arrived 
at  Aquia  Creek  on  the  4th,  and  on  the  5th  his  troops 
were  at  Falmouth.8  Pope,  however,  deferred  writing 
to  King  till  the  8th,  and  then  ordered  him  not  to 
move  until  a  certain  expeditionary  force  which  he  had 
ordered  King  to  send  out  in  the  direction  of  Hanover 
Junction3  should  have  returned.4  By  a  later  despatch 
sent  on  the  same  day,  however,  King  was  informed 
that  the  presence  of  the  enemy  had  been  recognized, 
and  he  was  ordered  to  proceed  at  once  to  Culpeper.5 
He  arrived  there  on  the  evening  of  the  llth.6 

It  was  indeed  quite  time  that  Pope's  army  should 
be  concentrated,  for  the  Confederate  force  under 
Jackson  had  recently  been  augmented  by  the  addi- 
tion of  over  10,000  men  under  A.  P.  Hill,  raising 
Jackson's  force  to  24,000  men.7  These  troops  were 
sent  by  Lee  on  learning  that  Pope  was  advancing 
towards  the  Rapidan,  and  threatening  Gordon sville 
with  his  entire  force.8  Jackson  kept  himself  in- 
formed as  to  Pope's  movements.  He  knew  that  his 
troops  were  not  concentrated, — that  only  a  part  of 
his  army  was  at  Culpeper, — and  "  hoping,"  as  he 
says  in  his  Report,9  "  to  be  able  to  defeat  it  before 
reinforcements  should  arrive  there,  Ewell's,  Hill's, 
and  Jackson's  divisions  were  moved  on  the  7th  in 
the  direction  of  the  enemy  from  their  respective  en- 

1  18  W.  R.,  524. 

*  Il>.,  528,  529.  *  16  W.  R.,  27. 

*  /£.,  528.  'Allan,  165. 
«  Ib.,  548.  872.,  159. 

s  Ib.,  550.  »  16  W.  R.,  182. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  249 


carnpments  near  Gordousville."  It  was  this  force 
which  had  driven  in  the  cavalry  of  Bayard,  who, 
assisted  on  his  right  by  Buford's  brigade,  was  screen- 
ing the  movements  and  positions  of  General  Pope's 
army. 

When  Jackson's  advance  reached  Cedar  (or  Slaugh- 
ter) Mountain,  about  eight  or  nine  miles  from  Cul- 
peper,  about  noon  of  August  9th,  it  encountered  the 
cavalry  of  Bayard  and  the  whole  of  Banks's  corps, 
which  Pope  had  ordered  forward  to  support  the  cav- 
alry. McDowell,  with  Ricketts's  division,  was  about 
half-way  between  Banks  and  Culpeper.  Sigel's 
corps  had  not  yet  arrived  at  Culpeper,  its  com- 
mander having  delayed  obeying  the  order  to  march 
there  from  Sperryville  until  he  should  get  particular 
information  as  to  his  route, — a  most  singular  pro- 
ceeding, considering  that  there  was  but  one  road 
which  he  could  take.  Pope,  therefore,  had  only 
about  two  thirds  of  his  army  with  him,  and  pru- 
dence should  have  dictated  a  careful  handling  of 
these  inferior  forces  in  presence  of  such  an  adversary 
as  Jackson. 

There  has  always  been  a  conflict  of  evidence  as  to 
the  orders  which  Pope  gave  to  Banks.  Pope  claims  in 
his  Report 1  that  he  ordered  him  to  take  up  a  strong 
position  at  or  near  the  point  occupied  by  Crawford's 
brigade,  which  had  been  already  sent  to  the  front  to 
support  the  cavalry.  Banks  claims  that  the  verbal 
orders  given  to  him  were  reduced  to  writing  at  his 
request  by  the  staff-officer  who  brought  them,  and 
that  they  contained  nothing  about  taking  up  a  posi- 

1  16  W.  R.,  25,  26. 


aso  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

tion,  but  instructed  him  to  deploy  his  skirmishers  if 
the  enemy  advanced,  and  to  attack  him  immediately 
if  he  approached;  and  that  he  was  to  expect  rein- 
forcements from  Culpeper.1  There  can  be  no  sort  of 
question  that  Pope  was  to  blame  for  not  giving 
Banks  explicit  written  orders;  in  fact,  we  may  go 
farther ;  it  was  for  the  commanding  general  to  go  to 
the  front  himself  and  select  a  position  for  the  army, 
if  one  was  to  be  selected  to  the  south  of  Culpeper. 
Such  a  task  as  this  can  rarely,  if  ever,  be  delegated. 
Nor  was  there  any  reason  why  General  Pope  should 
not  have  ridden  to  the  front,  obtained  his  informa- 
tion at  first  hand  as  to  the  enemy's  strength  and 
movements,  and  then  issued  his  orders  on  the  spot. 

What  happened  was  what  might  have  been  ex- 
pected under  the  circumstances  of  a  man  whose 
chief  qualification  for  high  military  rank  was  per- 
sonal gallantry.  Banks  advanced  to  a  point  some 
eight  miles  south  of  Culpeper,  placed  his  batteries  on 
a  ridge,  took  up  a  sufficiently  good  position,  and 
after  several  hours  spent  in  comparatively  useless 
cannonading,  on  seeing  the  enemy's  infantry  deploy- 
ing, he  advanced  suddenly  upon  them,  and  for  a 
brief  period  gained  decidedly  the  advantage.  But 
he  had  no  reserves ;  he  had  neglected  to  send  word 
to  Pope  or  McDowell  or  Ricketts  of  what  he  was 
doing  ;  and  when  Jackson's  entire  forces  came  upon 
the  field,  the  feeble  corps  of  Banks  was  utterly 
overwhelmed  and  driven  back  with  great  loss.2 

1  Ropes,  20 ;  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  405  ;  $C.  W.,  (1865,  Miscellaneous),  45~47  \ 
Allan,  170,  n.  3.  The  whole  subject  is  fully  and  ably  treated  by  General 
G.  L.  Andrews  in  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  389-442. 

*  For  an  excellent  account  of  this  battle,  see  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  389  et  seq. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  251 

Such,  in  brief,  was  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain. 
Banks  took  into  action  about  6800  infantry  and 
1200  cavalry, — 8000  in  all.1  Jackson  had  about 
20,000  men  on  the  ground.2  Banks  lost  upwards  of 
1600  killed  and  wounded,  and  nearly  600  missing,3 
the  greater  part  of  whom  were  undoubtedly  killed 
or  wounded.  The  Confederate  loss  was  nearly 
1300.4 

Both  armies  remained  for  two  days  in  face  of  each 
other.  Jackson  was  well  aware  that  if  he  advanced 
he  would  have  to  deal  with  fresh  troops,  probably 
superior  in  force  to  his  own.  It  was  no  part  of  his 
plan  to  fight  a  battle  unless  the  chances  were  in  his 
favor,5  or  unless  he  was  placed  in  a  position  from 
which  he  was  compelled  to  extricate  himself  by 
fighting,  which  was  not  the  case  here.  He  knew 
that  as  soon  as  McClellan's  withdrawal  from  the 
Peninsula  should  be  ascertained  beyond  a  question, 
he  would  be  joined  by  General  Lee  at  the  head  of 
his  whole  army.  Hence,  after  having  struck  his 
successful  blow,  he  wisely  retired  across  the  Rapidan 
towards  Grordonsville.6 

Pope,  however,  after  two  days  spent  in  resting  his 
troops,  determined,  on  the  arrival  of  King's  division 
from  Fredericksburg  on  the  night  of  the  llth,  to 
take  the  offensive,  and  he  did  accordingly  advance  to 
the  Rapidan.  He  says  in  his  Report  that  his  "  whole 
effective  force  was  barely  equal  to  that  of  the 
enemy." 7  In  this  he  was  entirely  mistaken ;  Jack- 

12  M.  H.  S.  M.,  417. 

*  Ib.,  207.  5  Lee  to  Jackson,  18  W.  R.,  922,  923. 

3l6  W.  R.,  139.  "Allan,  178. 

4  Ib.,  180.  7  16  W.  R.,  27,  28. 


252  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

son  had  hardly  23,000  men,1  while  the  three  corps  of 
Sigel,  McDowell,  and  Banks,  and  the  cavalry  of  Bay- 
ard and  Buford  could  not  have  numbered  much  less 
than  40,000  men.  A  battle  might  well  have  resulted 
favorably  for  Pope.  But  if  he  really  thought  that 
he  was  going  to  encounter  an  equal  force,  he  cer- 
tainly ought  not  to  have  offered  battle.  For  his 
rdle  was  to  cover  Washington  until  McClellan  should 
arrive  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  at  this 
time  McClellan  had  not  even  begun  to  withdraw  his 
troops  from  the  Peninsula.  When,  therefore,  Gen- 
eral Pope  says  (as  he  does  in  his  Report 2)  that  he 
had  determined  to  fall  upon  Jackson,  and  to  "com- 
pel him  to  fight  a  battle,  which  must  have  been  en- 
tirely decisive  for  one  army  or  the  other,"  he  shows 
that  he  utterly  misconceived  the  part  which  had 
been  assigned  to  him.  Had  he  suffered,  beyond  the 
Rappahannock,  an  "  entirely  decisive  "  defeat,  there 
is  no  telling  how  serious  might  have  been  the  con- 
sequences to  the  cause  of  the  Union.  And  it  must 
be  remembered  that  there  was  not  the  slightest  need 
of  his  fighting  any  battle  at  all  at  that  time.  Pope, 
moreover,  had  just  been  warned  by  Halleck3  (on 
August  8th)  not  to  expose  his  army  to  any  disaster 
until  more  troops  could  be  brought  up.  But  Pope 
was  an  impulsive  and  sanguine  man,  and  if  Jackson 
had  stood,  he  would  no  doubt  have  attacked  him, 
even  if  he  had  believed  Jackson's  army  to  be  equal 
in  strength  to  his  own,  oblivious  of  Halleck's  orders, 

1  Allan,  177,  n.  5  ;  Pope,  however,  thought  that  Jackson  was  being  rein- 
forced by  Longstreet ;  18  W.  R.,  561. 
8  16  W.  R.,  28. 
'18  W.  R.,  547. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  253 

and  regardless  of  the  obvious  impolicy  and  danger 
of  such  a  course. 

On  the  15th l  of  August  Pope's  force  was  increased 
by  twelve  regiments  from  Burnside's  command,  num- 
bering some  8000  men,2  under  General  Reno.3  Pope 
had  now  under  him  not  less  than  45,000  men,  ex- 
clusive of  cavalry.4  But  this  force  could  hardly 
with  propriety  be  called  an  army.5  It  was  rather  an 
aggregation  of  corps  and  divisions,  which  had  never 
been  previously  united,  had  no  experiences  in  com- 
mon, and  knew  as  little  of  their  commander  and 
cared  as  little  for  him  as  he  cared  for  and  knew 
them.  This  heterogeneous  body  was  now  to  be  at- 
tacked by  a  real  army,  composed  of  bodies  of  troops 
which  had  for  months  been  acting  together  or  in  con- 
cert, under  the  command  of  the  most  accomplished 
soldier  of  the  day,  General  Robert  Edward  Lee. 
This  army  had  already  under  his  leadership  achieved 
marked  success.  It  was  eager  for  an  offensive  cam- 
paign, enthusiastically  devoted  to  its  commander, 
and  confident  of  being  able  to  drive  the  Northern 
invaders  from  the  soil  of  Virginia.  The  chances  of 
victory  were  unquestionably  in  its  favor,  if  it  was  to 
be  allowed  a  fair  chance  at  Pope's  army ;  but  it  was 
Pope's  duty,  and  that  of  his  superior  officer,  General 
Halleck,  to  see  to  it  that  this  chance  should  not  be 
given,  and  that  Pope's  command  should  be  gradually 
but  steadily  retired  without  risking  a  serious  en- 

1  16  W.  R.,  545. 
*  Allan,  177. 

3  18  W.  R.,  566,  569. 

4  Ib.,  603  ;  Allan,  178,  212,  n.  ;  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  202. 
8  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  218. 


254  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

gagement  until  it  should  be  united  with  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  But  to  this  task  neither  Halleck 
nor  Pope,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  was  equal. 

General  Lee  had  carefully  watched  the  doings  of 
General  McClellan  on  the  James  River,  and  when 
the  latter  officer  moved  out  (as  he  did  once  or  twice) 
to  Malvern  Hill,  or  took  up  and  fortified  a  position 
on  the  south  side  of  the  James,  Lee  had  wondered 
whether  any  move  of  importance  was  to  follow.1  Of 
late,  however,  the  preparations  for  the  departure  of 
the  Federal  forces  were  too  plain  to  be  mistaken ; 
and  then,  without  hesitation,  Lee  determined  to  carry 
his  army  to  the  Rapidan,  where,  uniting  with  Jack- 
son and  A.  P.  Hill,  he  could  press  Pope  vigorously 
in  the  hope  of  forcing  him  to  a  battle  and  gaining 
a  decisive  victory  over  him  before  he  could  be 
reinforced  by  McClellan's  army  or  any  large  part 
of  it.2 

Accordingly,  on  the  13th  of  August,  Longstreet, 
with  ten  brigades,  and  Hood,  with  two,  were  ordered 
to  proceed  to  Gordonsville.3  Stuart's  cavalry  and 
Anderson's  division  speedily  followed  and  joined 
Lee,  raising  his  force  to  about  54,000  men 4 ;  and 
finally  nearly  all  the  rest  of  the  troops  composing 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  were  ordered  to 
the  front.9  Only  two  brigades  remained  for  the 
defence  of  Richmond.  "  Confidence  in  you,"  wrote 
President  Davis  to  General  Lee,  "overcomes  the 


J  18  W.  R.,  916,  917,  923,  925.  3 18  W.  R.,  928. 

*  Allan,  181,  182.  *  Allan,  199,  n. 

5  18  W.  R.,  929,  930,  932.     They  did  not,  however,  reach  the  army  of 
General  Lee  till  September  2d.    Allan,  324. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  255 

view   which    would    otherwise    be    taken    of    the 
exposed  condition  of  Richmond."1 

While  this  concentration  of  his  enemy's  forces  was 
being  effected,  General  Pope  remained  on  the  Rapi- 
dan  River.  His  letters  show  that  his  mind  went 
through  its  customary  succession  of  changes  of 
opinion.  Having,  while  near  Cedar  Mountain,  be- 
lieved that  Longstreet  was  reinforcing  Jackson,2  he 
was  naturally  elated  at  the  retirement  of  the  latter 
officer  across  the  Rapidan,  which  showed  him  that 
he  had  been  mistaken  ;  and  when  informed  by  Hal- 
leek  that  he  would  soon  receive  reinforcements  from 
Burnside's  command,3  he  actually  wrote  that  he 
should  move  forward  on  Louisa  Court-House  as  soon 
as  they  arrived.4  As  Louisa  Court-House  is  not 
only  south  of  the  Rapidan  but  is  about  fifteen  miles 
southeast  of  Gordonsville,  Halleck  must  indeed  have 
been  surprised.  He  telegraphed  at  once  to  Pope 
forbidding  him  to  cross  the  river 5 ;  and  told  him  it 
would  be  far  better  if  he  were  behind  the  Rappahan- 
nock.6  Pope,  however,  though  admitting  to  General 
Halleck  that  a  force  coming  from  Richmond  might 
interpose  between  him  and  Fredericksburg,  which 
place  was  still  held  by  Burnside,7  still,  as  late  as 
the  17th,  considered  his  "  position  strong,"  and  that 
it  would  be  "  very  difficult "  to  drive  him  from  it.8 
The  next  day,  however,  this  sense  of  security  had 
disappeared;  Pope,  by  a  fortunate  accident,  came 
into  possession  of  Lee's  orders  to  his  lieutenants9; 

'i8W.  R.,945.  4  /£.,  565. 

2/£.,56i.  5/£.,  569. 

*/£.,  565.  '/*.,  576. 

9  16  W.  R.,  29,  58,  726  ;  Allan,  183. 


256  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CirfL  WAR.       [1862 

he  saw  the  imminent  danger  in  which  he  was  placed 
of  being  cut  off,  not  only  from  Fredericksburg,  which 
was  a  matter  in  reality  of  no  consequence  to  him, 
but  from  Manassas  Junction,  his  base  of  operations ; 
and  he  immediately  withdrew  his  army  to  the  Rap- 
pahannock.1 

This  retreat  was  made  not  a  day  too  soon.  Pope's 
army  had  been  in  truth  in  an  extremely  dangerous 
position.  Not  only  was  it,  as  General  Halleck  had 
repeatedly  pointed  out  to  him,2  too  far  to  the  front, 
—not  only  was  Pope's  remaining  on  the  Rapidan  in 
contravention  of  his  plain  duty  of  taking  every 
precaution  to  secure  his  army  against  any  possible 
disaster,  and,  therefore,  to  avoid  a  general  engage- 
ment until  he  should  be  joined  by  the  troops  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac, — but  the  position  itself 
was  radically  a  bad  one.  Pope's  line  of  communi- 
cation was  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad.  In 
his  position  on  the  Rapidan,  his  line  of  battle,  facing 
south,  lay  athwart  the  line  of  the  railroad  as  it  runs 
nearly  south  from  Culpeper  to  the  Rapidan,  and  so 
far  was  all  right.  But  at  Culpeper  the  railroad 
turns  at  nearly  a  right  angle  and  runs  some  eleven 
or  twelve  miles  nearly  east  to  the  Rappahannock 
River,  which  it  crosses  at  Rappahannock  Station.  It 
was  therefore  perfectly  possible  for  General  Lee,  by 
crossing  the  Rapidan  to  the  eastward  of  Pope's  posi- 
tion, to  reach  Rappahannock  Station  almost,  if  not 
quite,  as  soon  as  Pope  himself  could  do,  and  without 
necessarily  encountering  any  opposition  from  Pope's 
army.  With  Lee  in  possession  of  Rappahannock 

1  18  W.  R.,  591,  603.  *  It.,  569,  576,  590. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  257 

Station,  and  the  railroad  bridge  destroyed,  Pope's 
army  would  indeed  be  in  a  dangerous  situation.  All 
this  is  very  plain,  but  apparently  it  was  not  seen  by 
General  Pope  until  the  capture  of  one  of  the  officers 
of  Stuart's  staff  put  him  in  possession  of  Lee's  or- 
ders to  his  army. 

Lee  was  greatly  disappointed  at  Pope's  escape. 
He  had  at  first  been  apprehensive  that  Pope  would 
be  discreet  enough  to  present  no  tempting  oppor- 
tunity either  to  Jackson  or  to  himself.  Ete  thought 
that  Pope's  proper  line  of  defence  was  behind  Bull 
Run,1  and  not  on  the  Rappahannock,  still  less  on  the 
Rapidan.  But  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  had 
shown  him,  not  only  that  Pope  had  ventured  beyond 
the  Rappahannock,  but  that  his  management  of  his 
army  was  so  faulty  that  he  might  be  expected  on 
occasions  to  expose  himself  to  attack  under  the  most 
unfavorable  circumstances.  Hence,  when  he  saw 
him  quietly  occupying  the  line  of  the  Rapidan,  Lee 
at  once  saw  his  opportunity.  He  ordered  Long- 
street  and  Jackson  to  cross  the  river  by  Raccoon  and 
Somerville  Fords  and  move  on  Culpeper,  while 
the  cavalry  of  Stuart,  crossing  farther  to  the  east- 
ward at  Morton's  Ford,  were  to  make  for  Rappahan- 
nock Station,  destroy  the  bridge  there,  and  then, 
turning  to  the  left,  form  on  the  right  of  Longstreet's 
corps.  Pope  would  have  been  attacked  in  flank  and 
rear,  and  his  communications  severed  into  the  bar- 
gain. Doubtless  he  would  have  made  a  strenuous 
fight,  but  he  could  hardly  have  escaped  defeat, 
and  defeat  under  such  circumstances  might  well 

1  Lee  to  Jackson,  July  23d  ;    18  W.  R.,  916. 

VOL.    II.— 17. 


258  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

have  been  ruin.  From  this  disaster  fortune  had 
saved  Pope  through  the  capture  of  Stuart's  staff- 
officer. 

When  General  Lee  arrived  on  the  B-appahannock, 
he  found  the  river  very  low,  and  offering  no  obstacle 
of  any  consequence  to  the  movements  of  an  army.1 
He  decided  on  making  an  attempt  to  turn  Pope's 
right,  and  Jackson  accordingly  ascended  the  river, 
and  crossed  some  of  his  troops  near  a  place  called 
Sulphur  Springs.  But  fortune  again  showed  her- 
self unfriendly  to  the  Confederates.  A  great  rain- 
storm came  on;  the  river  rose,  and  not  only  was 
Jackson  unable  to  throw  any  large  number  of  his 
troops  across,  but  he  was  unable  to  withdraw  those 
who  had  crossed, — chiefly  a  brigade  under  Early, — 
which  was  obliged  to  remain  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river,  isolated  from  its  associates,  for  two  days.2  In 
face  of  these  baffling  obstacles,  Lee  was  inclined 
to  despair  of  accomplishing  his  main  object,  that  of 
defeating  Pope  unsupported.  The  "  heavy  rain," 
he  wrote  to  Mr.  Davis  on  August  23d,3  "  will  no 
doubt  continue  the  high  water  and  give  the  enemy 
ample  time  to  reinforce  General  Pope  with  Mc- 
Clellan's  army,  if  desired."  Still,  there  was  a  gain 
(so  General  Lee  thought)  in  changing  the  theatre 
of  war  from  the  James  to  the  Rappahannock.  The 
Confederate  army  would  "  be  able,"  he  continued, 
"  to  consume  provisions  and  forage  now  being  used 
in  supporting  the  enemy.  This  will  be  some  ad- 
vantage, and  prevent  so  great  a  draft  upon  other 

1  Pope  to  Halleck,  18  W.  R.,  601. 

1  16  W.  R.,  642.  »  18  W.  R.,  941. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  259 

parts  of  the  country."  But  Lee,  as  we  shall  soon 
see,  did  not  stay  long  in  this  acquiescent  frame  of 
mind. 

When  General  Pope  retired  to  the  Rappahannock 
River,  he  knew  that  he  must  thenceforth  remain  on 
the  defensive.  All  thought  of  an  aggressive  cam- 
paign was  abandoned.  His  only  object  now  was  to 
comply  with  General  Halleck's  injunction  to  hold 
the  line  of  the  Rappahannock  and  keep  open  his 
communications  with  Fredericksburg.  But  this  was 
no  easy  matter,  in  face  of  an  adversary  who  was  ab- 
solutely free  in  his  movements.  Pope  was  obliged 
to  guard  Kelly's  Ford  and  to  keep  up  a  connection 
with  Burnside  at  Falmouth,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  provide  against  his  enemy  crossing  at  Sulphur 
Springs  and  marching  on  Warrenton,  thus  turning 
his  right,1  a  movement  which  General  Lee  would 
successfully  have  made  had  it  not  been  for  the  sud- 
den rise  in  the  river,  of  which  we  have  just  spoken. 
Such  a  movement  would  beyond  a  doubt  have  ne- 
cessitated a  battle,  in  which  the  chances  would  have 
been  in  favor  of  the  Confederate  commander,  whose 
force,  though  smaller,  was  much  better  organized, 
and  would  doubtless  have  been  more  concentrated. 
Yet  General  Halleck,  for  no  reason  that  we  can  dis- 
cover, except  that  he  was  unwilling  to  give  up  the 
Government  property  at  Falmouth  and  Aquia  Creek, 
or  to  allow  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad  to 
be  broken  up,  insisted  on  Pope's  running  this  wholly 
unnecessary  risk.  On  the  18th  of  August  he  tele- 
graphs to  Pope  to  "  stand  firm  on  the  line  "  of  the 

1  16  W.  R.,  58,  59. 


260  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

Rappahannock,  and  "fight  hard."  On  the  21st  he 
says :  "  Dispute  every  inch  of  ground,  and  fight  like 
the  devil  till  we  can  reinforce  you.  Forty-eight 
hours  more,  and  we  can  make  you  strong  enough. 
Don't  yield  an  inch  if  you  can  help  it." l  The  mili- 
tary capacity  of  Halleck  can  be  estimated  by  these 
orders.  He  insists,  in  spite  of  Pope's  evident  dis- 
satisfaction,2 on  the  army  remaining  for  several  days 
in  this  exposed  position,  liable  to  be  outflanked  and 
attacked  by  the  whole  of  Lee's  army,  in  order  that 
Pope  may  receive  on  the  Rappahannock  River3  the 
reinforcements  which  he  can  just  as  well  meet,  with- 
out incurring  any  risk  at  all,  on  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  railroad,  if  he  is  allowed  to  retire  on 
Manassas.  And  this  Halleck  does  when  a  large  part 
of  the  troops  which  he  is  proposing  to  send  out  to 
Pope  have  not  yet  arrived  from  the  Peninsula.  It 
would  be  hard  indeed  to  match  such  absolutely  in- 
defensible strategy  as  this.  Halleck  had  it  in  his 
power,  by  ordering  all  the  troops  from  the  Peninsula 
to  disembark  at  Alexandria,  and  also  directing  Pope 
to  fall  back  towards  Manassas,  and,  if  necessary, 
across  Bull  Run,  without  hazarding  a  battle,  to  unite 
the  army  of  Pope  with  that  of  McClellan  without 
incurring  the  slightest  risk  or  loss.  But,  instead  of 
this,  we  find  him  insisting,  without  any  sound  mili- 
tary reasons,  that  the  place  of  junction  should  be  on 
the  Rappahannock  River,  thus  exposing  the  army  of 
Pope  to  attack  before  the  army  of  McClellan  had 


1  16  W.  R.,  56,  57. 

*  Ib. ,  58,  59,  65,  66  ;  Pope's  Report,  ib.,  32,  33. 

3  1 8  W.  R.,  645-648,  659. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  261 


joined  it,  and  imperilling  unnecessarily  the  success 
of  the  campaign.1 

After  five  days  spent  in  vainly  endeavoring  to 
turn  Pope's  right  flank  and  thus  bring  on  a  battle 
near  the  Rappahannock,  General  Lee  determined  to 
send  Jackson  with  his  command  and  a  part  of  the 
cavalry  under  Stuart, — some  24,000  men  in  all, — by 
a  circuitous  route,  crossing  the  Bull  Run  mountains 
at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  to  strike  the  railroad  in  Pope's 
rear.  While  this  movement  was  in  progress,  Lee, 
with  the  balance  of  his  army,  consisting  of  about 
25,000  to  30,000  men,  proposed  to  confront  Pope's 
army  on  the  river  until  that  officer  should  abandon 
his  position,  which  it  was  expected  he  would  do  as 
soon  as  the  true  character  of  Jackson's  march  should 
become  known  to  him ;  and  then,  as  soon  as  the 
Federal  army  should  retire,  Lee  intended  to  follow 
Jackson  and  reunite  the  two  fractions  of  his  army. 

The  object  of  this  novel  and  perilous  operation, 
which  for  a  time  not  only  separated  Jackson's  corps 
of  24,000  men  from  the  rest  of  the  Confederate 
forces,  but  also  exposed  it,  while  separated,  to  being 
overwhelmed  by  the  whole  Federal  army,  remains 
to  be  stated.  Pope's  army,  which,  on  August  15th, 
consisted  of  about  45,000  men  (exclusive  of  cavalry) 
had  recently  been  increased  by  the  arrival  of  Rey- 
nolds's  (formerly  McCall's)  division  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Reserves2  and  of  the  corps  of  Heintzelman  and 
Porter  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  so  that,  after 


1  In  fact,  Halleck  actually  expected  that  Pope  would  fight  a  battle  on  the 
23d  of  August.     18  W.  R.,  633,  634. 

s  This  division  was  about  8000  strong  ;  18  W.  R.,  600,  611,  615. 


262          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

making  allowance  for  the  casualties  which  must  have 
attended  the  skirmishing  on  the  Rappahannock  and 
for  other  losses,  it  numbered  upwards  of  70,000  men.1 
The  disparity  between  this  force  and  that  of  Jack- 
son is  so  enormous,  that  it  is  impossible  not  to  be 
amazed  at  the  audacity  of  the  Confederate  general 
in  thus  risking  an  encounter  in  which  the  veiy  ex- 
istence of  Jackson's  command  would  be  imperilled, 
and  to  ask  what  was  the  object  which  General  Lee 
considered  as  warranting  such  an  extremely  danger- 
ous manoeuvre.  The  answer  is  not  an  easy  one. 
Lee  himself  has  said  nothing  in  justification  of  his 
course.  We  are,  however,  told,  that  for  Lee  to  "  send 
a  part  of  his  army  entirely  around  Pope  and  plant 
it  on  the  railroad  by  which  McClellan's  troops  were 
approaching  "  "  would  be  sure  to  spread  confusion 
and  dismay,"  "  would  disconcert  and  paralyze  Pope's 
reinforcements,  which  were  coming  forward  with  no 
expectation  of  having  to  force  open  a  road  by  which 
to  join  him,"  "  would  compel  Pope  to  let  go  the 
line  of  the  E-appahannock  and  devote  himself  to  pro- 
tecting his  supplies  and  reopening  his  communica- 
tions " ;  that  "  he  might  be  forced  to  fight  at  a 
disadvantage  in  doing  this  " ;  that  "  so  unexpected 
a  movement  would  afford  opportunities  of  striking 
Pope  a  damaging  blow  before  his  army  could  be  ren- 
dered too  formidable  for  attack  by  the  arrival  of  all 
the  troops  that  were  en  route  to  join  it."  And  this 
is  assuredly  all  that  can  be  advanced  in  explanation 
of  General  Lee's  course.  But  it  is  plain  from  what 

1  Ante,  253  ;  Allan,  212,  n. 

*  Allan,  200.     Cf.  2  Henderson,  153,  163,  187. 


i862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  263 

has  been  said  above,  that  to  oblige  Pope  to  abandon 
the  line  of  the  Rappahannock  and  retire  nearer  his 
base  was  simply  to  oblige  him  to  make  a  move  in 
the  right  direction 1 ;  and  it  will  be  conceded,  we 
suppose,  that  the  destruction  of  supplies  intended 
for  his  army  could  not  be  an  important  matter  in 
itself,  and  would  only  have  the  effect  of  accelerating 
such  a  move.2  There  remains  the  suggestion  that 
the  effect  of  Jackson's  blow  at  Pope's  communica- 
tions would  be  to  expose  Pope's  army  to  being  at- 
tacked at  a  disadvantage,  and  also  to  disconcert  and 
check  attempts  to  forward  to  him  the  remaining 
troops  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  We  shall  con- 
sider these  points  in  due  time,  only  remarking  here 
that  this  move  of  General  Lee's  in  dividing  his  army 
was  an  illustration  of  the  daring,  not  to  say  hazard- 
ous, policy  which  he  pursued  in  this  summer  of  1862. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th  Jackson  started  from 
Jefferson,  and,  marching  at  first  somewhat  to  the 
northwest  to  Amissville,  and  then  nearly  north, 
reached  Salem  at  night.  The  next  day  (the  26th) 
he  pursued  his  march  through  Thoroughfare  Gap 
and  Gainesville  to  Bristoe  Station  on  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  railroad,  which  place  he  reached 
about  sunset.  A  force  of  infantry  under  General 
Trimble,  accompanied  by  Stuart  with  a  part  of  his 
cavalry,  attacked  and  carried  that  evening  the  United 
States  post  at  Manassas  Junction,  capturing  a  large 
quantity  of  commissary  and  quartermaster's  stores, 
besides  several  hundred  prisoners.3 

The  task  which  Lee  and  Jackson  had  undertaken 

1  Allan,  231.  *  /<*.,  231.  3  16  W.  R.,  643. 


264          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

had  been  accomplished  easily  enough.  Jackson  had 
encountered  no  enemy  in  his  march  ;  the  railroad 
had  been  seized  without  opposition  ;  the  resistance 
at  the  Junction  had  been  quickly  overcome,  and  a 
large  amount  of  supplies  had  been  captured.  Jack- 
son had  now  to  consider  what  he  would  do  next,  for 
there  was  nothing  to  prevent  Pope  from  falling  back 
towards  Manassas  and  re-establishing  his  communica- 
tions, and  in  that  case  Jackson  would  very  probably 
have  to  fight  against  heavy  odds. 

The  first  part  only  of  Jackson's  march  had  been 
observed  by  Pope  and  his  officers,  and  their  observa- 
tions led  them  to  a  completely  erroneous  conclusion. 
On  the  morning  of  the  25th  they  saw  Jackson's 
column  proceeding  in  a  northerly  direction,1  and 
Pope  thought  it  must  be  bound  for  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  by  way  of  Front  Royal.2  In  this  opinion  he 
was  sustained  by  Banks.3  No  efficient  attempt  was 
made  to  follow  Jackson's  command  and  ascertain  the 
truth,  and  no  one  seems  to  have  suspected  that  Jack- 
son's object  was  to  break  up  the  railroad  in  Pope's 
rear  and  destroy  the  depot  of  supplies  at  Manassas. 
Pope,  in  fact,  believed  that  the  rest  of  Lee's  army 
would  soon  follow  Jackson  "  to  the  west  and  north- 
west." 4  Nor  was  this  an  unreasonable  supposition, 
considering  that  Jackson  could  not  move  on  Manas- 
sas without  putting  it  in  the  power  of  Pope  to  inter- 
pose between  him  and  Lee's  main  body.  Pope  no 
doubt  thought  that  it  was  improbable  that  Lee  and 
Jackson  would  run  such  a  risk  as  this  for  any  object 

1  18  W.  R.,  654,  655.  *  16  W.  R.,  67. 

*  /£.,  653,  665.  473.,67. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  265 

then  attainable.  Still,  the  omission  to  send  a  force 
of  cavalry  to  ascertain  the  facts  cannot  be  justified. 
We  may  in  truth  go  further  than  this.  Pope  knew 
that  there  was  a  possibility  that  his  line  of  commu- 
nications might  be  broken.  Stuart,  on  the  22d  and 
2 3d,  had  attempted,  though  unsuccessfully,  to  destroy 
the  bridge  over  Cedar  Run  at  Catlett's  Station  1 ; 
and  the  attempt  might  be  made  again  with  a  larger 
force.  It  was  true  that  Pope  had  reason  to  suppose 
that  large  bodies  of  troops  were  on  their  way  to  join 
him.2  But  he  had  no  definite  information  as  to  their 
whereabouts;  their  commanders  had  not  reported 
to  him.  He  was  necessarily  confined  to  expectations, 
which  perhaps  he  had  a  right  to  consider  well-founded 
expectations  ;  but  when  it  is  possible  that  the  com- 
munications of  an  army  of  70,000  men,  operating  in 
a  country  from  which  they  cannot  obtain  supplies, 
may  be  broken,  expectations  are  not  sufficient, — the 
commanding  general  ought  not  to  rely  on  anything 
short  of  definite  information.  Pope  should  have 
fallen  back  beyond  Thoroughfare  Gap  as  soon  as  he 
saw  Jackson  with  his  large  command  moving  towards 
the  road  which,  passing  through  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
leads  to  Bristoe  and  Manassas.  And,  as  we  have 
repeatedly  pointed  out,  there  was  no  good  reason 
for  his  exposing  his  army  to  any  misfortune  what- 
ever. The  blame  for  this  course  must,  however,  be 
laid  primarily  upon  Halleck's  shoulders. 

The  news  of  Jackson's  raid  on  the  railroad  was 
brought  to  General  Pope's  attention  early  in  the 
evening  of  the  26th.  At  first,  Pope  thought  it  must 

1  16  W.  R.,  730,  731.  2  /£.,  63. 


266  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

be  the  work  of  a  small  force,  but  on  further  inform- 
ation arriving,  he  perceived  the  gravity  of  the  sit- 
uation, and  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  issued  orders 
for  the  abandonment  of  the  line  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock.1  McDowell,  with  his  own  corps  and  that  of 
Sigel,  and  the  division  of  Reynolds,  was  ordered  to 
Gainesville.  Heintzelman,  with  Kearny's  division 
of  his  corps  and  the  two  divisions  under  Reno,  was 
ordered  to  Greenwich,  in  support  of  the  force  under 
McDowell.  Porter  was  directed  to  push  forward, 
i.  €.,  eastward,  from  Warrenton  Junction,  as  soon  as 
he  should  be  relieved  by  Banks,  to  whom  was  en- 
trusted the  charge  of  all  the  trains  of  the  army. 
Hooker's  division  was  ordered  from  Warrenton 
Junction  directly  towards  Manassas,  to  drive  away 
the  enemy,  and  to  reopen  the  communications  with 
Alexandria.  All  these  movements  were  suited  to 
the  exigency,  and  General  Pope  acted  with  com- 
mendable promptness. 

McDowell  and  Heintzelman  reached  their  respec- 
tive destinations  without  opposition,  but  Hooker, 
between  two  and  three  in  the  afternoon,  found 
Ewell  with  his  division  of  Jackson's  corps  holding 
the  line  of  Broad  Run  near  Bristoe  Station,  about 
nine  miles  west  of  Manassas  Junction,  covering  the 
rest  of  Jackson's  troops,  who  were  at  the  Junction, 
occupied  in  appropriating  as  much  as  they  could  of 
the  stores  which  had  been  captured  the  previous 
evening,  and  destroying  the  remainder.  Hooker  at 
once  attacked ;  and  Ewell,  who  was  under  orders  to 
retire  if  hard  pressed,  withdrew  his  forces  at  dusk 

1  i6W.  R.,  34,  70. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  267 

across  the  stream,  after  a  smart  action,  in  which  the 
advantage  would  seem  to  have  been  with  the  Federal 
troops.  Hooker  certainly  produced  the  impression 
on  his  opponents  that  he  outnumbered  them,1  which 
was  not  the  case.2 

Naturally  enough,  General  Pope  was  elated,  not 
merely  by  the  result  of  this  encounter,  but  by  the 
discovery  (as  he  supposed)  of  the  whereabouts  of 
Jackson's  command,  which  he  took  to  be  Manassas 
Junction.  That  afternoon  he  ordered  Porter  to 
march  at  one  in  the  morning  from  Warrenton  Junc- 
tion to  Bristoe  Station,3  and,  during  the  evening,  he 
sent  a  similar  order  to  Kearny,4  directing  him  to 
march  "  at  the  very  earliest  blush  of  dawn  " ;  thus 
concentrating  the  3d  and  5th  corps  at  Bristoe. 
Keno,  with  his  own  and  Stevens's  divisions,  was 
directed  to  march  from  Greenwich  direct  to 
Manassas.5  McDowell,  whose  corps  and  that  of 
Sigel  and  also  Reynolds's  division  were  supposed  to 
be  at  Gainesville,6  was  ordered  to  march  from  that 
place  at  daylight  to  Manassas  Junction,  resting  his 
right  on  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad,  and  "  throwing  " 
his  "  left  well  to  the  east," 7  that  is,  so  that  his  front 
line  should  be  at  right  angles  to  the  railroad.  Mc- 
Dowell's command  would  in  this  way  sweep  the 
country  to  the  eastward  of  the  railroad,  and  Pope 
undoubtedly  expected  that  some  part  of  his  troops 
would  come  in  contact  with  some  part  of  Jackson's, 
if  the  latter  retreated  in  a  northerly  direction.  If, 

1  16  W.  R.,  644,  709. 

*  Allan,  219,  n.  6.  8  18  W.  R.,  704. 

3  16  W.  R.,  71.  «i6W.  R.,  70. 

*Ib.,i2.  'I 6.,  72. 


268          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

however,  Jackson  remained  at  Manassas,  as  Pope 
thought  more  probable,  these  orders  would  bring 
almost  the  whole  Federal  army  upon  him  in  the 
course  of  the  forenoon  of  the  next  day. 

General  Pope,  however,  took  no  account  of  the 
probability  that  Lee,  with  Longstreet's  corps  and 
the  rest  of  his  army,  would  immediately  follow 
Jackson's  inarch  and  endeavor  to  unite  with  him  as 
soon  as  possible ;  but  McDowell,  recognizing  the 
importance  of  delaying  the  junction  of  the  two 
bodies  of  the  Confederate  army,  took  the  responsi- 
bility of  detaching  the  division  of  Ricketts  to 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  there  to  take  position.1  This 
action  was  not,  however,  approved  by  General 
Pope.2 

It  may  also  be  questioned  whether  it  would  not 
have  been  more  prudent  if  General  Pope  had  deferred 
sending  orders  to  McDowell  to  march  from  Gaines- 
ville on  Manassas  Junction  until  he  had  ascertained 
whether  Jackson  still  remained  there.  A  few  scouts 
sent  from  Pope's  headquarters  at  Bristoe  Station  to 
the  Junction  could  have  returned  by  five  or  six 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  would  have  brought 
back  the  information  that  Jackson  was  no  longer 
there. 

For  that  able  officer  had  no  idea  of  "planting 
himself  on  the  railroad " 3  on  which  McClellan's 
troops  might  be  expected  to  arrive,  and  thereby 
exposing  himself  to  be  attacked  at  once  in  front  and 
rear.  He  had  clearly  seen  the  probability  of  Pope's 
army  collecting  at  Manassas,  and  he  had  no  intention 

1  16  W.  R.,  336.  *  73.,  37,  38.  3  Ante,  262. 


1862]          LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  269 

of  fighting  that  army  unsupported  by  the  rest  of  the 
Confederate  forces.  During  the  night  of  the  27th 
one  of  his  divisions,  Taliaferro's,  moved  north  by 
way  of  the  Sudley  Springs  road,  and,  crossing  the 
Warrenton  turnpike,  encamped  on  the  morning  of 
the  28th  near  the  old  battle-field  of  Bull  Run.1 
Ewell's  division  left  the  Junction  at  dawn,  crossed 
the  stream  at  Blackburn's  Ford,  and,  on  reaching  the 
Warrenton  turnpike,  turned  to  the  left,  crossed  Bull 
Run  again  at  the  Stone  Bridge,  and  joined  Talia- 
ferro's command.2  Hill  also,  at  1  A.M.,  crossed  Bull 
Run  and  proceeded  to  Centreville,3  from  which  place 
he  the  next  morning  marched  west  on  the  turnpike 
until  he  had  joined  the  other  divisions.4  Jackson 
thus  succeeded  on  the  27th  in  destroying  the  Federal 
depdt  at  Manassas,  without  interruption  other  than 
that  made  by  an  attempt  at  the  recapture  of  the 
place  by  a  brigade  of  the  6th  corps  (Franklin's), 
under  General  Taylor,  assisted  by  two  regiments  of 
Cox's  Kanawha  division  under  Colonel  Scammon, 
which  was  repelled  without  difficulty,5  and  also  in 
concentrating  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  all  his 
divisions  on  the  north  side  of  the  Warrenton  turn- 
pike, where  they  could  hope  to  welcome  General 
Lee  at  the  head  of  the  rest  of  the  army,  so  soon  as  he 
should  emerge  from  Thoroughfare  Gap.  No  one 
could  have  displayed  sounder  judgment  or  acted 
with  greater  promptness. 

•16  W.  R.,  656. 
*/£.,7io. 

3  This  route  was  probably  selected  mainly  to  avoid  Hill's  march  interfer- 
ing with  those  of  the  other  divisions. 

4  16  W.  R.,  670.  s  /£.,  405-410,  537,  539-543,  643,  644. 


270          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

Yet,  although  up  to  this  point  Jackson  had  eluded 
his  foes,  an  incident  happened  that  morning  which,  if 
properly  improved  by  them,  would  probably  have 
secured  his  defeat.  One  of  his  brigadiers,  General 
Bradley  T.  Johnson,  on  seeing  McDowell's  column 
marching  down  towards  Manassas,  opened  fire  upon  it.1 
The  fire  was  promptly  returned,  and  Johnson's  troops 
were  withdrawn.  McDowell,  who  supposed  it  was 
a  reconnoitring  party,  made  the  mistake  of  not  stop- 
ping to  ascertain  the  truth.2  Had  he  done  so,  he 
would  at  once  have  attacked  Jackson  with  the  force 
under  his  command,  and  have  sent  word  to  Pope  to 
come  to  his  assistance  with  the  3d  and  5th  corps 
and  the  two  divisions  under  Reno.  It  is  hardly 
possible  that  Jackson  could  have  maintained  himself 
against  such  superior  forces.  But  the  significance 
of  Johnson's  skirmish  was  not  recognized  at  the  mo- 
ment, and  the  opportunity  of  engaging  Jackson  on 
the  28th  with  nearly 3  his  whole  army  slipped  away, 
unnoticed,  from  General  Pope. 

It  is  plain  that  on  this  day  it  was  not  the  Federal 
but  the  Confederate  forces  who  were  exposed  "  to 
fight  at  a  disadvantage,"4  and  that  it  was  Jackson 
and  not  Pope  who  was  in  great  peril.  It  may  also 
be  said  that  Jackson  himself  showed  an  astonishing 
lack  of  caution  in  disclosing  his  position  twenty-four 
hours  before  he  could  hope  to  be  joined  by  Lee  and 
Longstreet.  One  would  have  supposed  that  his  rdle 

1  1 6  W.  R.,  336,  664. 

*  Sigel  claims  (ib. ,  265)  that  he  correctly  apprehended  the  situation.    See 
McDowell's  statement,  15  W.  R.,  314  ;  also  Meade's  opinion,  ib.,  199. 

3  Ricketts  was  at  Thoroughfare  Gap,  and  Banks  was  with  the  trains. 

4  Ante,  262. 


i862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  271 

on  this  day  would  be  to  escape  observation  entirely, 
— to  lie,  as  it  were,  perdu.1 

General  Pope  did  not  move  from  his  bivouac  this 
morning  of  the  28th  "  at  the  earliest  blush  of  dawn  " 
or  "at  daylight,"  but  procrastinated  his  own  move- 
ments so  long  that  it  was  about  noon 2  when  he 
reached  Manassas  with  the  3d  corps  and  the  two 
divisions  under  Reno.  He  found  the  place  utterly 
deserted,  and  could  find  out  nothing  as  to  the  ene- 
my's movements.  At  first,  he  thought  that  Jackson 
must  have  retreated  in  a  northerly  direction,  and  he 
considered  the  desirability  of  sending  McDowell  to 
Gutn  Spring,  a  place  some  fifteen  miles  off,  to  inter- 
cept him.3  But,  later  in  the  day,  reports  that  Hill 
had  been  at  Centreville,  and  that  Confederate  cavalry 
had  been  raiding  between  Bull  Run  and  Alexandria, 
came  to  his  ears,  and,  at  4.15  P.M.,  he  ordered  all  his 
troops  to  Centreville.4  Sigel,  who  was  not  far  from 
Manassas,5  and  Reynolds,  moved  north  towards  the 
Warrenton  turnpike,  but  did  not  cross  Bull  Run ; 
portions  of  the  3d  corps  6  and  Reno's  division,7  how- 
ever, marched  to  Centreville  at  once,  and  encamped 
there  for  the  night.  Pope  himself  bivouacked  near 
Bull  Run,  at  or  near  Manassas  Junction.8 

It  was  reserved  for  King's  division  of  McDowell's 
corps9  to  ascertain  the  position  of  Jackson's  com- 

1  16  W.  R.,  644.  3  /£.,  74. 

8  /£.,  37.  *  16.,  360,  361. 

*  He  had,  by  mistake,  marched  on  the  south  side  of  the  Manassas  Gap 
railroad.     16  W.  R.,  265,  336  ;  see  15  W.  R.,  145,  147,  180. 

*  16  W.  R.,  430,  433,  434. 

1 1b.,  14  ;  but  not  Stevens's  division,  545.  8  18  W.  R.,  720. 

'  Ricketts's  division,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  at  Thoroughfare  Gap ; 
ante,  268. 


272          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

mand.  This  division,  as  soon  as  it  was  known  that 
Manassas  had  been  evacuated,  had  fallen  back  to  the 
Warrenton  turnpike ;  and,  on  receiving  Pope's  last 
order,  McDowell  directed  King  to  march  eastward 
on  the  turnpike  to  Centreville.  Leaving  him  to 
conduct  this  movement,  McDowell  rode  off  to  see 
Pope  and  have  a  conference  with  him.1  King  pur- 
sued his  march, — Hatch's  brigade  in  advance,  then 
Gibbon's,  then  Doubleday's,  and  then  Patrick's,2 — 
when,  about  5.30  P.M.,3  a  heavy  artillery  fire  was 
opened  from  the  north  upon  Gibbon's  and  Double- 
day's  brigades.  These  troops  halted,  and  were  im- 
mediately attacked  by  the  divisions  of  Ewell  and 
Taliaferro  of  Jackson's  corps  under  Jackson's  direc- 
tion.4 The  action  was  kept  up  for  an  hour  and  a 
half,  until  it  was  dark,  with  great  obstinacy,  and 
the  losses  were  very  severe  on  both  sides.  No  ad- 
vantage was  gained  by  either  party.5  Gibbon  lost 
over  a  third  of  his  brigade*  ;  Doubleday  nearly 
one  half  of  those  of  his  troops  who  were  en- 
gaged.7 Generals  Ewell  and  Taliaferro  were  both 
severely  wounded,  and  the  Confederate  loss  was 
very  heavy.  Neither  Hatch's  nor  Patrick's  brigade 
took  any  part  in  this  battle  ;  the  attack  of  the  Con- 
federates was  a  complete  surprise  to  the  Federal 
generals,  and,  owing  to  the  length  of  the  column,  or 


'i6W.  R.,337.  5/Z.,  381.  8  Ib.,  369. 

4  Ib.,  645.  For  Jackson's  motives  in  making  this  attack,  see  Allan,  231, 
232  ;  2  Henderson,  179,  235. 

6  Jackson,  in  his  Report  (16  W.  R.,  645),  dwells  on  the  fact  that  the 
Federal  troops  moved  off  in  the  night ;  but  this  was  merely  for  purposes  of 
concentration,  as  we  shall  soon  see. 

«i6W.  R.,378.  »  ^.,369. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  DEFENSIVE.  273 

the  advanced  hour  of  the  day,  or  to  other  causes, 
the  whole  Federal  strength  was  not  brought  out. 

The  news  of  this  action  was  at  once  sent  to  Gen- 
eral Pope,  and  though  he  did  not  correctly  divine 
the  attitude  of  the  Confederate  general,  he  felt  con- 
fident that  he  could,  by  a  prompt  concentration, 
surround  and  overwhelm  him.  In  his  view,  Jackson 
was  in  the  act  of  retreating  to  Thoroughfare  Gap 
when  he  encountered  King's  troops ;  in  this  conjec- 
ture he  was  mistaken ;  but,  inasmuch  as  King's 
division  was  actually  confronting  Jackson  on  the 
west,  it  seemed  to  be  possible,  by  promptly  uniting 
the  scattered  divisions,  to  hope  for  a  decisive  victory 
over  him.  He  therefore  at  once  issued  orders1  for 
the  assembling  of  his  troops  on  the  Warrenton  turn- 
pike ;  and  each  order  stated  that  McDowell  had 
intercepted  the  retreat  of  Jackson.2 

We  must  now  go  back  to  General  Lee.  That  of- 
ficer, calculating  that  the  news  of  Jackson's  irruption 
on  the  Federal  communications  would  compel  Pope 
to  retire  from  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock,  marched 
off  with  all  of  Longstreet's  corps  except  one  divi- 
sion, on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  by  the  same  route 
as  that  pursued  by  Jackson.  On  the  27th  the 


I  Although  Pope  passed  the  night  of  the  28th  at  Manassas  Junction  (18 
W.  R.,  720),  he  does  not  appear  to  have  known  that  Hooker  bivouacked  on 
the  south  side  of  Bull  Run   (16  W.  R.,  412)  and  could  easily  and  quickly 
have  joined  Sigel  by  marching  up*  the  Sudley  Springs  road  ;  Pope's  order  to 
Heintzelman  implied  that  Hooker  was  to  go  first  to  Centreville,  and  thence 
by  the  Warrenton  turnpike  to  the  field  of  battle  (ii>.,  75),  and  this  wholly 
unnecessary  dttour  was  actually  made  (ib.,  438,  444).     Porter,  also,  who 
was  still  at  Bristoe  Station,  instead  of  being  ordered  to  march  by  the  same 
Sudley  Springs  road,  was  ordered  to  proceed  first  to  Centreville  (ib.t  75). 

II  16  W.  R.,  74,  75. 


274          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

column,  although  delayed  an  hour  or  more  by  a 
dash  of  Buford's  (Federal)  cavalry  into  Salem, 
reached  White  Plains  at  night ;  and  at  three  o'clock  on 
the  next  day  the  head  of  the  column  reached  Thor- 
oughfare Gap.1  Here,  or  rather  at  the  eastern  end  of 
the  Gap,2  resistance  was  encountered  from  Kicketts's 
division,  which  McDowell  had  wisely  sent  to  the 
Gap  to  postpone  as  long  as  possible  the  union  of  the 
two  portions  of  the  Confederate  army.  But  Lee,  by 
sending  a  force  through  Hopewell  Gap,  a  few  miles 
to  the  north  of  Thoroughfare  Gap,  rendered  Rick- 
etts's  position  untenable ;  and  at  nightfall  he  retired 
to  Gainesville. 

A  short  march  would  now  have  united  Ricketts's 
division  with  that  of  King.  Connecting  with  King 
on  the  right  was  the  division  of  Reynolds ;  on  his 
right  was  the  corps  of  Sigel.  These  forces  were 
surely  enough  to  hold  their  own  until  Pope  could 
reinforce  them  by  the  3d  corps  and  Reno's  divisions 
from  Centreville  and  the  5th  corps  from  Bristoe. 
When  morning  should  dawn,  proper  positions  could 
be  selected,  and  the  attack  on  Jackson  could  be 
begun.  Nothing  surely  could  be  gained,  and  much 
might  be  lost,  by  any  of  the  troops  then  on  the 
ground  leaving  their  posts. 

Nevertheless,  King,  in  spite  of  the  advice  of  that 
excellent  soldier,  General  Reynolds,  who  did  not 
leave  him  until  after  9  P.M.,  and  who  promised  him 
assistance  in  the  early  morning,3  decided,  after  con- 
sulting his  brigadiers,  to  retreat  to  Manassas  at  1  A.M. 

1  16  W.  R.,  564. 

*  /£.,  384.  s  Ib.,  393  ;  15  W.  R.,  208,  213,  214. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  275 

of  the  29th,  and  sent  word  to  Ricketts  to  that 
effect.1  This  naturally  induced  Ricketts  to  adopt  a 
similar  course,  and  he,  that  night,  retired  from  Gaines- 
ville to  Bristoe.  It  was  a  most  unfortunate  thing 
for  his  corps  that  McDowell's  should  have  been  absent 
from  it  at  this  moment ;  but  he  spent  the  evening 
in  trying  to  find  Pope,  and,  to  his  great  regret,  was 
unable  to  rejoin  his  command  until  the  next  day.2 

The  morning  of  the  29th,3  therefore,  found  the 
Union  army  very  badly  dislocated,  so  to  speak ;  its 
parts  were  widely  separated  from  each  other.  Sigel's 
corps  and  Reynolds's  division  were  the  only  troops 
in  close  proximity  to  Jackson  ;  they  were  at  or  near 
Groveton.  Banks's  corps,  Porter's  corps,  and  Rick- 
etts's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  were  at  Bristoe 
Station  ;  King's  division  of  McDowell's  corps  was  at 
Manassas  Junction,  as  was  also  Hooker's  division  of 
Heintzelman's  corps ;  the  other  division  of  Heintzel- 
man's  corps  (Kearny's)  and  Reno's  two  divisions 
were  at  or  near  Centreville.  It  was  hardly  possible 
to  concentrate  all  these  bodies  for  a  battle  on  this 
day  of  the  29th.  On  the  other  hand  there  was  ab- 
solutely nothing  to  hinder  Longstreet  marching 
through  Gainesville  and  uniting  with  Jackson.  It 
must  be  also  remembered  that  the  Federal  troops 
were  much  exhausted  by  the  long  and  often  useless 


1  16  W.  R.,  384.  Pope  heard  of  King's  retreat  to  Manassas  at  daylight ; 
»£.,  38. 

'-^•t  337-  For  his  opinion  of  the  course  taken  by  King  and  Rick- 
etts, see  Stine,  137,  138,  where  he  is  quoted  as  severely  condemning  it. 
But  see  Gibbon's  statement,  16  W.  R.,  380.  For  thus  leaving  his  corps, 
McDowell  was  censured  by  a  Court  of  Inquiry  ;  15  W.  R.,  330,  331. 

*  See  Map  VIII.,  facing  page  300. 


276          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

marches  which  they  had  been  making,  and  that  the 
capture  of  the  stores  at  Manassas,  and  the  fact  that 
the  trains  under  the  charge  of  General  Banks  were 
so  far  in  the  rear,  caused  a  great  deficiency  in  food 
and  forage.  It  was  certainly  a  fair  question,  whether 
it  would  not  have  been  wise  to  order  the  whole  army 
to  retire  behind  Bull  Run,  for  rest  and  refreshment. 
No  losses  either  of  men  or  material,  of  any  account, 
had  been  thus  far  suffered  ;  it  only  needed  a  day  or 
two  to  put  everything  on  a  perfectly  satisfactory 
footing;  and  in  or  near  Washington  were  the  2d 
and  6th  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under 
Sumner  and  Franklin,  ready  to  be  added  to  the 
Army  of  Virginia. 

At  the  same  time,  notwithstanding  all  these  facts, 
it  was  probably  possible  to  inflict  a  severe  blow  on 
the  corps  of  Jackson  before  it  could  be  joined  by 
that  of  Longstreet  * ;  but  to  effect  this,  it  was  neces- 
sary that  General  Pope  should  have  a  clear  idea  in 
his  mind  of  what  he  proposed  to  do,  and  that  no 
time  should  be  lost  by  mistakes  or  delays,  or  by 
changes  of  purpose  on  his  part. 

Although  all  Pope's  orders  contained  his  custom- 
ary injunction  to  start  "at  dawn  of  day," 8  either  the 
fatigue  of  the  troops,  or  the  time  occupied  in  making 
the  long  detours  prescribed  in  the  orders,  caused  so 
much  delay  that  most  of  the  precious  hours  of  the 
morning  were  lost.  The  troops  from  Centreville, — 
those  of  Kearny,  Hooker,  and  Reno, — had  not  all 
arrived  on  the  field  by  twelve  o'clock.3  It  took 

1  Cf.  2  Henderson,  187,  188. 

»i6W.  R.,  75.  »/£.,  412. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  277 

Pope  until  noon,  therefore,  to  concentrate  the  right 
wing  of  his  army. 

The  orders  to  the  officers  commanding  the  detach- 
ments of  the  left  wing  were  anything  but  clear  and 
precise,  with  the  exception  of  the  instructions  sent 
to  Banks,  who  was  directed  to  send  his  trains  to 
Manassas  Junction  and  Centreville.1  Porter,  who 
was  at  first  ordered  to  Centreville,2  was  subsequently 
told  to  take  with  him  King's  division  of  McDowell's 
corps,  and  to  proceed  promptly  in  the  opposite  di- 
rection, towards  Gainesville,  with  the  intention,  per- 
haps, of  preventing  Jackson's  retreat  through  that 
town,  or  of  attacking  him  there.3  Porter  had  passed 
the  Junction  on  his  way  to  Centreville  when  he  re- 
ceived this  second  order.  His  column  at  once  faced 
about,  and  proceeded  towards  Gainesville  through 
the  Junction,  where,  towards  11  A.M.,  he  was  joined 
by  McDowell.  But,  about  noon,  Porter  received  a 
third  order,  addressed  to  McDowell  as  well  as  to 
himself,  known  in  the  controversy  which  subsequently 
sprang  up  as  to  Porter's  conduct,  as  the  "  Joint 
Order.  "  4 

In  this  paper  McDowell  and  Porter  are  informed 
that  Heintzelman,  Sigel,  and  Reno  "  are  moving  on 
the  Warrenton  turnpike,  and  must  now  be  not  far 
from  Gainesville,"  and  they  themselves  are  told  to 
move  forward  also  with  their  joint  commands  to- 
wards Gainesville.  "I  desire,"  continued  General 
Pope,  "  that  as  soon  as  communication  is  established 
between  "  the  forces  of  Heintzelman,  Sigel,  and  Reno 

1  16  W.  R.,  76.  3  Ib.,  518. 

*Jt>-,  75,  5i8.  4  It,,  76,  520. 


278  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

"  and  your  own,  the  whole  command  shall  halt.  It 
may  be  necessary  to  fall  back  behind  Bull  Run,  at 
Centreville,  to-night.  I  presume  it  will  be  so,  on 
account  of  our  supplies."  These  sentences  indicate 
that  Pope,  who  wrote  from  Centreville,  and  had  not 
taken  the  trouble  to  go  to  the  front  and  ascertain 
the  facts  from  Sigel  and  Reynolds,  still  supposed  that 
Jackson,  now  that  King  had  moved  away  from  him, 
was  retreating  to  Gainesville  and  the  Gap.  It  is  also 
tolerably  clear  from  his  language  that  Pope  does  not 
think  that  there  will  be  a  battle,  but  that  he  wishes 
the  two  wings  of  his  army  to  advance  towards 
Gainesville  until  they  have  established  communi- 
cation with  each  other.1  Pope  furthermore  says : 
"  If  any  considerable  advantages  are  to  be  gained 
by  departing  from  this  order,  it  will  not  be  strictly 
carried  out."  Then  he  recurs  to  the  caution  given 
in  the  first  part  of  the  order :  "  One  thing,"  he 
says,  "must  be  had  in  view,  that  the  troops  must 
occupy  a  position  from  which  they  can  reach  Bull 
Run  to-night  or  by  morning."'  These  expressions 
show  that  at  this  time  he  expected  to  fall  back  to 
Centreville  at  the  close  of  the  day.  And  it  is  at  Cen- 
treville, evidently,  where  he  expects  to  combat  Lee's 
reunited  army,  for  he  adds  :  "The  indications  are 
that  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy," — i.  e.,  Lee's  main 
army, — "  is  moving  in  this  direction  at  a  pace  that 
will  bring  them  here  [Centreville]  by  to-morrow 
night  or  the  next  day."  He  closes  by  saying  that  his 

1  18  W.  R.,  958. 

1  See  a  similar  order  from  Pope  to  Heintzelman,  Reno,  and  Sigel :  "  The 
command  must  return  to  this  place  [Centreville]  to-night  or  by  morning,  on 
account  of  subsistence  and  forage."  18  W.  R.,  958. 


i862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  279 

own  headquarters  will  be  for  the  present  with  Heint- 
zelman's  corps  or  at  Centre ville.  That  the  com- 
manding general  might  be  as  far  distant  from  the 
scene  of  any  possible  collision  with  Jackson's  forces 
as  Centreville,  indicated  plainly  his  opinion  that  no 
battle  was  likely  to  occur  on  that  day  of  the  29th. 

It  is  plain  from  this  order  that  General  Pope  be- 
lieved that  Jackson  had  retreated,  and  that  it  would 
not  do  to  follow  him  even  as  far  as  Gainesville,  for 
the  army  must  be  brought  back  at  night  to  Centre- 
ville to  obtain  needed  supplies.  It  is  also  plain  that 
he  believed  that  if,  contrary  to  his  expectation, 
Jackson  should  be  found  in  position,  the  Union 
troops  would  have  to  deal  only  with  Jackson,  and 
not  with  Jackson  and  the  rest  of  Lee's  army.  This 
is  established  by  his  fixing  "  to-morrow  night  or  the 
next  day  " — i.e.,  the  day  after  to-morrow — as  the  date 
of  Lee's  reaching  Centreville. 

It  did  not  take  the  two  generals  long  to  discover 
that  the  situation  was  wholly  different  from  that 
indicated  by  the  terms  of  the  Joint  Order.  The 
head  of  Porter's  column  in  its  march  towards  Gaines- 
ville reached  a  little  stream  called  Dawkins's  Branch 
about  half-past  eleven  o'clock.  Here  the  enemy 
was  perceived.  This  was  about  three  miles  and  a 
half  from  Gainesville.  Porter  at  once  deployed 
one  brigade  (Butterfield's)  of  his  leading  division 
(Morell's).  McDowell  showed  him  a  despatch 1  which 
he  had  just  received  from  General  Buford,  who 
commanded  the  Union  cavalry  on  the  right,  inform- 
ing him  that  seventeen  regiments,  one  battery,  and 

1  18  W.  R.,  730  ;  see,  also,  729. 


28o  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

500  cavalry  had  passed  through  Gainesville  about 
8.45  A.M.  It  was  evident  from  the  clouds  of  dust  in 
the  direction  of  Gainesville  that  large  bodies  of 
troops  were  still  arriving.  It  was,  in  fact,  Lee's  main 
army  under  Longstreet,  which,  having  left  Thorough- 
fare Gap  early  in  the  morning,  was  now  passing 
through  Gainesville,  and  deploying  on  Jackson's 
right,  in  front  of  the  position  taken  by  Morell's  di- 
vision of  Porter's  corps.1 

After  some  consultation  the  two  generals  decided 
that  it  was  not  possible  to  carry  out  the  directions 
contained  in  the  Joint  Order,  and  that  it  was  desira- 
ble to  avail  themselves  of  the  latitude  given  them 
to  vary  from  it ;  and  as  McDowell's  divisions,  being 
in  rear  of  Porter's,  were  near  the  Sudley  Springs 
road,  which  ran  from  the  Junction  to  Grove  ton,  Mc- 
Dowell determined  to  take  King's  division  with  him 
up  the  road  towards  Pope's  main  army,  leaving 
Ricketts,  who  was  painfully  making  his  way  from 
Bristoe  Station  to  the  Junction,  to  follow- as  fast  as 
his  wearied  men  could  march.  Porter  was  to  remain 
where  he  was.  It  is  likely  that  there  was  an  under- 
standing that  King,  when  he  should  arrive  at  a  suit- 
able place,  should  halt  and  deploy  his  division, 
making  connections  with  Morell  on  his  left  and  with 
Reynolds  or  Sigel  on  his  right ;  but  this  is  not  cer- 
tain.2 King  then  marched  away  towards  the  field 
of  Groveton,  from  which  sounds  of  artillery  firing 
could  now  plainly  be  heard.3  He  was  followed  by 
Ricketts. 

1  16  W.  R.,  519. 

*  Cf.  Ropes,  97,  98  ;  Allan,  255,  256;  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  371-381. 

*  See  the  Report  of  the  Board  of  Officers.  16  W.  R.,  513-535. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  281 

Porter  was  thus  left  isolated, — without  supports  or 
connections.  He  had  only  from  9000  to  10,000  men. 
His  plain  task  was  simply  to  observe  the  enemy  in 
his  front,  and  from  time  to  time  to  make  such  move- 
ments as  would  prevent  the  troops  there — i.  e.,  Long- 
street's  command — from  assisting  their  friends — i.  e., 
Jackson's  troops — who  were  fighting  Pope  north  of 
the  turnpike.  This  task  he  fully  performed.  He 
was  confronted  by  the  division  of  D.  R.  Jones,  of 
Longstreet's  corps,  which  was  supported  during  the 
afternoon  by  that  of  Wilcox  * ;  and  by  thus  occupy- 
ing the  attention  of  these  troops  he  was  doing  all 
that  it  was  possible  for  him  to  do, — small  as  his  force 
was  and  absolutely  without  any  supports.  More- 
over the  terms  of  the  Joint  Order  must  have  con- 
vinced him  that  General  Pope  had  no  intention 
whatever  of  engaging  the  united  commands  of  Lee 
and  Jackson  with  an  army  so  much  in  need  of  sup- 
plies, and  so  far  from  being  in  order  of  battle. 

And  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Porter  was 
not  right  in  the  opinion  which  he  attributed  to  Gen- 
eral Pope.  But  Pope  did  not  know  that  Longstreet 
and  Lee  had  arrived ;  he  still  thought  that  he  was 
opposed  by  Jackson  only.  The  troops  which  Sigel 
and  Reynolds  encountered  in  the  early  morning  be- 
longed to  Jackson's  command,  and  so  did  those  which 
Heintzelman  and  Reno  attacked  in  the  afternoon. 
Pope  knew  of  no  other  Confederate  troops  on  the 
field  than  these.  Hence  Porter's  inaction  was  at- 
tributed by  him  to  unworthy  motives ;  and  when  at 
the  close  of  the  afternoon  a  positive  written  order2 

1  16  W.  R.,  565-  *  /*.,  525. 


282  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

to  Porter  to  attack  the  enemy's, — that  is,  Jackson's, 
— right  flank,  produced  no  corresponding  movement 
on  the  part  of  Porter,  Pope  considered  his  conduct 
incapable  of  explanation.1  He  did  not  know  that  if 
Porter  advanced  at  all,  it  could  only  be  to  attack 
the  troops  of  Longstreet  directly  in  his  front,  who 
were  covering  that  right  flank  of  Jackson's  line 
which  Pope  erroneously  supposed  to  be  "  in  the  air  " 
and  to  lie  exposed  to  Porter's  attack.2  Such,  how- 
ever, was  the  case ;  it  was  plain  to  Porter  that  the 
commanding  general  had  issued  the  order  in  com- 
plete ignorance  of  the  facts.  It  may  be  remarked 
that  the  non-participation  of  Longstreet's  troops  in 
the  battle  which  Pope  was  fighting  on  this  day  of 
the  29th,  was  undoubtedly  due  to  their  being  con- 
fronted, and,  so  to  speak,  "contained,"  by  Porter's 
corps. 

Pope,  therefore,  in  the  absence  of  McDowell,  Por- 
ter, and  Banks,  had  only  the  corps  of  Sigel  and  Heint- 
zelman,  the  two  divisions  of  Reno,  and  the  division 
of  Reynolds  wherewith  to  fight  his  battle  north  of 
the  Warren  ton  turnpike, — say,  35,000  men  at  the 
outside, — and  his  force  was  not  all  on  the  field  until 
about  twelve  o'clock.  It  took,  naturally,  some  time 


1  Pope's  Report,  16  W.  R.,  40. 

*  Pope  made  such  charges  against  Porter  in  his  Report  (16  W.  R.,  40),  that 
the  latter  applied  for  a  Court  Martial,  which  sentenced  him  to  be  cashiered. 
President  Lincoln  approved  the  findings  of  the  Court  on  January  21,  1863. 
But  in  1878,  Porter  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  new  hearing  of  his  case  before 
a  Board  of  Officers,  who  had  access  to  much  testimony,  in  great  part  that  of 
the  Confederate  reports,  not  in  evidence  in  the  Court  Martial,  and  they 
unanimously  and  completely  exonerated  him,  and  he  was  restored  to  the 
army.  16  W.  R.,  505-536.  The  proceedings  of  the  Court  Martial  are 
contained  in  17  W.  R. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  283 

for  the  troops  from  Centreville  to  take  position  and 
to  make  the  necessary  connections  with  the  troops 
of  Sigel  and  Reynolds.  These  last  had  left  their 
bivouacs  early  in  the  morning,  had  crossed  the  War- 
renton  turnpike,  and  had  vigorously  pushed  the 
enemy  to  ascertain  his  exact  position,1  with  a  view 
to  further  active  operations  as  soon  as  the  expected 
reinforcements  should  arrive  from  Centreville  and 
Manassas.  There  was  much  artillery  firing,  but  lit- 
tle or  no  musketry  firing,  during  the  forenoon,  and 
in  faot  it  was  not  till  two  o'clock  P.M.  that  the  action 
became  serious.  Jackson  had  fallen  back  to  the 
westward,  and  had  established  his  men  "  along  and 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  cut  of  an  unfinished  railroad," 2 
which  ran  from  Sudley  Springs  in  a  southwesterly 
direction  towards  Gainesville.  Here,  in  the  after- 
noon, he  was  assailed,  but  in  disconnected  and  ill- 
combined  movements,  by  the  comparatively  fresh 
troops  of  Heintzelman  and  Reno.  Portions  of  the 
divisions  of  Hooker,  Kearny,  Reno,  and  Stevens,  well- 
disciplined  troops  and  most  bravely  led,  again  and 
again  assaulted,  but  in  a  desultory  way,  portions  of 
Jackson's  line.  A  magnificent  charge  led  by  Grover, 
a  brigadier  in  Hooker's  division,  came  near  achieving 
a  great  success.3  It  failed  from  lack  of  proper  sup- 
port. The  fighting  in  the  latter  part  of  the  after- 
noon was  on  the  whole  very  severe,  and  at  times  it 
seemed  as  if  the  issue  was  doubtful.4  The  vulner- 


1  16  W.  R.,  266,  393,  645,  680. 
*  Ib.   645. 

1  Ib.,  413,  438,  441,  680,  68l. 
4  Ib.,  671. 


284  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.      [1862 

able  place  in  Jackson's  line  was  his  extreme  left, 
which  Pope  might  have  turned  early  in  the  after- 
noon, when  Heintzelman  and  Reno  came  up.  But 
he  made  no  attempt  to  do  this.  Jackson's  troops 
were  in  good  positions,  so  far  as  front  attacks  were 
concerned,  and  they  were  troops  of  the  best  quality. 
They  had  every  confidence  in  their  leader,  and  they 
held  their  posts  with  the  greatest  tenacity  and  reso- 
lution.1 At  dusk,  King's  division  of  McDowell's 
corps  arrived,  and,  under  General  Hatch,2  took  part 
in  the  action,  but,  after  a  brief,  but  very  sharp  con- 
test, the  Union  troops  were  forced  to  retire  with  the 
loss  of  a  gun,3  which,  however,  was  left  on  the  ground 
between  the  lines.4  Hatch  was  driven  back  by  a 
part  of  Hood's  division  of  Longstreet's  corps.  The 
Federal  attacks  had  everywhere  been  repulsed,  and 
the  battle  was  over. 

General  Pope  seems  at  last  to  have  become  aware 
that  a  part  at  least 5  of  the  command  of  Longstreet 
had  now  joined  Jackson,  for,  in  his  despatch  to 
Halleck,  dated  at  five  o'clock  A.M.  of  the  30th,  he 
claims  to  have  defeated  the  day  before  "  the  com- 
bined forces  of  the  enemy." 6  At  any  rate,  he  was, 
not  long  after  this,  distinctly  informed  by  Porter, 
who  early  arrived  on  the  field  from  Manassas,  as 
well  as  by  Reynolds  and  Buford,7  that  Longstreet 
had  been  in  position  on  Jackson's  right,  south  of  the 
turnpike,  on  the  day  before,  and  was  at  that  time 
getting  in  readiness  to  turn  the  left  of  the  Union 

1  16  W.  R.,  646.  4  72.  ,565. 

s  General  King  had  been  taken  ill.  s  Cf.  Allan,  269,  n.  3. 

s  16  W.  R.,  623.  «  18  W.  R.,  741. 

1  Letter  to  the  writer  from  General  Porter. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  285 


army.  McLean  1  also,  whose  brigade  was  on  the 
extreme  left  on  the  night  of  the  29th,  reported  to 
Pope  that  he  had  observed  the  enemy  in  force  south 
of  the  turnpike  the  afternoon  before.  Pope's  esti- 
mate of  Lee's  entire  army  was,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, that  it  was  a  force  u  immensely  superior  "  to 
his  own.2  Under  this  belief  it  was  surely  his  true 
policy  to  take  up  a  strong  position  for  defence,  and 
await  supplies  and  reinforcements.  Two  corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  those  of  Sumner  and 
Franklin,  had  not  yet  joined  him.  Only  the  day 
before,  he  had  written  to  McDowell  and  Porter,3 
and  also  to  Heintzelman,  Reno,  and  Sigel, 4  that  the 
army  would  probably  have  to  fall  back  behind  Bull 
Run  to  obtain  supplies.5  In  fact,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  effect  on  the  troops  of  retreating  after  a  bat- 
tle, it  would  probably  have  been  best  to  retire  to 
Centreville.  But  if  this  was  (as  it  seems  to  us  it 
was)  unadvisable,6  it  would  be  beyond  question  a 
direct  departure  from  the  part  which  had  been 
assigned  to  General  Pope  in  this  campaign  in  Virginia 
for  him  to  attack  the  "  combined "  forces  of  the 
enemy  before  he  had  effected  a  junction  with  the  two 
corps  of  Sumner  and  Franklin.  Had  he  achieved 


1  Letter  to  the  writer  from  General  McLean. 

»i6  W.  R.,  47. 

llb.,  76.     Cf.  Pope's  Report,  ib.,  41. 

4i8  W.  R.,  958. 

5  There  were,  however,  plenty  of  supplies  in  the  railroad  cars  near  Bris- 
toe  Station  ;  and  although  the  cars  could  not  have  been  brought  to  Ma- 
nassas  Junction,  owing  to  the  destruction  of  the  bridge  at  Bristoe,  yet  there 
were  plenty  of  wagons  there  which  might  easily  have  been  loaded  with  sup- 
plies and  reached  the  army  during  the  3Oth.  i  Pen.  Recoil.,  N.  Y.,  45. 

'But  see  Allan,  266,  and  Swinton,  187. 


286  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 


on  the  29th  any  success  of  importance, — attained 
any  position  which  gave  him  a  decided  advantage, — 
the  case  would  have  been  different.  But  nothing 
of  the  sort  had  happened.  Although  he  had  every- 
where pressed  the  enemy  hard,  he  had  failed  to  find 
a  weak  place  in  their  lines.  And  it  is  not  unlikely 
that  he  would  have  contented  himself  with  taking 
up  a  strong  position  and  awaiting  the  movements 
of  the  enemy  had  not  a  report  that  the  Confederates 
were  retreating  been  unluckily  brought  to  his  atten- 
tion. 

On  the  morning  of  August  30th  it  was  found  by 
General  Pope's  skirmishers  that  the  Confederates  had 
fallen  back  from  the  advanced  positions  which  they 
had  occupied  at  nightfall  the  day  before  in  follow- 
ing up  the  repulsed  Union  troops  to  the  vicinity  of 
their  lines.1  A  personal  reconnoissance  of  the  ground 
made  by  Generals  McDowell  and  Heintzelman  in- 
clined those  officers  to  think  that  Jackson's  forces 
were  retiring  towards  Gainesville.2  Such  was  also 
General  Pope's  opinion.3  He  issued  at  noon  an  order 
for  the  vigorous  pursuit  of  the  enemy.4  McDowell 
was  "  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  pursuit,"  in 
which  his  own  corps,  the  division  of  Reynolds,  and 
the  corps  of  Porter  were  to  be  employed. 

General  Pope's  account  of  the  matter  in  his  Report 
is,  however,  a  very  different  one.  He  says 5 :  "It  was 
necessary  for  me  to  act  thus  promptly  and  make  an 
attack,  as  I  had  not  the  time,  for  want  of  provisions 

'16  W.  R.,  557,  565  ;  Allan,  265. 

*  Ib.,  340, 413.     This  was  also  the  opinion  of  General  Sigel. 

*/J.,  41  ;  413. 

«/£.,  361  ;  18  W.  R.,  741.  •  Ib.t  42. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  287 

and  forage,  to  await  an  attack  from  the  enemy,  nor 
did  I  think  it  good  policy  to  do  so  under  the  circum- 
stances. During  the  whole  night  of  the  29th  and 
the  morning  of  the  30th  the  advance  of  the  main 
army  under  Lee  was  arriving  on  the  field  to  rein- 
force Jackson,  so  that  by  twelve  or  one  o'clock  in 
the  day  we  were  confronted  by  forces  greatly  superior 
to  our  own,  and  these  forces  were  being  every  mo- 
ment largely  increased  by  fresh  arrivals  of  the  enemy 
from  the  direction  of  Thoroughfare  Gap.  Every 
moment  of  delay  increased  the  odds  against  us,  and 
I  therefore  advanced  to  the  attack  as  rapidly  as  I 
was  able  to  bring  my  forces  into  action."  Here 
Pope  represents  himself,  not  as  pursuing  on  this 
afternoon  a  retreating  foe,  but  as  attacking  one 
whose  force,  already  superior,  was  being  constantly 
augmented,  and  whose  attack,  for  that  reason,  he 
did  not  "  think  it  good  policy  "  to  await.  We  con- 
fess ourselves  unable  to  follow  this  argument.  If 
Pope  supposed  that  the  enemy's  forces  were  at  noon 
"  greatly  superior "  to  his  own  and  were  hourly  in- 
creasing in  numbers,  it  was  the  height  of  imprudence 
to  attack  them,  unless  they  were  occupying  some 
untenable  position,  or  were  making  some  capital 
blunder,  neither  of  which  it  was  pretended  was  the 
case.  And  the  imprudence  was  aggravated  by  the 
fact  that  a  delay  of  twenty-four  hours  would  add 
two  fine  corps  to  his  army.  We,  however,  find  it 
impossible  not  to  believe  that  the  order  issued  at 
noon  to  press  the  enemy  vigorously  in  pursuit  indi- 
cates a  wholly  different  view  of  the  situation  from 
that  which  General  Pope  subsequently  thought  he 


288  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 


recollected  entertaining.  There  can  be  little  doubt, 
that,  at  the  time,  Pope  thought  the  enemy  were  re- 
treating, and  that  he  could  pursue  them. 

In  this  view,  Pope  was  completely  mistaken.  So 
far  from  wishing  to  avoid  a  conflict,  "the  thing 
above  all  others  that  Lee  wanted  was  a  battle,  be- 
fore any  further  additions  from  McClellan's  army 
could  join  Pope."1  Whether  Lee  would  have  at- 
tacked Pope  in  position  may  perhaps  be  doubted,2 
although  Longstreet  was  during  the  morning  of  the 
day  of  the  battle  moving  to  a  position  from  which 
to  assault  the  Federal  left.3  But  the  Federal  com- 
mander gave  his  adversary  just  the  opportunity  he 
needed.  Unwilling  to  believe  that  Porter  was  cor- 
rect in  his  belief  that  Longstreet  had  joined  Jackson 
the  day  before,  Pope  was  full  of  the  idea  that  the 
latter,  whom  he  believed  to  be  in  the  act  of  retreat- 
ing from  the  field,  could  be  routed  by  the  fresh 
troops  which  could  now  be  put  in  against  him,  and 
he  utterly  disbelieved  the  reports  which  were  early 
brought  to  him  of  Longstreet's  assembling  his  forces 
south  of  the  turnpike  with  the  intention  of  attacking 
the  left  of  the  Union  army. 

Accordingly  General  Pope  massed  nearly  his  en- 
tire army  north  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike.  He 
gave  McDowell  the  general  charge  of  the  pursuit, 
and  instructed  him 4  that  Porter's  corps  should  ad- 
vance on  the  turnpike  and  be  followed  by  the  divi- 
sion of  Hatch 5  of  McDowell's  own  corps,  and  by  that 

1  Allan,  309.  *  16  W.  R.,  394.  565,  579. 

*  See  2  Henderson,  206.  *  Ib.,  340,  361. 

5  Sometimes  called  King's  division. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  289 

of  Reynolds, — the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  so  called, 
which  had  been  of  late  under  McDowell's  command. 
The  other  division  of  McDowell's  corps — that  of 
Ricketts, — followed  by  Heintzelman's  corps,  consist- 
ing of  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Kearny,  was  to 
take  the  road  which  runs  from  Sudley  Springs  to 
Haymarket  (a  town  about  half-way  between  Thor- 
oughfare Gap  and  Gainesville),  nearly  parallel  to 
the  Warrenton  turnpike  and  about  a  mile  and  a  half 
to  two  miles  north  of  it.  The  whole  plan  was  based 
on  the  belief  that  the  Confederates  were  retiring ;  it 
was  not  a  plan  of  an  offensive  battle  against  an 
enemy  in  position.1 

In  carrying  out  this  programme,  Reynolds's  divi- 
sion was  at  first  formed  on  the  south  side  of  the 
turnpike  near  the  Henry  House ;  it  marched  west- 
wardly,  partly  on  the  turnpike  and  partly  over  the 
fields  south  of  it ;  and  his  batteries  opened  fire  on 
the  enemy  on  the  ridge  in  front  of  Groveton.2  His 
skirmishers  advanced  through  the  woods  on  the 
south  side  of  the  turnpike.  When  Reynolds  had 
got  as  far  as  Groveton,  he  had  encountered  so  much 
resistance  that  he  was  "  convinced  that  the  enemy 
were  not  in  retreat,  but  were  posted  in  force  on  the 
left  flank  "  of  the  Union  army.  On  being  informed 
of  this,  McDowell  ordered  Reynolds  to  take  his  di- 
vision to  Bald  Hill 3  to  resist  the  threatened  attack, 
and  promised  him  other  troops  to  sustain  him.4  The 
order  was  immediately  carried  out.  This  with- 

1  Cf.  Sykes's  Report,  ib.,  483. 

2  16  W.  R.,  394,  398. 

3  The  Chinn  house  stood  on  this  hill. 

4  Ib.,  340,  341,  394. 

VOL.  II. — 19 


29o  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 


drawal  of  Reynolds's  division  to  Bald  Hill,  however, 
exposed  the  left  of  Porter's  corps,  near  which,  south 
of  the  turnpike,  Hazlett's  battery  was  posted.1  But 
Warren,  of  Sykes's  division,  at  once  moved  his  bri- 
gade to  the  support  of  the  battery,  which  continued 
to  do  efficient  service.2 

On  the  other  (right)  flank  of  the  Federal  army, 
Ricketts,  who  was  leading  the  way,  followed  by  the 
two  divisions  of  Heintzelman's  corps,  speedily  be- 
came convinced  that  the  enemy  in  his  front  were  in 
their  old  lines,  and  had  no  intention  of  retiring,  and 
he  was  soon  directed  by  McDowell  to  resume  his 
first  position.3  Immediately  afterwards,  he  was  or- 
dered to  send  two  of  his  brigades  with  two  batteries 
under  General  Tower  to  the  south  of  the  turnpike 
to  the  Henry  House  Hill,  to  meet  the  threatened  at- 
tack on  the  left  of  the  Union  army.4  At  the  same 
time  Sigel  was  directed  to  send  one  brigade  to  Bald 
Hill,  and  thither  McLean's  brigade  immediately  re- 
paired.5 

Meantime  Porter  was  making  his  preparations. 
He  saw  plainly  enough  that  the  task  before  him  was 
not  that  of  pursuing  a  retreating  foe,  but  of  assault- 
ing a  strong  force,  well  posted.  He  had  unfortu- 
nately lost  for  the  day  one  brigade  (Griffin's)  of  his 
first  division,  and  also  another  brigade  (Piatt's,  then 
under  Sturgis),  which  had  recently  been  attached 
to  his  command,  for  these  brigades  had  marched  to 
Centreville  with  the  division-commander,  Morell, 


1  Allan,  286,  n.  3.  4  /£.,  341. 

9  16  W.  R.,  469,  470,  482,  503.  s  Ib.,  286. 

'/».,  384. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  291 

under  the  impression  that  the  rest  of  the  corps,  to 
which  these  divisions  acted,  under  Morell,  as  a  rear- 
guard, had  fallen  back  to  Centre ville,  instead  of 
having  marched  on  the  Sudley  Springs  road  towards 
Groveton.1  Hence  Porter's  leading  division,  now 
under  Butterfield,  consisted  only  of  two  brigades, — 
those  of  Roberts  and  Weeks.  His  second  division 
under  Sykes  contained  three  brigades,  that  of  War- 
ren— which  was  now  posted  south  of  the  turnpike, 
— and  those  of  Buchanan  and  Chapman,  composed 
of  regular  troops.2  Porter  had  modified  the  original 
instructions  given  to  Hatch,  and  had  ordered  him  to 
form  on  his  right  and  make  the  attack  simultane- 
ously with  him.3 

The  corps  of  Sigel  and  Reno's  two  divisions  were 
held  in  reserve. 

General  Lee's  army  was  arrayed  in  two  lines, 
which  made  an  obtuse  angle  a  little  north  of  a  point 
on  the  Warrenton  turnpike  about  half  or  three 
quarters  of  a  mile  west  of  Groveton.  His  left  con- 
sisted of  Jackson's  corps,  which  still  occupied  the 
line  of  the  unfinished  railroad.  This,  as  it  ap- 
proached the  turnpike  from  the  north,  kept  off  to  the 
westward,  showing  open  ground  half  a  mile  wide  in 
its  front,  that  is,  towards  the  Federal  position.  On 
every  favorable  spot  Jackson  had  planted  batteries, 
and  on  the  heights  between  Jackson's  right  and  the 
turnpike  Longstreet  had  placed  a  considerable  part 
of  his  artillery  under  Colonel  S.  D.  Lee,4  in  a  posi- 
tion which  completely  commanded  the  wide  sweep 

1  17  W.  R.,  970,  989,  985,  noo.  3  Ib.,  368. 

*  16  W.  R.,  260.  *  Ib.,  548,  577. 


292  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

of  vacant  land  which  separated  the  line  held  by 
Jackson  at  the  southerly  end  of  the  railroad-bed 
from  the  belt  of  woods  from  which  Porter  must 
make  his  attack.  The  rest  of  Longstreet's  troops 
occupied  the  roads  and  adjacent  woods  lying  to  the 
south  and  southeast  of  the  turnpike;  and  his  right 
division — that  of  D.  R.  Jones — was  making  its  way 
along  the  old  stage-road,  which  ran  parallel  to  the 
turnpike  and  about  a  mile  south  of  it,  towards  Bald 
Hill  and  the  Henry  House  Hill,  with  the  intention 
of  attacking  the  left  flank  of  the  Federal  army. l 

Notwithstanding  that  the  information  obtained  by 
Reynolds  that  the  Confederates  were  in  force  on  the 
south  side  of  the  turnpike  had  been  promptly  com- 
municated by  that  officer  to  Pope  2  as  well  as  to  Mc- 
Dowell,3 and  Pope  had  approved  of  McDowell's 
action  in  withdrawing  Reynolds's  division  from  Por- 
ter's column  of  attack,  and  in  sending  it,  as  well  as  a 
brigade  of  Sigel's  corps,  to  take  position  on  Bald 
Hill,  south  of  the  turnpike ;  notwithstanding,  also, 
that  McDowell, — undoubtedly  with  Pope's  sanction 
and  approval, — had  ordered  4  two  brigades  and  two 
batteries  from  Ricketts's  division  to  the  Henry  House 
Hill,  to  augment  the  forces  which  he  deemed  re- 
quired to  render  the  left  of  the  army  secure — ,Pope 
made  no  change  in  his  orders  to  Porter.  That  offi- 
cer therefore,  continued  to  make  his  arrangements  to 
deliver  the  blow  which  he  was  expected  to  deliver 
against  the  enemy's  left  centre,  although  his  sup 

1  Allan,  272. 

1  Letter  from  General  Ruggles. 

1  16  W.  R.,  340.     This  was  about  2  P.M.  ;  18  W.  R.,  964. 

«i6  W.  R.,  341. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  293 

ports  on  the  right  and  left  were  being  withdrawn  to 
meet  an  expected  attack  on  the  line  of  communica- 
tions of  the  army.  It  is  unnecessary  to  comment  on 
the  reckless  tactics  employed  by  General  Pope  on 
this  day. 

Finally,  between  three  and  four  o'clock,1  Butter- 
field's  two  brigades,  together  with  Hatch's  and  Pat- 
rick's brigades  of  Hatch's  division,  having  approached 
as  cautiously  as  possible  to  the  edge  of  the  woods 
near  the  Dogan  House  in  which  they  had  been 
formed,  rushed  forward  with  loud  cheers,  and,  in 
spite  of  a  terrible  front  and  flank  fire  of  artillery,  and, 
when  they  neared  the  enemy's  position  behind  the 
railroad  cut,  of  musketry  also,  gallantly  pushed  on 
until  they  were  not  only  at  close  quarters  with  their 
antagonists,  but  in  some  places  came  very  near  break- 
ing their  lines.  They  advanced  in  three  ranks,  and 
doubtless  appeared  to  their  foes  stronger  than  they 
really  were.  For  nearly  half  an  hour  they  main- 
tained themselves  close  to  the  Confederate  lines,  and 
the  fighting  was  of  the  most  severe  kind.2 

But  the  Confederates  were  too  strong.  Longstreet, 
being  asked  for  reinforcements,  simply  brought  up 
more  guns 3  to  enfilade  the  Federal  lines,  and  to  sweep 
the  approaches  to  the  railroad  cut.  Sykes  found  it 
impossible  to  get  his  troops  across  the  open  to  the 
aid  of  their  comrades.4  Reynolds  on  the  left  and 

1  There  is  much  discrepancy  in  the  accounts  as  to  the  hour  of  this  attack. 

4  16  W.  R.,  472,  599,  666  ;  Allan,  280-282.  3  16  W.  R.,  565. 

4  Ib.,  577,  599.  Pope's  statement  (ib.  42)  that  "  the  attack  of  Porter  was 
neither  vigorous  nor  persistent "  is  incorrect  and  unjust.  The  successful 
charge  of  Butterfield  could  not  have  been  repeated  by  Sykes.  The  inter- 
vening space  could  not  be  crossed  after  Longstreet  and  S.  D.  Lee  had  got 
their  guns  in  position. 


294  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

Kicketts  on  the  right,  as  we  have  seen,  had  already 
been  withdrawn  to  other  parts  of  the  field.  There 
was  nothing  for  the  brave  fellows  of  Butterfield's 
and  Hatch's  divisions  to  do  but  to  fall  back,  which 
they  did,  naturally  in  considerable  disorder.  Their 
losses  had  been  very  severe,  and  Hatch  himself  was 
badly  wounded.  The  assault  had  completely  failed. 
It  should  never  have  been  ordered. 

The  instant  that  the  repulse  of  Porter's  attack  was 
perceived,  General  Lee  ordered  Longstreet  forward 
on  the  right.  But  his  order  had  been  anticipated  by 
that  vigilant  officer.1  The  divisions  of  Hood,  An- 
derson, Wilcox,  Kemper,  and  D.  R.  Jones  rapidly 
advanced  south  of  the  turnpike,  assaulting  unhesi- 
tatingly and  fiercely  whatever  stood  in  their  way. 

The  first  shock  fell  on  Warren's  little  brigade  of 
not  more  than  a  thousand  men,  which,  after  a  gallant 
resistance  and  suffering  great  loss,  was  fairly  swept 
off  the  field  by  Hood's  Texans.2 

The  defeat  of  Warren's  small  command  would  not, 
however,  of  itself  have  involved  serious  consequences 
for  the  Union  army.  But  Pope,  with  alack  of  sound 
judgment  which  is  almost  unintelligible,  had,  on  wit- 
nessing the  rout  of  Butterfield's  division,  ordered 
Reynolds  to  leave  his  position  on  Bald  Hill,  on  Mc- 
Lean's left,  and  to  cross  the  turnpike  and  the  field  of 
battle,  "  to  the  rear  of  Porter,  to  form  a  line  behind 
which  the  troops  might  be  rallied." '  This  most 

1  16  W.  R.,  557. 

*  76.,  503,  609. 

1  Ib.,  394.  The  rear  brigade,  under  Anderson,  was  not  able  to  cross 
the  road  before  Warren  was  attacked,  and  it  participated  in  Warren's 
battle. 


1862]           LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  295 

injudicious  step  left  the  defence  of  the  important 
position  of  Bald  Hill  solely  to  McLean's  brigade.1 
McLean,  attacked  at  first  by  the  Texans  who  were 
following  up  their  success  over  Warren's  brigade, 
bravely  maintained  his  position z ;  but  finally,  on  the 
Confederates  pushing  large  forces  round  both  his 
flanks,  he  was  forced  from  the  hill  after  a  determined 
resistance,3  in  which  Schenck,  his  division-commander, 
gallantly  participated ;  nor  could  all  the  efforts 
which  were  subsequently  so  bravely  made  to  recover 
the  position  by  the  other  troops  of  Sigel's  corps  un- 
der Schurz,  Krzyzanowski,  Koltes,4  and  others,  and 
by  the  two  brigades  of  Ricketts's  division  which  had 
been  hurried  up  from  the  Henry  House  Hill,5  and 
which  Tower  so  gallantly  led,6  avail  to  wrest  this 
important  post  from  the  grasp  of  the  Confederate 
army.  Had  Reynolds  remained  on  the  hill,  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  Bald  Hill  would  have  been 
held,  until  the  arrival  of  these  reinforcements,  or  of  a 
part  of  them — all  that  would  have  been  needed — 
had  rendered  its  capture  practically  impossible. 

While  this  spirited  action  was  going  on,  the  two 
regular  brigades  of  Sykes's  division  of  the  5th 
corps  were  sent  to  the  Henry  House  Hill,  as  were 
also  the  two  brigades  of  Reynolds's  division,  which 
had  so  unnecessarily  left  Bald  Hill,  and  had  crossed 
the  field  only  to  find  themselves  in  the  midst  of  the 
confusion  created  by  the  repulse  of  Butterfield's  di- 
vision, and  to  see  that  the  troops  of  Heintzelman's 


1  16  W.  R.,  286.  4  Ib.,  269,  283,  301. 

2  Ib.,  286.  5  Jb.,  255,  341,  342,  390-392. 

3  Ib.,  287.  *  Tower  was  severely  wounded  in  this  action. 


296  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

corps,  who  with  those  of  Stevens,  Doubleday,  and 
Gibbon  held  the  Federal  centre,  did  not  stand  in 
need  of  their  assistance.1  To  the  divisions  of  Rey- 
nolds and  Sykes  were  added  Reno's  old  brigade,2 
Graham's  battery,  and  such  other  troops  as  happened 
to  be  at  hand.  The  Confederates  under  G.  T.  An- 
derson, Toombs,  Wilcox,  and  others,  made  repeated 
and  desperate  efforts  to  carry  the  position,  but  after 
a  long  and  bloody  fight  they  were  obliged  to  renounce 
the  attempt.  The  fighting  was  not  over  till  after 
dark.8  Reno's  brigade,  with  the  battery,  remained  on 
the  Henry  House  Hill  until  about  9  P.M.4 

Meantime  Jackson,  having  so  completely  repulsed 
Porter's  charge,  was  pushing  his  troops,  or  such  of 
them  as  had  not  suffered  too  severely  to  be  ordered 
forward, — assisted  by  some  brigades  of  Longstreet's 
corps, — against  the  Federal  troops  north  of  the  turn- 
pike. These  consisted  of  portions  of  Sigel's  corps, 
of  the  divisions  of  Hooker  and  Kearny  of  Heintzel- 
man's  corps,  the  division  of  Stevens  of  Reno's  corps, 
and  of  Hatch's  division  and  of  two  brigades  of  Rick- 
etts's  division  of  McDowell's  corps. 

The  peculiar  feature  of  the  battle  north  of  the  turn- 
pike consists  in  the  fact  that  the  Federal  line,  which^ 
after  the  defeat  of  Butterfield's  assault  on  Jackson's 
position,  was  amply  strong  enough  to  resist  any  at 
tacks,  was,  immediately  thereupon,  weakened  and 

1  16  W.  R.,  394,  395. 

2  The   other  brigade — the  ist — had  suffered  so  much  on  the  previous  day 
that  it  was  unfit  for  service.    2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  151.     Cf.  16  W.  R.,  341,  342. 
Cf.  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  143. 

3  16  W.  R.,  600. 

4  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  143  ;  16  W.  R.,  420. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  297 

confused  by  being  obliged  to  respond  to  the  demands 
required  by  the  exposed  state  of  the  left  flank  and 
communications  of  the  Federal  amry.  Sigel,  whose 
corps  was  to  have  been  the  reserve  of  the  whole  army, 
was  obliged  to  send  all  or  nearly  all  his  troops  to 
take  position  on  Bald  Hill,  or  to  join  in  the  fighting 
which  raged  in  that  region.  Of  Sykes's  division, 
Warren  had,  prior  to  Butterfield's  attack,  been 
obliged  to  leave  his  proper  position  to  occupy,  so  far 
as  with  his  weak  brigade  he  could,  the  post  which 
Reynolds  had  vacated  to  march  to  Bald  Hill ;  and, 
almost  as  soon  as  the  two  other  brigades — those  of 
Buchanan  and  Chapman — had  been  joined  by  the 
retiring  troops  of  Butterfield,  they  were  ordered  off 
to  the  Henry  House  Hill.  Ricketts,  too,  on  the 
right,  had  been  obliged  to  send  away  two  of  his  brig- 
ades under  Tower ;  and  finally  Reno  with  his  brigade 
had  been  called  from  his  central  position  in  reserve 
to  defend  the  all-important  Henry  House  Hill. 

The  advance  of  Jackson  could  not,  therefore,  be 
resisted  as  it  might  otherwise  have  been.  The  Fed- 
eral troops  in  his  front,  confounded  and  bewildered 
by  the  spectacle  of  their  supports  and  reserves 
marching  off  to  other  parts  of  the  field,  weakened, 
not  only  in  numbers,  but  by  the  withdrawal  of  the 
troops  on  which  they  had  depended  for  the  defence 
of  their  flanks  and  for  reinforcement  in  combat — 
their  commander  also  having  his  attention  entirely 
occupied  with  the  vital  necessity  of  defending  the 
hills  south  of  the  turnpike — were  in  no  condition  to 
make  an  effectual  resistance.  Possibly  some  able 
general  in  charge  of  the  whole  mass  of  men  might 


298  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

have  established  a  line  of  battle,  and  have  animated 
the  troops  with  courage  and  confidence.  But  this 
task  was  not  even  attempted  by  anyone.  McDowell 
had  his  hands  full  on  the  south  of  the  turnpike.1 
Heintzelman  says  that  he  was  "directed  to  retire 
and  hold  successive  positions," z  and  this  seems  to 
have  been  the  only  order  given  by  General  Pope  af- 
fecting the  disposition  of  his  troops  in  this  region. 
The  consequences  were  what  might  have  been  ex- 
pected. No  effectual  resistance  was  made  to  the 
advance  of  the  Confederates.  They  were  detained, 
certainly,  by  the  admirable  practice  of  the  Federal 
artillery ;  but  the  Federal  infantry  steadily  retired. 
The  Carter  House,  a  mile  northeast  of  the  Henry 
House,  was  evacuated  after  dark,  though  after  "  a 
desperate  stand." 3  This  capture  terminated  the 
battle  on  the  north  side  of  the  turnpike.  The  Con- 
federates made  no  further  attempt  to  pursue  their 
retreating  foes.  Kearny,  in  fact,  remained  in  the 
vicinity  of  this  house  till  10  P.M. 

Thus  ended  the  battle  of  the  Second  Bull  Run, 
as  it  is  called  in  the  North, — the  Second  Manassas,  as 
it  is  called  in  the  South.  Both  armies  were  tired 
out ;  both  had  lost  heavily ;  the  Confederate  loss 
was  upwards  of  7000  for  the  three  days 4 ;  but  the 
Union  forces  had  suffered  by  far  the  most.  They 
had  unquestionably  been  badly  beaten.  The  Con- 

1  i6W.  R.,  340. 

*  /*.,  413. 

1  Ricketts's  Report,  16  W.  R.,  385.  Cf.  Kearny's  Report,  /£.,  416.  The 
"brown  house"  which  he  mentions  is  the  Carter  House  ;  Allan,  300,  n.  3. 
It  is  sometimes  called  the  "  Pittsylvania  House." 

4  16  W.  R..  560-562. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  299 

federates  had  captured,  according  to  General  Lee's 
report,1  7000  prisoners — many,  or  probably  most  of 
them,  wounded — numerous  colors,  some  30  guns, 
and  20,000  small  arms.  The  loss  in  killed  must 
have  been  some  1500,2  and  doubtless  as  many  as 
3000  or  4000  wounded  men  made  their  escape. 
Parts  of  the  army  had  suffered  very  severely ;  many 
regiments,  some  brigades,  and  some  divisions  were 
practically  broken  up.  Crowds  of  stragglers  and 
demoralized  men  had  left  the  field  for  Centreville, 
creating  the  erroneous  impression  that  the  army  was 
routed.3  For,  at  the  time,  when  General  Pope,  be- 
tween 6  and  8  P.M.,4  ordered  a  retreat  from  the  field, 
the  Confederates  had  ceased  all  attacks.  No  firing 
was  going  on,  except  occasionally  a  shot  from  a  Federal 
gun  on  the  Henry  House  Hill.5  There  was  nothing 
to  prevent  the  Union  army  remaining  on  the  ground. 
No  opportunity  was  lost,  or  even  endangered,  by  re- 
maining. The  retention  of  the  Henry  House  Hill 
secured  the  passage  over  Bull  Run  by  the  Stone 
Bridge  and  the  neighboring  fords ;  there  was,  as  we 
say,  no  need  of  retreating  that  night ;  it  was  simply 
a  question  of  what  it  was  best  to  do — to  retire  be- 
hind the  stream,  or  to  sleep  on  the  ground  and  await 
supplies  and  reinforcements  in  the  morning.  Parts 
of  the  army  were  in  perfectly  good  condition  ;  several 

1  16  W.  R.,  558.     Cf.  Allan,  306,  n.  r  :  also,  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  211-214. 
*  16  W.  R.,  249-262,  where  the  casualties  in  the  whole  campaign  are 
given. 

3  i6/0.,  536. 

4  The  order  to  retreat  was  not  sent  to  all  the  troops  until  8  o'clock.     16 
W.  R.,  43,  78.     McDowell  says  he  received  it  about  7  (343),  but  a  staff-offi- 
cer of  his  informs  the  writer  that  the  exact  hour  was  5.50  P.M. 

5  16  W.  R.,  344. 


300  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

brigades  had  not  been  engaged.  The  discipline  of  a 
large  part  of  the  army  was  unimpaired.  Many  of  the 
troops  who  had  suffered  a  good  deal  would  beyond 
doubt  have  recovered  themselves  in  a  few  hours,  so 
far,  that  is,  as  organization  and  discipline  were  con- 
cerned.1 It  was  going  to  be  a  serious  blow  to  the 
confidence  of  the  army,  and  also  to  the  prestige  of 
the  commanding  general,  to  retreat  after  such  a  hard- 
fought  day.  But  General  Pope  was  convinced  that, 
considering  "the  result  of  the  battle,"  the  "very 
heavy  losses  his  army  had  suffered,  and  the  complete 
prostration  of  his  troops  from  hunger  and  fatigue," 
he  could  not  "  maintain  his  position."  *  In  this  cal- 
culation he  failed,  as  it  seems  to  us,  to  do  justice  to 
th&  courage  and  tenacity  of  his  soldiers.  Nor  did  he 
take  due  account  of  the  very  heavy  losses  which  the 
Confederates  must  have  sustained,  nor  of  their  ex- 
haustion and  fatigue.  In  our  judgment,  it  is  unlikely 
that  General  Pope's  army  would  have  been  attacked 
the  next  day  until  sufficient  time  had  elapsed  for  the 
two  corps  of  Franklin  and  Sumner  to  come  up,  and 
until  ample  opportunity  had  been  given  for  supply- 
ing the  needs  of  the  soldiers.3  General  Pope  did 
not  attach  sufficient  weight  to  the  fact  that  Lee 
would  have  no  reinforcements  to  counterbalance  the 
veteran  troops  of  Sumner  and  Franklin,  which  were, 
on  that  evening,  as  Pope  knew,  only  a  few  miles 
away.  Banks's  corps,  of  8000  or  9000  men,  was  also 

1  Cf.  Palfrey,  2,  3. 

1  16  W.  R.,  43. 

3  At  any  rate,  we  know  that  on  the  next  day  no  part  of  Lee's  army  except 
the  cavalry  of  Stuart  moved  from  their  lines  until  afternoon.  16  W.  R., 
714. 


1 86 2]           LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  301 

close  at  hand.1  Nor  did  he  estimate  at  its  proper 
value  the  demoralizing  effect  which  a  night  march  in 
retreat  across  a  stream  traversable  only  by  one  bridge 
and  by  fords  difficult  to  find  in  the  darkness  must 
have  upon  some  50,000  weary  and  hungry  men  who 
had  been  beaten  that  day,  and  many  of  whose  or- 
ganizations had  been  seriously  shaken,  not  only  by 
defeat  but  by  the  loss  of  many  efficient  officers. 

The  truth  is,  that  this  retreat  on  the  night  after 
the  battle  of  the  30th  of  August  has  given  a  char- 
acter of  hopeless  failure  to  this  whole  campaign. 
Up  to  the  30th  of  August  General  Pope,  although  as- 
suredly he  had  achieved  no  success,  and  had  entirely 
failed  to  take  advantage  of  the  unique  opportunity 
which  the  temerity  of  Lee  and  Jackson  had  afforded 
him  of  attacking  the  latter's  25,000  men  with  double 
their  numbers,  had  yet  sufficiently  accomplished  the 
task  which  he  was  set  to  do.  He  had  brought  his 
army  to  the  neighborhood  of  Washington  without 
suffering  any  severe  losses  ;  he  had,  in  fact,  inflicted 
nearly  as  much  loss  as  he  had  suffered ;  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  30th  he  had  his  army  well  in  hand  ; 
it  was  entirely  within  his  power  to  take  up  a  good 
position,  and  to  hold  it  against  any  assault  which 
Lee  with  his  inferior  forces  could  make.  There  was 
no  reason  why  the  experience  of  Malvern  Hill  might 
not  have  been  repeated  on  the  plains  of  Manassas. 
He  made,  however,  the  fatal  mistake  of  utterly  mis- 
conceiving the  situation,  and,  neglecting  all  pre- 


1  Why  Pope  did  not  make  use  of  this  corps,  or  at  least  of  a  part  of  it,  in  the 
battle  of  the  soth,  it  is  not  easy  to  see.  Greene's  division  was  at  Manassas 
Junction  by  n  A.M.  See  Gordon's  A.  V.,  415. 


302  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

cautions,  he  ordered  an  attack.  His  battle  was, 
therefore,  fought  under  great  disadvantages ;  but  it 
was  fought  with  great  obstinacy,  and  their  victory 
must  have  cost  his  opponents  dearly.  Pope  was 
beaten,  and  badly  beaten ;  still,  he  was  not  forced 
from  the  field.  He  might  have  remained  on  the 
ground  that  night ;  and  the  chances  are,  as  we  have 
said,  that  before  Lee  could  have  organized  any  at- 
tack against  him,  his  army  would  have  more  than 
repaired  its  losses  by  reinforcements,  and  would  have 
received  all  necessary  supplies.  But  his  retreat  on 
that  night  changed  the  whole  aspect  of  affairs ;  it 
stamped  the  whole  campaign  as  a  failure.  It  was  a 
confession  of  his  inability  to  meet  his  antagonist,  and 
it  lost  him  the  remaining  confidence  of  his  soldiers. 
This  confidence,  never  very  strong,  had  from  the  be- 
ginning of  the  campaign  been  continually  impaired 
by  the  contrasts  presented  between  his  projects  and 
promises  and  the  unbroken  series  of  failures  to  obtain 
tangible  and  successful  results,  and  this  retreat  from 
the  field  of  Bull  Run  completely  exhausted  it. 

The  next  morning,  August  31st,  the  Union  army 
took  position  on  the  heights  of  Centreville.  The 
right  wing  had  retreated  in  good  order,1  but  parts  of 
the  centre  and  left — by  no  means  all,  however — 
had  got  into  considerable  confusion  in  retiring  over 
the  turnpike  and  the  Stone  Bridge.  This  was,  in 
great  part  certainly,  the  natural,  not  to  say  unavoid- 
able, result  of  the  fact  that  the  principal  avenue  of 


1  For  instance,  Kearny,  16  W.  R.,  416,  422  ;  Doubleday,  370,  372. 
Some  of  these  troops  fell  back  over  the  fields  and  forded  the  stream  above 
the  Stone  Bridge.  See  Gordon's  A.  V.,  413. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  303 

retreat  was  not  adequate  for  the  movement  of  such 
a  large  force.  During  the  day,  however,  all  this  dis- 
order was  remedied  and  the  men  fell  into  their 
proper  places.  The  different  corps  took  up  suitable 
positions.  Banks 1  joined  the  army  with  his  corps 
of  nearly  9000  men,  having  brought  all  his  wagons, 
full  of  most  welcome  supplies,  to  Fairfax  Court 
House.2  Sumner  and  Franklin,  with  the  2d  and  6th 
corps — about  10,000  men  each — veteran  and  excel- 
lent troops,  and  well  commanded — were  also  this 
morning  added  to  Pope's  command.  But  these 
troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  well  as  those 
of  the  3d  and  5th  Corps,  who  had  participated  in 
the  campaign  under  Heintzelman  and  Porter,  were 
very  distrustful  of  General  Pope,  and  their  advent 
did  not  tend  to  restore  confidence  to  the  army  as  a 
whole.  In  fact,  the  brief  but  unfortunate  history  of 
the  Army  of  Virginia — for  this  wTas  the  name  given 
to  General  Pope's  forces — shows  how  different  a  mere 
aggregation  of  troops  is  from  an  army,  and  illustrates 
the  truth  that  an  army  is  a  living  organism,  and  can- 
not be  manufactured  at  will  by  the  simple  process 
of  adding  together  portions  of  different  armies.8 

1  He  had  been  placed  in  charge  of  the  trains  and  supplies.     Ante,  266. 

!  He  had  come  up  from  Bristoe  to  Fairfax  Court  House  with  the  wagon 
trains,  having  lost  nothing.  16  W.  R.,  45.  At  Bristoe  he  had,  in  obedi- 
ence to  orders,  destroyed  the  supplies  there,  cars,  engines,  etc.  73.,  78, 

324- 

3  ' '  The  advantage  possessed  by  an  army  composed  of  troops  who,  for  a 
year,  have  been  organized  as  an  army,  who  are  under  a  general  to  whom 
they  are  accustomed  and  in  whom  they  trust,  in  fighting  an  army  that  is  a 
mere  collection  of  three  or  four  independent  armies,  or  parts  of  armies, 
drawn  together  and  organized  as  an  army  a  few  weeks  only  before  the  first 
battle  of  the  campaign,  placed  under  the  command  of  a  general  of  whom 
they  know  absolutely  nothing,  and  who  knows  nothing  either  of  the 


304  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

General  Lee,  the  morning  after  the  battle — Sun- 
day, the  31st — at  once  despatched  Stuart  with  the 
cavalry  to  ascertain  the  position  and  movements  of 
the  enemy.  That  active  officer  was  in  the  saddle 
before  daylight,  and  soon  discovered  the  Union 
army  on  the  heights  of  Centreville." 1  Deeming  it 
unwise  to  attack  his  antagonist  in  position,  General 
Lee  determined  to  turn  the  Federal  right  by  the 
Little  River  turnpike,  which  runs  from  Aldie  Gap 
in  a  southeasterly  direction  to  Germantown  on  the 
Warrenton  turnpike,  a  point  some  six  miles  east  of 
Centreville.  Accordingly,  on  Sunday  afternoon z 
Jackson's  corps  moved  north  to  Sudley  Ford,  where 
Bull  Run  was  crossed.  His  troops  then  proceeded 
to  the  Little  River  turnpike,  and,  turning  to  the 
right,  marched  to  Pleasant  Valley,3  about  four  miles 
northwest  of  Chantilly,  where  they  bivouacked  for 

troops  or  their  officers,  is  simply  enormous.  It  outweighs  disparity  of  num- 
bers, at  any  rate,  to  a  very  great  degree.  The  former  army  is  a  military 
machine,  welded  together,  and  a  fit  instrument  of  war  in  the  hands  of  a 
man  who  knows  what  it  is  and  how  to  use  it.  The  latter  is  an  aggregation 
of  troops,  and  not  an  army  at  all. 

"  General  Pope's  army  was  ordered  to  be  made  up  from  the  independent 
and  widely  separated  armies  of  Sigel,  Banks,  and  McDowell,  on  June  26th. 
While  the  concentration  was  going  on,  and  the  organization  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia  was  being  effected,  General  Pope  remained  in  Washington.  He 
joined  his  new  command  on  July  2gth.  The  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain  was 
fought  on  August  gth,  only  twelve  days  later.  As  for  the  troops  from  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  coming  up,  as  they  necessarily  did,  in  detachments, 
it  was  obviously  out  of  the  question  to  incorporate  them,  in  any  proper 
sense  of  the  word,  with  the  Army  of  Virginia  ;  in  fact  it  was  not  even  at- 
tempted. In  my  judgment  far  too  little  has  been  made  of  these  disadvan- 
tages under  which  the  Federal  commander  and  his  troops  labored.  They 
account  for  a  great  part  of  the  failure  which  attended  the  campaign." — Note 
by  the  writer  in  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  217-219. 

'i6W.  R.,  557,737. 

8  /*.,  714. 

3  /£.,  682. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  305 

the  night.  Longstreet  followed  Jackson  later  in  the 
afternoon,  but  halted  for  the  night  on  the  west  side 
of  Bull  Run.1 

The  next  day,  September  1st,  Jackson,  preceded  by 
Stuart's  cavalry,  resumed  his  march  on  the  Little 
Elver  turnpike  towards  Germantown  and  Fairfax 
Court  House.2  He  proceeded  slowly,  for  he  did  not 
wish  to  permit  too  wide  a  gap  between  the  rear  of 
his  column  and  the  following  force  of  Longstreet.3 
He  had  passed  the  little  town  of  Chantilly  about 
two  miles,  and  had  reached  a  point  near  an  eminence 
known  as  Ox  Hill  on  the  easterly  side  of  the  road, 
when  he  was  made  aware  of  the  presence  of  the 
enemy  moving  towards  him  from  the  Warrenton 
turnpike.  This  force  consisted  of  Stevens's  division 
and  of  Reno's  brigade  of  Reno's  division,  the  whole 
under  command  of  General  Stevens,  General  Reno, 
who  ranked  him,  being,  for  the  moment,  indisposed.4 
Stevens,  who  was  a  very  energetic  and  gallant  offi- 
cer, had  been  verbally  directed  by  General  Pope 
soon  after  1  P.M.,5  "  to  march  at  once  [from  Centre- 
ville]  across  the  fields  to  the  Little  River  turnpike, 
take  a  position  across  it,  and  hold  in  check  a  Con- 
federate force  said  to  be  advancing  by  that  road 
towards  Fairfax  Court  House."  6 


1  16  W.  R.,  566. 

5/£.,  647. 

3  Ib.,  744- 

4  Reno,  however,  accompanied  the  expedition.     2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  153. 

6  In  this  description  of  the  action  at  Chantilly,  great  reliance  is  placed  on 
the  excellent  account  of  it  by  the  late  Bvt.  Brig.  Gen.  Charles  F.  Walcott, 
in  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  135  etseq.  The  narratives  in  Gordon's  A rmy  of  Virginia 
and  in  Ropes's  Army  under  Pope  are  incorrect. 

«  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  150. 


VOL.   II.— 20 


306  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

General  Pope  had  foreseen  early  in  the  morning 
the  possibility  of  his  right  being  turned  by  a  move- 
ment of  the  enemy  down  the  Little  River  turnpike, 
and  had  as  early  as  3  A.M.1  ordered  Sumner  to  send 
a  brigade  of  infantry — there  being  actually  no  cav- 
alry fit  for  service — to  make  a  reconnoissance  in  that 
direction.  Before  many  hours  he  was  informed 
that  the  movement  of  the  enemy  was  actually  in 
progress ;  at  1 1  A.M.  he  telegraphed  Halleck  to  that 
effect2;  at  noon  he  ordered  McDowell  to  march 
rapidly  to  Fairfax  Court  House  and  occupy  German- 
town  with  his  whole  force3;  at  1  P.M.  he  ordered 
Hooker  to  Gennantown,  to  assume  command  of  the 
troops  already  there 4 ;  and  soon  after  this  he  ordered 
Stevens  to  proceed  to,  and  to  hold,  the  Little  River 
turnpike  west  of  Germantown,  as  we  have  above 
narrated. 

Stevens,  about  4  P.M.,  reached  the  neighborhood 
of  the  turnpike.  He  there  struck  the  enemy's  skir- 
mishers, and  recognized  the  presence  of  a  large  force. 
A  belt  of  woods  lined  the  turnpike  on  its  westerly 
side,  and  the  troops  which  he  had  struck  were  from 
the  divisions  of  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill.  Stevens  de- 
termined at  once  to  attack.  Forming  his  division, 
of  hardly  2000  men,  in  three  lines,  and  preceded  by 
a  heavy  skirmish  line,  he  soon  drove  the  enemy's 
light  troops  back  to  the  woods,  and  pushed  his  men 
close  to  the  fences  which  separated  the  open  from 
the  timbered  land.  Here  he  was  met  with  a  stag- 
gering fire  and  his  men  wavered.  But  Stevens, 

1  16  W.  R.,  81  ;  see,  also,  a  subsequent  order  of  5.45  A.M.,  it.,  82. 
s/£.,84.  3/£.,84.  *  Ib.,  84. 


1 86  2]           LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  307 

seizing  the  colors  of  the  79th  (N.Y.)  Highlanders, 
his  own  regiment,  led  the  whole  force  against  the 
enemy.  The  fences  were  thrown  down  and  a  lodg- 
ment was  made  in  the  woods.  The  gallant  Stevens 
fell,  shot  through  the  head.  The  brigades  of  Branch 
and  Brockenbrough  of  Hill's  division  were  broken 
and  fell  back  in  disorder.  But  Hill  brought  up 
other  troops,  and  Lawton,  who  commanded  Early's 
division,  put  three  of  his  brigades  into  the  fight. 
On  the  other  hand  Reno's  brigade  soon  joined 
Stevens's  division.  The  fighting  was  hot,  and  lasted 
an  hour  or  more.  Hays's  Confederate  brigade  was 
broken  and  forced  to  retire.  Finally  Kearny  came 
up  with  his  division  from  Germantown,  and,  miscon- 
ceiving the  situation — thinking  that  the  troops  in 
the  woods  were  Federal  troops — rode  right  up  to 
the  woods  and  was  instantly  killed.  The  fighting 
gradually  languished  owing  to  the  increasing  dark- 
ness, and  finally  ceased,  both  sides  having  lost  heav- 
ily and  neither  having  gained  any  ground.  The 
only  wonder  is  that  the  Union  forces,  which  were 
greatly  outnumbered,  were  able  to  make  head  for  so 
long  against  their  foes.  The  fight,  though  a  small 
affair,  was  very  fiercely  and  obstinately  contested. 
During  a  good  part  of  the  time  a  severe  thunder- 
storm raged.  All  the  accounts  speak  of  this  feature 
of  the  action  as  having  greatly  intensified  the  grim- 
ness  of  the  scene.  Before  daylight  all  the  Union 
troops  retired  to  Germantown  and  Fairfax  Court 
House.1 

We  must  return  to  General  Pope.     This  officer 

1  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  160. 


308  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

had,  since  arriving  at  Centreville,  been  losing  confi- 
dence in  the  ability  of  his  army  to  fight  a  successful 
battle.  In  his  first  account  *  of  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  written  at  Centreville,  at  9.45  P.M.,  August 
30th,  he  had  stated  that  the  troops  were  in  good 
heart;  and  that  he  had  "lost  nothing;  neither  guns 
nor  wagons."  The  next  morning,  writing  to  Halleck,2 
he  suggests  that  the  troops  are  not  to  be  trusted ; 
"  you  may  rely,"  he  says,  "  upon  our  giving  them 
[the  enemy]  as  desperate  a  fight  as  I  can  force  our 
men  to  stand  up  to."  After  this  very  oracular  ob- 
servation he  says :  "  I  should  like  to  know  whether 
you  feel  secure  about  Washington,  should  this  army 
be  destroyed."  Pope  shows  here  that  he  has  lost 
confidence  in  his  men.  And  yet,  at  this  very  mo- 
ment, he  had  in  the  three  corps  of  Sumner,  Franklin, 
and  Banks  nearly  30,000  excellent  troops  who  were 
perfectly  fresh,  and  had  not  fired  a  shot  in  the  recent 
battles — quite  enough  to  have  defeated  Jackson  on 
the  Little  River  turnpike,  separated  as  he  was  from 
Longstreet.  Halleck's  reply,3  dated  11  A.M.  of  the 
31st,  to  the  encouraging  despatch  of  the  previous 
evening  crossed  Pope's  discouraging  note  of  the 
morning,  and  elicited  from  the  latter  a  note  written 
in  the  afternoon,  which  contained  the  not  very 
hopeful  statement, — "We  shall  fight  to  the  last."  4 
The  next  morning,  September  1st,  Pope  unbur- 
dens his  mind  to  Halleck  in  regard  to  the  officers  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.5  "  Their  constant  talk," 


1  16  W.  R.,78. 

3  /£.,  80.  4/3.,8i. 

3  Ib.,  79-  6  /<$.,  82,  83. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE,  309 

he  says,  "  indulged  in  publicly,  and  in  promiscuous 
company,  is  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  will  not 
fight — that  they  are  demoralized  by  withdrawal  from 
the  Peninsula,  etc."  That  Pope  could  write  such 
stuff  as  this  after  he  had  had  such  troops  as  the  di- 
visions of  Hooker,  Kearny,  and  Reynolds  under 
him  for  weeks,  and  had  witnessed,  only  a  day  or  two 
before,  the  gallant  charge  of  Butterfield's  division  of 
Porter's  corps  and  the  stout  defence  of  the  Henry 
House  Hill  by  Sykes's  division  of  the  same  corps, 
almost  passes  belief.  But  the  idea  that  his  defeats 
were  due  to  his  being  sacrificed  by  McClellan's  offi- 
cers had  got  full  possession  of  his  mind.  In  this 
epistle  he  practically  confesses  himself  unequal  to  the 
task  of  commanding  his  army. 

He  closes  his  letter  with  the  urgent  advice  to 
Halleck  to  "  draw  back  the  army  to  the  intrench- 
ments  in  front  of  Washington,  and  set  to  work  in 
that  secure  place  to  reorganize  and  rearrange  it. 
You  may,"  he  continues,  "  avoid  great  disaster  by 
doing  so."  This  was  certainly  the  only  logical  con- 
clusion from  his  premises.  And  such  a  recommenda- 
tion as  this  from  the  commander  of  the  army  General 
Halleck  could  do  nothing  but  adopt.  Accordingly, 
the  next  day,  September  2d,  he  gave  the  necessary 
order  to  Pope,1  informing  him  at  the  same  time  that 
McClellan  had  charge  of  the  disposition  of  all  troops 
within  the  defences.  Pope,  who  had  already  ordered 
his  army  to  retire  from  Centre ville  towards  Fairfax 
Court  House,2  at  once  issued  his  instructions,3  and 
was  able  to  report  to  Halleck,  at  7.10  P.M.,4  that  all 

'i8W.  R.,  797.  *i6W.  R.,  85.  »/3.,86.  4/£.,87. 


310  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

the  commands  would  be  within  the  works  by  morn- 
ing. The  passage  of  the  army  trains  and  the  move- 
ment of  the  troops  from  Centreville  to  Alexandria 
was  covered  by  Torbert's  brigade  of  the  6th  corps, 
acting  by  Franklin's  orders  under  general  instructions 
from  McClellan.1 

Thus  ended  General  Pope's  campaign  in  Virginia. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  we  should  say  anything  in 
addition  to  the  comments  with  which  we  have  ac- 
companied the  incidents  of  the  campaign,  except  to 
call  attention  again  to  the  fact  that  neither  Halleck 
nor  Pope  ever  seems  to  have  grasped  firmly  the  na- 
ture and  limits  of  the  task  which  Pope's  forces  in 
Virginia  ought  to  have  striven  to  accomplish  while 
McClellan's  army  was  being  withdrawn  from  the 
Peninsula.  That  task  was  a  simple  one — to  delay 
Lee  as  long  as  possible,  and  to  refuse  to  fight  him 
(unless  of  course  some  great  emergency  should  arise, 
or  some  wonderful  opportunity  occur)  until  the  two 
armies  of  Pope  and  McClellan  should  be  united. 
To  this  task,  which  was  of  the  first  importance, 
Halleck  perversely  added  another  and  a  wholly  incon- 
sistent one,  that  of  preserving  the  Government  prop- 
erty at  Fredericksburg  and  Aquia  Creek.  Hence 
he  allowed  Pope  to  push  out  even  as  far  as  the 
Rapidan,  where  (as  we  saw 2)  he  came  within  an  ace 
of  being  routed,  and  was  obliged  to  retreat  in  haste 
to  the  Rappahannock.  It  is  but  justice  to  Pope  to 
say  that  after  he  had  been  forced  back,  he  saw  the 
situation  more  clearly  than  did  Halleck ;  and  that 
he  would  probably  have  welcomed  receiving  permis- 

1  16  W.  R.,  537.  *  Ante,  256-258. 


1862]          LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  3n 

sion  to  retire  to  Centreville.  In  regard  to  Pope's 
battles — while  we  may  fully  justify  him  in  attacking 
on  the  29th — supposing,  as  he  did,  that  he  had  only 
Jackson  to  deal  with — it  is  plain  that  he  went  directly 
counter  to  his  rdle  in  attacking  the  united  forces 
of  Lee  on  the  next  day, — before  Sumner  and  Frank- 
lin had  joined  him.  On  the  other  hand,  Halleck's 
efforts  for  the  preservation  of  the  Government  stores 
and  property  at  Fredericksburg  and  Aquia  Creek 
resulted  in  utter  failure.  Both  places  were  aban- 
doned, and  not  only  were  the  warehouses  burned,  but 
also  the  bridges  on  the  railroad  and  the  wharves  at 
Aquia  Creek.  Why  these  last  acts  of  destruction 
were  committed  it  is  not  easy  to  see ;  for  the  wharves 
and  bridges  were  of  no  use  to  the  Confederates,  and 
might  conceivably  have  been  still  in  existence  when 
a  Union  army  should  next  occupy  Falmouth  and 
need  a  railroad  running  thence  to  Aquia  Creek,  as 
actually  happened  in  the  ensuing  December.  But 
for  one  reason  or  another  General  Halleck  saw  fit 
to  have  everything  burned.1 

General  Lee's  operations  had  indeed  been  success- 
ful, but  we  must  point  out  that  his  successes  were 
due  much  more  to  the  ability  with  which  he  im- 
proved the  mistakes  of  his  antagonist,  than  to  any 
advantages  which  he  procured  for  himself  by  the 
hazardous  strategy  which  he  employed.  Thus,  al- 
though he  was  able  to  attack  Pope's  army  at  a  dis- 
advantage 2  on  August  30th, — the  only  time  when  he 

1  18  W.  R..  799,  813-816.  General  Haupt,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the 
construction  of  the  United  States  military  railroads,  says  :  ' '  The  burning 
of  the  wharf,  buildings,  and  bridges,  I  consider  to  have  been  unnecessary 
and  highly  censurable."  *  Ante,  262. 


312  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

did  attack  it, — this  was  not  due  to  any  previous 
movements  of  his  own,  but  solely  to  Pope's  making 
the  mistake  of  assaulting  Jackson's  position  that 
same  afternoon  under  the  impression  that  he  was 
retreating,  and  of  persisting  in  it  after  he  knew  that 
Lee  was  preparing  to  move  in  force  upon  his  left 
and  communications.  Of  these  mistakes  Lee  took 
prompt  advantage,  and  thus  won  his  victory.  But 
the  separation  of  Jackson  from  the  main  body  of 
the  Confederate  army  three  days  before  had  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  these  mistakes  of  General  Pope's 
on  the  field  of  battle. 

Again,  it  is  quite  true  that  the  severance  of  Pope's 
communications  with  Washington  and  Alexandria 

O 

did  cause  a  great  deal  of  alarm  among  the  officers  of 
the  Government  there,  and  did  undoubtedly  delay 
the  forwarding  of  the  two  corps  of  Sumner  and 
Franklin  to  the  army  of  General  Pope.1  But  Gen- 
eral Pope,  though  he  had  met  with  no  success,  yet 
had  not  been  beaten  in  the  battle  of  the  29th ;  he 
could  perfectly  well  have  taken  up  a  defensive  posi- 
tion for  the  following  day ;  if  he  had  been  attacked, 
he  ought  to  have  been  able  with  his  superior  num- 
bers to  maintain  himself  till  reinforced  and  supplied  ; 
and  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  he  would  not 
have  been  able  to  do  so.  His  defeat  on  the  30th 
was  due  obviously  to  his  faulty  management  on  the 
field ;  and  although  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
assistance  of  Sumner  and  Franklin  would  have  been 
most  valuable, — as  indeed  would  that  of  Banks,  whom 

1  Ante,  262.     See  2  M.  H.  S.  M.,  265-334  ;   18  W.  R.,  706-750.    Ropes, 
chapter  xii. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  313 

lie  did  not  even  summon  to  his  aid, — it  is  not  correct 
to  say  that  Pope  was  defeated  because  he  did  not 
have  a  sufficiently  large  force  under  him. 

We  may  well,  however,  inquire  how  it  came  about 
that  General  Halleck  did  not  send  these  corps  of 
Sumner  and  Franklin  and  also  the  corps  of  Keyes 
to  join  the  army  of  General  Pope  in  time  for  the  last 
battles.  The  whole  object  of  removing  McClellan 
from  the  Peninsula  being  to  unite  his  army  to  the 
force  under  Pope,  and  General  Lee  being  powerless 
to  prevent  the  union,  it  is  certainly  remarkable  that 
it  should  not  have  been  accomplished. 

In  the  first  place,  Halleck  actually  intended  to 
leave  the  4th  corps — Keyes's — at  Yorktown1 — a 
most  extraordinary  thing  to  do,  considering  the  im- 
perative necessity,  as  he  had  represented  the  matter 
in  his  correspondence  with  McClellan,  of  uniting 
the  two  Union  armies,  so  as  to  be  able  to  cope  with 
Lee's  200,000  men.  It  only  shows  how  impossible 
it  was  for  General  Halleck  to  grasp  the  main  idea 
of  a  military  operation  clearly  and  firmly,  and  to 
prevent  other  ideas  from  crowding  it  out  of  its  place 
of  paramount  importance  in  his  mind.  There  was 
really  nothing  which  10,000  veteran  soldiers  could 
do  at  Yorktown,  although,  if  there  had  been  a  super- 
abundance of  troops,  some  might  very  properly 
have  been  stationed  there.  There  was  every  reason 
in  the  world  why  the  transfer  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  to  Washington,  if  once  decided  on,  should 
have  been  a  complete  transfer.  But  the  fates  were 

1  This  measure  was  evidently  disapproved  of  by  McClellan  ;  18  W.  R.,  628, 
633.     He  wanted  to  have  Yorktown  and  Gloucester  held,  but  by  new  troops. 


314  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

too  strong  for  General  Halleck.  Towards  the  end 
of  the  month,  on  August  26th  and  27th,  Halleck,  on 
McClellan's  suggestion,  decided  to  replace  Couch's 
division  of  Keyes's  corps  with  5000  fresh  troops,1 
and  Couch  was  sent  for  in  haste.2  And,  still  later, 
on  September  2d,  after  Pope's  army  had  retired  within 
the  defences  of  the  capital,  Halleck  was  reluctantly 
compelled  to  admit  that  the  great  danger  to  Wash- 
ington rendered  it  necessary  that  the  remainder  of 
Keyes's  corps  should  be  sent  from  Yorktown  to  join 
the  rest  of  the  army.8  This  attempt  to  combine  the  re- 
tention of  10,000  veteran  troops  in  the  abandoned 
Peninsula  with  the  all-important  matter  of  securing 
a  sufficient  force  to  meet  Lee  in  front  of  Washing- 
ton, thus  met  with  the  same  fate  as  Halleck's  other 
attempt  to  combine  with  the  same  all-important 
matter  the  preservation  of  the  government  stores 
and  wharves  at  Falmouth  and  Aquia  Creek. 

With  the  corps  of  Franklin  and  Sumner,  however, 
the  case  was,  of  course,  quite  different.  Franklin's 
corps  arrived  at  Alexandria  on  the  24th  and  25th  of 
August ; 4  and  he,  in  obedience  to  orders  from  Mc- 
Clellan,5  who  was  then  at  Aquia  Creek,6  reported  in 
person  on  the  26th  to  General  Halleck  in  Washing- 
ton, and  received  from  him  an  order  directing 
him  to  march  by  Centreville  towards  Warrenton.' 
Franklin  at  once  telegraphed  to  his  staff  at  Alex- 
andria the  necessary  order  for  the  corps  to  start  the 
next  morning  at  six  o'clock.8  After  further  consul- 

1  18  W.  R.,  672,  673,  688,  689.  5  /£.,  651. 

8  Ib.,  692,  Williams  to  Sawtelle.  *  12  W.  R.,  93. 

3  16.,  798.  '  18  W.  R.,  676. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  315 

tation  with  Franklin,  however,  in  which  the  fact 
that  Franklin's  artillery  had  not  yet  arrived  was 
considered,  Halleck  thought  it  best  that  the  order 
for  starting  should  be  revoked1,  and  Franklin  at 
once  telegraphed  to  his  staff-officer  from  Halleck's 
office  in  Washington2  to  that  effect. 

Shortly  afterwards,  before  nine  P.M.  of  the  26th,8 
the  news  came  of  Jackson's  having  broken  at  Bristoe 
Station  the  communications  with  Pope's  army.  This 
was  at  first  supposed  to  be  the  work  of  a  small  raid- 
ing party,  and  Halleck,  during  the  night,  through 
the  agency  of  General  Haupt,  the  officer  in  charge 
of  railroad  transportation,  ordered  Taylor's  brigade 
of  Franklin's  corps  and  two  regiments  from  Cox's 
Kanawha  command  under  Colonel  Scammon  to  pro- 
ceed to  Manassas  at  once.4  At  ten  the  next  morning 
(the  27th),  Halleck  telegraphed  McClellan,5  who 
had  arrived  at  Alexandria  the  previous  evening,6 
that  Franklin  ought  to  go  out  to  Manassas  as  soon 
as  possible.  About  the  same  time  a  despatch  was 
received  from  General  Burnside,7  who  was  at  Fal- 
mouth,  in  which  he  copied  a  note  written  to  himself 
by  General  Porter,  containing  the  substance  of 
Pope's  order  to  him  of  seven  o'clock  the  previous 
evening,8  ordering  him  to  the  neighborhood  of  War- 
renton,  and  saying  that  he  (Pope)  did  not  see  how 

1  Letter  to  the  writer  from  General  Franklin.  General  Halleck  fails  to 
mention  in  his  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War  this  change  of  opinion  of  his  ; 
18  W.  R.,  739. 

1  Ib.,  676. 

1  Ib.,  679.     Halleck  to  McClellan,  ib.,  690  ;  12  W.  R.,  95. 

4  Ante,  269.  6  1 8  W.  R.,  688. 

5  12  W.  R.,  95.  T  Ib.,  701. 

8  Ib.,  675.     This  was  written  before  Pope  had  heard  of  Jackson's  raid. 


316  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

a  general  engagement  could  be  put  off  more  than  a 
day  or  two.  McClellan  thereupon  very  wisely  sug- 
gested to  Halleck1  the  advisability  of  bringing  up 
Sumner  from  Aquia,  where  his  corps  had  landed,  to 
Alexandria,  remarking  that  a  defeat  at  Warrenton 
"  would  leave  the  troops  on  the  lower  Rappahannock 
(Burnside's  and  Sumner's)  in  a  dangerous  position," 
and  that  from  Alexandria  the  corps  of  Franklin  and 
Sumner  could  move  out  together  to  Centreville, 
where  they  would  cover  the  capital.  He  followed 
this  up  by  suggesting  that  Burnside  should  at  once 
evacuate  Falmouth  and  Aquia.2  Halleck  acceded 
to  McClellan's  suggestion  that  Sumner's  corps  should 
be  brought  up  to  Alexandria,  but,  still  unwilling  to 
renounce  his  favorite  scheme,  deferred  coming  to  a 
decision  as  to  Burnside's  command.3  Halleck,  in 
truth,  was  by  no  means  devoting  sufficient  attention  to 
the  military  crisis  in  Virginia.  He  even  wrote  to 
McClellan  that  "  more  than  three  quarters  of "  his 
time  was  "  taken  up  with  the  raising  of  new  troops 
and  matters  in  the  West." 4  McClellan  at  once  or- 
dered Sumner  to  re-embark  his  troops  at  Aquia  and 
come  up  to  Alexandria  with  them. 5 

While  this  correspondence  was  going  on,  or  soon 
after,  news  arrived  that  the  supposed  raid  was  a 
serious  matter — that  Manassas  and  Fairfax  Station 
had  fallen  into  the  possession  of  the  enemy.6  Tay- 
lor's expedition  had  been  completely  defeated  on 
the  morning  of  the  27th,  and  he  himself  had  been 

1  18  W.  R.,  689.  47£.,  691. 

*  Ib.,  689.  s  7^,692. 

3  Ib.,  691.  «  7^,693. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  317 

mortally  wounded.  Confederate  troops,  both  infan- 
try and  cavalry,  liad  passed  through  Centreville  on 
the  morning  of  the  28th.  Fitz-Hugh  Lee  with 
three  regiments  of  Stuart's  cavalry  raided  the  coun- 
try on  the  27th  and  28th  between  Fairfax  Court 
House  and  Alexandria.1  For  four  days  (26th,  27th, 
28th,  29th)  nothing  was  heard  from  General  Pope.2 
No  one  even  knew  where  he  was. 

McClellan  was  strongly  averse  to  the  movement 
of  Franklin's  corps  alone,  which  Halleck  had  or- 
dered. On  the  27th  he  urged  on  Halleck's  attention 3 
the  fact  that  Franklin  had  "  no  horses  except  for 
four  guns  without  caissons,"  that  he  (McClellan) 
could  pick  up  no  cavalry,  and  insisted  that  without 
artillery  or  cavalry  Franklin  could  not  effect  any 
useful  purpose.4  In  the  same  letter  he  called 
Halleck's  attention  to  the  necessity  of  "  placing  the 
works  in  front  of  Washington  in  an  efficient  con- 
dition of  defence."5  In  a  later  note  he  explicitly 
stated  his  opinion  to  be  that  the  true  policy  was  to 
make  the  works  perfectly  safe,  and  also  to  mobilize 
two  corps  as  soon  as  possible,  but  not  to  advance 
them  until  they  could  have  their  artillery  and 
cavalry.6  But  General  Halleck  reverted  to  his  first 
decision  as  to  the  employment  of  Franklin's  corps  by 
itself.  At  noon  of  the  27th  he  told  McClellan  that 
it  ought  to  move  out  by  forced  marches  carrying 
three  or  four  days'  provisions.7 

1  16  W.  R.,  735.  2/£.,  724. 

3  As  Franklin  himself  had  done  on  the  26th.     Letter  to  the  writer  from 
General  Franklin. 

4  1 8  W.  R.,  689.  6  Ib.,  690. 
5/<JM  689.  '  12  W.  R.,  94. 


3i 8          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

About  the  same  time  rumors  of  the  presence  of 
Confederate  troops  on  the  north  of  the  Capital1 
alarmed  McClellan ;  and  the  reports  which  General 
Barnard/  who  was  in  charge  of  the  defences  of 
Washington,  made  to  him  and  to  General  Halleck 
in  regard  to  the  necessity  of  taking  immediate  meas- 
ures for  the  security  of  the  city,  induced  him  to 
change  his  mind  as  to  the  advisability  of  pushing 
out  both  the  corps,  and  to  suggest  to  Halleck  that 
Sumner's  corps  should  be  retained  for  the  defence 
of  Washington.  Halleck  at  once  concurred  in  Mc- 
Clellan's  opinion,3  and  Sumner's  corps,  which  arrived 
at  Alexandria  on  the  28th,  was,  on  the  next  day, 
stationed  near  the  forts  on  the  west  side  of  the  city.4 

This  disposition  of  Sumner's  command  left  Frank- 
lin's corps  the  only  body  of  troops  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  still  under  McClellan's  control,  and  the 
only  body  available  for  the  reinforcement  of  General 
Pope's  army.  General  Halleck  adhered  to  his  origi- 
nal intention,  that  this  corps  must  move  out  from 
Washington  alone.  On  the  evening  of  the  27th, 
Halleck  and  McClellan  had  a  conference 5  in  which 

1  18  W.  R.,  690,  691,  722. 

*  "  A  serious  attack,"  said  Barnard,  "would  not  encounter  a  serious  re- 
sistance. .  .  .  It  is  my  duty  to  state  that  without  experienced  garrisons  thrown 
into  the  works  and  experienced  troops  posted  along  the  lines,  the  fortifica- 
tions of  Washington  are  not  secure  against  assault."  (16.,  711,  712.)  Hal- 
leek's  reply  to  Barnard  (712)  is  characteristic  of  him.  "  If  you  are  deficient 
in  anything  for  the  defence  of  the  forts,"  said  he,  "  make  your  requisitions 
on  the  proper  office.  General  Casey  will  give  you  plenty  of  new  troops  and 
General  McClellan  will  assist  you  with  artillerists.  I  have  no  time  for 
these  details,  and  don't  come  to  me  until  you  exhaust  other  resources." 
But  neither  Casey  nor  McClellan  were  under  Barnard's  orders.  All  three 
were  under  Halleck's  orders  only. 

3  Ib.,  722. 

4  Ib.,  723.  5  Ib. ,  739,  740. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  319 

it  was  determined  that  Franklin  was  to  move  on  the 
next  morning.1  Soon  after  noon  of  the  28th  Halleck 
sent  Franklin  a  direct  order 2  to  move  his  corps  that 
day  "  toward  Manassas  Junction,  to  drive  the  enemy 
from  the  railroad."  But  McClellan  would  not  allow 
Halleck's  order  to  be  carried  out.  He  replied  at 
once 3  to  the  general-in-chief,  saying  that,  as  soon  as 
Franklin  could  "  be  started  with  a  reasonable  amount 
of  artillery,"  he  should  go.  Halleck  replied  that 
not  a  moment  must  be  lost  in  pushing  as  large  a 
force  as  possible  towards  Manassas,  so  as  to  commun- 
icate with  Pope  before  the  enemy  should  be  rein- 
forced.4 But  McClellan  was  refractory  and  unwilling 
to  yield.  He  acknowledged  instantly  the  receipt  of 
the  order,  but  refused  to  obey  it.  "  Neither  Frank- 
lin's nor  Sumner's  corps,"  said  he,5  "  is  now  in  con- 
dition to  move  and  fight  a  battle.  It  would  be  a 
sacrifice  to  send  them  out  now."  To  this  Halleck 
replied 6 :  "  There  must  be  no  further  delay  in  mov- 
ing Franklin's  corps  toward  Manassas.  They  [sic] 
must  go  to-morrow  morning,  ready  or  not  ready.  If 
we  delay  too  long  to  get  ready  there  will  be  no 
necessity  to  go  at  all,  for  Pope  will  either  be  defeated 
or  be  victorious  without  our  aid." 

That  evening  Franklin's  artillery  arrived,7  and  the 
next  morning  he  started.8     But  McClellan,  under  the 

1  18  W.  R.,  707. 
s/£.,  707. 

3  Ib.,  708.     No  doubt  Scammon's  experience  at  the  bridge  over  Bull  Run, 
without  artillery  (16  W.  R.,  406),  which  was  known  to  McClellan  (18  W. 
R.,  708),  had  its  influence  on  his  opinion. 

4  Ib.,  709. 

5  Ib.,  709.  7  Ib.,  709. 

•  Ib.,  710.  8  12  W.  R.,  97. 


320          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 


plea  that  it  would  not  be  safe  for  him  to  advance 
beyond  Annandale — a  town  only  nine  miles  from 
Alexandria — ordered  him  to  halt  there.1  When 
Halleck  learned  this,  he  said  that  it  was  contrary  to 
his  instructions 2 ;  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  Hal- 
leek's  latest  order  was  anything  but  precise.  Instead 
of  telling  McClellan  that  Franklin  must  reach  Manas- 
sas  or  Centreville  that  night,  he  had  contented  him- 
self, in  replying  to  the  question  which  McClellan 
had  asked  him  in  the  afternoon — how  far  he  wished 
Franklin  to  advance3 — with  saying  that  he  wanted 
him  "  to  go  far  enough  to  find  out  something  about 
the  enemy.  Perhaps,"  he  said,  "he  may  get  such 
information  at  Annandale  as  to  prevent  his  going 
farther ;  otherwise,  he  will  push  on  toward  Fairfax."4 
Kow  Franklin  did  get  some  news  at  Annandale, 
which  he  sent  to  McClellan.5  Halleck,  however, 
apparently  oblivious  of  the  limited  scope  of  Frank- 
lin's mission,  as  defined  above,  wrote  in  the  evening 
to  McClellan 6 :  "  That  corps  must  push  forward,  as 
I  directed,  protect  the  railroad,  and  open  our  com- 
munications with  Manassas,"  certainly  a  much  more 
important  and  an  altogether  different  task  from  that 
of  "  getting  information." 7  It  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at  that  McClellan,  in  reply,  said :  "  Please  give  dis- 
tinct orders  in  reference  to  Franklin's  movements  of 
to-morrow." 8  Halleck  vouchsafing  no  reply  to  this 
request,  McClellan  ordered  Franklin  to  march  at  six 

1  12  W.  R.,  99.  *  Ib.,  722. 

*  18  W.  R.,  723.  *  76.,  723. 

*  Ib.,  722.  s  Ib. ,  723. 

1  For  Halleck's  own  account  of  this  matter,  see  18  W.  R.,  739. 
8  12  W.  R.,  99. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  321 

the  next  morning  (the  30th)  "to  place  himself  in 
communication  with  General  Pope."1  Franklin 
reached  the  vicinity  of  Bull  Run  at  six  o'clock,  just 
as  the  battle  was  over.  2 

As  for  Sumner,  he  was  ordered  on  the  30th  to 
march  to  the  relief  of  General  Pope,  leaving  a  brig- 
ade and  a  battery  near  Washington.3  He  left  that 
afternoon,4  and  arrived  at  Centreville  the  next  morn- 
ing, finding  the  whole  army  assembled  there. 

In  reviewing  the  unsatisfactory  story  of  these  few 
days  many  criticisms  naturally  arise,  but  we  shall 
confine  ourselves  to  a  very  few. 

In  the  first  place,  General  Halleck's  deficiencies  as 
a  general-in-chief  are  everywhere  painfully  apparent. 
It  is  plain  that  he  had  no  definite  policy  of  his  own. 
The  bringing  up  of  Sumner  from  Aquia  and  the 
posting  of  his  corps  along  the  lines  of  Washington 
were  both  suggestions  of  McClellan.  Halleck  con- 
fessed himself  ignorant  of  the  state  of  the  defences 
of  the  Capital.5  He  indeed  sent  Franklin  out  at  last, 
and  wanted  to  send  him  earlier,  but  his  purposes  in 
so  doing  were  very  vaguely  and  somewhat  inconsist- 
ently defined.  Had  he  seriously  intended  that  Frank- 
lin, as  soon  as  he  arrived  from  the  Peninsula,  should 
go  out  to  reinforce  Pope,  he  could  certainly,  one 
would  think,  before  McClellan  arrived  at  Alexandria, 
have  provided  him,  out  of  the  stores  of  the  Capital, 
with  all  the  necessary  artillery  and  transportation. 
An  able  and  efficient  officer  in  his  place  would  have 


1  12  W.  R.,  ioo. 

*  16  W.  R.,  536,  537.  *  Ib.,  752. 

Ji8  W.  R.,  745,  */*.,  712. 


VOL.    II.— 21 


322  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

had  decided  views  on  all  these  points ;  and,  armed 
with  the  powers  of  a  general-in-chief,  would  have 
carried  them  out. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  very  plain  that  General 
McClellan's  estimate  of  the  danger  attending  a  move- 
ment of  troops  sent  out  from  Washington  to  rein- 
force Pope's  army  was  enormously  exaggerated,  to 
say  the  least  of  it.  There  was  in  fact  no  danger  at 
all  after  August  27th.  But  we  must  remember  that 
the  facts  were  not  known  at  the  time  to  McClellan 
or  to  Halleck,  or  to  anyone  in  Washington.  All 
sorts  of  rumors  were  floating  in  the  air ;  McClellan 
was  honestly  anxious  about  the  safety  of  the  city ; 
the  fact  that  Pope,  with  an  army  of  70,000  men,  had 
had  his  communications  with  the  Capital  severed  was 
inexplicable  and  ominous  of  disaster;  and  under 
such  circumstances,  McClellan  did  not  feel  like  try- 
ing experiments.  At  one  time,  on  the  27th,  he  in- 
deed seemed  to  think  that  two  well-equipped  corps 
might  prudently  venture  out  to  Pope's  assistance  * ; 
two  days  later  he  wrote  to  the  President 2  that  either 
all  available  forces  should  be  used  to  open  communi- 
cation with  Pope,  or  that  he  should  be  left  "  to  get 
out  of  his  scrape,"  while  all  means  should  be  used  to 
make  Washington  perfectly  safe.  It  is  plain  that 
he  was  all  along  doubtful  of  the  expediency  of  mak- 
ing any  serious  attempt  to  reopen  communications 
with  Pope,  or  to  reinforce  him,  and  there  could 
hardly  be  a  question  as  to  condemning  him  for  un- 
due caution,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  the  two 
corps  of  Sumner  and  Franklin,  which  constituted  all 

•  18  W.  R.,  689,  690.  s  12  W.  R.,  98. 


1862]          LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  323 

his  available  resources,  were  without  an  adequate 
force  of  artillery  and  cavalry.  Yet,  considering  that 
a  march  of  twenty -five  miles  over  a  road,  on  which, 
as  we  know  now,  no  enemy  except  Fitz-Hugh  Lee's 
three  regiments  of  cavalry  would  have  been  found, 
would  have  united  these  troops  to  Pope's  army  in 
time  for  the  battle  of  the  30th,  it  is  certainly  re- 
markable that  the  attempt  was  not  made.  We  do 
not  believe  that  General  McClellan,  as  has  been  so 
often  charged,  deliberately  withheld  these  corps 
from  going  to  Pope's  army  for  fear  that  with  their 
assistance  Pope  would  gain  a  victory.  Rather  was 
he  afraid  that  these  corps  would  be  sacrificed  in  a 
futile  attempt  to  enable  Pope  to  withstand  Lee's 
army. 1 

The  failure  of  General  Pope's  operations  had  been 
so  manifest,  and  the  lack  of  belief  on  the  part  of  the 
troops  in  his  ability  as  a  commander  of  an  army  had 
become  so  universal,  that  there  was  really  nothing 
for  the  Government  to  do  but  to  relieve  him  and  to 
appoint  McClellan  in  his  room.  McClellan  possessed 
to  the  full  the  confidence  of  the  Peninsular  army,  the 
officers  and  men  of  which  believed  that  his  plans  had 
been  interfered  with  by  ignorant  and  envious  poli- 
ticians, and  that,  but  for  this,  success  would  have 
crowned  his  arms.  They  joyfully  welcomed  the  op- 
portunity of  serving  again  under  his  command.  The 
troops  of  the  late  Army  of  Virginia  laid  to  the  ac- 
count of  General  Pope  their  harassing  and  useless 
marches,  their  unsuccessful,  because  ill-planned  and 
ill-managed,  battles,  and  the  mortifying  issue  of  their 

1  See  McClellan's  letter  to  Halleck  of  August  31  ;  ib.,  103. 


324  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

campaign,  and  were  for  the  most  part  not  averse  to 
coming  under  the  control  of  a  commander  who  at 
least  knew  how  to  win  the  enthusiastic  devotion  of 
his  soldiers,  and  whose  reputation  for  considerate 
and  careful  management  was  so  widespread  and  so 
well  deserved  as  was  that  of  General  McClellan. 

Something  of  course  had  to  be  done  at  once.  The 
capital  was  full  of  stragglers.1  The  discipline  of 
defeated  soldiers  is  never  of  the  best.  Notwith- 
standing the  large  number  of  troops  within  the 
works,  there  was  some  alarm  felt  for  the  safety  of 
Washington.  The  Secretary  of  War  ordered  a  large 
part  of  the  contents  of  the  arsenal  to  be  shipped  to 
New  York.2  The  clerks  and  employes  of  the  civil 
departments  were  organized,  armed,  and  supplied 
with  ammunition  for  the  defence  of  the  Capital.3 
Halleck,  of  course,  had  no  intention  of  taking  the 
command  of  the  army  in  person  ;  this  was  a  task 
for  which  he  knew  he  was  wholly  unsuited.  There 
could  be  no  real  doubt  as  to  the  choice  that  must  be 
made.  It  is  true  that  Pope  accused  McClellan  of 
having  intentionally  ruined  his  campaign  by  delay- 
ing to  send  out  the  corps  of  Franklin  and  Sumner4; 
but  Halleck  knew  more  about  this  matter  than  Pope 
did.  There  was  in  truth  no  alternative  for  the  Gov- 
ernment; and,  on  the  2d  of  September,  McClellan 
was  given  "  command  of  the  fortifications  of  Wash- 
ington and  of  all  the  troops  for  the  defence  of  the 
Capital." 5  On  the  5th,  Pope,  who  up  to  this  time 


1  18  W.  R.,  798  ;  Slough  to  Stanton. 

1  /£.,  802,  805.  «/<*.,  808. 

1  Ib.,  807.  *  16.,  807. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  325 

had  hoped  that  the  Government  would  reorganize 
the  army  under  officers  friendly  to  him  and  send 
him  out  at  the  head  of  it,1  was  relieved  from  duty.2 
He  was  subsequently  sent  to  the  West.3  The  army 
of  Virginia  was  consolidated  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,4  only  the  latter  name  being  retained. 
There  was  no  formal  order  reinvesting  McClellan 
with  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac; 
but  then  he  had  never  been  relieved  from  this  com- 
mand 5 ;  and  as  he  was  the  only  officer  in  charge  of 
the  troops,  he  naturally  and  unavoidably  assumed 
control  as  well  of  movements  outside  the  lines  of 
Washington  as  of  those  within  them. 

While  these  necessary  changes  and  readjustments 
were  being  made  within  the  works  which  encircled 
the  Federal  capital,  General  Lee  was  considering 
what  use  he  would  make  of  his  victory — what  step 
he  would  take  next.  An  assault  on  the  fortifica- 
tions of  Washington  was  too  hazardous  an  experi- 
ment to  be  thought  of,  and  a  siege,  undertaken  by 
an  army  of  not  over  55,000  men,  was,  of  course,  out 
of  the  question.6  There  remained  the  alternative  of 
crossing  the  Potomac  or  remaining  in  Virginia.  To 
take  the  former  course  was  to  keep  the  initiative — 
a  thing  always  of  great  advantage  in  war.  To  take 
the  latter,  to  remain  on  the  defensive  in  Virginia, 
was  to  leave  it  to  the  Federal  authorities  to  deter- 
mine when  to  recommence  hostilities  in  the  field— 
an  option  which  would  not  be  exercised — the  Con- 

1  18  W.  R.,  808,  810,  812.  3  /£.,  816. 

»/*.,  811,  813.  4  /£.,  813. 

5  See  Halleck  to  McClellan,  14  W.  R.,  359,  360. 
«  28  W.  R.,  590. 


326  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

federate  commander  might  feel  sure — until  the 
United  States  army  had  been  so  reorganized  and 
strengthened  that  it  was  believed  to  be  much  more 
powerful  than  its  adversary.1  And  who  could  say 
that  the  Washington  Government,  possessing,  as  it 
did,  the  command  of  the  sea,  might  not  again  trans- 
port its  army  to  the  Peninsula,  thus  transferring  the 
seat  of  war  to  the  neighborhood  of  Richmond  ? 

It  was  true  that  General  Lee's  forces  were  by  no 
means  in  a  fit  state  to  undertake  the  invasion  of  the 
North.  "  The  army,"  so  wrote  that  officer  to  Presi- 
dent Davis  on  September  3d,2  "is  not  properly 
equipped  for  an  invasion  of  an  enemy's  territory. 
It  lacks  much  of  the  material  of  war,  is  feeble  in 
transportation,  the  animals  being  much  reduced,  and 
the  men  are  poorly  provided  with  clothes,  and,  in 
thousands  of  instances,  are  destitute  of  shoes."  But 
the  Confederate  troops  were  in  high  spirits  and  full 
of  confidence  in  their  commander,  and  Lee  wisely 
decided  to  take  advantage  of  the  favorable  elements 
in  the  military  situation  and  to  cross  the  Potomac. 

One  of  the  reasons  which  weighed  with  General 
Lee  in  favor  of  this  course  of  action  was  the  hope 
that  the  presence  of  the  Confederate  army  in  the 
State  of  Maryland  might  arouse  the  people  of  that 
State,  or  a  large  part  of  them,  at  any  rate,  to  rise 
against  the  United  States,  and  declare  their  State 
independent  of  the  Union.3  Like  all  the  Border 
States,  Maryland  was  much  divided  in  opinion.  At 
one  time,  in  the  early  days  of  the  war,  Baltimore 

1  McClellan,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  554. 

»28W.  R.,  590.  */<*.,  590. 


1862]           LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  327 

had  fallen  completely  under  the  control  of  the  favor- 
ers of  secession.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  if  Maryland 
had  been  south  of  the  capital  of  the  Union,  instead 
of  north  of  it,  she  might  have  cast  in  her  lot  with  the 
majority  of  the  slaveholding  States.  But,  situated 
as  she  was,  the  pressure  exercised  unhesitatingly  by 
the  G-overnment  of  the  United  States  upon  her  peo- 
ple prevented  the  advocates  of  secession  from  ex- 
hibiting their  full  strength.  There  was,  undoubtedly, 
a  strong  party  in  all  parts  of  the  State  in  favor  of 
remaining  in  the  Union,  especially  in  the  western 
counties ;  but  in  all  such  cases  the  party  of  action 
is  always  more  aggressive  than  its  opponents,  and 
it  was  impossible  to  say  whether  the  presence  in  the 
State  of  a  victorious  Confederate  army  might  not 
give  the  partisans  of  secession  at  least  a  temporary 
advantage  over  their  adversaries.  Anything  of  this 
sort  would  be  certain  to  hamper  the  movements  of 
the  Federal  armies,  and  to  diminish  their  available 
strength  for  actual  combat.  Therefore,  under  the 
circumstances,  it  was  impossible  for  President  Davis 
and  General  Lee  not  to  entertain  a  hope  that  some 
advantage  to  their  cause  might  not  improbably  result 
from  the  unveiling  of  the  Confederate  flag  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Potomac.1 

It  must  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  the  inva- 
sion of  the  North  was  undertaken  mainly  for  the 
effect  which  it  was  hoped  it  might  produce  on  the 
people  of  the  State  of  Maryland.  Apart  from  any 

1  Lee  to  Davis,  28  W.  R.,  590,  596  ;  Davis  to  Lee,  ib.,  598  ;  Lee's  Pro- 
clamation to  the  People  of  Maryland,  ib.,  601.  This  hope,  however,  was 
not  realized.  The  people  of  Maryland  gave  no  assistance  worth  mentioning 
to  the  Confederate  army. 


328  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

political  change  in  the  attitude  of  that  population,  it 
was  eminently  desirable  to  exhibit  the  spectacle  of  a 
Confederate  army  freely  traversing  the  soil  of  the 
States  which  remained  in  the  Union  ;  the  effect  which 
this  might  have  on  northern  sentiment,  and  also  on 
foreign  opinion,  in  the  direction  of  indicating  the 
impossibility  of  the  North's  accomplishing  the  tre- 
mendous task  of  subjugating  the  South,  was  likely 
to  be  of  very  great  consequence.  The  party  in  the 
North  which  had  always  believed  in  this  impossibil- 
ity would  certainly  have  its  belief  fortified  when  an 
invasion  of  the  North  was  substituted  for  an  invasion 
of  the  South ;  and  the  chance  of  foreign  interference 
to  stop  a  war  in  which  it  seemed  plain  that  the  North 
had  no  reasonable  chance  of  achieving  such  a  de- 
cisive and  overwhelming  victory  as  alone  would 
justify  such  a  struggle,  could  not  but  be  materially 
increased. 

Lastly,  General  Lee  had  had  thus  far  such  successes 
in  dealing  with  Pope  and  McClellan,  one  of  whom 
was  practically  certain  to  command  the  Union  army 
in  the  coming  campaign,  that  hopes  of  obtaining  a 
great  victory  over  the  Northern  army,  the  military 
results  of  which  might  be  practically  decisive  of  the 
war,  must  have  influenced  him  strongly  to  take  such 
a  course  as  would  in  all  probability  bring  about  a 
battle  before  the  Union  forces  had  had  time  to  re- 
cover from  the  disorganization  and  depression  caused 
by  their  recent  defeats.  He  probably  never  would 
find  the  Federal  army  in  poorer  condition  for  a  great 
struggle  (at  least  so  he  thought)  than  at  this  time. 

His  own  army  was,  it  was  true,  weak  in  numbers ; 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  329 

nevertheless,  another  chance  for  victory,  as  good  as 
that  which  Pope  offered  to  him  at  Bull  Run  on 
August  30th,  might  not  impossibly  occur  again. 

Accordingly,  General  Lee  at  once  set  about  making 
the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  establishment  of 
a  new  line  of  communications.  Neither  the  War- 
renton  turnpike  nor  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
railroad  could  serve  him  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Potomac.  The  Shenandoah  Valley  must  now  be  his 
only  avenue  of  supply.  On  the  5th  of  September, 
he  wrote  to  President  Davis,1  notifying  him  that  the 
railroad  and  turnpike  had  been  abandoned  as  far 
back  as  Culpeper  Court  House,  and  that  henceforth 
all  supplies  must  be  sent  from  that  place  by  way  of 
Luray  Gap  and  Front  Royal  to  Winchester,  where  it 
was  proposed  to  establish  a  depot  of  stores.2 

With  the  view  that,  by  crossing  east  of  the  Blue 
Ridge  and  thus  threatening  Washington  and  Balti- 
more, he  could  secure  the  withdrawal  of  the  entire 
Federal  force  to  the  north  of  the  Potomac,  and  thus 
be  able  to  feel  reasonably  secure  about  his  com- 
munications, General  Lee  crossed  the  Potomac,  be- 
tween the  4th  and  7th  of  September,  by  the  fords 
in  the  vicinity  of  Leesburg.3  The  movements  of 
the  army  were  screened  by  the  cavalry  under  Stuart. 
On  the  7th,  the  Confederates  had  retired  behind  the 
line  of  the  Monocacy,  a  stream  which  empties  into 
the  Potomac  at  a  point  almost  twenty  miles  south 
of  Frederick  City,4  and  near  this  place  Lee  estab- 

1  28  W.  R.,  593,601,603. 

2  See  Map  IX.,  facing  page  350. 

'27  W.  R.,  145.  28  W.  R.,  604,  605, 

4  Of  ten  called  Fredericktown,  and  sometimes  Frederick. 


330  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.      [1862 

lished  his  headquarters.  His  intention  at  this  time 
was  to  move  eastward  through  the  Catoctin  and 
South  Mountain  ranges  to  the  Cumberland  Valley, 
gathering  the  supplies  with  which  that  fertile  region 
abounded,  invading  Pennsylvania,  occupying  Harris- 
burg,  threatening  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  and  Wash- 
ington,1 and  in  this  way  occupying  the  remainder  of 
the  autumn,  thus  postponing  to  the  ensuing  spring 
any  Federal  invasion  of  Virginia.2  From  this  plan, 
however,  General  Lee  almost  immediately  departed, 
being  tempted  by  the  opportunity  presented  by  the 
dangerous  situation  of  the  Federal  troops  at  Harper's 
Ferry  to  renounce,  for  the  time  being,  at  any  rate, 
his  larger  projects,  and  to  bend  all  his  energies  to 
the  capture  of  this  exposed  garrison  and  the  guns 
and  stores  which  they  were  undertaking  to  protect. 
The  town  of  Harper's  Ferry  is  situated  in  Vir- 
ginia, at  the  junction  of  the  Shenandoah  River  with 
the  Potomac,  and  on  the  left  or  western  bank  of  the 
Shenandoah.  It  is  quite  capable  of  defence  against 
an  attack  from  the  southwest,  where  Bolivar  Heights 
run  across,  behind  the  town,  from  one  river  to  the 
other.  But  the  post  is  completely  commanded  by 
Loudoun  Heights  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Shen- 
andoah, and  by  the  still  more  lofty  Maryland  Heights 
on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Potomac.  Singularly 
enough,  the  place  had  always  possessed  a  certain 
attraction  for  the  military  authorities  of  both  gov- 
ernments. There  had  been  for  years  before  the  war 


1  General  J.  G.  Walker  in  2  B.  &  L.,  605. 

*  Lee  to  Davis ;  28  W.  R.,  602  :  Lee's  Report,  27  W.  R.,  144,  145  ;  Swin- 
ton,  198. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  331 

an  armory  and  an  arsenal  in  the  town  ;  it  was  this 
arsenal  which  John  Brown  and  his  party  seized  in 
October,  1859.  In  1861,  the  Confederate  govern- 
ment instructed  General  J.  E.  Johnston  to  occupy 
the  place,  but  that  able  officer  was  not  long  in  dis- 
covering that  the  position  was  an  untenable  one; 
and  he  soon  evacuated  it.1  The  Federal  general 
Patterson  then  occupied  it,  and  from  that  time  on 
there  had  always  been  a  Federal  force  there.  On 
September  1,  1862,  there  were  about  8000  men  at 
the  post,  including  a  force  of  some  2500  men 2  on 
Maryland  Heights,  all  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
D.  S.  Miles,  an  officer  of  the  regular  army. 

Why  this  large  force  should  be  shut  up  in  Harper's 
Ferry  instead  of  serving  in  the  field,  it  is  not  easy 
to  see.  Undoubtedly  it  was  important  to  have  small 
bodies  of  troops  stationed  at  convenient  points  along 
the  Potomac  River  for  the  protection  against  raids 
of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  railroad  and  the  Chesapeake 
and  Ohio  canal,  both  which  run  on  the  north  side 
of  the  river  and  close  to  it ;  but  a  force  of  8000  men 
was  altogether  out  of  proportion  for  any  such  duty. 
It  is  only  another  proof  of  Halleck's  lack  of  military 
sagacity  that  he  should  have  kept  such  a  consider- 
able force  in  this  place,  where  it  was  perfectly  use- 
less, at  a  time,  too,  when  its  presence  was  so  much 
needed  to  augment  the  army  with  which  General 
Pope  in  August,  and  General  McClellan  in  Septem- 
ber, were  endeavoring  to  make  head  against  the  army 
of  General  Lee. 

Halleck  had  also  stationed  a  force  of  some  2500 


1  Part  I.,  124.  * 27  W.  R.,  778  ;  cf.  537. 


332  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

men,1  under  General  White,  at  Winchester  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley,  but,  on  receiving  word  that  a 
large  Confederate  force  was  moving  down  the  Val- 
ley, he,  on  September  2d,  ordered  White  to  evacuate 
the  town  and  fall  back  to  Harper's  Ferry,2  which 
he  did,  arriving  there  on  the  3d,  and  adding  the 
troops  which  he  brought  with  him  to  Miles's  com- 
mand. White  was  thereupon  ordered  by  General 
Wool,  who  commanded  this  military  district,  to  re- 
pair to  Martinsburg,  Virginia,  and  take  command  of 
the  troops  there,3  consisting  of  three  regiments  and 
a  battery,  perhaps  2000  men  in  all.4  Why  General 
Wool,  or  General  Halleck,  under  whose  orders  he 
acted,  should  have  expected  that  the  Martinsburg 
garrison  would  be  more  fortunate  than  the  Win- 
chester garrison  in  being  able  to  hold  its  position 
against  a  superior  force,  is  not  apparent. 

It  thus  came  about  that  when  General  Lee  crossed 
the  Potomac  into  Maryland,  both  Martinsburg  and 
Harper's  Ferry  were  garrisoned  by  Union  troops. 
When  Lee  discovered  this,  he  determined,  as  we 
have  said,  to  renounce  his  projected  invasion  of 
Pennsylvania,  for  the  time  being  at  any  rate,  and  to 
endeavor  to  capture  these  detachments.  He  says 
in  a  letter  to  President  Davis,5  dated  September  12th, 
that  he  had  supposed  that,  as  soon  as  it  was  known 
that  his  army  had  reached  Frederick  City,  the  Union 
forces  at  Martinsburg  and  Harper's  Ferry  would 
retreat  from  Virginia;  and  that,  finding  himself 
disappointed  in  this  expectation,  he  had  detached 

1  16  W.  R.,  53.  4  Ib.,  525. 

*  Ib.,  767,  et  seq.  3  27  W.  R.,  522.  s  28  W.  R.,  604. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  333 

Jackson  and  McLaws  to  capture  these  troops.  In 
his  Report,  however,  he  puts  his  action  in  this  mat- 
ter on  the  ground  of  necessity.  He  says  that  it  was 
"necessary  to  dislodge  the  enemy"  from  Martins- 
burg  and  Harper's  Ferry  "  before  concentrating  the 
army  west  of  the  mountains."  1  In  this  view  of  the 
necessity  of  driving  the  Federal  forces  from  Martins- 
burg  and  Harper's  Ferry  before  attempting  the  inva- 
sion of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  several  writers 
of  authority  have  concurred.2  But  when  we  bear 
in  mind  that  the  small  garrison  of  Martinsburg  would 
certainly  have  to  evacuate  the  town  if  the  Con- 
federates made  any  move  in  that  direction,  that  Lee 
did  not  propose  permanently  to  hold  Harper's  Ferry, 
and  that  therefore  it  could  be  re-occupied  by  Federal 
troops  at  any  time,  we  fail  to  see  any  military  neces- 
sity for  General  Lee's  action.3  Assuming  that  an 
invasion  of  the  North  was  a  wise  move  to  make,4 — 
and  Lee's  reasons  in  its  favor  are  certainly  strong, — 
we  see  nothing  in  the  fact  that  White  was  at  Mar- 
ti usburg  with  2000  men  and  Miles  at  Harper's 
Ferry  with  10,000  men  to  have  rendered  the  project 
any  more  liable  to  interruption  or  difficult  of  accom- 
plishment than  if  those  troops  had  been  (as  they 
assuredly  should  have  been)  added  to  McClellan's 
army.  The  fact,  in  our  judgment,  is  simply  this, 
that  General  Lee  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to 
capture  these  detachments,  even  although,  to  effect 

1  27  W.  R.,  145. 

*  Swinton,  200  ;  Palfrey,  19;  2  Henderson,  261. 

3  The  next  year,  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  Lee  made  no  attempt  to 
capture  Harper's  Ferry. 

4  Palfrey,  16  ;  Swinton,  198. 


334  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

this,  he  deemed  it  necessary  to  divide  his  army  into 
two  unequal  portions,  and  to  keep  it  thus  divided 
for  several  days  in  presence  of  a  hostile  force  largely 
superior  in  numbers  to  his  army  when  united.  We 
have  already  called  attention  to  General  Lee's  dar- 
ing and  dangerous  strategy  in  this  campaign,  and 
this  operation  of  his,  which  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  these  Federal  garrisons  and  in  the  battle  of  the 
Antietam — or  Sharpsburg,  as  it  is  called  by  the  Con- 
federates— is,  as  we  shall  see,  most  remarkable  in 
showing  this  quality  of  extreme  hardihood. 

Although  it  was  known  in  the  first  days  of  Sep- 
tember that  the  Confederates  had  disappeared  from 
the  front  of  Washington,  it  was  not  known  where 
they  had  gone — still  less  what  their  intentions  were. 
This  uncertainty  continued  even  after  it  was  ascer- 
tained that  they  had  crossed  the  Potomac  into  Mary- 
land ;  and  until  exact  information  had  been  obtained, 
it  was  not  deemed  wise,  either  by  General  Halleck 
or  General  McClellan,  to  advance  far  from  Washing- 
ton. But  the  reports  of  the  cavalry  under  Pleason- 
ton,  who  pressed  hard  upon  Stuart,  who  was  screening 
the  movements  of  the  Confederate  army,  finally  satis- 
fied McClellan,  who  had  been  slowly  marching  north 
with  his  left  on  the  Potomac  and  his  right  on  the 
railroad  which  connected  Washington  with  Balti- 
more, that  Lee  had  fallen  back  behind  the  Monocacy. 
Accordingly  on  the  10th  of  September  he  pushed 
forward  more  rapidly,  and  on  the  12th  and  13th  the 
right  wing  and  centre  of  his  army  entered  Frederick 
City.' 

1  27  W.  R.,42. 


1 862]           LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  335 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  now  organized,  con- 
sisted of  the  1st  corps,  formerly  McDowell's,  but 
now  under  Hooker;  the  2d  corps  under  Sumner; 
Couch's  division  of  the  4th  corps  ;  the  5th  corps  un- 
der Franklin ;  the  9th  corps  under  Burnside  1 ;  and 
the  12th  corps,  formerly  Banks's,  but  now  under 
Mansfield.2  McClellan  adopted  a  new  system  in  this 
campaign.  He  assigned  Burnside  to  the  command 
of  the  right  wing,  consisting  of  the  1st  and  9th  corps ; 
Sumner  to  the  command  of  the  centre,  consisting  of 
his  own  corps,  the  2d,  and  the  12th  corps ;  and 
Franklin  to  the  command  of  the  left  wing,  consisting 
of  his  own  corps,  the  6th,  and  Couch's  division  of  the 
4th  corps.3 

The  3d  corps,  Heintzelman's,  the  5th  corps/ Porter's, 
and  Sigel's  corps,  now  the  llth,  with  other  troops, 
were  left  in  the  lines  of  Washington.  General 
Banks  was  assigned  to  the  "  command  of  the  defences 
of  the  capital." 5 

To  each  of  these  corps  several  of  the  new  regi- 
ments which  had  been  raised  during  the  summer 
were  assigned.6  These  troops,  though  composed  of 
good  material,  had  had  little  time  for  drill,  could 
not  be  said  to  have  acquired  any  discipline,  and  there- 
fore could  not  be  counted  as  very  useful  additions 
to  the  army.  Had  the  Government  refused  to  or- 
ganize these  new  battalions,  and  distributed  these 

1  Cox's  Kanawha  Division  was  at  this  time  incorporated  in  the  gth  corps  ; 
27  W.  R.,  178. 

2  27  W.  R.,  40. 

3  The  other  division  of  this  corps — Peck's — was  still  in  the  Peninsula. 

4  Two  divisions  of  this  corps  were  sent  to  McClellan  on  September  I2th, 
the  third  on  September  i6th. 

*  28  W.  R.,  202,  214.  '/£.,   197. 


336  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

recruits  among  the  old  regiments,  the  result  would 
have  been  a  sensible  and  welcome  augmentation  of 
the  strength  of  the  anny. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  when  it  left  Washing- 
ton numbered  on  paper  a  little  less  than  84,000  men,1 
— in  reality,  somewhat  over  67,000  men.  There 
were  left  in  and  near  Washington,  nominally,  about 
72,000  or  73,000  men;  but  the  number  actually 
ready  for  duty  unquestionably  was  considerably  less.2 
From  these  troops,  two  divisions  of  the  5th  corps, 
under  Porter,  those  of  Morell  and  Sykes,  numbering 
12,930  men,  were  sent  to  join  McClellan  on  September 
12th,  at  his  urgent  request,3  thereby  raising  his  entire 
(nominal)  force  to  nearly  97,000  men.4 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  recently  been 
reinforced  by  the  divisions  of  D.  H.  Hill  and  McLaws, 

1  McClellan  gives  (27  W.  R.,  67)  the  number  of  his  troops  at  the  battle  of 
Antietam,  as  ..........  87,164 

Deduct  the  two  divisions  of  the   5th   corps,  which   were  not 
sent  to  him  until  the  I2th  of  September        .....       12,930 

We  have  left 74,234 

Add  Couch's  division,  not  in  the  battle  (28  W.  R.,  336)        .         .  7,219 

Add  the  losses   at   South  Mountain,   Crampton's   Gap,    etc.  (27 

W.  R.,  204) 2,430 

And  we  have    ..........       83,883 

as  the  number  with  which  he  started  out  from  Washington.  Cf.,  Palfrey, 
7  ;  Allan,  327.  As  to  the  deduction  to  be  made  from  these  returns,  see 
Palfrey,  70.  In  this  work  we  also  shall  consider  a  deduction  of  20  per  cent, 
a  fair  allowance  for  men  on  extra  duty,  etc.  Cf.  Allan,  398. 

*  Banks  to  Halleck,  with  estimate,  28  W.  R.,  265  ;  Irwin  to  Williams, 
/£.,  266. 

»/3.,  254,  255. 

4  McClellan  also  advised  Halleck  to  send  him  the  troops  at  Harper's  Ferry, 
(28  W.  R.,  254)  but  Halleck  replied  that  there  was  no  way  at  that  time  for 
Miles  to  join  him  ;  that  the  only  thing  for  Miles  to  do  was  to  defend  himself 
until  communications  could  be  opened  with  McClellan's  army.  (27  W.  R., 
44). 


1 862]          LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  33,7 

the  division  of  J.  G.  Walker,  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry 
under  Hampton.1  These  troops  (leaving  out  Walker's 
division)  originally  numbered  19,000  men,  but  they 
had  lost  considerably  by  fatigue  and  straggling,  for 
they  had  marched  all  the  way  from  Richmond.2 
Even  with  these  additions,  the  army  was  perhaps  no 
stronger  than  it  was  before  the  movement  on  Manas- 
sas,  two  weeks  before.3  At  that  time,  its  strength  in 
the  three  arms,  is  given  by  the  best  Confederate  au- 
thority at  from  50,000  to  55,000  men.4  It  would 
probably  be  approximately  correct  to  say  that  Gen- 
eral Lee  had  under  him  on  September  3d,  when  this 
Maryland  campaign  began,  about  55,000  men.5  That 

1  Allan,  199.  s  Ib.,  324, 

s  Ib.,  324.  *  Ib.,  212,  n. 

5  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  on  September  22,  1862, — five  days  after 
the  battle  of  Sharpsburg, — is  officially  (28  W.  R.,  621)  stated  as  having 
"  present  for  duty  "  officers  and  men  ......  36,418 

In  this  return  it  is  said  that  the  cavalry  and  reserve  artillery 
are  not  reported. 

The  official  return  (27  W.  R.,  810-813)  of  the  killed  and 
wounded  in  all  the  engagements  of  the  campaign  in  thirty-nine 
brigades  of  infantry  and  some  of  the  batteries  shows  a  loss  of  .  10,291 

We  thus  get  a  figure  of     ........       46,709 

To  this  number  should  be  added  : 

1.  The  cavalry  and  reserve  artillery  not  included  in  the  return  of  "  present 
for  duty  "  on  September  22d. 

2.  The  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  in  the  other  batteries,  in  the  cavalry, 
and  in  Jones's  brigade  of  Jackson's  division,  none  of  which  are  included 
among  the  10,291. 

3.  The  prisoners  captured,  reckoned  by  General  McClellan  (27  W.  R., 
67,  161)  at  5000  or  6000. 

4.  The  stragglers  who  had  not  returned  to  their  regiments. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  the  estimate  given  in  the  text  of  55,000 
men  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  is  approximately  correct. 

General  Longstreet's  estimate  is  57,000  men,  exclusive  of  artillery  and 
cavalry  (2  B.  &  L.,  674),  but  his  figures  will  not  bear  examination. 

That  Jones's  brigade  of  Jackson's  division  was  in  the  battle,  and  suffered 
loss,  see  27  W.  R.,  808,  1008. 


VOL.    II. — 22. 


338          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

he  was  unable  to  keep  them  all  with  the  colors  will 
appear  as  we  proceed. 

When  the  Federal  troops  entered  Frederick  City 
on  September  12th  and  13th,  they  found  that  their 
adversaries  had  departed.  General  Lee  had  decided 
upon  his  movement  against  Harper's  Ferry  as  early 
as  the  9th,  and  had  on  that  day  issued  a  special 
order1  to  his  generals,  prescribing  to  each  his  al. 
lotted  part  in  the  difficult  and  dangerous  task  which 
was  now  to  be  attempted.  The  whole  army  was  to 
march  west  on  the  following  day,  the  10th,  as  far  as 
Middletown, — Jackson,  with  his  own  division  and 
those  of  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill,  in  the  advance. 
From  Middletown,  Jackson  was  to  proceed  west, 
over  the  South  Mountain  range,  to  Sharpsburg,  and 
there  cross  the  Potomac,  march  on  Martinsburg, 
capture  the  Federal  garrison  at  that  place,  and  in- 
tercept any  Union  troops  who  might  attempt  to  es- 
cape from  Harper's  Ferry.  Longstreet,  with  the 
divisions  of  D.  R.  Jones  and  Hood,  and  the  brigade 
of  Evans  of  his  own  corps,  followed  by  the  division 
of  D.  H.  Hill  of  Jackson's  corps,  and  accompanied 
by  Lee  himself,  was  to  follow  Jackson,  pass  through 
Middletown,  cross  the  South  Mountain  range,  and 
halt  at  Boonsborough.  McLaws,  with  his  own  di- 
vision and  that  of  R.  H.  Anderson,  both  of  Long- 
street's  corps,  was  to  follow  Longstreet,  but  at 
Middletown  he  was  to  march  southwest wardly 
through  Burkittsville  to  and  across  the  South  Moun- 
tain range  into  Pleasant  Valley,  to  take  possession 
of  Maryland  Heights  and  endeavor  to  capture  the 

1  27  W.  R.,  42  ;  28  W.  R.,  603. 


1862]          LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  339 

garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry.  Finally,  J.  G.  Walker's 
division  of  Longstreet's  corps  was  to  cross  the  Poto- 
mac near  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy,  march  up  on 
the  south  side  of  the  rivers-take  possession  of  Lou- 
doun  Heights,  and  co-operate  with  McLaws  in  the 
reduction  of  Harper's  Ferry.  This  programme  was 
somewhat  modified  so  far  as  Jackson  was  concerned. 
That  officer,  fearing  lest  the  Federal  force  at  Martins- 
burg  might  retreat  to  the  west,  if  his  advance 
against  it  should  be  made  from  Sharpsburg  and 
Shepherdstown,  directed  his  march  northwestwardly 
on  Williamsport,  where  he  crossed  the  Potomac, 
making  a  considerable  detour,  and  was  thus  able  to 
bar  the  retreat  of  General  White  to  the  westward.1 
The  main  body,  also,  under  Longstreet  and  Lee,  in- 
stead of  halting  at  Boonsborough,  pursued  its  march 
to  Hagerstown.2  Here,  or  at  Boonsborough,  the 
troops  of  Jackson,  McLaws,  and  Walker  were  or- 
dered to  rejoin  the  main  body,  after  their  tasks 
should  have  been  fulfilled.3 

General  Lee  based  his  hope  of  success  in  this 
operation  partly  upon  the  expectation  that  the  very 
deliberate  movements  of  the  Federal  forces  would 
be  continued,4  and  partly  on  the  expectation  that 
McLaws  would  be  able  to  take  possession  of  Mary- 
land Heights  and  Walker  of  Loudoun  Heights  by 
the  morning  of  Friday,  September  12th.5  But  his 
expectations  as  to  the  performance  of  his  lieutenants 
were  too  sanguine ;  it  was  not  until  the  afternoon 


1  27  W.  R.,  953. 

*/<*.,  145.  427  W.  R.,  145. 

3  28  W.  R.,  604.  *  28  W.  R.,  603,  604. 


340          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

of  Sunday,  the  14th,  that  McLaws,  who  had  entered 
Pleasant  Valley  on  the  1 1th,  was  able  to  shell  Har- 
per's Ferry  from  Maryland  Heights,1  nor  was  it  until 
nearly  the  same  time  that  Walker  was  prepared  to 
open  from  Loudoun  Heights.2  This  part  of  the  pro- 
gramme consumed  two  days  and  a  half  longer  than 
General  Lee  had  expected.  Jackson,  however, 
marching  with  great  celerity,  crossed  the  Potomac 
at  Williamsport  on  the  llth,  and  entered  Martins- 
burg  on  the  morning  of  the  12th,3  as  General  Lee 
had  expected  he  would  do  4 ;  and  on  the  13th,  about 
noon,  the  head  of  his  column  came  in  view  of  the 
Federal  force  posted  strongly  on  Bolivar  Heights. 
As  nothing  could  be  seen  at  this  time  by  Jackson 
of  McLaws  and  Walker,  the  remainder  of  the  day 
was  necessarily  taken  up  in  communicating  with 
them.  It  was,  therefore,  not  until  the  morning  of 
the  14th,  that  Jackson,  with  all  his  energy,  could 
begin  operations  against  Harper's  Ferry,  and,  as  we 
have  already  said,  McLaws  and  Walker  were  not  in 
position  until  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day. 

This  exceeding  of  the  expected  time  of  its  absence 
by  the  expeditionary  force  would  have  been  serious 
enough  for  General  Lee  under  any  circumstances, 
but  the  fortune  of  war  added  an  element  of  unusual 
peril  to  his  situation.  A  copy  of  his  Special  Order, 
of  which  we  have  above  given  the  substance,  was  on 
the  13th  found  in  the  abandoned  Confederate  camp 5; 
and  McClellan,  who  had  not  yet  been  able  fully 6  to 


'27W.  R.,  854.  *28W.  R.,  603. 

9  /*.,  913.  5  27  W.  R.,  42  ;  Palfrey,  20-22  ;  Allan,  343. 

1  •#.,  953-  '  28  W.  R.,  270,  272. 


i862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  341 

put  together  the  various  reports  which  had  reached 
him  of  the  movements  of  his  enemy,  was  at  once 
placed  in  possession  of  the  plans  of  his  adversary 
and  of  the  destination  and  approximate  positions  of 
his  different  divisions.  He  knew  that  at  that  mo- 
ment *  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill,  under  Lee's  direct 
command — fourteen  brigades  only — were  the  only 
troops  directly  in  front  of  him — that  they  were 
probably  at  Boonsborough  or  Hagerstown;  that 
McLaws  and  Anderson,  with  ten  brigades,  were  in 
Pleasant  Valley,  striving  to  get  possession  of  Mary- 
land Heights ;  that  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Poto- 
mac, near  or  on  Loudoun  Heights,  was  the  division  of 
Walker,  consisting  of  two  brigades;  and  that  the 
remainder  of  Jackson's  corps — fourteen  brigades — 
was  by  this  time,  probably,  also  on  the  south  side  of 
the  river,  fronting  Bolivar  Heights,  which,  it  will  be 
remembered,  is  the  name  given  to  the  high  ridge 
which  runs  between  the  Potomac  and  the  Shenan- 
doah,  and  is  the  southwest  boundary  of  the  post  of 
Harper's  Ferry. 

To  be  put  suddenly  into  complete  possession  of 
one's  adversary's  intentions  and  situation  is  a  piece 
of  good  luck  which  has  rarely  happened  even  to  the 
fortunate  generals  of  the  world ;  but  the  good  luck 
is  the  more  striking  in  this  case  because  the  facts 
disclosed  were  so  extremely  favorable  for  General 
McClellan.  The  main  fact — the  one  which  far  out- 
weighed all  the  others  in  importance — was,  that  it 
was  probably  possible  by  a  prompt  advance  to  fight 
Lee  and  Longstreet  alone  with  the  entire  Army  of 

1  28  W.  R.,28i. 


342  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

the  Potomac.  It  was  also  shown  to  be  probably 
possible  to  relieve  Miles  at  Harper's  Ferry.  But 
what  was  that,  compared  to  the  opportunity  of 
striking  the  force  commanded  by  Lee  in  person 
when  it  was  so  gravely  weakened  by  the  detach- 
ments sent  off  for  the  capture  of  Harper's  Ferry  ? 
Yet  McClellan,  in  writing  to  Halleck !  to  announce 
to  him  the  finding  of  Lee's  Special  Order,  impressed 
as  he  had  been  for  the  past  few  days  by  the  danger 
to  which  the  troops  at  Harper's  Ferry  were  exposed, 
seemed  to  regard  the  relief  of  that  post  a«  his  first 
and  chief  duty.  He  says,  it  is  true,  that  he  believes 
that  Lee  has  120,000  men,  and  outnumbers  him 
when  these  troops  are  united,  but  he  does  not  say 
that  he  (McClellan)  is  bending  all  his  energies  to 
the  task  of  attacking  Lee  now  that  he  has  not  his 
entire  army  with  him.  There  is,  in  fact,  nothing  in 
the  letter  which  rises  above  the  level  of  ordinary 
correspondence.  McClellan's  abstract  of  the  dis- 
covered Order  is  exceedingly  confused ;  he  either  had 
no  views  which  he  cared  to  impart  to  Halleck,  or 
else  he  had  no  defined  views  himself.  He  evidently 
saw  nothing  specially  inspiring  in  the  situation.  The 
same  evening  he  wrote  to  the  Adjutant  General  a 
letter2  about  the  artillery  service  in  the  regular 
army — just  such  a  letter  as  he  might  have  written 
at  any  time.  McClellan,  it  is  plain,  did  not  propose 
to  hurry  his  movements,  even  when  Fortune  herself 
beckoned  him  on  to  victory. 

Instead,  therefore,  of  ordering  his  army  to  march 

1  28  W.  R.,  281  ;  September  I3th,  n  P.M. 
» Ib.,  282. 


i862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  343 

at  nightfall  of  the  13th,  which  would  have  brought 
the  troops  to  the  Gaps  in  the  South  Mountain  range 
by  daybreak,  McClellan  postponed  their  advance  till 
the  morning  of  the  14th.1  There  was  no  reason  in 
the  world  why  he  should  not  have  called  on  his 
troops  for  a  night-march  in  this  emergency.  Since 
leaving  Washington  they  had  been  marching  very 
slowly  ;  the  weather  was  fine ;  the  roads  were  excel- 
lent 2 ;  and  whether  it  was  proposed  to  follow  Mc- 
Laws  into  Pleasant  Valley  and  there  overwhelm  him, 
or  to  push  on  rapidly  after  Lee  and  Longstreet,  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  Union  army  to  pos- 
sess at  the  earliest  moment  the  Passes  through  the 
South  Mountain  range.  When  McClellan  discov- 
ered Lee's  Order — on  September  13th — these  Passes 
were  not  occupied  in  any  force  by  the  Confederates. 
D.  H.  Hill  was  a  mile  or  two  west  of  Boonsborough, 
and  Longstreet  was  as  far  off  as  Hagerstown.3  Only 
Stuart,  who  covered  with  his  cavalry  the  movements 
of  the  infantry  divisions,  and  was  supported  by  one 
brigade,4  was  opposing  the  advancing  columns  of 
the  Union  army.  In  fact,  it  was  not  Lee's  original 
intention  to  make  a  stand  at  the  Passes 5 ;  he  had  ex- 
pected to  reunite  his  scattered  divisions  west  of  the 
mountains  before  McClellan  should  arrive  at  the 
mountains ;  but  when  he  learned  of  the  disclosure  of 
his  plan  to  the  enemy,  as  he  did  that  evening,8  he 

27  W.  R.,  48. 
Palfrey,  29. 

Long  to  McLaws,  28  W.  R.,  606.      Cf.  D.  H.  Hill,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  560. 
Colquitt's ;  27  W.  R.,  1052. 
27  W.  R.,  145. 

Allan,    345.  "  A  citizen,  friendly  to  the  Confederate  cause  had  accident- 
ally been  present  when  the  Order  had  been  brought  to  McClellan,  and  had 


344          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

feared  lest  a  strong  Federal  force  should  cross  at  one 
or  more  of  the  Gaps,  and  endeavor  to  crush  McLaws 
in  Pleasant  Valley.  Hence  he  promptly  ordered 
Hill  to  return  to  the  Boonsborough  Pass,  or  Turner's 
Gap,  as  it  is  often  called,  and  directed  Longstreet 
to  march  back  with  all  speed  from  Hagerstown  to 
support  him.  Stuart — of  his  own  motion,  appar- 
ently— l  intrusted  the  defence  of  Crampton's  Gap, 
five  miles  south  of  Turner's  Gap,  through  which 
Federal  troops,  intending  to  strike  McLaws,  would 
naturally  pass,  to  Colonel  Munford  of  his  com- 
mand. By  the  early  morning  of  the  14th  these 
troops,  with  the  exception  of  Longstreet's  command, 
were  in  position ;  but  had  McClellan  acted  with 
energy  and  promptness  the  moment  he  came  into 
possession  of  Lee's  plans,  the  Federal  troops  would 
have  forestalled  their  adversaries. 

As  it  was,  it  was  not  until  the  afternoon  of  the 
14th  that  the  Union  generals  were  prepared  to  carry 
the  Passes.  The  northernmost  Pass,  known  as  Turn- 
er's Gap,  was  held  chiefly  by  the  troops  of  D.  H.  Hill, 
— Longstreet  coming  up  too  late  to  be  of  much  as- 
sistance. It  was  carried  by  the  1st  and  9th  corps 
after  a  spirited  defence.  In  the  action  the  brave 
and  capable  Reno  was  killed.  The  Federal  troops 
could  not,  however,  advance  that  afternoon  to  the 
westerly  side  of  the  mountain.  Franklin  at  the 
same  time  carried  Crampton's  Gap,  which  was  stoutly 

heard  the  expressions  of  gratification  that  followed,  and  had  learned  of  the 
orders  then  issued.      He  lost  no  time  in  leaving  Frederick,  and,  making  his 
way  through  the  lines,  brought  this  information  after  night  to  Stuart,  who 
at  once  forwarded  it  to  General  Lee." 
1  27  W.  R.,  818,  826. 


1 86  2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  345 

defended  by  Munford's  cavalry,  assisted,  but  not  very 
efficiently,1  by  troops  of  McLaws's  command.  Frank- 
lin effected  a  lodgment  of  his  troops  in  Pleasant 
Valley  before  night  set  in. 

But  while  these  efforts  were  being  made  for  the 
relief  of  the  garrison  of  Harper's  Ferry,  its  besiegers 
had  not  been  idle.  Kershaw,  commanding  one  of 
McLaws's  brigades,  had,  on  the  13th,  gallantly  pushed 
his  way  to  Maryland  Heights,  and  had  routed  the 
Union  troops  under  Ford,2  who  had  attempted  to  hold 
the  position.  A  battery  was  immediately  brought 
up,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  while  McClel- 
lan  was  attacking  the  Gaps,  McLaws  was  able  to  open 
fire  from  a  height  of  over  six  hundred  feet  on  the 
town,  and  to  shell  the  camps  of  the  Federal  garrison. 
Walker,  also,  in  the  forenoon  of  the  14th,  began  firing 
from  Loudoun  Heights,  at  a  height  of  three  hundred 
feet.3  This  cannonade,  which  could  not  be  effectively 
returned,  did  much  to  demoralize  the  Union  troops, 
who,  indeed,  with  some  reason,  lost  heart,  after  the 
abandonment  of  Maryland  Heights  by  Ford.4  Jack- 
son, meantime,  was  making  careful  preparation  to 
carry  Bolivar  Heights  by  storm  the  next  morning. 
Early  on  the  15th  fire  was  opened  upon  the  Federal 
troops  and  their  defences  from  all  quarters ;  there 
was  no  resistance ;  the  commanders  and  the  troops 


1  27  W.  R.,  827,  870. 

*  Ford  was  afterwards  dismissed  the  service  ;  27  W.  R.,  803. 

1  Munford's  Address  on  Lee's  Invasion  of  Maryland,  49. 

4  Jackson,  however,  placed  little  reliance  on  McLaws  and  Walker.  He 
says  : — "  In  consequence  of  the  distance,  and  range  of  their  guns,  not  much 
could  be  expected  from  their  artillery  so  long  as  the  enemy  retained  his  ad- 
vanced position  on  Bolivar  Heights."  27  VV.  R.,  953. 


346  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

alike  considered  their  case  hopeless ;  and  at  9  A.M. 
the  post  was  surrendered.  While  the  negotiations 
were  going  on,  Colonel  Miles  was  mortally  wounded, 
and  the  papers,  by  which  the  garrison  were  made 
prisoners  of  war  and  immediately  paroled,1  were 
signed  by  General  White.  The  Federal  cavalry, 
however,  under  Colonel  B.  F.  Davis,  having  crossed 
the  river  on  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  made  their 
escape  under  the  shadow  of  Maryland  Heights  to 
Greencastle,  Pennsylvania,  capturing  an  ordnance- 
train  of  Longstreet's  on  their  way,2 — a  daring  and 
skilfully  executed  feat,  for  which  Davis  justly  re- 
ceived high  commendation,3 — the  only  creditable 
circumstance  for  the  Union  troops  in  the  whole 
affair. 

It  is  not  unlikely  that  this  hasty  surrender  would 
not  have  been  made,  had  Franklin,  in  the  early 
morning  of  the  15th,  forced  his  way  to  Maryland 
Heights,  and  displayed  the  United  States  flag  to  the 
demoralized  and  apparently  neglected  garrison  of 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  he  has  been  severely  criticized 
for  having  made  no  serious  effort  to  accomplish  this.4 
It  must,  however,  be  remembered  that  McLaws,  as 
soon  as  he  learned  of  the  forcing  of  Crampton's  Gap 
by  the  Federal  troops,  established  a  formidable  line 
of  defence  across  Pleasant  Valley,  from  Elk  Ridge s 
on  the  west  to  South  Mountain  on  the  east,6  and  suc- 
ceeded in  conveying  to  his  antagonist  the  appear- 

1  27  W.  R.,  529. 

»28W.  R.,  305.  s  27  W.  R.,  802. 

4  Palfrey,  43-45  ;  Allan,  363-366. 

'  Maryland  Heights  are  the  southern  extremity  of  Elk  Ridge. 

«27\V.  R.,  855. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  347 

ance  of  having  occupied  the  line  in  great  strength.1 
Franklin,  in  fact,  thought  that  he  was  outnumbered, 
"  two  to  one."  *  While  he  remained  in  presence  of 
this  force,  Harper's  Ferry  surrendered,  and  McLaws, 
during  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  skilfully  and  with- 
out molestation,  withdrew  his  command  across  the 
river  to  the  town.  In  considering  the  caution  ex- 
hibited by  Franklin  in  this  affair,  we  must  remem- 
ber that  he  had  been  warned  to  provide  against  an 
attack  on  his  right  rear  by  way  of  Rohrersville,3 
which  might  be  made  for  the  purpose  of  reliev- 
ing his  pressure  on  McLaws,  and  that  Couch's  divi- 
sion was  accordingly  occupying  that  place,  and  also, 
that,  for  all  he  knew,  Jackson  might  send  a  portion 
of  his  command  across  the  river  to  the  assistance  of 
McLaws. 

Let  us  return  now  to  General  Lee.  The  storming 
of  Turner's  Gap  on  the  afternoon  of  September  14th 
had  left  him  no  choice  but  to  retire  the  next  morn- 
ing. He  had  with  him  only  D.  R.  Jones's  and 
Hood's  divisions, — eight  brigades,4 — and  the  brigade 
of  Evans, — of  Longstreet's  corps,  and  the  division  of 
D.  H.  Hill, — five  brigades, — of  Jackson's  corps,  four- 
teen brigades  in  all, — say  11,000  men, — with  the 
cavalry  and  the  reserve  artillery, — 8000  men,5 — say 
19,000  men  in  all.  The  enemy's  main  army  was 
certain  to  advance  upon  him  and  bring  him  to  bat- 
tle, as  soon,  at  least,  as  the  constitutional  slowness  of 
McClellan  would  admit.  Stuart  had  brought  him 

1  Allan,  364  ;  Franklin,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  596. 

s  27  W.  R.,  47,  53. 

*  Ruggles  to  Franklin,  27  W.  R.,  47. 

4  Of  these,  six  belonged  to  Jones  and  two  to  Hood.  5  Allan,  380. 


348  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

word  that  Franklin  had  forced  Crampton's  Gap,  and 
there  was  every  reason  to  expect  that  he  would  at- 
tack McLaws  in  the  morning, — presumably  with 
superior  forces.  In  this  state  of  affairs  General  Lee 
felt  that  further  operations  against  Harper's  Ferry 
must  be  postponed  to  the  imperative  necessity  of 
reuniting  his  scattered  divisions.  By  the  battles  of 
Turner's  and  Crampton's  Gaps  everything  had  been 
changed.  The  main  army  of  McClellan  was  close 
upon  him.  Lee  decided  that  he  could  not  safely 
remain  north  of  the  Potomac,  and  at  eight  P.M.  of  the 
14th  he  so  wrote  to  McLaws,1  telling  him  to  abandon 
hie  position  that  night,  and  to  cross  the  river,  if  pos- 
sible, by  a  ford  east  of  that  at  Shepherdstown,  leav- 
ing the  ford  at  Shepherdstown  for  the  main  army  to 
take.  But  in  less  than  two  hours  Lee  had  changed 
his  mind — why,  we  are  not  informed — and  had  de- 
termined to  await  battle  north  of  the  Potomac.  At 
10.15  P.M.  he  wrote  to  Colonel  Munford2  of  the  cav- 
alry to  pilot  McLaws,  if  possible,  over  the  mountains 
to  Sharpsburg  ;  and,  an  hour  later,3  he  wrote  to  Mc- 
Laws, informing  him  that  the  main  army  would  go 
to  Keedysville,4  a  village  two  or  three  miles  northeast 

1  108  W.   R.,  618.      Jackson,  also,  was   ordered    "to   take  position   at 
Shepherdstown  to  cover  Lee's  crossing  into  Virginia,"  but  subsequently  the 
order  was  changed.     Douglas,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  627.     Jackson  replied  to  the 
first  order  "  that  he  could  cross  the  river  and  join  General  Lee  at  Sharps- 
burg."      Letter  to  the  writer  from  Colonel  Douglas,  and  quoted  from  his 
notes,  written  in  1865. 

2  28  W.  R.,6og. 

3  Ib. ,  608.     This   despatch   is   inaccurate  in    speaking  of   crossing   the 
mountain  "below  Crampton's  Gap  toward  Sharpsburg."      The  mountain 
which  lay  between  McLaws  and  Sharpsburg  was  Elk  Ridge,  not  the  South 
Mountain.     Crampton's  Gap  is  in  the  South  Muontain. 

4  Sometimes  called  Centreville. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  349 

of  Sharpsburg,  and,  while  not  forbidding  McLaws  to 
cross  the  river,  suggesting  that  he  should  go  to 
Sharpsburg  across  country.  This  order  was  con- 
firmed by  a  despatch  sent  to  McLaws  the  next  day, 
the  15th,  from  Keedysville.1 

This  decision,  to  stand  and  fight  at  Sharpsburg, 
which  General  Lee  took  on  the  evening  of  the  14th 
of  September, — just  after  his  troops  had  been  driven 
from  the  South  Mountain  Passes — is  beyond  con- 
troversy one  of  the  boldest  and  most  hazardous  de- 
cisions in  his  whole  military  career.  It  is  in  truth 
so  bold  and  so  hazardous  that  one  is  bewildered 
that  he  should  even  have  thought  seriously  of  mak- 
ing it.  Nearly  the  whole  force  which  he  had  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  Potomac  had  been  engaged  that 
afternoon  in  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  hold  a  de- 
fensive position,  and  it  had  been  badly  beaten.  Hill's 
troops  had  found  themselves  largely  outnumbered, 
and  Longstreet's  had  arrived  footsore  and  weary, 
only  to  find  themselves  also  outmatched  by  their 
antagonists.  There  could  not  be  the  slightest  doubt 
that  the  Union  army,  now  greatly  encouraged,  would 
follow  up  its  advantage.  Lee  knew  that  McClellan 
was  perfectly  aware  that  Jackson,  Walker,  McLaws, 
and  Anderson  were  at  or  near  Harper's  Ferry. 
There  was  assuredly  no  reason  why  McClellan  should 
not  force  a  battle  while  the  odds  continued  so  de. 
cidedly  in  his  favor.  There  was  really  nothing  to 
prevent  his  attacking  the  Confederates  the  next  day, 
the  15th,  with  the  advantage  of  superior  numbers, 
and  with  the  additional  advantage  of  having  just 

1  28  W.  R.,  609,  Long  to  McLaws. 


350  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

been  victorious.  Lee  could  perhaps  count  upon  de- 
laying his  pursuers  at  Keedysville,  or  at  Antietam 
Creek,  during  one  day,  but  he  must  have  been 
obliged  to  look  fully  in  the  face  the  probability  that 
a  great  battle  would  be  fought  on  the  16th — and  he 
certainly  could  not  count  on  all  the  Harper's  Ferry 
contingent  being  reunited  to  the  main  army  so  soon 
as  that.1  Then  the  position  at  Sharpsburg,  though 
in  many  respects  a  good  one,  was  a  hopeless  one  for 
his  army,  if  it  should  be  defeated.2  There  was  but 
one  way  of  crossing  the  Potomac  in  his  rear — by  the 
ford  at  Shepherdstown.  The  peril  was  of  a  character 
not  to  be  thought  of  with  calmness.3  A  defeat  would 
mean  a  rout — the  loss  of  thousands  of  prisoners — of 
hundreds  of  guns.  And  for  what  was  this  fearful 
risk  to  be  incurred  ?  One  can  imagine  nothing  but 
the  avoidance  of  a  loss  of  military  prestige,4  involved, 
it  might  be  thought,  in  leaving  the  soil  of  Maryland 
without  fighting  a  battle.  It  was  not  enough,  it 
might  be  said,  to  have  captured  Harper's  Ferry, — 
there  must  be  a  battle.  But  could  General  Lee  se- 
riously suppose  that  his  veteran  army  would  lose 
either  in  its  own  self-respect,  or  in  its  absolute  con- 
fidence in  him,  if  he  should  see  fit  to  reunite  its 
scattered  divisions  south  of  the  Potomac,  where  the 
operation  could  be  safely  and  easily  accomplished  ? 
One  can  hardly  think  so.  Of  his  two  principal  lieu- 

1  The  divisions  of  McLaws,  Anderson,  and  A.  P.  Hill,  fifteen  brigades  in 
all,  did  not  reach  Lee  till  the  I7th.  One  brigade — Thomas's — was  left  at 
Harper's  Ferry. 

*  Cf.  Allan,  373. 

s  But  see  Palfrey,  49.     Cf.  Pendleton,  27  W.  R.,  830. 

4  Cf.  Palfrey,  49. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  351 

tenants,  one,  Longstreet,  was  opposed  to  this  perilous 
course.1  Jackson,  however,  was,  as  we  know,2  in 
favor  of  making  a  stand  at  Sharpsburg.  Of  his  atti- 
tude on  this  question  General  Lee  wrote 3 :  "  When 
he  (Jackson)  came  upon  the  field,  having  preceded 
his  troops,  and  learned  my  reasons  for  offering  battle, 
he  emphatically  concurred  with  me.  When  I  de- 
termined to  withdraw  across  the  Potomac,  he  also 
concurred ;  but  said  then,  in  view  of  all  the  circum- 
stances, it  was  better  to  have  fought  the  battle  in 
Maryland  than  to  have  left  it  without  a  struggle." 
But  as  for  the  army  generally,  who  can  suppose  that 
the  confidence  of  the  officers  and  men  could  have 
been  shaken  in  their  commander,  had  Lee  adopted 
the  more  prudent  course  of  reuniting  his  scattered 
and  straggling  troops  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
Potomac  ? 

General  Lee,  however,  thought  that  there  was  a  fair 
chance  for  him  to  win  a  victory  over  McClellan.  He 
exaggerated  the  influence  which  the  recent  defeat  of 
the  Federal  army  at  Manassas  had  had  upon  its 
moral.  General  Walker  says  that  he  spoke  of  that 
army  before  the  campaign  opened,  as  "  in  a  very 
demoralized  and  chaotic  condition." 4  But  this  was 
very  far  from  being  the  fact.  The  Federal  army 
had  no  doubt  suffered  a  good  deal  from  its  experi- 
ences in  the  month  of  August,  and  it  was  now  some- 
what hampered  and  hindered  from  the  fact  that  it 

1  2B.  &L.,  666. 
s  Ante,  348,  n. 

1  Letter   from   General   Lee   to   Mrs.   Jackson,    dated   Lexington,  Va., 
January  25th,  1866. 
4  2  B.&  L.,  606. 


352          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

had  very  recently  been  reorganized.  But  it  was 
nevertheless  a  well-disciplined  and  veteran  army, 
inured  to  war,  and  it  was,  for  the  most  part,  led  by 
brave  and  competent  officers.  General  Lee,  in  truth, 
seems  to  have  been  unable  to  discriminate  between 
successes  obtained  against  poor  troops,  and  successes 
obtained  against  good  troops — poorly  led.  There 
was  nothing  in  the  Manassas  campaign  to  indicate 
that  the  Union  troops  were  poor  troops.  Naturally, 
he  did  not  consider  them  as  good  as  his  own,  and  it 
is  without  doubt  true  that  they  did  not  constitute  so 
good  an  army  as  that  which  he  commanded.  They 
were  at  that  time  badly  organized  and  poorly  led. 
But  since  Manassas  things  had  changed.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  now  in  the  field,  and  under  its 
favorite  general.  That  army  could  do  a  great  deal 
of  hard  fighting ;  in  bravery  and  stubbornness,  and 
in  power  of  recuperation  after  defeat,  it  was  quite 
the  equal  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia ;  and 
had  its  75,000  or  80,000  men  been  commanded  at 
this  moment  by  a  Lee,  with  a  Jackson  in  charge  of 
one  wing  and  a  Longstreet  in  charge  of  the  other, 
there  would  have  been  no  chance  of  escape  for  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia.1  ^t  is  certainly  a  mis- 
take for  a  general  to  overestimate  his  adversary's 
strength  and  prowess  ;  it  is  no  less  a  mistake,  how- 
ever, to  underestimate  them.  But  this  was,  as  we 
know,  the  habit  of  General  Lee's  mind ; 2  and  his  sub- 
sequent successes  confirmed  him  in  it.  It  was  not 
until  the  disastrous  assault  on  the  heights  of  Gettys- 
burg that  he  found  out  his  mistake, 

1  Palfrey,  17,  18.  9  Ante,  204. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  353 

On  the  night  of  the  14th,  General  Lee,  evidently 
finding  it  impossible  to  make  any  stand  at  Keedys- 
ville,  as  he  had  proposed  to  do,  retired  to  and  across 
Antietam  Creek  to  the  neighborhood  of  Sharps- 
burg.1  Here,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  he 
took  up  his  position,  facing  east.2  On  the  right  of 
his  line,  on  a  high  hill,  stood  the  village  of  Sharps- 
burg.  About  half  or  three  quarters  of  a  mile  south- 
east of  the  town,  the  Antietam  was  crossed  by  a 
stone  bridge,  afterwards  known  as  Burnside's  Bridge. 
Antietam  Creek,  though  fordable  in  many  places, 
constituted  nevertheless  a  considerable  obstacle  to 
the  passage  of  troops,  especially  of  artillery;  but  it 
was  only  at  Burnside's  Bridge  and  below  that  it 
was  held  by  the  Confederates ;  their  centre  and  left 
being  posted  well  to  the  westward  of  it.  The  turn- 
pike to  Hagerstown,  which  runs  nearly  due  north 
from  Sharpsburg,  was  a  marked  feature  in  the  field 
of  battle.  It  ran  behind  the  Confederate  line,  and 
was  the  principal  avenue  of  communication  between 
the  different  parts  of  the  army.  About  a  mile  from 
Sharpsburg,  on  the  west  side  of  the  turnpike  and 
close  to  it,  stood  (and  still  stands)  a  little  church, 
of  brick,  painted  white,  belonging  to  a  sect  known 
as  Dunkers.  To  the  west  of  the  turnpike  the  ground 
was  broken  and  uneven,  and  not  much  of  it  was 
cultivated,  while  to  the  east  of  it  there  was  easy, 
rolling,  unobstructed  ground,  even  the  woods  being 
free  from  underbrush,  and  there  were  several  farms, 
and  the  fields  were  generally  under  cultivation. 

1  27  W.  R.,  839,  1021,   1022. 

2  See  Map  X.,  facing  page  376. 


354          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

The  whole  Confederate  line,  from  Burnside's  Bridge 
on  the  south  to  the  extremity  of  their  left,  was 
perhaps  three  miles  in  length,  and  during  the  15th 
was  occupied  only  by  the  divisions  of  D.  R.  Jones 
and  Hood  and  the  brigade  of  Evans  of  Longstreet's 
corps,  the  division  of  D.  H.  Hill  of  Jackson's  corps, 
Stuart's  cavalry,  and  the  Reserve  Artillery, — four- 
teen brigades  of  infantry  and  three  of  cavalry, — 
18,000  or  19,000  men,  with  about  125  guns.1 

These  troops  were  thus  posted :  Stuart,  with  the 
greater  part  of  the  cavalry  and  horse-artillery,  held 
the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  occupying  a  command- 
ing hill 2  not  far  from  the  Potomac,  situated  perhaps 
a  third  of  a  mile  northwest  of  the  Dunker  Church. 
Hood,  with  his  two  brigades,  held  the  ground  near 
the  church3  and  beyond  it.  He  connected  with 
Stuart  on  his  left  and  with  D.  H.  Hill  on  his  right,  and 
faced  to  the  north  and  northeast.  D.  H.  Hill,  with 
his  five  brigades,  held  the  left-centre  of  the  line,  fac- 
ing east.  His  troops  were  posted  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
or  more  east  of  the  turnpike.  On  his  right  was  the 
brigade  of  Evans,  occupying  the  centre  of  the  line, 
and  watching  the  two  bridges  over  the  Antietam.  On 
the  heights  of  Sharpsburg  and  on  the  high  ground 
overlooking  the  lower  fords  was  stationed  the  divi- 
sion of  D.  R.  Jones  with  its  six  brigades.  On  the 
extreme  right  of  the  army  Colonel  Munford  was 
posted  with  his  brigade  of  cavalry.4  On  every  suita- 

1  Cf.  21  W.  R.,  835-837. 

*/£.,  819,  957  ;  Allan,  393;  Palfrey,  80,  84  ;  Swinton,  211 ;  McClellan's 
Stuart,  130. 

*27  W.  R.,  922,  923. 
4  Cf.  Allan,  377,  378. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  355 

ble  eminence  the  Confederates  had  placed  their  bat- 
teries, and  the  ground  presented  many  positions 
adapted  to  the  effective  use  of  guns.1 

Against  this  small  force  General  McClellan  was 
advancing  with  the  1st,  2d,  5th,2  and  12th  corps  and 
the  cavalry,  containing  nominally  about  75,000  offi- 
cers and  men,  and  numbering  in  reality  over  60,000.s 
The  morning  of  the  15th  found  the  Confederates 
retreating  from  the  South  Mountain ;  the  weather 
was  fine ;  the  roads  were  excellent  and  unobstructed  ; 
it  was  only  seven  miles  from  the  Mountain  to  Antie- 
tarn  Creek  ;  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  McClellan 
from  taking  advantage  of  the  unique  opportunity 
which  had  fallen  to  his  lot.  By  noon  the  bulk  of 
his  troops  might  have  been  brought  into  contact 
with  the  enemy.  But  McClellan,  not  appreciating 
the  circumstances,  hesitated  and  delayed,  and  noth- 
ing whatever  was  done  on  September  15th. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  16th  Lee's  army  was 
reinforced  by  the  arrival  from  Harper's  Ferry  of 
Jackson,  with  his  own  division  under  J.  R.  Jones, 
and  Swell's  division  under  Lawton,4  and  of  J.  G. 
Walker  of  Longstreet's  corps,  with  his  own  divi- 
sion,5— ten  brigades  in  all,  say  8000  men,  with  a  full 
complement  of  artillery.  Jackson's  troops  were  at 
once  sent  to  the  left  of  the  line,  relieving  Hood,  who 
was  placed  in  support  of  them.  Jones  took  position 

1  See  note  i,  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

8  Two  divisions  of  this  corps  under  Porter  had  left  Washington  on  the 
I2th,  and  had  now  joined  the  army.  One  of  these,  however,  Morell's,  did 
not  reach  Keedysville  until  noon  of  the  l6th. 

3  27  W.  R.,  67  ;  see  Palfrey,  70. 

4  27  W.  R.,  955.  */<*.,  914. 


356  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

on  the  west  of  the  Hagerstown  turnpike  and  Law- 
ton  on  the  east  of  it.  Lawton's  division  connected 
on  its  right  with  that  of  D.  H.  Hill.  Walker  was 
placed  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  line,  south  of 
Sharpsburg.  Longstreet  had  general  charge  of  the 
right  of  the  Confederate  army,  and  Jackson  of  the 
left. 

One  would  have  supposed  that  McClellan,  whose 
estimate  of  the  numbers  of  Lee's  army  was  (as  was 
usual  with  him)  far  too  high,  would  have  called  up 
Franklin  from  Pleasant  Valley  with  certainly  two 
out  of  his  three  divisions, — one,  perhaps,  being  left 
to  watch  McLaws.  And  he  undoubtedly  enter- 
tained this  design  in  the  morning  of  the  15th,1  but 
he  did  not  act  upon  it ;  in  fact,  he  soon  reconsidered 
this  scheme.  It  is  plain  from  subsequent  despatches 
written  during  the  15th,  that  he  still  expected 
Franklin  to  watch,  and,  if  he  could,  to  attack 
McLaws,  and  he  even  thought  of  sending  Burnside 
to  reinforce  him.2  It  was  not  till  7.30  P.M.  of  the 
16th  that  McClellan  ordered  Franklin  to  join  him, 
leaving  a  small  force  on  Maryland  Heights.3  Yet 
before  8  A.M.  of  that  day  he  had  learned  of  the 
capture  of  Harper's  Ferry,4  and  he  might,  one  would 
think,  have  divined  that  McLaws  and  the  other 
Confederate  officers  in  that  vicinity  would  march  at 
once  to  join  Lee,  in  which  event  he  would  need  the 

1  See  the  despatch  of  8.45  A.M.,  September  isth  (107  W.  R.,  835).  This 
was  not  received  by  Franklin, — so  he  has  informed  the  writer.  It  is  not 
certain  that  these  supplemental  despatches,  which  (as  the  writer  is  informed) 
are  taken  from  McClellan's  "manifold  despatch  book,"  were  ever  sent; 
but  at  any  rate,  they  show  what  was  passing  in  his  mind. 

»  107  W.  R.,  836,  837.  s/3.,  839.  4  76.,  839. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  357 

aid  of  the  6th  corps.     But  he  delayed  summoning 
Franklin  till  evening. 

On  the  afternoon  of  September  16th  McClellan 
completed  his  preparations  for  the  battle  which  he 
proposed  to  deliver  the  next  day.  He  had  some- 
what changed  his  dispositions.  Sumner  was  now 
on  the  right  of  the  army  with  his  two  corps, — the 
2d  and  12th, — in  place  of  Burnside,  whom  McClel- 
lan had  put  on  the  left  of  the  line,  and  from  whose 
command  he  had  removed  the  1st  corps  under 
Hooker.1  This  he  had  placed  on  the  extreme  right, 
Sumner,  with  the  2d  and  12th  corps,  coming  next; 
then  Porter  with  the  5th,  occupying  the  centre  of 
the  line ;  and  then  Burnside  with  the  9th  corps. 
When  Franklin,  with  the  divisions  of  Slocum  and 
W.  F.  Smith  of  the  6th  corps,  should  arrive  the  next 
morning  from  Pleasant  Valley,  McClellan  proposed 
to  use  them  as  a  general  reserve  to  the  whole  army. 
His  plan,  as  stated  by  himself  in  his  final  and  elabo- 
rate report,2  was  to  attack  the  Confederate  left  with 
the  1st  and  12th  corps,  supported  by  the  2d,  and  if 
necessary  by  the  6th,  "  and,  as  soon  as  matters  looked 
favorably  there,"  to  cany  the  heights  of  Sharpsburg 
with  the  9th  corps.  If  these  assaults  or  either  of 
them  should  prove  successful,  he  intended  to  advance 
his  centre  with  all  his  disposable  forces.  He  pro- 
posed to  begin  at  once  by  pushing  Hooker  across 

1  107  W.  R.,  837. 

*  27  W.  R.,  55.  In  his  first  report  (*'£.,  30)  he  says  that  he  intended  "to 
create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  main  attack  with  the  hope  of  something 
more,  by  assailing  the  enemy's  right."  This  language  may  be  construed  as 
showing  an  intention  to  make  a  simultaneous  attack  on  both  ends  of  the 
line.  Cf.  Cox,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  633  ;  Palfrey,  107.  Also,  27  W.  R.,  63. 


358  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

the  Antietam  that  afternoon,  with  the  intention  of 
gaining  a  foothold  on  the  enemy's  left. 

Accordingly,  about  2  P.M.  of  September  16th, 
the  1st  corps,  alone  and  unsupported,1  left  its  camp, 
and  about  four  o'clock  crossed  the  creek  by  the  upper 
of  the  three  bridges  which  spanned  it.  When  the 
troops  reached  the  Hagerstown  turnpike  they  were 
faced  to  the  south ;  and,  marching  on  the  turnpike 
and  on  both  sides  of  it, — Meade's  division  in  front, 
— they  encountered  the  enemy  about  dark.  On  ac- 
count of  the  lateness  of  the  hour,  no  serious  engage- 
ment followed,  and  the  only  effect  of  this  hazardous 
operation  was  to  indicate  to  the  Confederates  the 
plan  of  the  Union  general.  At  11.30  on  the  same 
evening 2  the  12th  corps  under  Mansfield  also  crossed 
the  Antietam,  following  the  route  taken  by  the  1st 
corps,  and  bivouacked  for  the  night  a  mile  and  a 
half  north  of  Hooker's  troops.3  Two  corps, — say 
18,000  or  19,000  men,4 — were  now  across  the  creek, 
and  menacing  the  Confederate  left.  But  they  were 
not  so  disposed  as  to  be  able  to  act  in  unison ;  and 
they  were  not  under  one  commander. 

On  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  the  17th,  Sumner, 
who  in  person  commanded  the  2d  corps,  and  who 
had  been  ordered  to  put  his  troops  in  readiness  to 
march  to  the  support  of  General  Hooker  an  hour 
before  daylight,  and  whose  corps  was  ready  to  move 

1  It  is  plain  that  Hooker  recognized  the  perilous  character  of  this  opera- 
tion ;  27  VV.  R.,  217. 

'/*.,  275. 

3  It.,  475.    The  position   may  have  been  designated  by    Hooker;    107 
W.  R.,  839. 

4  Allan,  398. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  359 

at  that  time,  receiving  no  orders,  and  hearing  the 
sound  of  heavy  firing  across  the  creek,  rode  to  Me- 
Clellan's  headquarters  to  obtain  instructions,  waited 
there  an  hour  or  more,  without  seeing  him,1  and  did 
not  get  orders  to  move  till  half -past  seven  o'clock.2 

With  these  badly  conceived  and  ill-combined 
movements  did  General  McClellan  begin  the  battle 
of  the  Antietam. 

Somewhere  about  half -past  five  or  six  o'clock  Hook- 
er's corps  left  its  bivouac,  and,  marching  south  on 
both  sides  of  the  Hagerstown  turnpike,  speedily  en- 
countered the  enemy.  Jackson  (as  we  know)  was 
in  charge  of  the  left  of  Lee's  army,  and  the  first 
shock  fell  on  Ewell's  division,  under  Lawton,  and 
on  Jackson's  old  division,  now  commanded  by  J.  R. 
Jones.  This  officer  was  speedily  carried  off  the  field 
wounded.  His  place  was  taken  by  Starke,  who 
shortly  fell  mortally  hurt.  The  losses  in  this  struggle, 
which  lasted  for  more  than  an  hour,  were  terrible. 
"  Colonel  Douglass,  commanding  Lawton's  brigade, 
was  killed.  General  Lawton,  commanding  division, 
and  Colonel  Walker,  commanding  brigade,  were 
severely  wounded.  More  than  half  of  the  brigades 
of  Lawton  and  Hays  were  either  killed  or  wounded, 
and  more  than  a  third  of  Trimble's,  and  all  the 
regimental  commanders  in  those  brigades,  except 
two,  were  killed  or  wounded." 3  Hood's  two  brigades 
were  soon  sent  for,  and  came  to  the  assistance  of 
Jones's  and  Lawton's  exhausted  troops,  as  did  also 

1  Letter  from  Colonel  S.  S.  Sumner,  6th  cavalry,  then  on  the  staff  of  his 
father,  General  E.  V.  Sumner.' 
J  27  W.  R.,  275. 
*  Jackson's  Report,  #.,  956. 


360  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

three  brigades  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division.  The  Federal 
troops  were  in  equal  or  perhaps  superior  force,1  and 
were  well  led  by  Hooker  himself,  and  by  Doubleday, 
Bicketts,  and  Meade,  his  division-commanders.  The 
struggle  was  most  determined,2  but  the  Union  troops, 
after  fighting  a  good  hour  or  more,  drew  off.  Finally, 
Hooker  was  wounded,3  and  obliged  to  leave  the  field. 
He  had  lost  upwards  of  2500  men 4  in  this  brief  en- 
gagement out  of  the  9000  or  10,000  which  he  had 
brought  upon  the  field.5  On  the  Confederate  side, 
the  divisions  of  J.  R.  Jones  and  Lawton  had  lost  nearly 
half  their  numbers  and  were  practically  IwrK  de 
combat.  * 

If  the  corps  of  Mansfield  had  been  at  hand  while 
this  action  was  being  fought,  the  result  might  very 
possibly  have  been  the  overwhelming  of  the  troops 
which  constituted  the  left  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia ;  but  that  corps,  though  starting  at  the  first 
sound  of  the  cannon,  had  a  mile  and  a  half  to  march 
before  reaching  the  field.  The  troops  then  had  to 
deploy,7  and  could  not  get  into  action  until  Hooker's 
troops,  exhausted  by  their  hard  fighting  and  losses, 
were  about  retiring 8  to  the  shelter  of  their  artillery, 
where  under  Meade,  who  had  succeeded  Hooker  in 

1  Cf.  Allan,  397,  398. 

9  See,  e.  g.,  27  W.  R.,  224,  225,  255,  968,  etc. 

'Probably  before  9  A.M.  He  was  wounded  before  Sumner  came  up  (27 
W.  R.,  275),  and  this  was  shortly  after  nine  o'clock  (ib.,  476).  General  Meade 
(ib.,  270),  who  puts  the  arrival  of  the  I2th  corps  at  about  10  A.M.,  and  the 
wounding  of  Hooker  at  after  eleven,  is  clearly  in  error.  The  I2th  corps 
was  engaged  as  early  as  eight  o'clock.  See  Allan,  392,  n.  4. 

4  27  W.  R.,  200. 

*  Allan,  398. 

*  Ib.,  389,  390,  393  ;  27  W.  R.,  968,  969. 

7  27  W.  R.,  475.  *  Palfrey,  78. 


i862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  361 

command,1  they  subsequently  reorganized  their  shat- 
tered battalions.2  It  was  at  least  half-past  seven 
o'clock3  before  the  troops  of  the  12th  corps,  some  of 
whom  were  raw  regiments,4  were  in  a  position  to 
make  their  attack,  and,  in  the  meantime,  their  com- 
mander, General  Mansfield,  a  gallant  veteran,  had 
been  killed.  His  place  was,  however,  filled  by 
Williams,  a  brave  and  experienced  officer.  The 
movement  of  the  1st  corps  had  been  in  great  part 
from  the  north  down  the  turnpike  and  on  both  sides 
of  it,  as  well  as  in  part  from  the  east,  but  that  of  the 
12th  corps  was  almost  entirely  on  the  east  side  of 
the  turnpike,  and  was  made  in  a  southwesterly  di- 
rection. [The  first  Confederate  troops  struck  were 
the  brigades  of  D.  H.  Hill's  and  Hood's  divisions,  of 
which  we  have  just  spoken,  and,  after  a  stubborn 
and  extremely  gallant  resistance,  these  troops,  already 
shattered  and  exhausted,  were  forced  to  give  way  in 
some  confusion.  The  victorious  Federals  poured 
across  the  Hagerstown  turnpike,  and  Greene's  divi- 
sion got  possession  of  the  Dunker  Church  and  the 
ground  near  it  on  the  west  side  of  the  roa3J  In  this 
struggle  also,  which  lasted  an  hour  or  more,  the 
casualties  on  both  sides  were  very  heavy,  and  the 
troops  of  the  12th  corps,  although  successful,  needed 
a  period  of  rest  before  again  assuming  the  offensive. 
The  12th  corps  lost  some  1700  men 5  out  of  the  7000 6 
brought  into  action.  The  Confederate  loss  must 
have  been  far  greater. 


1  27  W.  R.,  270.  4  27  W.  R.,  475. 

2  Cf.  Cox,  in  2  B  &  L.,  645,  n.  6  Ib.,  igg. 

3  Allan,  392,  n.  4.  8  Allan,  398. 


362  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

fn  both  these  actions  the  Union  troops  suffered 
greatly  from  the  fire  of  Stuart's  artillery,  stationed 
on  the  hill  before  referred  to,  which  was  northwest 
of  the  scene  of  conflict.1 

On  the  other  hand  the  Federal  batteries  on  the 
east  side  of  the  Antietam  poured  "  a  severe  and 
damaging  fire  "  upon  the  Confederates,2  the  shot  and 
shell  passing  over  the  heads  of  the  Union  trooj5|. 

The  scene  of  this  desperate  fighting  was  the  woods 
lying  to  the  east  of  the  turnpike 3  north  of  the  Dun- 
ker  Church,  the  cornfield  between  the  woods  and 
the  turnpike,  and  also,  to  a  less  degree,  the  fields 
and  woods 4  on  the  west  side  of  the  turnpike^  With 
the  exception  of  the  hill  occupied  by  Stuart  the 
Confederates  held  now  but  little  ground  north  of  the 
Dimker  Church.  But  the  remnants  of  Jones's  di- 
vision under  Grigsby,  reinforced  by  Early,  who  had 
succeeded  Lawton  in  the  command  of  Ewell's  divi- 
sion, clung  obstinately  to  the  ground  south  and  west 
of  the  church,5  opposed  chiefly  by  Greene,  whose  skil- 
ful management  of  his  division  of  the  12th  corps 
was  conspicuous.  Greene,  however,  was  too  weak  * 
to  press  his  antagonists,  and  the  other  division  of 
the  corps,  under  Crawford,  was  resting.  It  was 
about  nine  o'clock.  Both  sides  expected  reinforce- 
ments, and  there  was  for  the  moment  a  lull  in  the 
fight. 


1  27  W.  R.,  56,  476. 

9  Jackson's  Report ;  27  W.  R.,  956.     Cf.  ib.,  206  ;  Allan,  385. 

3  Often  spoken  of  as  "  the  East  Woods." 

4  Often  spoken  of  as  "  the  West  Woods." 
*  27  W.  R.,  969,  970 ;  Allan,  401,  402. 
«27  W.  R.,  476. 


1862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  363 

On  the  Federal  side,  Sumner,  having  at  last  ob- 
tained his  orders,  was  marching  with  his  second  and 
third  divisions,  under  Sedgwick  and  French,  to  the 
scene  of  action.1  He  himself  accompanied  Sedgwick, 
and  ordered  French  to  follow  closely,  and  take  post 
on  his  left.  Shortly  after  nine,  Sedgwick's  three 
brigades  in  three  columns  emerged  from  the  belt  of 
woods  east  of  the  turnpike,  deployed,  and  in  three 
lines,  facing  west,  crossed  the  cornfield  and  the  turn- 
pike, passing  Greene's  troops,  who  heartily  cheered 
them,2  and,  leaving  the  Dunker  Church  on  their  left, 
entered  the  woods  which  lay  west  of  the  turnpike. 
They  made  no  halt,  but  pushed  right  on.  The  gal- 
lant old  general  (Sumner)  was  confident  that  he  was 
about  to  bring  upon  the  field  of  the  Antietam  to  the 
soldiers  of  Hooker  and  Mansfield  the  timely  assist- 
ance which  he  had  so  bravely  carried  on  the  field  of 
Fair  Oaks  to  the  defeated  troops  of  Keyes  and  Couch. 
He  would  not  stop  to  ask  the  positions  of  the  Union 
or  the  Confederate  troops.  No  doubt  he  was  im- 
patient, not  to  say  indignant,  at  having  been  com- 
pelled by  the  remissness  of  McClellan  to  waste  the 
precious  hours  of  the  early  morning.  His  only 
thought  now  was  to  press  on.  He  must,  however, 
one  would  suppose,  have  known  that,  after  he  should 
have  crossed  the  turnpike,  his  left  would  be  exposed 
to  attack.  But  he  threw  out  no  skirmishers.  He 
probably  supposed  that  French  was  following  en 
echelon  on  his  left.  He  also,  in  his  haste,  failed  to 


1  The  third  division,  Richardson's,  was  detained  an  hour  or  so  by  order  of 
General  McClellan  ;  27  W.  R.,  275. 
*  /£.,  476. 


364  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

notice  that  his  brigades  were  pressing  upon  each 
other  at  intervals  too  small  to  admit  of  their  chang- 
ing front  in  case  of  necessity.  The  distance  between 
the  lines  was  not  over  thirty  paces, — some,  indeed, 
have  said,  not  over  fifty  feet.1  His  troops  numbered 
about  5500  men.  They  were  veterans ;  they  had 
fought  through  the  Peninsular  campaign;  and  many 
of  his  regiments  were  among  the  best  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  They  were  full  of  confidence.  In 
fact,  they  were  able  to  overcome  any  resistance  that 
could  be  opposed  to  them  in  their  direct  front,  but 
it  was  soon  to  be  seen  how  helpless  even  the  finest 
troops  are  when  subjected  to  a  close  and  persistent 
flank  fire,  which  from  their  formation  they  are  power- 
less to  return. 

Just  at  the  time  when  Sedgwick's  division  was 
crossing  the  Hagerstown  road,  the  Confederate  di- 
visions of  McLaws  and  Walker — eight  brigades, 
say  6000  men — rapidly  approached  the  scene  of 
action  from  the  south.  Deploying  to  the"  left,  and 
facing  north,  they  took  position  behindthe  rocky 
ledges  with  which  that  region  abounds.  [The  head  of 
Sumner's  column  was  temporarily  checked  in  its  ad- 
vance a  quarter  of  a  mile  or  so  beyond  the  turnpike, 
partly  by  the  difficult  character  of  the  ground  and 
by  the  fences,  partly  by  the  musketry  fire  opened 
upon  it  in  front  by  the  remnants  of  Jackson's  divi- 


1  Palfrey,  83.  The  best  account  of  this  famous  charge  is  to  be  found  in 
Palfrey's  very  valuable  work.  He  participated  in  the  action  as  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  of  the  2Oth  Massachusetts,  and  was  severely  wounded.  His  state- 
ment, however,  on  page  87,  that  "the  Philadelphia  brigade"  (the  ad), 
commanded  by  Howard,  "was  the  first  to  go,"  has  been  denied  on  very 
high  authority. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  365 

sion  under  Grigsby,  and  partly  by  the  fire  of  Stuart's 
artillery  from  the  high  ground  on  the  right  before 
spoken  of,1  and,  owing  to  the  halt  of  the  front  line, 
the  brigades  were  naturally  getting  closer  to  each 
other?]  At  this  moment  the  troops  of  McLaws  and 
Walker  poured  upon  their  left  flank  at  close  range 
a  terrible  and  sustained  fire,  which  it  was  impossible 
for  them  to  return.  The  two  leading  brigades  were 
so  close  together  that  they  could  not  change  front 
and  present  a  line  of  battle  to  the  enemy.  An  at- 
tempt was  made  by  the  third  line  to  face  about,  but 
it  was  frustrated  by  the  heavy  fire.2  There  could 
be  but  one  issue  to  such  a  struggle.  In  spite  of  the 
heroic  exertions  of  Sumner  and  Sedgwick  and  their 
brave  subordinates,  it  was  impossible  to  offer  any 
effective  resistance  to  the  enemy.  The  loss  was 
terrible, — over  2200  officers  and  men,3 — and  it  was 
all  sustained  in  a  very  few  minutes.4  Sedgwick 
himself  was  three  times  wounded,  and  finally  had 
to  leave  the  field.  The  division  fell  back  in  more 
or  less  disorder  perhaps  a  third  of  a  mile  to  the 
north,  and  re-formed  under  the  protection  of  the 
batteries. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  representations 
made  to  General  Sumner  of  the  urgent  need  of  rein- 
forcements on  this  part  of  the  field  of  battle  influenced 
him  greatly,  and  account  in  great  part  for  the  impetu- 
osity of  his  attack.  But  since  it  was  plain,  when  he 
arrived  near  the  Dunker  Church,  that  no  fighting  of 
any  consequence  was  going  on,5 — that  there  was  no 

1  27  W.  R.,  310. 

a  //>.,  275,  276,  306.  4  Palfrey,  87. 

3  Ib.,  193.  6  27  W.  R.,  476. 


366  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

pressing  emergency, — it  is  not  easy  to  see  why  he 
should  not  have  taken  the  time  necessary  to  get  his 
two  divisions  together. 

It  is  worth  remarking  that  this  disaster  to  the 
Union  army  could  hardly  have  happened  if  the  bat- 
tle had  been  fought  on  the  16th,  for  McLaws  with 
his  six  brigades  did  not  arrive  at  Sharpsburg  till  the 
morning  of  the  17th. 

(We  must  not  fail  to  note  the  skill  and  resolution 
exhibited  by  General  Lee  in  thus  reinforcing  his  left 
with  troops  stationed  originally  on  his  right.  In 
view  of  the  vital  importance  of  preventing  his  left 
from  being  turned,  and  with  a  correct  estimate  of 
the  lack  of  enterprise  of  the  Union  commander  who 
opposed  his  right  wing  (Burnside),  he  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  transfer  these  6000  men  from  one  flank  to 
the  other,1  and  thus  he  preserved,  for  the  time  being 
at  any  rate,  his  line  unbrokejg. 

McLaws  and  Walker  vigorously  pressed  Sedgwick's 
defeated  troops.  But  they  were  checked  by  the 
Federal  batteries,  behind  which  their  antagonists 
rallied  and  re-formed,  and  repulsed  every  attack. 
That  these  assaults  were  made  with  ill-advised  per- 
sistence is  shown  by  the  great  loss  suffered  by  the 
Confederates, — that  of  McLaws's  division  being  39£ 
per  cent,  of  the  number  engaged,2  while  the  division 
of  Walker  is  said  to  have  "  suffered  heavily." J  Al- 
most all  this  loss  must  have  been  incurred  after 
Sedgwick's  division  had  been  flanked  and  broken. 

1  McLaws  and  Walker  were  originally  stationed  on  the  right  of  the  line  ; 
27  W.  R.,  857,  858,  914. 
4  7^,860.  »/£.,  917. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  367 

Farther  to  the  south,  the  remnants  of  Jones's  and 
Lawton's  troops,  after  an  obstinate  fight,  drove 
Greene's  division  from  the  Dunker  Church  across  the 
Hagerstown  turnpike  by  or  soon  after  twelve  o'clock. 
But  by  that  time  all  the  Confederate  troops  in  that 
part  of  the  field  had  sustained  very  heavy  losses. 
They  were  in  no  condition  to  make  further  attacks, 
and  indeed  were  not  strong  enough  to  make  any 
effectual  resistance  to  a  vigorous  and  judiciously 
directed  assault  by  fresh  troops.  They  had  no  re- 
serves ;  all  their  regiments  had  been  engaged.  The 
victory,  however,  remained  with  them.  They  had, 
with  the  utmost  bravery,  with  inflexible  resolution, 
and  at  a  terrible  sacrifice  of  life,  repelled  the  three 
attacks  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Confederate  army. 

It  may  well,  however,  be  asked,  Where  were  the 
two  other  divisions  of  Sumner's  corps,  those  of 
French  and  Richardson  ?  Why  were  they  not  at 
hand  and  engaged  in  this  conflict  ?  The  answer  is 
simply  this, — that  French,  who  started  with  Sedg- 
wick  from  their  bivouac  near  Keedysville,  took  his 
division  too  far  to  the  southward,  thus  separating 
himself  from  Sedgwick ;  and  so,  striking,  not  the 
extreme  left  of  the  Confederate  line,  as  was  intended, 
but  its  left  centre,  became  involved  at  once  in  a 
bloody  and  desperate  conflict  with  the  division  of 
D.  H.  Hill,  assisted  by  that  of  R.  H.  Anderson. 
This  officer,  who  had  been  sent  up  by  General  Lee 
from  the  Confederate  right  to  the  defence  of  the  left, 
naturally  turned  to  the  assistance  of  Hill,  who  was 
sorely  pressed  by  French.  One  brigade  of  McLaws's 
division — Cobb's — also  joined  Hill,  thereby  increas- 


368  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

ing  his  force  to  twelve  brigades,  of  which,  however, 
three,  belonging  to  Hill's  own  division,  had  been 
already  (in  their  fight  with  the  Federal  corps  of 
Hooker  and  Mansfield)  "  broken  and  much  demoral- 
ized," l  leaving  perhaps  7000  men  in  good  order  and 
condition.  On  the  other  hand,  Richardson,  as  soon 
as  he  obtained  permission  to  start,  moved  promptly 
to  the  scene  of  action,  and  took  position  on  French's 
left.  The  two  Federal  divisions  numbered  probably 
a  little  over  10,000  men.2 

The  combat  which  followed  was  beyond  a  question 
one  of  the  most  sanguinary  and  desperate  in  the 
whole  war.  Shortly  after  it  began,  the  Confederates 
fell  back  to  a  country  road,  or,  more  properly,  lane, 
which  runs  into  the  Hagerstown  turnpike  from  the 
east  about  a  third  of  a  mile  south  of  the  Dunker 
Church,  the  connection  between  the  two  places  being 
maintained  by  a  part  of  Manning's  brigade  of  J.  Gr. 
Walker's  division.  For  a  considerable  part  of  its 
course  the  level  of  this  road  is  below  that  of  the  ad- 
joining fields,  so  that  it  constitutes  a  sort  of  natural 
rifle-pit.  This  sunken  road  was  held  with  the  great- 
est tenacity  by  the  Confederates,  and  it  was  assailed 
with  great  gallantry  and  persistency  by  the  Union 
troops.  For  an  hour  or  more  their  assaults  were 
absolutely  unsuccessful ;  but  shortly  after  the  ar- 
rival of  Richardson's  division  they  began  to  gain  the 
advantage.  At  last,  some  of  the  Confederate  regi- 
ments broke,  and  the  sunken  road  thereupon  became 
for  them,  and  for  the  troops  near  them,  a  pit  from 
which  there  was  no  escape  from  the  deadly  fire  of 

1  27  W.  R.,  1023.  *  Allan,  420. 


1 86 2]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  369 

their  antagonists  on  the  upper  bank.  The  carnage 
was  awful.  The  road  was  speedily  filled  with  the 
dead  and  wounded.  To  this  day  it  is  called  "  the 
Bloody  Lane."  At  some  points  the  Confederates 
were  forced  to  surrender.  Colonel  Barlow  of  the  61st 
New  York  at  one  place  captured  several  hundred 
men.  The  Confederates  finally  fell  back  in  great 
disorder,  having  lost  very  heavily,  and  with  their 
moral  and  organization  much  impaired. 

The  Union  troops  now  held  the  road  and  the  ad- 
jacent hills  to  the  south  of  it.  They  also  had  suffered 
severely ;  Barlow  was  badly,  and  Richardson  mortally, 
wounded.  The  casualties  in  the  two  divisions  ex- 
ceeded 2900  men.  But  their  loss  was  greatly 
exceeded  by  that  of  their  antagonists.  In  fact,  "  at 
this  time,  the  Confederate  left  centre  under  D.  H. 
Hill  was  pretty  thoroughly  broken  up.  .  .  .  The 
Confederate  artillery,  however,  kept  up  a  vigorous 
fire.  .  .  ."  But  "  there  was  no  body  of  Confederate 
infantry  in  this  part  of  the  field  that  could  have  re- 
sisted a  serious  advance."1 

At  this  moment  fortune  favored  McClellan.  The 
two  divisions  of  Franklin's  corps,  under  W.  F. 
Smith  2  and  Slocum,  had  arrived  on  this  part  of  the 
field.  A  brigade  of  Smith's  division  under  Irwin 
had  checked  the  advance  of  the  Confederates  when 
they  drove  Greene's  division  across  the  Hagerstown 
turnpike.  But,  except  for  this,  the  6th  corps  had 
not  been  engaged.  Franklin  at  once  saw  the  posi- 
tion of  affairs  and  was  anxious  to  put  his  troops  in. 
He  had  with  him  some  10,000  or  12,000  men,  under 

1  Allan,  418-420.  *  Often  called  "  Baldy  "  Smith. 

VOL.  II. — 24 


370  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

two  division-commanders  of  exceptional  ability ;  the 
soldiers  had  marched,  it  is  true,  some  ten  miles, 
from  Pleasant  Valley,  but  they  were  in  perfectly 
good  condition.  They  were  veterans,  well  organized 
and  well  led.  Such  an  attack  as  that  proposed  by 
Franklin,  made  upon  troops  exhausted  as  the  Con- 
federates were  by  several  hours'  hard  fighting,  whose 
losses  had  been  enormous,  who  had  moreover  been 
driven,  in  some  cases  in  disorder,  from  their  original 
positions,  was  conformable  to  all  the  rules  of  war? 
and,  as  we  know  now,  it  could  hardly  have  failed 
of  complete  success.  But  Sumner,  whose  three  divi- 
sions had  suffered  so  heavily,  deemed  it  unwise  to 
hazard  these  fresh  troops ;  and  McClellan,  always 
deficient  in  enterprise,  and  undoubtedly  much  in- 
fluenced by  Sumner,  would  not  permit  any  attack 
by  Franklin's  corps.1  The  contrast  between  the  two 
commanders — Lee  and  McClellan — in  vigor,  skill,  and 
enterprise,  cannot  be  seen  more  plainly  than  by  com- 
paring this  conduct  of  the  latter  with  the  unhesitat- 
ing employment  of  all  his  available  troops  by  the 
Confederate  commander.  McClellan  had  on  this 
part  of  the  field,  in  addition  to  Franklin's  corps,  the 
5th  corps  under  Porter,  which  had  not  been  engaged. 
He  also  had  the  1st  corps  under  Meade  and  the  12th 
corps  under  Williams,  besides  the  excellent  though 
unfortunate  troops  of  Sedgwick's  division,  and  the 
successful  divisions  of  French  and  Richardson.  He 
had  also  a  decided  preponderance  in  artillery.2  The 
1st,  2d,  and  12th  corps,  with  the  artillery,  could 
surely,  in  spite  of  their  losses  and  fatigues,  be  relied 
1  27  w.  R.,  61, 62,  277.  *  ib.,  1026. 


i862]           LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE,  371 

on  to  hold  the  ground  which  had  been  gained,  and 
also  furnish  any  needed  support  to  the  attacking 
columns  of  the  6th  corps.  The  5th  corps  might  thus 
remain,  as  before,  in  reserve.  Had  McClellan  exerted 
himself  personally,  had  he  shown  himself  to  the 
soldiers,  who  were  all  devoted  to  him,1  had  he  called 
upon  them  for  their  best  exertions  to  finish  the  battle, 
who  can  suppose  that  he  would  have  failed  ?  Un- 
questionably, the  indomitable  veterans  of  Lee's  army 
would  have  fought  with  unabated  courage  and  with 
all  the  strength  they  had  left,  but  they  would  have 
been  so  largely  outnumbered  in  men  and  guns,  and 
so  outfought  by  the  fresh  troops  which  Franklin 
would  have  put  in,  that  the  result  can  hardly  be 
doubted.2 

McClellan's  plan  of  battle  comprehended,  as  we 
have  seen,3  an  attack  on  the  heights  of  Sharpsburg,  on 
the  Confederate  right.  Such  an  attack  may  have  been 
a  difficult  one  to  make,  for  the  ground  was  favorable 
for  the  defenders,  who  commanded  with  their  batter- 
ies the  bridge  and  the  fords.  But  a  decisive  success 
in  this  part  of  the  field  might  have  compelled  the 
Confederates  to  abandon  their  positions  north  of 
Sharpsburg  and  to  concentrate  on  their  right,  in  order 


1  On  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Federal  soldiers  for  McClellan,  see  Palfrey, 
56,  119. 

2  To  the  same  effect,  see  Palfrey,  121,  122.     Colonel  Allan  (423)15  of  a 
different  opinion  ;  he  bases  it  on  the  fact  that  Lee,  Longstreet,  and  Jackson 
desired  at  that  time  to  attack  the  Federal  right,  and  would  have  done  so  had 
they  not  found  themselves  too  weak  to  attempt  such  a  task  ;  but  this  seems  to 
us  only  to  show  that  the  Confederate  generals  were  bolder  men  than  Mc- 
Clellan ;  it  certainly  does  not  tend  to  support  the  correctness  of  McClellan's 
decision. 

'  Ante,  357. 


372  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

to  retain  possession  of  Boteler's  Ford,  which  was  their 
only  way  of  retreat  across  the  Potomac.  Any  serious 
assault  made  at  this  place  would  very  probably  have 
deterred  General  Lee  from  sending  (as  he  did)  troops 
from  this  quarter  of  the  field  to  the  left  of  his  line 
of  battle,  and  we  have  seen  that  it  was  by  these 
troops  that  at  least  one  of  the  serious  attacks  of  the 
Union  army  on  his  left — that  made  by  Sumner  and 
Sedgwick — was  repulsed. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  whether  General  McClel- 
lan  originally  proposed  that  his  left  attack  should 
be  simultaneous  with  his  right  attack,  or  that  it 
should  be  deferred  until  some  palpable  advantage 
should  have  been  gained  by  the  latter.  His  expres- 
sions are  not  easy  to  reconcile  with  either  theory.1 
There  can  be  little  question  that  the  two  attacks 
ought  to  have  been  simultaneous.  But  while  Mc- 
Clellan  arranged  for  the  right  attack  to  be  begun  at 
5.30  A.M.,  it  was  not  until  eight  o'clock — two  hours 
and  a  half  after  the  battle  had  been  begun  by  Hooker, 
and  half  an  hour  after  McClellan  had  allowed  Sum- 
ner to  depart  with  the  divisions  of  Sedgwick  and 
French — that  he  ordered  Burnside  to  carry  the 
bridge  and  storm  the  heights  of  Sharpsburg.2  Here 
was  a  delay,  wholly  unnecessary,  of  two  hours. 

General  Burnside  had  been  assigned  to  the  com- 


1  27  W.  R.,  30,  55,  63. 

2  Some  say  that  no  order  was  sent  until  ten  o'clock.    See  Cox,  in  2  B.  &  L., 
647,  n.  One  certainly  was  dated  9.10  A.M.  ;  107  W.  R.,  844.    In  his  first  re- 
port, McClellan  gives  the  hour  as  ten  ;  in  his  second,  as  eight ;  28  W.  R.,  31, 
63.     The  diary  of  the  officer  who  carried  the  order,  Lieutenant  (now  Briga- 
dier-General) John  M.  Wilson,  gives  the  hour  as  8  A.M.     See  also  Cox's  Re- 
port, 27  W.  R.,  424. 


1862]          LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  373 

maud  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  consisting  of 
two  corps,  his  own — the  9th — and  Hooker's — the 
1st,1 — and,  as  we  know,  Hooker  had  recently  been  re- 
moved from  his  control.  Burnside,  however,  seems 
still  to  have  considered  himself  the  chief  of  the  right 
wing,  although  he  was  commanding  on  the  day  of 
the  battle  only  his  own  corps,  and  was  on  the  left 
of  the  line.2  He  had  undoubtedly  been  irritated  at 
McClellan's  action  in  this  regard,3  and  he  showed  it 
(among  other  things)  by  refusing  to  assume  the 
personal  control  of  his  corps,  which  he  entrusted  to 
General  Cox,  of  the  Kanawha  division.4  It  may  be 
doubted  whether  the  interests  of  the  service  lost 
anything  by  the  change,  but  when  two  officers  com- 
mand one  body  of  troops,  there  is  never  to  be  seen 
that  energy  and  sense  of  responsibility,  as  in  cases 
where  there  is  but  one  officer  in  charge.5  For  the 
extraordinary  delays  which,  as  we  shall  see,  charac- 
terized the  handling  of  the  9th  corps  on  this  day, 
and  which  have  excited  the  severe  criticism  of  mili- 
tary historians,6  Burnside  himself  must  be  held  prin- 
cipally responsible. 

McClellan  had  sent  Burnside  about  7  A.M.7  an  order 
to  make  preparations  for  the  attack,  and  the  troops 
were  accordingly  moved  nearer  the  Antietam.  The 
eight-o'clock  order  to  attack  was  received  about  nine, 

1  Ante,  357. 

s  27  W.  R.,4i6. 

3  There  was  also  some  feeling  on  his  part  against  Hooker  ;  ib.,  422.     Cf. 
Cox,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  631.     On  the  other  hand,  McClellan  seems  to  have  been 
quite  carried  away  by  his  admiration  for  Hooker;  27  W.  R.,  219.     Cf. 
Palfrey,  107,  108,  116,  117. 

4  27  W.  R.,  418.  8  Swinton,  220  ;  Palfrey,  116-120. 

5  Cf.  Palfrey,  117.  '  27  W.  R.,  424. 


374  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

and  preparations  for  crossing  the  stream  were  imme- 
diately made.1  Rodman's  division,  accompanied  by 
E wing's  brigade  of  the  Kanawha  division,  was  sent 
down  the  stream  to  the  fords.  To  Sturgis's  division, 
assisted  by  the  other  brigade,  Crook's,  of  the  Kana- 
wha division,  was  assigned  the  task  of  carrying  the 
stone  bridge.  Willcox's  division  was  held  in  reserve. 
The  heights  on  the  west  of  the  creek  were  occupied 
in  force  by  the  enemy's  artillery,  but  only  one  bri- 
gade of  infantry,  Toombs's,  of  D.  R.  Jones's  division, 
lined  the  shore.  These  troops,  however,  were  so 
well  placed  and  fought  so  well  that  they  repelled 
four  assaults  with  considerable  loss  to  the  Federal 
troops.  During  all  this  time  no  attempt  was  made  to 
ford  the  stream.  About  1  P.M.,  however,  the  bridge 
was  carried ;  Crook  crossed  at  a  ford  above  the 
bridge;  Toombs  retired  on  his  supports,  and,  about 
the  same  time,  Rodman  and  Ewing,  having  crossed 
by  the  lower  fords,  came  up  and  connected  with 
Sturgis's  troops  on  the  west  bank.  These  latter 
were  now  withdrawn  on  the  ground  of  fatigue,  and 
replaced  by  Willcox's  division.  While  these  arrange- 
ments were  being  made,  Burnside  himself  came  down 
to  the  creek,  actually  crossed  it,  remained  a  short 
time  with  his  troops,  and  then  returned  to  his  posi- 
tion on  the  eastern  side.2  It  was  not  till  about  three 
o'clock  that  Cox  got  his  corps  ready  for  the  assault 
on  the  heights.  When  it  was  made  it  was  a  bril- 
liant success  ;  the  Confederate  infantry  were  broken 
and  driven  into  the  town,  a  battery  (Mclntosh's) 

1  Cox's  Report,  27  W.  R.,  424. 
*  Cox,  in  2  B.  &  L.,  653. 


1 86z]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  375 

was  captured,  and  a  complete  victory  seemed  within 
sight.     But  this  was  not  to  be. 

It  was  one  of  the  peculiar  features  of  General  Mc- 
Clellan's  conduct  of  this  battle,  that  he  put  his  cavalry 
in  the  centre  of  his  line,  instead  of  on  his  flanks, 
and  it  was  the  more  extraordinary  that  he  should 
have  made  this  disposition  of  his  horse  in  this  battle 
because  he  had  every  reason  to  expect  that  his  antag- 
onist would  be  reinforced  by  troops  marching  from 
Harper's  Ferry  on  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac,  of 
whose  approach  notice  could  at  least  be  given  by  the 
cavalry,  even  if  their  onward  march  could  not  be 
hindered   by   its   operations.      But  so  it  was ;   the 
Union  army  had  no  cavalry  on  its  left ;   and  just  as 
the   gallant  9th  corps,  after  all  the  delays   of   the 
morning,  was  about  closing  in  upon  its  adversary — 
when,  to  all   appearance,  another   half-hour  would 
have  given  it  the  possession  of  the  town  of  Sharps- 
burg,  and  decided  the  fortune  of  the  whole  battle — 
the  Confederate  "light  division,"  consisting  of  five 
brigades  *  under  A.  P.  Hill,  having  just  arrived  from 
Harper's   Ferry  and  crossed  the  Potomac  without 
molestation,  climbed  the  heights  south  of  the  town. 
Without  an  instant's  hesitation  they  rushed  to  the 
rescue  of  their  comrades.     Attacking  Cox's  troops 
in  flank  as  they  were  eagerly  pressing  their  advan- 
tage over  Jones's  defeated  and  disorganized  soldiers, 
Hill's   men   broke   several  of   the  Union   brigades, 
rendered  imperative  a  complete  re-formation  of  the 
Federal   line,   recaptured    Mclntosh's   battery,    and 
finally  forced  their  antagonists  to  retire  in  more  or 

1  One  brigade,  Thomas's,  had  been  left  at  Harper's  Ferry. 


376  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

less  disorder  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  bridge, 
where  they  bivouacked  for  the  night.1  This  ended 
the  battle. 

The  battle  of  Sharpsburg,  or  of  the  Antietam, 
was  one  of  the  bloodiest  battles  of  the  war,  and  it  is 
likely  that  more  men  were  killed  and  wounded  on 
that  17th  of  September  than  on  any  single  day  in 
the  whole  war.  The  Confederate  loss  "probably 
amounted  to  8000  men  or  more "  2 ;  that  of  the 
Union  army  is  given  at  12,410  men.3  Each  side  lost 
about  one  quarter  of  the  troops  engaged ;  for  the 
Confederate  infantry,  in  which  were  nearly  all  the 
casualties,  did  not  exceed  31,200  men  4  or  there- 
abouts, while  the  1st,  2cl,  9th,  and  12th  corps,  which 
were  the  only  troops  put  in  by  McClellan — as  is 
shown  by  the  losses  in  the  5th  and  6th  corps  and  the 
cavalry  division,  which  amounted  to  only  578  men5— 
numbered  about  46,000  men.6 

To  get  a  correct  idea  of  the  management  of  the 


1  27  W.  R.,  423,  886,  890,  981. 

2  Allan,  438.     The  Confederate  summary  (27  W.  R.,  813)  includes  the 
losses  at  South  Mountain,  Crampton's  Gap,  and  Sharpsburg.     This  summary 
gives  the  total  number  of  killed  as  1567,  and  is  wholly  irreconcilable  with 
the  statement  of  Major  Davis  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  who  reported 
that  he  buried  about  3000  of  Lee's  army.     27  \V.  R.,  181. 

3  27  W.  R.,  200. 

4  Allowing,  that  is,  800  men  to  each  of  the  39  brigades.     The  cavalry  and 
artillery,  8000  strong,  brought  up  Lee's  total  strength  to  39, 200.  Cf.  Palfrey, 
68  ;  Swinton,  209  et  seq. 

6  27  W.  R.,  200. 

6  The  nominal  strength  of  these  corps,  as  given  by  McClellan  (27  W.  R., 
67),  is  57,614,  from  which  about  20  per  cent,  should  be  deducted  for  "  extra 
duty  "  men,  etc.  See  Palfrey,  70.  Colonel  Allan  (398)  puts  the  strength  of 
the  ist  and  I2th  corps,  including  artillery,  at  18,000  to  19,000  men,  which  is 
only  76  per  cent,  of  the  number  given  by  McClellan  in  27  W.  R..  67.  But 
he  here  deducts  the  loss  of  the  ist  corps  at  South  Mountain. 


1 862]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  377 

battle,  however,  all  the  troops  within  reach  on  both 
sides  should  be  included.  Adding  the  Confederate 
cavalry  and  artillery  to  their  infantry,  therefore,  we 
have  a  total  of  39,200  men  1 ;  and  adding  the  5th 
and  6th  corps  and  the  cavalry  and  artillery  2  to  the 
46,000  Federal  troops  already  enumerated,  we  arrive 
at  a  total  of  about  70,000  men.  The  battle  of 
Sharpsburg  was  therefore  in  every  light  most  cred- 
itable to  General  Lee  and  his  army ;  whether  we 
regard  his  31,200  infantry  as  contending  with  the 
Federal  46,000  infantry,  or  whether  we  admire  his 
intrepidity  in  standing  to  fight  an  army  of  70,000 
with  less  than  40,000  men,  not  all  of  whom,  in  fact, 
were  with  him  at  the  commencement  of  the  action. 
Of  General  Lee's  management  of  the  battle  there 
is  nothing  but  praise  to  be  said.  Nor  could  any 
troops  have  more  fully  justified  the  reliance  which 
their  leader  placed  on  them  than  the  troops  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Lee,  in  fact,  intended 
to  try  his  men  again.  He  was  urged  by  both  Long- 
street  and  Jackson  to  recross  the  Potomac  that  night, 
but  he  refused,  and,  instead,  he  endeavored  to  ar- 
range for  an  attack  on  the  Federal  right  wing  the 

O  O  O 

next  day.3  But  this  was  found  to  be  absolutely  out 
of  the  question,  and  the  Confederate  army  had  to  be 
content  with  remaining  in  its  lines  and  awaiting  the 
action  of  the  Federal  general. 

1  See  note  2,  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

*  The  numbers  of  the  5th  and  6th  corps  and  the  cavalry  division  are  given 
by  McClellan  (27  W.  R.,  67)  at  29,550,  80  per  cent,  of  which  is  23,640. 
The  artillery  seems  to  have  been  included  in  the  corps. 

3  General  Stephen  D.  Lee,  in  the  Richmond  Despatch,  December  20, 
1896  ;  White's  Lee,  224  ;  Palfrey  123. 


378  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

McClellan  (as  we  have  just  seen)  had  some  24,000 
troops  who  had  not  been  seriously  engaged  on  the 
17th.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  18th,1  Couch 
brought  up  his  division  (nominally)  7218  strong,2 
and,  by  11  A.M.,3  Humphreys  arrived  with  his  divi- 
sion of  6000  men.4  Franklin  again  strongly  advised 
an  attack.  He  was  the  only  one  of  the  Union  corps- 
commanders  who  recognized  the  importance  of  the 
high  ground  held  by  Stuart,5  and  he  desired  to  begin 
by  driving  him  and  his  artillery  from  it.6  He  would 
thus  have  placed  his  troops  on  the  extreme  left  of 
the  Confederate  line.7  But  McClellan  decided  not 
to  renew  the  battle.  We  have  little  to  add  to  the 
considerations  presented  above,  save  to  say,  that 
the  12,000  fresh  troops  of  Couch  and  Humphreys 
far  outweighed  any  accession  to  the  fighting  strength 
of  the  Confederate  army  which  General  Lee  could 
possibly  have  received  from  the  return  of  stragglers. 
That  McClellan  had  everything  to  gain  and  nothing 
to  lose  by  renewing  the  battle  seems  to  us  very 
plain,  nor  can  we  bring  ourselves  to  entertain  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  as  to  the  result,  if  he  had  recom- 
menced the  fight.8 

On  the  night  of  the  18th  of  September,  Lee  re- 
crossed  the  Potomac  at  Boteler's  Ford,  just  south  of 
Sharpsburg.  He  had  lost  "13  guns,  39  colors,  upwards 
of  15,000  stand  of  small  arms,  and  more  than  6000 

1  27  W.  R.,  377. 

8  28  W.  R.,  336.     In  reality,  it  was  probably  about  5800  or  6000  strong. 

3  107  W.  R.,  1005. 

4  27  W.  R.,  373.  «  2  B.  &  L.,  597. 
*  Ante,  354,  n.  2.  '  27  W.  R.,  957. 

8  So,  Palfrey,  127  ;  Swinton,  223  ;  contra,  Allan,  443. 


1 86a]  LEE  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  379 

prisoners."     The  Federal  army  had  not  lost  a  gun 
or  a  color.1 

These  losses  were  severely  felt  by  the  Confeder- 
ates, especially  as  nothing  but  glory  had  been  gained 
by  fighting  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg.2  This  they 
unquestionably  had  won  ;  but  at  what  fearful  risks ! 
Of  several  of  these  we  have  already  spoken.  But 
we  cannot  refrain  from  calling  attention  to  those  of 
the  afternoon  of  the  battle.  What  right  had  Gen- 
eral Lee  to  count  upon  the  extraordinary  delay  of 
the  9th  corps  in  crossing  the  Antietam,  where  there 
were  two  or  three  fords  besides  the  bridge,  and  over 
three  hours  were  consumed  in  making  the  transit  ? 
Or  upon  the  further  delay  of  two  more  hours  occa- 
sioned by  confining  the  passage  of  Willcox's  division 
to  the  bridge  only  ?  Had  the  9th  corps  accomplished 
by  noon,  as  it  certainly  might  have  done,  what  it  had 
accomplished  by  the  time  A.  P.  Hill  arrived,  Lee  in 
all  probability  would  have  lost  the  battle.  As  it 
was,  fortune  favored  him ;  he  repulsed  all  the  attacks 
of  his  foes,  and  made  good  his  retreat  across  the 
river.  But  the  prestige  of  victory  remained  natu- 
rally with  McClellan,  who  after  a  few  weeks  followed 
the  Confederates  into  Virginia.3  Lee's  invasion  had 
terminated  in  failure — failure  which  could  not  but 
be  admitted  by  the  authorities  and  people  of  the 
South. 


1  McClellan's  Report,  27  W.  R.,  67.     For  the  condition  of  the  Confed- 
erate army  after  the  battle,  see  2  Henderson,  322-324. 

2  Cf.  2  Henderson,  340  et  seq. 

'  Sumner's  corps  occupied  Harper's  Ferry  and  Bolivar  Heights  on  Sep- 
tember 22d  ;  27  W.  R.,  71. 


380  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  III. 

1.  (P.  355.)  No  field-intrenchments  of  any  kind 
were  used  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  (or  Sharps- 
burg)  ;  and  this  is  remarkable,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  their  construction  would  have  been  of  infinite 
service  to  the  Confederates.  In  a  lecture  on  "  Hasty 
Intrenchments  "  recently  delivered  before  the  Mili- 
tary Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  Major 
(now  Lieutenant-Colonel)  Arthur  L.  Wagner,  speak- 
ing of  the  intrench ments  thrown  up  by  Fitz-John 
Porter  at  Gaines's  Mill,  says : 

u  Hasty  intrenchments  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
term  had  at  last  made  their  appearance.  Porter's 
slight  barricades  were,  it  is  true,  quite  insignificant 
when  compared  with  the  works  quickly  constructed 
by  the  opposing  armies  on  the  same  ground  two 
years  later,  but  they  were  the  germ  of  the  works  so 
universally  found  on  American  battle-fields  in  the 
later  stages  of  the  war.  But  though  the  value  of 
hasty  intrenchments  would  have  been  great  in  the 
succeeding  battles  of  the  Change  of  Base,  and  though 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  its  retreating  conflicts, 
made  use  of  rail  fences  and  the  accidental  shelter  of 
the  ground,  the  lesson  of  hasty  fortifications  had  not 
been  learned,  for  at  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run 
we  find  both  armies  fighting  desperately  without 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  III.  381 

availing  themselves  of  the  powerful  auxiliary  that 
could  have  been  so  readily  found  in  hasty  intrench- 
ments.  Yet  this  very  battle  gave  a  striking  object- 
lesson  in  this  respect  which  doubtless  sank  deep  into 
the  memory  of  officers  and  men.  At  Groveton,  on 
the  first  day  of  the  battle,  Jackson's  main  line  rested 
on  the  excavation  of  an  unfinished  railroad,  which 
constituted  virtually  the  best  kind  of  ready-made  in- 
trenchments,  and  the  most  determined  attacks  on 
the  part  of  the  Federal  troops  were  unable  to  carry 
it. 

"  It  would  seem  that  the  value  of  this  lesson 
would  have  been  so  apparent  to  the  Confederates 
that  their  next  defensive  battle  (Sharpsburg)  would 
find  them  resorting  largely  to  the  use  of  hasty  in- 
trenchments ;  but  little  use  seems  to  have  been  made 
by  them  of  any  shelter  except  that  afforded  by  the 
accidents  of  the  terrain.  On  the  Confederate  left  a 
part  of  the  line  was  protected  by  a  sunken  road,  a 
wood  in  which  were  outcroppings  of  limestone,  af- 
fording welcome  shelter,  a  stone  wall,  and  (some 
authorities  say)  a  breastwork  of  rails.  But,  in  the 
main,  the  Confederate  line  was  unsheltered  by  natu- 
ral cover,  and  Lee  neglected  the  aid  of  intrenchments 
in  a  struggle  in  which  he  was  forced  to  play  the 
part  of  a  Wellington  without  a  Bliicher,  but  in 
which,  fortunately  for  him,  he  was  not  opposed  by 
a  Napoleon." l 

2.  (P.  377.)  The  estimate  given  in  the  text  of 
the  strength  of  the  Confederate  army  at  the  battle 

1  Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  March,  1898  (p.  230).     Gov- 
ernor's Island,  N.  Y.  H. 


382  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR. 

of  Sharpsburg  is  not  put  forward  as  reconciling  the 
very  conflicting  data  on  the  subject,  for  they  are 
irreconcilable.  The  following  figures  are  given  in 
the  Confederate  reports,  viz.  : 

27  W.  R,    860  :  McLaws  4  brigades  2,893  men. 

886 :  D.  K.  Jones  6         "  2,430  " 

"         919 :  Kansom  1  brigade  1,600  " 

929 :  Wofford  1         "  854  " 

"       "         973 :  Early  4  brigades  3,500  " 

981 :  A.  P.  Hill  3         "  2,000  " 

"       "        1008 :  J.  K.  Jones  4         "  1,600  " 

1022 :  D.  H.  Hill  5        "  3,000  " 

1023  :  K.  H.  Anderson    6         "  4,000  " 


In  all  34  21,877     " 

This  gives  only  643  men  to  a  brigade. 

As  these  reports  were — most  of  them — written 
long  after  the  battle,  their  statements  should  no 
doubt  be  taken  with  some  allowance,  and  in  estimat- 
ing 800  men  to  a  brigade,  it  was  attempted  to  make 
such  allowance. 

But  in  the  official  statement  of  the  strength  of 
the  Confederate  army  on  September  22,  1862,1 — five 
days  after  the  battle, — we  find  the  number  of  those 
then  present  for  duty  in  the  infantry  alone  given  as 
36,418.  To  these  must  be  added  the  cavalry  and 
reserve  artillery,  as  also  those  killed,  wounded,  and 
captured  in  the  battle.2  The  cavalry  and  reserve 
artillery  numbered  about  8000 3 ;  and  the  killed  and 
wounded  about  8000  more.4  Here  we  have  upwards 

1  28  W.  R.,  621.  3  Allan,  380. 

s  Ante,  337,  n.  5.  *  Ib.,  438. 


NOTES  TO  CHAPTER  III. 


383 


of  52,000  men,  exclusive  of  prisoners,  the  number 
of  whom  General  McClellan  estimated  at  6000,1 — 
making  a  total  of  58,000  men  present  for  duty  on 
the  morning  of  the  battle.  The  only  deduction  that 
can  be  made  from  this  sum  besides  Thomas's  bri- 
gade, which  was  not  in  the  action, — say  800  men, — is 
the  number  of  stragglers  who  had  joined  their  com- 
rades after  the  battle ;  but  on  September  22d  cer- 
tainly the  army  had  not  in  the  opinion  of  General 
Lee  been  augmented  from  this  cause. 2 

We  must  leave  these  contradictory  statements  to 
be  reconciled  by  others.  We  have  thought  best  in 
the  text  to  adopt  substantially  the  numbers  given  in 
the  Confederate  reports,  though  most  of  them  were 
written  long  after  the  battle.  We  desire  to  call  at- 
tention in  this  Note  to  the  fact  that  the  Return  of 
September  22,  1862,  would  warrant  a  much  larger 
estimate  of  the  size  of  General  Lee's  army.  Still,  it 
seems  hard  to  believe  that  the  recollections  of  so 
many  officers  can  have  been  so  far  out  of  the  way. 

'27  W.  R.,  67,  161. 

2  See  Lee  to  Davis  ;  27  W.  R.,  143. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE  IN  THE  WEST.1 

GENERAL  HALLECK,  as  we  have  said  above,2  made, 
after  the  fall  of  Corinth,  the  terrible  mistake  of  dis- 
persing his  army  of  over  100,000  men.3  His  plain 
military  duty  was  closely  to  follow  up  the  greatly 
inferior  army  of  Beauregard/  and  to  force  it  either 
to  fight  in  the  open,  or  to  take  shelter  in  Vicksburg, 
where,  sooner  or  later,  it  would  have  been  forced  to 
capitulate.  But  instead  of  attempting  this,  Halleck 
remained  at  Corinth,  and  undertook  the  impractica- 
ble task  of  repairing  and  maintaining  in  running  order 
the  railroads  connecting  Columbus  with  Corinth  and 
Memphis  with  Chattanooga.  He  sent  one  division 
(Wallace's)  to  reinforce  Curtis  in  Arkansas.  He 
seems  to  have  deluded  himself  with  the  idea  that  the 
weather  was  too  hot  for  a  summer  campaign  in  Mis- 
sissippi.5 He  had,  however,  to  meet  the  renewed 
demand  from  Washington  that  the  movement  on 
East  Tennessee,  which  had  been,  as  we  know,'  in- 

1  See  Map  XL,  facing  page  414. 
9  Ante,  95,  218. 

3  Greene,  29  ;  n  W.  R.,  235. 

4  Consisting,  on  its  arrival  at  Tupelo,  of  45,365  "effective"    men;    n 
W.  R.,  604. 

*  23  W.  R.,  62  ;  <•/.  Greene,  31-34.  '  Ante,  ir. 

384 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  385 

terrupted  by  the  expedition  against  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson,  should  now  be  taken  up  again.  To  this 
movement,  as  we  have  seen,  President  Lincoln  had 
always  attached  an  importance  far  in  excess  of  its 
real  consequence,  if  the  matter  be  considered  from  a 
purely  military  standpoint  * ;  his  sympathies  were 
excited  by  the  sufferings  of  the  Unionists  in  that 
region,  and  he  also  deemed  it  very  desirable  that  the 
United  States  Government  should  show  itself  capa- 
ble of  affording  succor  to  those  who  claimed  its  sup- 
port. At  the  time  of  which  we  are  now  writing  it 
was  certainly  possible — if  the  Confederate  Western 
army  would  be  content  to  remain  in  Mississippi— 
to  send  a  considerable  Union  force  into  East  Ten- 
nessee and  occupy  it ;  and  General  Halleck  ordered 
Buell,  who  had,  since  the  fall  of  Corinth,  resumed 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,2  to  proceed 
to  Chattanooga.  He,  however,  coupled  this  task 
with  another,  that  of  rebuilding  and  repairing,  as 
Buell  proceeded  towards  Chattanooga,  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  railroad,  on  which  he  was  ordered  to 
depend  for  his  supplies.  Nothing  which  Halleck 
ever  did  in  his  life  shows  more  distinctly  his  inability 
to  grasp  a  military  problem  than  this  attempt  of  his 
to  maintain  as  a  line  of  supplies  for  an  invading  army 
a  railroad  which  ran  on  the  boundary  between  the 
territory  which  had  just  been  conquered  and  the 
hostile  region  south  of  it,  and  which  was  therefore 
exposed  to  interruption  in  every  mile  of  its  course 
by  the  active  and  daring  troopers  in  the  Confederate 

1  10  W.  R.,  671  ;  23  W.  R.,  8,  75. 
9  23  W.  R.,  i. 

VOL.  II. — 35 


386  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

service.1  Buell,  from  time  to  time,  remonstrated 
against  this  course,  but  Halleck  for  several  weeks 
insisted  upon  it.2 

The  remainder  of  Halleck's  army,  except  the  di- 
vision of  Wallace,  which,  as  we  have  said,  was  sent 
to  Arkansas,  numbered  about  65,000  men,  and  was 
stationed  by  him  at  various  points  between  Memphis 
in  Tennessee  and  Decatur  in  Alabama.  It  consisted 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  of  which  General 
Grant  now  assumed  the  command,  and  the  Army  of 
the  Mississippi,  of  which  for  a  few  days  General  Pope 
retook  the  charge,  until  he  was  ordered  to  Virginia, 
when  his  place  was  filled  by  General  Rosecrans. 
Memphis  was  occupied  in  force  by  General  Sherman. 
General  Halleck  fixed  his  own  headquarters  at 
Corinth,  and  remained  there  until  the  early  part  of 
July,  when  he,  too,  was  ordered  to  Washington. 
Grant  then  assumed  command  of  the  two  armies  of 
the  Tennessee  and  the  Mississippi.  He,  like  Buell, 
found  it  impracticable  to  maintain  communication 
with  Memphis  over  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
railroad,3  and  relied  for  his  supplies  on  the  Mobile 
and  Ohio  railroad,  which  ran  from  Columbus  in  Ken- 
tucky through  Jackson  to  Corinth,  and  which  was  in 
order  as  far  south  as  Rienzi  in  Mississippi,  and  on 
the  Central  Mississippi  railroad,  which  ran  from 
Jackson  to  Bolivar,  in  Tennessee.4  It  was  difficult 
enough  to  protect  these  lines  of  railroad,  but  as  they 

1  22  W.  R.,  30,  31  ;  23  W.  R.,  27,  33,  44,  58,  76,  78.     See  also  Greene, 
33  ;  i  Grant,  383,  401  ;  cf.   no  W.  R.,  330,  331. 
9  23  W.  R.,  33,  44. 
8  i  Grant,  396  ;  25  W.  R.,  36,  41,  47. 
4  i  Grant,  395. 


1 86 2]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          387 

ran  back  directly  from  the  front  of  the  army,  it  was 
not  impossible  to  concentrate  troops  in  a  short  time 
for  the  defence  of  any  threatened  point. 

The  force  thus  retained  by  Halleck  and  left  by 
him  in  charge  of  Grant  was  not  strong  enough  to 
undertake  offensive  operations  against  the  army 
which  Beauregard  and  Bragg  kept  at  Tupelo  until 
the  last  week  of  July,  or  even  against  the  forces  of 
Price  and  Van  Dorn,  which  took  the  place  of  that 
army,  when  it  was  sent  to  Chattanooga ;  and  Grant 
was  even  called  upon  later  to  send  two  of  his  divisions 
to  the  assistance  of  Buell.  These  troops  of  Grant's 
were  therefore  practically  useless  during  the  whole 
summer.  Halleck's  only  offensive  operation  was 
that  which  Buell  was  ordered  to  make  with  about 
one  third  of  the  army  which  captured  Corinth  ;  and 
the  result  of  Halleck's  refusal  to  follow  up  and  de- 
stroy Beauregard's  army  as  soon  as  the  latter  had 
evacuated  Corinth  was  to  stalemate  the  larger  por- 
tion of  his  own  army,  and  to  entrust  to  the  smaller 
fraction  of  it  a  task  which  he  gave  his  antagonist 
ample  opportunity  to  defeat. 

General  Buell,  after  receiving  his  orders  from 
General  Halleck,  started  out  on  his  campaign  about 
the  10th  or  12th  of  June.  He  had  with  him  the 
four  divisions  of  McCook,  Nelson,  Crittenden,  and 
Wood.  His  first  division,  under  Thomas,  was 
not  allowed  to  join  him  until  the  latter  part  of  July. 
A  division  under  Mitchel,  which  had  been  for  some 
weeks  overrunning  the  country  between  Corinth  and 
Chattanooga,  was  charged  with  rebuilding  bridges, 
and  generally  with  preparing  the  way  for  the  ad- 


388  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.      [1862 

vance  of  the  main  body.  The  division  of  G.  W. 
Morgan,  composed,  in  great  part,  of  refugees  from 
East  Tennessee,  which,  at  President  Lincoln's  earnest 
desire,  had  been  sent  by  Buell  in  the  spring  to  occupy 
Cumberland  Gap  in  Kentucky,1  with  the  view  of 
opening  and  guarding  that  route  into  East  Tennessee, 
was  at  this  time  on  the  point  of  seizing  that  im- 
portant post,  and  it  was  General  Buell's  intention  at 
the  proper  time  to  combine  in  some  way  his  own 
movements  with  those  of  Morgan.  Had  Buell  been 
given  his  whole  army  at  the  outset,  and  ordered  to 
move  on  Chattanooga  with  all  despatch,  his  cam- 
paign would  have  had  a  good  chance  of  success2; 
but,  compelled,  as  he  was,  to  repair  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  railroad  as  he  went  along, — thereby  giv- 
ing his  enemy  not  only  explicit  notice  of  his  inten- 
tions, but  ample  time  to  meet  him,  wherever  and 
whenever  they  might  choose,  with  superior  forces, — 
his  enterprise  was  from  the  first  doomed  to  defeat. 
The  four  divisions  with  which  he  moved  out  num- 
bered between  20,000  and  25,000  men  3 ;  Thomas,  in 
the  first  days  of  August,4  brought  him  some  6000 
more.  These  troops  comprised  the  whole  of  Buell's 
active  army.  From  Athens,  Alabama,  where  in  the 
last  days  of  June  he  collected  three  of  his  divisions 
together,5  to  Chattanooga,  is  about  150  miles. 

The  Confederate  army  of  the  West  had,  as  we 
have  seen,  about  the  first  of  June,  retired  from  Corinth 
to  Tupelo,  Mississippi.  Here  it  remained  for  nearly 

1  22  W.  R.,  28. 

8  This  was  General  Grant's  opinion  ;   i  Grant,  383,  401. 

3  23  W.  R.,  5. 

4  22  W.  R.,  707.  *  Ib.,  31. 


1 86 2]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          389 

two  months,  recruiting  its  numbers,  resting  after  the 
labors  of  the  previous  campaign,  improving  in  health 
and  strength,  and  progressing  rapidly  in  discipline, 
organization,  and  instruction.1  On  June  27th  Bragg 
formally  succeeded  Beauregard,2  whose  health  had 
broken  down,  in  command  of  the  Western  Depart- 
ment. In  view  of  the  threatening  movements  of  the 
Federal  general,  Mitchel,  who  had  occupied  Battle 
Creek,  where  the  stream  of  that  name  flows  into  the 
Tennessee  River  a  few  miles  north  of  Bridgeport, 
and  in  response  to  the  urgent  request  of  General  E. 
Kirby  Smith,  who  commanded  the  Confederate  De- 
partment of  East  Tennessee,  Bragg,  on  June  27th, 
sent  McCown's  division  to  Chattanooga,  for  the  de- 
fence of  that  post,3  but  he  retained  the  rest  of  his 
army  at  Tupelo  until  the  latter  part  of  July. 

During  the  months  of  June  and  July,  however, 
Buell  was  in  no  condition  to  take  advantage  of  the 
immobility  of  the  Confederate  forces.  The  country 
between  Corinth  and  Chattanooga  did  not  afford 
sufficient  food  for  the  subsistence  of  his  army,  and 
he  was  obliged  to  rely  on  the  railroads  for  his  sup- 
plies. The  month  of  June  was  consumed  in  the  futile 
attempt  to  put  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad 
in  condition  to  furnish  these  supplies.  But  on  the 
30th  of  June,  when  the  road  had  been  completed  only 
as  far  as  Decatur,  Halleck  recognized  that  Buell  had 
better  rely  on  the  railroad  which  ran  from  Nashville 4 
through  Murfreesborough  to  Stevenson,  and  thence  to 
Bridgeport  and  Chattanooga.  Halleck  himself  had, 

1  22  W.  R.,  1089.  3  22  W.  R.,  1088  ;  23  W.  R.,  709,  710. 

*  25  W.  R.,  626.  4  23  W.  R.,  75,  76. 


390  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

about  this  time,  ceased  attempting  to  use  the  Mem- 
phis and  Charleston  railroad  between  the  former 
place  and  Corinth.1  For  the  loss  of  the  last  three 
weeks  in  June,  Buell  was  in  nowise  responsible. 
Had  his  suggestions  been  adopted  he  might  have 
completed  during  this  time  the  Nashville  and  Chat- 
tanooga railroad. 

Mitchel's  division  had  been,  however,  set  to  work 
upon  this  road,  as  well  as  upon  the  Nashville  and 
Decatur  railroad,  and  about  July  1st,  Buell  felt  so 
far  assured  of  his  supplies  that  he  ordered  the  divi- 
sions of  McCook  and  Crittenden  to  Battle  Creek  in 
the  first  week  of  July.2  On  the  12th  the  road  from 
Nashville  was  opened  as  far  as  Decherd,  and  Nel- 
son's division  was  at  work  on  the  line  running  south 
from  Decherd  to  Stevenson.  One  division  of  Buell's 
army — Wood's — was,  it  is  true,  yet  at  Athens,  work- 
ing on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railway,  for  the 
idea  of  using  that  road  for  supplying  the  forces  had 
not  then  been  absolutely  abandoned.3  Still  there 
would  have  been  no  difficulty  in  collecting  the  four 
divisions  at  Stevenson,  and  thence  moving,  by  way 
of  Bridgeport,  on  Chattanooga,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  occupied  at  that  moment  only  by  the 
single  division  of  McCown. 

But  on  the  13th  of  July,  a  Confederate  cavalry 
force  of  some  1400  men,  under  the  famous  Forrest, 
suddenly  descended  on  Murfreesborough,  a  station  on 
the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad,  and,  meet- 
ing with  no  effective  or  even  creditable  resistance 
from  the  garrison,  captured  the  post  with  more  than 
1 23  w.  R.,  93.  *  22  w.  R.,  33.  *  St.,  33. 


1 86 2]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          391 

1000  officers  and  men,1  and  broke  up  the  railroad  so 
thoroughly  that  it  was  not  repaired  till  the  28th  of 
the  month.  This  interruption  of  Buell's  railroad 
communications  necessarily  postponed  for  the  mo- 
ment any  advance  on  his  part,  while  it  gave  to  his 
opponent  time  to  concert  a  scheme  of  invasion  of  the 
States  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  of  which  he  took 
ample  advantage. 

There  were  many  reasons  which  at  this  time 
urged  the  Confederate  authorities  to  adopt  this 
scheme.  In  the  first  place  it  was  eminently  desir- 
able to  prevent  the  United  States  forces  from  seiz- 
ing Chattanooga,  occupying  the  principal  places  in 
East  Tennessee,  organizing  the  Unionists  of  that 
region,  and  severing  the  railroad  communications 
between  Virginia  and  Georgia.  These  results  once 
accomplished,  the  entire  States  of  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  would  be  irrecoverably  lost  to  the  Con- 
federate cause.  In  the  next  place,  not  only  was  the 
population  of  middle  and  western  Tennessee  strongly 
opposed  to  the  Union,  but  it  was  believed  that  a 
large  part  of  Kentucky  was  full  of  sympathizers 
with  the  Confederates.  The  two  States  had  very 
recently  been  overrun  by  the  Northern  armies,  and 
there  was  reason  to  think  that  if  the  presence  of 
these  armies  could  be  removed,  they  might,  both  of 
them,  cast  in  their  lot  with  their  Southern  neighbors. 

The  military  situation  also  invited  an  invasion. 
The  Union  armies  were  not  living  on  the  products 
of  the  regions  occupied  by  them, — they  relied  for 
everything  on  the  supplies  furnished  them  by  the 

1  22  W.  R.,  792  et  seq. 


392  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

railroads,  which  conveyed  to  convenient  points  the 
food  and  forage  brought  from  the  fertile  regions  of 
the  North  and  West.  The  base  of  supplies  for  the 
army  under  Grant  was,  as  we  have  seen,  Columbus 
in  Kentucky 1 ;  but  with  this  line  of  supplies  Bragg 
did  not  propose  to  interfere.  The  primary  base  of 
the  army  of  Buell  was  Louisville,  Kentucky,  the 
secondary  base  was  Nashville,  Tennessee,  and  it  was 
the  long  line  of  railroad  running  from  Louisville  to 
Nashville  and  thence  to  Bridgeport,  Alabama,  which 
it  was  needful  to  maintain  in  unimpaired  efficiency 
if  Buell  was  to  seize  Chattanooga  and  advance  into 
East  Tennessee.  For  the  interruption,  or  perhaps 
even  the  temporary  destruction,  of  these  railroad 
communications  the  Confederate  general  relied  on 
the  skill  and  boldness  of  his  two  famous  cavalry 
commanders,  Forrest  and  Morgan,  both  exceptionally 
brilliant  leaders,  and  the  former,  Forrest,  possessing 
in  large  measure  the  high  qualities  of  a  great  gen- 
eral. The  troops  which  they  commanded  were  in 
every  way  fitted  for  the  perilous,  exhausting,  and 
dangerous  work  involved  in  these  cavalry-raids ;  bet- 
ter horsemen,  more  capable  soldiers,  could  not  be 
found  anywhere  than  those  who  constituted  these 
commands.  The  nature  of  the  service  demanded 
from  these  troops  was  also  precisely  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  which  ought  to  regulate  opera- 
tions of  this  kind.  Cavalry-raids  like  these,  made 
in  a  friendly  country,  upon  the  communications  of  a 
hostile  army  which  has  advanced  far  into  this  coun- 
try, are  justifiable  on  the  plainest  principles  of  war- 

1  Ante,  386. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  393 

fare,  and  ought  always  to  be  distinguished  from 
those  cavalry-raids  which  are  made  in  a  hostile  ter- 
ritory, and  are  intended  either  to  intimidate  and 
harass  its  inhabitants,  or  to  cut  the  communications 
of  a  hostile  army  operating  in  its  own  country.  The 
raids  of  Morgan  and  Forrest  were  of  the  first  de- 
scription, and  were  eminently  useful  to  the  Confed- 
erates; that  of  Stuart1  in  Pennsylvania,  in  October 
of  this  year,  and  that  of  Stoneman  in  Virginia,  in 
March,  1863,  were  of  the  second  kind,  were  attended 
with  great  risk  to  the  troops  employed,  and  were  of 
no  benefit  to  the  operations  of  the  generals2  who 
ordered  them  to  be  made.  The  distinction  which 
we  have  drawn  above,  between  these  two  classes  of 
cavalry-raids,  we  regard  as  fundamental,  and  of  the 
greatest  importance.  We  shall  hereafter  have  occa- 
sion to  recur  to  it  frequently. 

General  Kirby  Smith,  who  commanded  the  De- 
partment of  East  Tennessee,  seems  to  have  taken  a 
clear  and  comprehensive  view  of  the  whole  situation. 
He  saw  that  East  Tennessee  would  in  all  probabil- 
ity be  lost  to  the  Confederates  unless  Bragg  should 

v  OO 

bring  the  greater  part  of  his  army  promptly  to  Chat- 
tanooga. He  wrote  to  this  effect  to  President  Davis 
on  July  14th,3  and  to  Bragg  on  the  19th  and  20th.4 
Then  on  the  24th 5  he  wrote  Bragg  a  long  letter,  in 
which  he  opened  the  project  of  an  offensive  cam- 
paign. He  urged  him  to  bring  the  main  body  of 
his  army  to  East  Tennessee  and  to  take  command  in 


1  Post.,  438. 

5  Lee  in  one  case,  and  Hooker  in  the  other.  *  Ib.,  730. 

*  23  W.  R.,  726.  6  Ib.,  734. 


394  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

person  of  all  the  forces.  He  offered  cheerfully  to 
serve  under  him.  He  pointed  out  that  there  was 
"  yet  time  for  a  brilliant  summer  campaign,"  with 
"  every  prospect  of  regaining  possession  of  Middle 
Tennessee  and,  possibly,  Kentucky."  He  stated  his 
own  force  to  be  about  18,000  men,  half  of  which  was, 
however,  opposed  by  the  Federal  general,  Morgan, 
at  and  near  Cumberland  Gap. 

But  Bragg  had  already  (on  July  21st)  issued  his 
orders  for  the  movement.1  His  infantry  he  sent  by 
rail  via  Mobile,  and  it  arrived  at  Chattanooga  shortly 
after  the  1st  of  August.  His  cavalry  and  artillery, 
being  compelled  to  march  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
distance  over  the  hilly  country  of  northern  Alabama 
and  Georgia,  were  some  time  longer  in  completing 
their  movement.  On  the  31st  of  July  he  had  a  con- 
ference at  Chattanooga  with  Kirby  Smith,2  who 
came  from  Knoxville  for  the  purpose,  and  the  two 
generals  arranged  their  measures.  Their  expecta- 
tion was  that  Smith  would  be  able  to  dispose  in 
some  way  of  Morgan's  force  in  Cumberland  Gap, 
and  that  then  the  entire  Confederate  army  would  be 
"thrown  into  Middle  Tennessee,  with  the  fairest 
prospect  of  cutting  off  General  Buell,"  should  he 
continue  in  his  then  position. 

Buell's  forces  at  that  time  were  menacing  Chat- 
tanooga ;  his  own  headquarters  were  at  Huntsville, 
Alabama3;  Wood's  division  was  at  Decherd,  Ten- 
nessee 4 ;  Nelson's  was  at  Murfreesborough 5 ;  Me- 


1  23  W.  R.,  731  ;  no  W.  R.,  330,  331. 
S23\V.  R.,  741. 
8  Ib.,  236. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          395 

Cook's  and  Oittenden's  were  at  Battle  Creek1; 
Thomas's  was  still  in  the  rear  at  Athens,  Alabama.2 
Buell  had  learned  of  the  arrival  of  Bragg  and  of 

oo 

some  of  his  troops  at  Chattanooga,3  and  fully  ex- 
pected to  find  the  place  occupied  in  force.4  He  was 
now — so  he,  on  the  6th  of  August,  wrote  to  Hal- 
leek,  then  in  Washington  and  General-in-Chief  of  all 
the  armies — "  concentrating  his  troops  again,"  i.  e., 
for  an  advance  on  Chattanooga.  The  next  day  he 
wrote  a  fuller  letter  to  Halleck,5  giving  the  strength 
of  his  movable  column  at  from  31,000  to  36,000 
men,  that  of  his  garrisons  and  railway-guards  (ex- 
clusive of  Morgan's  division  at  Cumberland  Gap)  at 
15,000  men,  that  of  the  Confederates  under  Kirby 
Smith  at  about  15,000,  and  that  of  the  troops  which 
Bragg  had  recently  brought  from  Tupelo  at  about 
30,000.  These  estimates  were  substantially  correct. 
To  these  last  he  thought  Bragg  had  added  some 
15,000  to  20,000  new  troops ;  but  here  he  was  mis- 
taken. In  this  letter  he  reiterated  his  intention  of 
marching  at  once  on  Chattanooga,  unless  he  should 
"ascertain  certainly  that  the  enemy's  strength  ren- 
dered it  imprudent"6;  and  on  the  12th  of  August 
he  sent  to  General  Grant  for  the  two  divisions  for 
which  Halleck  had  authorized  him  to  call  in  case  of 
emergency.7 

But,  on  the  12th  of  August,  before  Buell  could 
organize  his  forces  for  an  advance — in  fact,  within 

1  23  W.  R.,  239.  * 

2  Ib.,  237.  * 
»  73. ,  236. 

6  Cf.  Buell's  Statement  ;  22  W.  R.,  35,  36. 
1  23  W.  R.,  286,  315,  316. 


396  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

a  week  after  he  had  written  his  long  letter  to  Hal- 
leek — the  Confederate  general,  Morgan,  captured 
the  town  of  Gallatin  on  the  Louisville  and  Nash- 
ville railroad,  a  few  miles  north  of  the  latter  place, 
destroyed  the  tunnel  near  the  town,  and  effectually 
broke  up  this  line  of  communication.1  This  was 
the  most  serious  of  all  the  attempts  made  by  the 
Confederate  cavalry  at  this  time  to  break  up  the 
communications  of  the  Union  armies  in  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee.  But  the  Southern  troopers  and 
guerrillas  were  raiding  constantly  and  freely  through- 
out these  States,  and  causing  infinite  trouble  to  the 
Federal  commanders.  A  sort  of  epidemic  of  panic 
seems  to  have  prevailed  among  the  Union  officers 
commanding  detached  posts,  and  many  of  them  sur- 
rendered their  commands  with  little  or  no  resistance.2 
Moreover,  reports  of  the  probability  of  an  invasion 
of  the  two  States  by  the  Confederate  armies  under 
Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith  were  at  this  time  more  and 
more  frequent  and  authoritative.  Towards  the  last 
of  August,  General  Buell  found  himself  obliged  to 
renounce  his  project  of  an  advance  on  Chattanooga, 
and  to  devote  his  entire  attention  to  the  task  of 
meeting  and  repelling  the  invasion  of  his  Depart- 
ment by  his  antagonists.8 

The  arrangements  incident  to  the  change  of  base 
which  General  Bragg  had  made  from  Tupelo  to 
Chattanooga  consumed  some  three  weeks,  so  that  he 
was  prevented  from  beginning  his  advance  until  late 


1  22  W.  R.,  857. 

*  Cist,  ch.  4  ;  i  Van  Home,  145  et  seq. 
3  22  W.  R.,  36,  37. 


1 86 2]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          397 

in  August.  His  movement  was  to  be  made  into 
Tennessee  contemporaneously  with  that  of  Kirby 
Smith  into  Kentucky.  Bragg  had  sent  Smith,  whose 
headquarters  were  at  Knoxville,  McCown's  division 
and  other  troops,  thereby  increasing  the  strength  of 
Smith's  column  to  about  20,000  men.  Bragg's  orig- 
inal intention  was  to  operate  in  middle  Tennessee, 
and  he  appears  to  have  held  to  this  intention  as 
late  as  the  24th  of  August.1  But  the  confidence 
exhibited  by  Smith  as  to  the  political  results  of 
an  invasion  of  Kentucky  soon  began  to  influence 
Bragg's  mind,  and,  as  we  shall  see  later  on,  Bragg 
ended  by  practically  subordinating  the  military 
management  of  his  campaign  to  political  projects. 
Of  the  projects — political  or  military — of  his 
adversary,  General  Buell  had,  of  course,  no  direct 
information.  He  was  at  first  inclined  to  think  that 
Bragg's  object  was  to  recover  middle  Tennessee, 
and  in  this,  as  we  have  seen,  he  was  right.  Buell 
had  a  difficult  part  to  play,  for  the  territory  which 
it  was  plain  was  to  be  invaded  had  no  actual  bound- 
aries that  Buell  could  make  use  of,  and  it  extended 
from  the  Ohio  to  the  Tennessee.  One  thing  only 
was  clear,  and  that  was,  that  for  Buell  to  retain  his 
hold  on  middle  and  southern  Tennessee,  it  was  ab- 
solutely necessary  for  him  to  defend  Nashville,  his 
secondary  base.2  But  while  Bragg  might  threaten 
an  advance  on  Nashville,  and  so  detain  Buell  in  its 
vicinity,  it  was  perfectly  possible  for  him,  by  making 
this  movement  a  feint,  to  reach  some  point  on  the 
railroad  north  of  Nashville,  such  as  Bowling  Green 

1  23  W.  R.,  775.  2  Cf.  22  W.  R.,  712,  713. 


398  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

or  Munfordville,  or  even  to  march  directly  on 
Louisville.  And  Buell's  deficiency  in  cavalry,  which 
he  had  again  and  again  applied  to  the  Government 
to  remedy,  but  in  vain,  placed  him  at  a  great  dis- 
advantage in  securing  information  of  his  enemy's 
movements.1 

The  Confederate  commanders  also  had  their  diffi- 
culties, chief  among  which  was  want  of  provisions 
and  forage,  in  both  of  which  the  country  which  they 
had  to  traverse  was  lacking.  Then  there  were  no 
railroads  or  rivers  on  which  they  could  depend  for 
transportation.  They  had  to  rely  solely  on  the 
country  roads,  which  were  often  very  poor.  These 
were  circumstances  which,  it  will  be  remembered,2 
had  always  rendered  it  difficult  for  the  Federals  to 
invade  East  Tennessee,  and  which  now  made  it 
difficult  for  the  Confederates  to  invade  middle  Ten- 
nessee and  Kentucky  from  East  Tennessee.  Thus 
we  find  Kirby  Smith  writing  from  Barboursville, 
Kentucky,  on  the  20th  of  August,3  that  the  country 
around  that  place  had  been  "  almost  completely 
drained  of  all  kinds  of  supplies,"  and  that  the  roads 
were  "  much  worse  than "  he  "  had  supposed." 
Bragg's  march,  moreover,  presented  peculiarly  try- 
ing features.  He  had  to  cross  the  river  Tennessee, 
which  runs  in  this  region  in  a  southwesterly  direc- 
tion from  its  source  to  Chattanooga ;  then  to  traverse 
Walden's  Ridge,  a  range  of  heights  parallel  with  the 
course  of  the  river,  and  some  1200  feet  above  the 
level  of  the  sea  ;  then  to  descend  into  the  valley 


1  ii  W.  R.,  183  ;  23  W.  R.,  202. 

9  Part  I.,  192,  193.  3  23  W.  R.,  766. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          399 

of  the  Sequatchie  River,  a  stream  running  south- 
westerly into  the  Tennessee  and  parallel  with  it; 
and  then  to  ascend  the  plateau  of  the  Cumberland 
Mountains,  somewhere  about  2200  feet  above  the 
sea-level,  before  he  could  possibly  concentrate  his 
army  for  the  invasion  proper.  And  during  all 
these  operations,  all  supplies  had  to  be  earned  in 
wagons. 

The  Confederate  generals,  however,  were  at  first 
most  successful.  Kirby  Smith,  on  the  right,  having 
a  force  much  superior  to  that  of  the  Federal  general 
who  occupied  Cumberland  Gap,  passed  through  the 
mountains  about  the  middle  of  August  by  other 
roads,  and  possessed  himself  of  Morgan's  line  of 
supply.1  Leaving  one  of  his  divisions  under  Steven- 
son to  watch  Morgan,  Smith  pressed  forward  into 
Kentucky,  and  on  August  30th  encountered  an  ex- 
temporized force  of  Federal  troops  near  Richmond, 
and  routed  them  with  great  loss.2  On  September 
2d,  he  was  in  possession  of  Lexington,  and  he  estab- 
lished his  headquarters  there.  Bragg,  too,  effected 
his  movement  through  the  Sequatchie  Valley  and  his 
crossing  of  the  Cumberland  Plateau  in  the  first  days 
of  September,  and  on  the  5th  established  his  head- 
quarters at  Sparta.3  From  this  point  he  could 
march  either  west  on  Murfreesborough  or  Nashville, 
or  northwest  on  Carthage  and  Bowling  Green.  He 
could  also,  if  he  chose,  push  rapidly  almost  due 

1  22  W.  R.,992.     Morgan  maintained  himself   a  month  at  Cumberland 
Gap,  and  then,  not  being  relieved,  and  being  short  of  provisions,  skilfully 
retreated  without  loss  to  the  Ohio  River. 

2  Ib. ,  93 1  et  seq. 

3  23  W.  R.,  796. 


400  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 


north,  in  the  direction  of  Louisville,  via  Glasgow 
and  Munfordville. 

Up  to  this  point  Bragg's  movements  had  been 
screened  by  the  Cumberland  Mountains,1  and  Buell 
could  not  obtain  any  definite  information  respecting 
them;  and,  as  we  have  just  pointed  out,  it  was  in 
Bragg's  power  to  take  his  choice  of  routes  after 
arriving  at  Sparta.  Buell,  it  is  true,  might  have 
forestalled  any  direct  movement  of  his  adversary 
into  Kentucky  by  concentrating  at  Sparta ;  but  in 
that  case  he  would  run  the  risk  of  Bragg's  turning 
his  right,  marching  by  way  of  Altamont  and  McMinn- 
ville,  and  cutting  him  off  from  Nashville.  On  the 
whole,  Buell  decided  to  concentrate  his  scattered 
forces  at  Murfreesborough,  where  his  army  would 
cover  Nashville,  and  where  he  could  easily  receive 
the  expected  reinforcements  from  Grant's  army  in 
western  Tennessee.  This  he  accomplished  by  Sep- 
tember 5th.  His  plan,  as  stated  by  himself  in  a 
letter  to  Halleck  of  the  2d,a  was,  after  leaving  a  suf- 
ficient force  to  defend  Nashville,  to  move  rapidly 
into  Kentucky.  He  had  then  heard  of  Kirby  Smith's 
victory  at  Richmond,3  and  he  strongly  suspected  that 
Bragg  was  intending  to  effect  a  junction  with  him. 
There  was  danger  of  a  Confederate  rising  in  Ken- 
tucky, and  it  was  far  from  unlikely  that  Louisville 
might  be  carried  by  a  coup-de-main,  in  which  case 
the  cause  of  the  Union  would  receive  a  serious  blow. 
At  all  events,  to  march  into  Kentucky  with  the 
great  body  of  his  army  was  clearly  the  step  for 
General  Buell  to  take. 

1  23  W.  R.,  470.  *  /£.,  470.  */£.,  462. 


1 86 2]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.  40 1 

Basil's  movements  would  doubtless  have  been 
somewhat  more  expeditious  had  it  not  been  that, 
in  addition  to  the  delay  involved  in  the  concentra- 
tion of  his  widely  separated  divisions,  and  in  mak- 
ing the  military  arrangements  necessary  for  the 
defence  of  Nashville,  he  was  obliged  to  satisfy,  so 
far  at  least  as  his  view  of  the  military  situation  per- 
mitted him  to  do  so,  the  demands  of  the  Military 
Governor  of  Tennessee,  Andrew  Johnson,  a  func- 
tionary whom  President  Lincoln,  soon  after  the 
capture  of  Fort  Donelson,  had  unnecessarily  and 
very  injudiciously  appointed.  There  was  no  duty 
which  such  a  functionary  could  possibly  perform  in 
time  of  war  which  could  not  be  more  fitly  performed 
by  the  ranking  military  officer  in  the  Department; 
and  to  introduce  a  civilian,  with  undefined  and 
undefinable  powers,  into  a  territory,  the  control  of 
which  was  still  being  disputed  by  armies,  was  to 
add  unnecessarily  an  element  of  difficulty  to  the 
already  difficult  task  of  the  military  authorities.  Mr. 
Johnson  was  a  sturdy  and  thorough-going  Unionist, 
a  well  known  politician  of  East  Tennessee,  but  he 
was  wholly  ignorant  of  military  matters,  and  his 
views  were  often  in  conflict  with  those  of  the  gen- 
erals in  command.1 

On  the  14th  of  September  Buell  was  at  Bowling 
Green  with  the  bulk  of  his  army.2  Bragg,  however, 
had  reached  Glasgow,3  a  town  about  thirty  miles  east 
of  Bowling  Green,  on  the  day  before,  and  on  the 


1  ii  W.  R.,  79,  126,  128,  129,  139  ;  22  W.  R.,  697,  698  ;  23  W.  R., 
36,  48,  72,  119,  122,  516,  etc. 

8  23  W.  R.,  515.  J  22  W.  R.,  1090. 


VOL.  II. — 26 


402  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

14th  his  advance  attacked  the  Federal  post  at  Mun- 
fordville, eighteen  miles  north  of  Glasgow,  and  a 
station  on  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad.  The 
attack  was  repulsed,  but  Bragg  at  once  brought 
up  his  main  army,  and  the  Federal  commander,  on 
being  satisfied  that  he  was  largely  outnumbered, 
surrendered  on  the  17th  with  over  4000  men.1  Buell 
was  severely  censured  for  not  preventing  this  catas- 
trophe, but  the  Military  Commission,  which  was 
afterwards  convened  to  investigate  his  operations  in 
this  campaign,  acquitted  him  of  all  blame.  He  was 
not  aware  that  the  post  was  in  any  danger, — the  gar- 
rison being  large  and  the  position  being  a  strong 
one ;  and  he  was,  in  fact,  marching  on  Glasgow  to 
attack  Bragg,  when  Munfordville  was  surrendered.2 
By  occupying  Munfordville,  Bragg  had  thrown 
his  army  between  that  of  Buell  and  Louisville.  It 
would  therefore  certainly  seem  that  this  was  the 
place  for  him  to  attack  Buell,  if  he  intended  to  fight 
him  at  all.  It  must  have  been  plain  to  any  one  at 
the  time,  one  would  think,  that  Buell  was  marching 
to  the  relief  of  Louisville,  and  that  he  could  not 
get  there  unless  he  could  defeat  Bragg,  or  unless 
Bragg  should  move  off,  and  allow  him  to  pursue  his 
march  unmolested.  Bragg,  it  is  true,  could  not  re- 
main in  his  present  position  for  more  than  a  few 
days,  for  he  was  short  of  supplies3;  but  he  could 
send  for  Kirby  Smith,  who  was  perhaps  a  hundred 
miles  away,  at  Lexington,  and  who  could  not  only 
bring  him  10,000  men,  but  plenty  of  provisions, 

1  23  W.  R.,  523,  524,  538,  542.  s  22  W.  R.,  9,  10,  48. 

3  Ib. ,  1090. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          403 

and  who,  although  an  independent  Department-com- 
mander, had  offered  to  serve  under  Bragg  in  this 
campaign.  Still,  the  fact  that  Bragg  was  not  the 
sole  commander  in  this  region  unquestionably  ham- 
pered his  movements.  It  was  another  instance  of 
the  folly,  which  both  the  Union  and  the  Confederate 
Governments  were  so  constantly  committing,  of  hav- 
ing more  than  one  commanding  officer  in  one  theatre 
of  war.1  Smith  was  not  summoned,  and  Bragg  did 
not  feel  himself  strong  enough  to  attack  Buell  alone. 
He  contented  himself  with  offering  battle  to  Buell 
for  a  few  days,  but  Buell,  who  clearly  saw  the  para- 
mount importance  of  reaching  Louisville  with  an 
unbeaten  army,  did  not  accept  his  offer.  On  the 
21st 2  Bragg  marched  off  to  Bardstown,  to  make 
connection  with  Kirby  Smith ;  and  Buell,  the  road 
to  Louisville  being  now  open,  proceeded  there  at 
once,  arriving  on  the  25th.3  In  a  very  few  days  he 
had  re-formed  and  greatly  increased  his  army  by 
judiciously  distributing  the  raw  levies  among  his 
veteran  troops,  and  on  the  1st  of  October  he  started 
out  to  find  and  defeat  his  adversary. 

During  this  period  there  was  great  alarm  felt  in 
Washington  regarding  the  military  situation  in  the 
"West.  The  Government,  as  early  as  August  19th, 
created  a  new  Department,  called  the  Department  of 
the  Ohio,  consisting  of  Kentucky  and  the  States  north 
of  it,  and  assigned  Major-General  Wright,  an  able 
and  experienced  officer,  to  the  command  of  it.4 

1  Cf.  the  remarks  of  General  Wheeler,  in  3  B.  &  L.,  20-22. 

2  22  W.  R.,  48. 

3  23  W.  R. ,  542.     The  last  division  reached  Louisville  on  the  2gth ;  22 
W.  R.,  49.  «23  W.  R.,  375. 


404  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 


There  followed,  of  course,  some  conflicts  of  jurisdic- 
tion, but,  fortunately,  none  of  importance.  The  fact 
that  General  Buell's  headquarters  during  the  mouths 
of  June,  July,  and  August  were  at  points  in  Alabama 
and  southern  Tennessee  rendered  such  a  step  neces- 
sary. After  the  destruction  of  the  railroad  near 
Gallatin  on  August  12th,  a  feeling  of  uneasiness  in 
respect  to  Buell's  army  began  to  pervade  the  public 
mind,  and  when  Bragg  actually  invaded  Kentucky 
early  in  September,  the  alarm  in  Louisville  and  even 
in  Cincinnati  grew  rapidly.1  Buell's  position  and 
circumstances  were  not  understood  in  Washington. 
Halleck  thought  him  very  slow.2  The  President 
and  Secretary  of  War  even  decided  to  relieve  him, 
and  to  put  Thomas  in  his  place 3 ;  but  the  orders  did 
not  arrive  until  September  29th,  when  Buell  was 
preparing  to  move  against  Bragg.  Hence  Thomas 
generously  asked  that  Buell  should  be  retained  in 
command,  and  to  this  request  the  Government  as- 
sented. But  Mr.  Stanton,4  it  seems  pretty  clear,  be- 
lieved that  Buell  ought  somehow  to  have  prevented 
this  invasion  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  in  this 
opinion  the  governors  of  Ohio,5  Indiana,  and  Illinois' 
concurred,  as  did  also  Johnson,  the  Military  Governor 
of  Tennessee — all  loyal  men,  but  not  one  of  them 
sufficiently  acquainted  with  military  matters  to  un- 
derstand the  situation  in  which  Buell  had  been 
placed  since  the  first  of  August.  They  could  not 
pardon  an  officer  who  had  not  risked  a  great  battle 


1  23  W.  R.,  523,  524,  538,  542  ;  109  W.  R.,  277-284. 

4  23  W.  R.,  530,  542.  *  Ib.,  652. 

» Ib.,  538,  539.  *  16.,  652.  •  Ib.,  662. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          405 

to  defend  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  from  Bragg's  in- 
vasion. Sentiment,  often  passing  into  indignation 
and  even  into  passion,  prevented  them  from  consider- 
ing intelligently  the  military  problems  of  the  last 
two  months. 

In  point  of  fact,  the  balance  of  advantage  was 
now,  on  October  1st,  decidedly  with  the  Federals. 
The  Confederates  had,  it  is  true,  captured  isolated 
garrisons,  defeated  a  force  of  raw  recruits,  and  ob- 
tained some  valuable  supplies.  But  they  had  not 
destroyed — in  truth,  they  had  not  dared  to  fight — 
the  main  Union  army.  And  now  that  army  had 
reached  its  base  without  suffering  any  loss ;  it  had 
received  heavy  reinforcements  ;  the  chance  of  defeat- 
ing it  was  smaller  than  ever.  Bragg  unquestionably 
lost  his  great  opportunity  for  a  successful  battle  in 
refusing  to  attack  Buell  immediately  after  the  capture 
of  Munfordville.1 

It  might  have  been  expected,  certainly,  that  so  ex- 
perienced a  soldier  as  General  Bragg  would  now 
have  concentrated  his  forces,  united  his  army  with 
that  of  General  Smith,  and  given  his  sole  attention 
to  the  struggle  which  he  must  have  recognized  to  be 
impending.  No  one  could  doubt  that  the  Union 
army  would  now  assume  the  offensive  vigorously, 
and  that  that  army  must  either  be  defeated,  and 
badly  defeated  too,  or  the  Confederate  forces  must 
retire  from  Kentucky.  But  a  mania  for  constitu- 
tional and  legal  forms  seems  to  have  possessed  the 
authorities  and  even  the  generals  of  the  Confederacy.8 

1  Cf.  3  B.  &  L.,  600,  601. 

*  6  N.  &  H.,  277  ;  2  Pollard,  155. 


406          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 


Bragg  and  Smith  determined  to  inaugurate  a  seces- 
sionist governor  of  Kentucky  under  the  protection 
of  their  armies ;  and  Mr.  Richard  Hawes  was  to  be 
duly  sworn  into  office  at  Frankfort,  the  capital  of 
the  State.  This  preposterous  performance  might  be 
suffered  to  pass  without  comment,  were  it  not  for 
the  fact  that  the  arrangements  needed  for  the  cere- 
mony and  its  adjuncts  interfered  with  the  military 
requirements  of  the  situation. 

Bragg,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  retired  from 
the  neighborhood  of  Munfordville  to  Bardstown. 
Here  he  put  his  army  under  the  charge  of  General 
Polk,1  and  on  October  1st  proceeded  to  Lexington,2 
where  Kirby  Smith  had  his  headquarters,  and  where 
also  the  stores  of  all  kinds  gathered  by  that  officer 
during  his  stay  in  Kentucky  were  collected.  Here 
the  two  generals,  instead  of  joining  their  forces  to 
defeat  the  enemy,  whom  they  believed  to  be  ap- 
proaching,3 made  their  arrangements  for  Mr.  Hawes's 
inauguration.  They  proposed  to  be  in  Frankfort 
on  the  3d,  and  the  inauguration  was  to  take  place 
on  the  4th. 

Buell,  starting  out  from  Louisville  on  the  1st, 
sent  two  divisions  under  Generals  Sill  and  Dumont 
in  the  direction  of  Frankfort  to  contain  or  observe 
Kirby  Smith,  and,  with  the  rest  of  his  army, 
marched  in  three  columns  towards  Bardstown,  with 
the  intention  of  attacking  Bragg.4  Both  Bragg  and 
Smith  were  deceived  by  these  movements  of  Buell. 
They  thought  the  force  under  Sill  and  Dumont  was 

1  22  W.  R.,  1109.  3  23  W.  R.,  896. 

J  /£.,  1091.  *  i  Van  Home,  184. 


1 862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          407 

the  main  Federal  army,  and,  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
2d,  Bragg  ordered  Polk  to  march  north  from  Bards- 
town  to  attack  the  Union  army  in  flank  as  it  was 
marching  east,  while  he  and  Smith  opposed  it  in 
front.1  Polk,  however,  having  other  and  more  trust- 
worthy information,  had  already  written  to  Bragg  on 
the  morning  of  the  2d  that  Buell  was  approaching 
Bardstown,  and  on  the  3d  he  told  Bragg  that  he 
should  not  obey  his  orders,  but  should  fall  back 
toward  Camp  Breckinridge,2  a  place  formerly  known 
as  Camp  Dick  Robinson,3  situated  about  fifty  miles 
from  Bardstown  in  a  southeasterly  direction.  He 
added  that  he  had  called  a  council  of  his  officers, 
and  that  they  had  unanimously  indorsed  his  deci- 
sion.4 On  receiving  this  word  from  Polk,  Bragg  the 
next  morning  ordered  him  to  concentrate  the  army 
at  Harrodsburg.5  Later  in  the  day  he  wrote  to  Polk, 
that  he  expected  to  put  his  "  Governor  in  power 
soon,"  and  u  then "  he  proposed  "  to  seek  the 
enemy." 6 

On  the  5th  of  October  Kirby  Smith's  forces, 
known  as  the  Army  of  Kentucky,  having  left  Frank- 
fort on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  immediately  after 
the  ceremony,7  were  at  Versailles,8  some  twenty 
miles  north  of  Harrodsburg,  covering  the  depot  of 
stores  at  Lexington.  On  the  7th,  Smith,  thinking 
that  he  was  confronted  by  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy,  asked  Bragg  for  reinforcements.  It  was 

1  23  W.  R.,  897.  2  Ib.,  901.  3/£.,  887. 

4  Out  of  this  refusal  to  obey   orders,  there  arose  quite  a  lengthy  corre- 
spondence ;  22  W.  R.,  1097-1107. 

5  23  W.  R.,  904.  '  3  B.  &  L.,  602. 

6  /£. ,  905.  »23W.  R.,915. 


408  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

thereupon  decided  by  Bragg  that  the  army  under 
Polk  should  march  from  Harrodsburg  to  Versailles 
to  join  that  of  Smith.1  But  before  this  movement 
had  been  completed,  Bragg  learned  that  Union 
forces  were  pressing  at  Perry ville  his  left  wing 
under  Hardee,  which  had  not  yet  moved  towards 
Harrodsburg,  and  he  thereupon  ordered  Polk  to 
send  one  of  the  two  divisions  of  the  right  wing— 
Cheatham's — back  to  Perry  ville.2  This  was  done ; 
and  on  the  morning  of  October  8th,  Bragg's  army, 
excepting  the  division  of  Withers,  was  at  Perryville, 
numbering  about  1V,000  men.3  Buell's  forces,  ex- 
cepting the  divisions  of  Sill  and  Dumont,  were  also 
near  Perryville,  but  his  troops  had  arrived  from 
several  directions, — "  the  distance  from  one  flank  of 
the  army  to  the  other  was  not  perhaps  less  than  six 
miles," 4 — the  different  bodies  were  much  separated 
from  each  other  in  searching  for  water,  of  which 
there  was  a  great  scarcity  in  this  region,5  and  the 
line  of  battle  had  not  been  formed  by  noon.  The 
presence  of  the  enemy  in  force  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  recognized.6  General  Buell  was  at  his 

1  22  W.  R.,  IOQ2,   1095. 

4  Both  Polk  and  Hardee  urged  Bragg  to  concentrate  the  whole  army  at 
Perryville;  22  W.  R.,  1109,  1120. 

3  Bragg's  Report,  ib.t  1092.     Hardee  says  (ib.,  1120)  that  his  effective 
force — the  left  wing — did   not  exceed   10,000    men.     The    right  wing, — 
Folk's,  afterwards  Cheatham's — had  been  reduced  from  15,588  on  August 
22d  (23  W.  R.,  772)  to  10,979  on  October  3d  (ib. ,  900).   Deducting  Withers's 
division  5524  (which  was  not  present),  from  Cheatham's  10,979,  and  add- 
ing the  1500  cavalry,  which  Bragg  (22  W.  R.,  1092)  says  were  present,  we 
get  a  total  of  16,955. 

4  22  W.  R,,  1025,  1026. 

*  23  W.  R.,  565,  575,  580,  587  ;  22  W.  R.,  1024,  1025. 
'  22  W.  R.,  1039. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          409 

headquarters  some  two  miles  and  a  half  behind  the 
centre  of  the  army,  and  General  Thomas,  the  second 
in  command,  was  on  the  extreme  right.  There  was 
something  peculiar  in  the  state  of  the  atmosphere. 
Buell  at  his  headquarters  did  not  hear  the  sound  of 
heavy  firing.1  Thomas  did  not  know  that  there  had 
been  a  battle  till  after  nightfall.2  About  2  P.M.  the 
Confederates  fiercely  assaulted  the  Union  left  under 
McCook,  and  in  spite  of  a  gallant  resistance  forced 
it  back  in  disorder,  capturing  some  fifteen  guns. 
The  corps  of  Gilbert,  on  McCook's  right,  failed  for 
some  reason  to  render  effective  assistance,  at  least 
until  the  close  of  the  action,  when  Sheridan  in  a 
spirited  fight  drove  his  opponents  through  the  town 
of  Perryville.  The  action  was  a  bloody  one  for  the 
number  of  troops  engaged  and  considering  its  brief 
duration — the  Confederates  losing  about  3400  men,3 
and  the  Federals  4200."  The  Confederates  achieved 
a  tactical  success  against  the  Union  left,  but  for  all 
practical  purposes  the  battle  was  a  drawn  battle. 
At  night  the  Confederates  retired.5 

The  battle  of  Perryville  was  an  accidental  encoun- 
ter of  two  armies,  rather  than  a  pitched  battle. 
General  Buell  was  not  informed  of  the  action  till 
4  P.M.,  and  had  not  the  time  or  the  opportunity  to 
make  use  of  his  great  superiority  in  numbers.  Of 
the  58,000  men6  which  he  had  in  that  vicinity,  not 
much  more  than  half  were  engaged.  Only  one 
brigade  of  Crittenden's  corps  on  the  right  of  the 


1  22  W.  R.,  50,  51.        4  Ib.,  1036. 

*  Ib.,  187.  6  Cf.  Buell's  Report,  22  W.  R.,  1031. 

3  Ib.,  1112.  6  Ib.,  1028. 


410  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

line  was  in  action  at  all.  The  next  morning  Buell 
gave  orders  to  attack,  but  Bragg  had  retired  to 
Harrodsburg.  He  had  made  a  great  blunder  in 
exposing  his  little  army  to  an  attack  from  Buell's 
much  superior  forces,  and  he  felt  now  the  absolute 
necessity  of  uniting  with  the  Army  of  Kentucky 
under  Kirby  Smith. 

Up  to  this  time  the  two  Confederate  armies  had 
acted  independently.  Hawes,  as  we  know,  was  in- 
augurated as  Governor  at  Frankfort  on  October  4th, 
and  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day  the  Army  of  Ken- 
tucky evacuated  the  town.1  It  was  immediately 
afterward  occupied  by  the  Federal  general,  Sill. 
Kirby  Smith  retired  to  Versailles,2  on  the  east  side 
of  the  Kentucky  River,  where  he  covered  the  princi- 
pal approach  to  Lexington,  where  were  his  supplies. 
At  this  time  he  expected  a  battle  at  Versailles,3  and 
(as  we  know)  he  sent  to  Bragg  and  obtained 
Withers's  division.4  Hearing  soon  afterwards  that 
Sill  was  moving  south  on  the  west  side  of  the  Ken- 
tucky River,  he,  on  the  8th,  transferred  his  army  to 
that  side,  and  expected  to  fight  a  battle  near  Law- 
renceburg.5  Sill,  however,  evaded  him,  and  on  the 
9th,  Smith,  having  learned  of  the  battle  at  Perry- 
ville,  marched  to  Bragg's  assistance.'  He  arrived  at 
Harrodsburg  on  the  10th.7 

Buell,  on  his  part,  finding  that  Bragg  had  retired 
on  Harrodsburg,  where  he  would  without  doubt 
join  the  force  under  Kirby  Smith,  waited  for  Sill  to 

1  22  W.  R.,  I02O. 

S23W.  R.,  915.  S23W.  R.,925. 

*  It.,  919,  922.  '  It.,  927. 

*  22  W.    R.,  IO92.  7  22  W.  R.,   1093. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          411 

come  up  before  offering  battle.  He  may  perhaps 
have  overestimated  the  strength  of  his  enemy,  but 
he  remembered  that  22,000  of  the  54,000  men  which 
remained  to  the  Union  army  after  the  battle  of 
Perryville  were  raw  troops,1  and  he  expected  to 
meet  at  least  20,000  men  of  Bragg's  army,  and  10,- 
000  or  15,000  more  of  Kirby  Smith's,  and  they  were 
all  veteran  soldiers.  He  knew  well  the  extreme 
importance  of  the  situation.  But  he  fully  intended 
to  fight,  and  he  fully  expected  that  Bragg  would 
fight.2  He  had  no  idea  that  Bragg  would  relinquish 
his  hold  on  the  State  of  Kentucky  without  fighting 
a  battle ;  and  he  thought — and  justly — that  for  this 
battle  he — Buell — ought  to  assemble  all  his  available 
troops.  His  adversaries  had  now  united  their  forces ; 
it  would  be  taking  a  wholly  unnecessary  risk  for 
him  not  to  call  in  all  his  detachments. 

But  Bragg  looked  at  his  duty  from  a  wholly  dif- 
ferent standpoint.  He  recognized  that  he  had  so 
far  accomplished  nothing.  He  had  not  defeated 
Buell's  army,  nor  had  he  persuaded  the  Kentuckians 
to  rise  in  revolt  against  the  Federal  Government.  A 
great  victory  over  Buell  would,  no  doubt,  change  the 
situation  materially,  but  an  undecisive  battle  was 
far  more  probable  than  a  great  victory.  Buell  had 
now  unrestricted  recourse,  through  Louisville,  to  the 
resources  of  the  Northwestern  States,  both  in  men 
and  supplies  ;  the  Confederates,  on  the  other  hand, 
expected  no  reinforcements  from  any  quarter,  and 


1  22  W.  R.,  1028.     A  brigade  of  these  new  troops — Ten-ill's — had  given 
way  in  confusion  at  Perryville  ;  i6.,  1026,  1040. 
*/<*.,  51-53  ;  Fry,  72-74- 


412  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

could  rely  on  no  other  supplies  than  those  which 
they  had  already  collected.  Should  he  be  defeated, 
Bragg  had  no  alternative  but  to  retreat  as  best  he 
might,  over  terribly  bad  roads,  into  East  Tennessee 
— roads  over  which  in  November  and  December  it 
was  next  to  impossible  even  for  an  unbeaten  army  to 
march.  Under  all  the  circumstances,  therefore, 
Bragg,  after  waiting  a  few  days  at  Harrodsburg,  to 
see  if  Buell  would  attack  him  in  position,  withdrew 
his  army  to  Camp  Dick  Robinson,  and  thence  into 
East  Tennessee. 

Accordingly  Buell,  who  waited  until  the  evening 
of  October  llth  for  Sill  to  arrive,  and  who  immedi- 
ately thereupon  advanced  on  Harrodsburg,  and  after- 
wards on  Camp  Dick  Robinson,  found  his  antagonist 
unwilling  to  hazard  a  battle.  He  started  in  pursuit, 
but  the  Confederate  retreat  was  well  managed  ;  their 
rear  was  admirably  protected  by  the  cavalry  of 
Wheeler  and  Wharton ;  and  at  London,  Buell,  con- 
vinced of  the  impolicy  of  carrying  his  army  at  that 
season  of  the  year  into  the  difficult  country  of  East 
Tennessee,1  discontinued  the  pursuit  and  transferred 
his  troops  to  Bowling  Green  and  Glasgow,  intend- 
ing, later  on,  to  place  his  forces  at  some  point  or 
points  east  of  Nashville,  on  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  railroad,  in  readiness  for  another  season 
of  active  campaigning. 

At  this  juncture,  on  October  24th — by  an  order 
received  on  October  30th — Buell  was  relieved  from 
command,  and  Rosecrans,  who,  under  Grant,  had 
been  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  in 

'23  W.  R.,6ig. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          413 

western  Tennessee,  was  put  in  Buell's  place.1  Why 
the  Government  did  not  adhere  to  the  original  plan 
of  replacing  Buell  by  Thomas  is  not  clear;  it  is 
possible  that  Thomas's  request  to  Halleck  to  allow 
Buell  to  continue  in  command,8  made  when  he  learned 
in  Louisville  in  the  last  days  of  September  that  the 
Administration  had  relieved  Buell  and  had  appointed 
him  in  Buell's  place,  had  been  unpalatable  to  the 
Washington  authorities.  At  any  rate,  at  this  time, 
Thomas  was  passed  over,  and  Rosecrans  was  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  of  the  army  which  Buell  had 
been  commanding,  and  which  was  now  designated 
as  the  14th  army  corps.3 

The  removal  of  General  Buell  was  preceded  by  a 
correspondence  between  him  and  General  Halleck, 
who  expressed  undoubtedly  the  views  of  President 
Lincoln  and  Secretary  Stanton 4  quite  as  much  as  his 
own.5  Buell  clearly  stated  the  facts  of  the  situa- 
tion— the  sterile  nature  of  the  region  through  which 
the  army  must  advance  into  East  Tennessee;  the 
consumption  of  all  its  resources  by  the  retreating 
Confederates ;  the  inadequacy  of  his  force  to  preserve 
his  communications  and  at  the  same  time  carry  a 
column  of  sufficient  strength  into  the  enemy's  coun- 
try; the  difficulty  of  the  mountainous  roads  and 
passes ;  and  also  the  importance  of  holding  Nash- 
ville and  the  railroad  between  Nashville  and  Louis- 
ville. He  did  not  deny  the  importance  of  the 
acquisition  of  East  Tennessee,  but  insisted  that  the 


1  23  W.  R.,  640,  653. 

8  /*.,  555-  4 /£.,  619,  621,  636,  637.     Cf.  6  N.  &  H.,  279-281. 

3  lb.,  641.  *  Fry,  101,  102. 


4M  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

Union  forces  were  not  at  that  moment  adequate  to 
this  task.  To  these  arguments,  Halleck  replied  by 
urging  that  the  enemy  must  be  driven  out  of  East 
Tennessee l ;  that  the  President  had  said  that  the 
"army  must  enter  East  Tennessee  this  fall"2;  that 
the  Union  army  could  live  where  the  Confederate 
army  could — ignoring  the  probability  that  the  retreat- 
ing army  would  exhaust  the  limited  resources  of  the 
country.  There  was  in  reality  no  serious  attempt  on 
Halleck's  part  to  answer  Buell's  arguments ;  there 
was  simply  a  reiteration  of  the  President's  wishes, 
and  an  ignoring  of  all  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
carrying  them  out.  No  one  who  will  take  the 
trouble  to  read  this  correspondence,  and  is  capable  of 
forming  a  judgment  on  the  military  questions  in- 
volved in  it,  can  hesitate  an  instant  in  arriving  at  the 
conclusion  that  General  Buell  was  in  the  right. 

But  the  President  and  Secretary  were  neither  will- 
ing nor  competent  to  discuss  the  question  on  purely 
military  grounds;  and  Buell  was  accordingly  removed. 
It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  cause  of  the  Union  was 
seriously  injured  by  withdrawing  Buell  from  the 
command  of  this  army.  Buell  was  as  able  a  general 
as  any  in  the  service.  Had  he  at  the  first — that  is, 
on  November  1,  1861 — been  placed  in  chief  com- 
mand in  the  West,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the 
Confederate  army  of  the  West  would  have  ceased 
to  exist  before  June  1,  1862,  and  that  thereafter  a 
regiment  of  Union  troops  could  have  marched  with- 
out opposition  from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga  and 
Knoxville.  But  circumstances,  which  have  been  al- 

1  23  W.  R.,  623.  *  lb.,  627,  638. 


1862]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          415 

ready  sufficiently  recounted,  obliged  him  to  take  a 
course  the  necessity  of  which  could  not  be  made  ap- 
parent to  the  strenuous  and  excitable  political  lead- 
ers in  the  West,  or  to  the  unmilitary  minds  of  the 
President  and  Secretary  of  War. 

His  successor,  General  Rosecrans,  had  served  under 
Grant,  as  we  have  said,  during  the  previous  summer, 
in  western  Tennessee,  and  had  recently  fought  two 
bloody  battles  against  the  forces  under  Van  Dorn 
and  Price,  which  Bragg,  when  he  moved  his  army 
from  Tupelo  to  Chattanooga,  had  left  in  upper  Mis- 
sissippi, to  hold  Grant  in  check,  and,  if  possible,  gain 
some  advantage  over  him.  The  first  of  these  actions, 
fought  at  luka  on  September  19th,  was  not  a  bril- 
liant success,  although  the  Confederates  retired  after 
it.  The  second,  fought  at  Corinth  on  October  3d 
and  4th,  was  a  decisive  victory,  and  established 
Rosecrans's  reputation  as  a  hard  fighter  and  an 
able  officer.  The  attack  of  Van  Dorn  and  Price  on 
the  Federal  army  intrenched  at  Corinth  was  most 
gallantly  made  and  was  well  supported,  and  the  re- 
sistance was  equally  brave  and  tenacious.  The  Con- 
federates were  decisively  repulsed,  and  the  credit  of 
their  defeat  justly  belonged  to  General  Rosecrans. 
The  Government  undoubtedly  considered  him  a  vig- 
orous and  a  fortunate  officer.  But  if  Mr.  Lincoln 
and  Mr.  Stanton  expected  to  find  in  Rosecrans  a 
docile  and  obedient  general,  who  would  perform  im- 
possibilities when  desired  to  do  so,1  they  were 
wofully  mistaken.  On  arriving  at  Louisville  on 
November  1st,  Rosecrans  told  Halleck  that  he  was 

1  23  W.  R.,  640  ;  3  C.  W.  (1865),  Rosecrans's  Campaigns,  24. 


4i6  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

going  to  Bowling  Green ;  that  the  move  by  Somerset 
into  East  Tennessee  was  impracticable ;  and  that 
he  was  going  to  move,  as  fast  as  supplies  could 
be  obtained,  towards  Gallatin  and  Nashville.1  He 
was  soon  able  to  report  that  all  Bragg's  forces  were 
moving  towards  Murfreesborough,  intending,  proba- 
bly, to  attack  Nashville — McCown  only  being  left  in 
East  Tennessee.2 

Thus  ended  the  Confederate  invasion  of  Kentucky 
and  Tennessee  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1862. 

Whether  it  would  not  have  been  wiser  for  the  Con- 
federate Government  to  send  25,000  or  30,000  men 
to  Virginia  as  soon  as  it  became  plain  that  Halleck 
was  not  proposing  to  take  the  offensive  with  vigor — 
say,  by  June  15th — is  a  question  which  we  cannot 
forbear  stating.  Such  an  addition  to  Lee's  army  in 
the  Seven  Days'  Battles  might  very  possibly  have 
given  him  a  decisive  victory  over  McClellan.  And 
a  decisive  victory  was  a  necessity  for  the  success  of 
the  Southern  cause.  For  as  the  United  States  had 
taken  the  position  that  the  South  was  in  rebellion, 
the  military  necessities  of  the  Southern  Confederacy 
were  not  determined  by  the  political  attitude  assumed 
by  the  Southern  States,  but  were,  for  all  practical 
purposes,  exactly  what  they  would  have  been  if  the 
Southern  people,  like  the  people  of  the  Thirteen 
Colonies  in  1776,  had  conceded  that  they  were, 
strictly  speaking,  in  rebellion.  That  is  to  say,  the 
United  States  in  1861,  like  Great  Britain  in  1776, 
was  not  waging  war  to  obtain  accessions  of  territory, 
or  commercial  or  political  advantages,  but  to  put 

'SOW.  R.,  3.  */<*.,  17- 


1 86 2]        BRAGG  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE.          417 

down  and  crush  out  all  opposition  whatever;  and 
this  attitude  of  the  United  States  made  the  obtain- 
ing on  the  part  of  the  South  of  a  success  as  signal 
and  decisive  as  that  of  Saratoga  or  Yorktown  an 
almost  necessary  condition  of  the  achievement  of 
her  independence.  Without  a  success  of  this  magni- 
tude, it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  Southern 
Confederacy  would  either  gain  recognition  in  Europe, 
or  convince  the  North  that  it  had  undertaken  an  im- 
possible task. 

For  the  weaker  party  in  a  war  of  this  kind  to 
gain  such  a  decisive  success  requires  the  deliberate 
adoption  on  its  part  of  a  military  policy  very  different 
from  that  which  a  weaker  nation  would  usually  be 
justified  in  adopting  in  an  ordinary  war.  This  dif- 
ference results  from  the  fact,  that  in  an  ordinaiy  war 
both  parties  look  forward,  as  the  ultimate  result  of 
the  struggle,  to  a  treaty,  which,  whatever  may  be 
its  provisions,  will  be  certain  to  leave  the  two 
nations  in  existence ;  whereas  in  such  wars  as  those 
of  1776  and  1861  it  is  the  political  existence  of  the 
weaker  party  which  is  at  stake.  In  wars  of  this  lat- 
ter description,  therefore,  the  paramount  object  of 
the  weaker  party  should  be  to  gain  such  striking  suc- 
cesses as  will  compel  its  recognition  as  a  nation  ;  and 
in  order  to  gain  these  successes,  almost  any  risks  may 
justifiably  be  taken.  As  a  rule,  a  vigorous  offensive 
in  one  part  of  the  theatre  of  war  should  be  main- 
tained at  the  expense  and  risk  of  making  little  or  no 
provision  for  the  defence  of  other  parts  of  the  coun- 
try, if  in  this  way  a  decisive  success  against  the 
stronger  adversary  can  be  seen  to  be  possible. 


VOL.  II. — 27 


4i8          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

It  certainly  would  seem  that  President  Davis 
never  adopted  the  view  of  the  war  which  we  have 
given  above.  Only  once  or  twice 1  were  serious 
efforts  made  to  concentrate  large  numbers  of  troops 
for  a  particular  campaign  ;  the  usual  practice  in  the 
South  as  well  as  in  the  North  was  to  let  each  De- 
partment take  care  of  itself.  But  at  the  time  of 
which  we  are  speaking,  surely  the  invasion  of  Ten- 
nessee and  Kentucky  ought  to  have  been  postponed, 
and  the  chance  of  overwhelming  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  its  retreat  from  the  Chickahominy  to  the 
James  improved.  Van  Dorn  and  Price  could  have 
maintained  a  strictly  defensive  attitude  in  northern 
Mississippi ;  Kirby  Smith,  with  the  vigorous  assist- 
ance of  Forrest  and  Morgan,  would,  without  much 
doubt,  have  been  able  to  hold  East  Tennessee  until 
the  1st  of  August;  and  Bragg  with  30,000  men 
might  have  joined  Lee  before  the  25th  of  June. 
Who  can  say  what  might  not  have  been  accomplished 
with  this  powerful  reinforcement?  The  attempt 
was,  it  seems  to  us,  well  worth  making.2 

1  As  when  Longstreet's  corps  was  sent  to  join  Bragg,  in  September,  1863. 

5  Cf.  ante,  Part  I.,  169  ;  Lee,  28  W.  R.,  591  ;  J.  E.  Johnston,  30  W.  R., 

460  ;  Bragg,  ib.,  493  ;  Beauregard,  i  B.  &  L.,  221  ;  Smith,  C.  W.  P.,  13-40. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE  IN  THE 
WEST  :  THE  BATTLE  OF  MURFREESBOROUGH. 

GENERAL  HALLECK,  in  his  letter  of  instructions 
of  October  24,  1862,  which  accompanied  President 
Lincoln's  order  placing  Rosecrans  in  command  of 
the  army  then  under  Buell,  urged  upon  the  new 
commander  to  push  into  East  Tennessee  by  way  of 
Somerset,  but  at  the  same  time  permitted  him,  in 
view  of  all  the  circumstances,  to  go  to  Nashville  and 
to  operate  from  that  city  as  a  base.  The  damage 
done  by  Morgan  to  the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
railroad  near  Grallatin  by  destroying  the  tunnel  had 
not  yet  been  repaired,  and  Halleck  himself  in  this 
letter  called  Rosecrans's  attention  to  the  necessity 
of  repairing  and  guarding  this  railroad,  so  as  to  se- 
cure his  supplies  from  Louisville  until  the  Cumber- 
land River  (on  which  Nashville  was  situated)  should 
become  navigable.1  Halleck,  however,  though  evi- 
dently realizing  the  difficulties  in  Rosecrans's  path, 
did  not  hesitate  to  conclude  his  letter  with  a  warn- 
ing. "  I  need  not  urge  upon  you,"  wrote  he,  "  the 
necessity  of  giving  active  employment  to  your  forces. 

1  23  W.  R.,  640,  641.     The  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  rivers  became 
navigable  in  the  latter  part  of  the  winter. 

419 


420  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

Neither  the  country  nor  the  Government  will  much 
longer  put  up  with  the  inactivity  of  some  of  our 
armies  and  generals."  This  language  simply  con- 
veyed General  Halleck's  belief  as  to  the  probable 
action  of  the  President  and  Mr.  Stanton.1  This  be- 
lief of  his  as  to  their  principles  of  dealing  with  the 
generals  of  the  army  had  been  even  more  baldly  and 
distinctly  stated  in  a  letter  to  General  Wright  on 
August  25th.2  After  saying  that  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  War  were  greatly  displeased  with  the 
slow  movements  of  General  Buell,  and  that  he 
(Buell)  would  probably  be  removed  "  unless  he  does 
something  very  soon,"  Halleck  proceeds  as  follows : 
"  There  must  be  more  energy  and  activity  in  Ken- 
tucky and  Tennessee,  and  the  one  who  first  does 
something  brilliant  will  get  the  entire  command.  .  .  . 
The  Government  seems  determined  to  apply  the 
guillotine  to  all  unsuccessful  generals.  It  seems 
rather  hard  to  do  this  where  the  general  is  not  in 
fault,  but  perhaps  with  us  now,  as  in  the  French 
Revolution,  some  harsh  measures  are  required." 3  We 
have  had  occasion  to  call  our  readers'  attention  before 
to  this  feature  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  by  President 
Lincoln  and  Secretary  Stanton.4  "  Neither  of  them 
made  any  real  effort  to  understand  the  nature  and  ex- 
tent of  the  harassing  and  difficult  tasks  "  of  the  gen- 
erals who  were  faithfully  doing  their  best  to  achieve 
the  conquest  of  the  South.  Generals  in  high  com- 
mand not  infrequently  received  from  the  Adminis- 
tration reminders  to  the  effect  that  their  positions 

1  Fry,  101.  *  Cf.  35  W.  R.,  95,  in  ;  also  Fry,  99. 

*  23  W.  R.,  421.  *  Part  I.,  226,  227. 


1 862]     FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE    421 

were  held  by  a  very  precarious  tenure.  The  impres- 
sion created  at  the  time  by  these  things  was  most 
disagreeable ;  nor  can  it  ever  be  expected  to  disap- 
pear. The  President  and  Secretary  acted  in  this 
regard  as  would  the  stockholders  of  a  corporation, 
who  should  either  neglect  to  read  or  be  incompetent 
to  understand  the  reports  of  the  directors,  and  should 
vote  to  retain  them  in  office  or  to  dismiss  them,  as 
they  did  or  did  not  declare  dividends. 

Accordingly  we  are  not  surprised  to  find  Halleck 
telling  Roseerans,1  even  when  the  tunnel  near  Gal- 
latin  was  not  yet  in  running  order,2  that  if  he  re- 
mained long  at  Nashville  he  would  disappoint  the 
wishes  of  the  Government.  A  letter  of  Halleck's 
on  December  4th,3  however,  brought  this  kind  of 
fault-finding  to  a  head.  "  The  President,"  said  he, 
"  is  very  impatient  at  your  long  stay  in  Nashville. 
.  .  .  Twice  have  I  been  asked  to  designate  some 
one  else  to  command  your  army.  If  you  remain  one 
more  week  at  Nashville,  I  cannot  prevent  your  re- 
moval. As  I  wrote  you  when  you  took  the  com- 
mand, the  Government  demands  action,  and,  if  you 
cannot  respond  to  that  demand,  some  one  else  will  be 
tried."  To  this  letter,  which  one  can  hardly  imagine 
having  actually  been  sent  by  the  General-in-Chief  of 
a  civilized  nation  to  an  educated  and  able  officer  of 
high  rank — this  letter,  couched  in  language  which  one 
might  perhaps  apply  to  a  clerk  in  a  subordinate  posi- 
tion— General  Roseerans  returned,  the  same  evening, 


1  30  W.   R.,   102  ;  November  27,   1862  ;   3  C.   W.  (1865),   Rosecrans's 
Campaigns,  25. 
»3oW.  R.,93.  3/<J.,  117. 


4*22          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

a  dignified  and  manly  answer.  "  I  reply,"  said  he, 
"  in  few  but  earnest  words.  I  have  lost  no  time.  .  .  . 
If  the  Government  which  ordered  me  here  confides 
in  my  judgment,  it  may  rely  on  my  continuing  to  do 
what  I  have  been  trying  to  do — that  is,  my  whole 
duty.  If  my  superiors  have  lost  confidence  in  me, 
they  had  better  at  once  put  some  one  in  ray  place, 
and  let  the  future  test  the  propriety  of  the  change. 
I  have  but  one  word  to  add,  which  is,  that  I  need 
no  other  stimulus  to  make  me  do  my  duty  than  the 
knowledge  of  what  it  is.  To  threats  of  removal  or 
the  like  I  must  be  permitted  to  say  that  I  am  insen- 
sible." *  For  this  clear  assertion  of  the  proper  posi- 
tion of  a  general  officer  as  respects  his  Government, 
and  of  the  consideration  due  to  that  position  from 
the  Government,  General  Rosecrans  deserved  the 
thanks  of  his  profession.  General  Halleck,  in  his 
answer,2  denied  that  he  had  used  a  threat,  and  dwelt 
at  length  on  the  probable  political  effect  on  the 
action  of  European  nations  of  delay  in  the  recovery 
by  General  Rosecrans  of  the  territory  of  which,  in 
the  beginning  of  the  year,  the  Federal  Government 
had  been  in  possession  in  the  State  of  Tennessee. 

We  do  not  mean  to  say,  or  to  imply,  that  the  civil 
administration  has  not  a  perfect  right  in  certain  cases 
to  remove  a  general  officer  for  slowness.  Slowness 
may  be  one  of  the  effects  of  the  inability  of  the 
general  to  master  the  situation  in  which  he  is  placed  ; 
this  inability  of  his  may  result  from  his  own  incom- 
petence; and  incompetence,  of  course,  always  justi- 
fies the  removal  of  an  officer.  What  we  object  to  is 

>3oW.  R.,  118.  »/£.,  123. 


1862]   FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.     423 

the  threat, — partly  because  it  is  a  threat,  and  partly 
because  in  military  movements  it  is  often  beyond  the 
power  of  any  general,  no  matter  how  able  or  energetic 
he  may  be,  to  prevent  delay.1 

Rosecrans,  in  fact,  delayed  three  weeks  after  re- 
ceiving Halleck's  last  warning.  In  so  doing  he  was 
simply  carrying  out  the  plan  which  he  had  announced 
to  Halleck  as  early  as  November  17th,2  which  was  to 
remain  where  he  was  until  the  railroad  to  Louisville 
should  be  fully  opened,  and  he  should  be  able 
through  its  instrumentality  to  accumulate  an  abun- 
dance (2,000,000)  of  rations  at  Nashville.  It  was 
only  in  this  way  that  he  could  hope  to  carry  out  his 
movements  unaffected  by  the  raids  which  it  was 
certain  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  would  make  on  his 
communications.  If  he  should  advance  to  Murfrees- 
borough  while  he  was  yet  dependent  on  the  regular 
arrival  of  the  trains  to  bring  to  his  army  its  daily 
supplies,  it  is  plain  that  a  successful  attempt  on  the 
railroad — the  destruction  of  a  tunnel,  the  burning 
of  a  trestle-bridge — would  always  necessitate  a  halt, 
and  might  also  cause  much  embarrassment  and  even 
danger.  But,  by  postponing  his  advance  until  he 
should  be  comparatively  independent  of  the  daily 
service  of  the  railroad  trains,  he  would  be  able  to 
view  the  enterprises  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  with 
indifference  and  to  pursue  his  plans  without  inter- 
ruption. This  he  soon  demonstrated. 

The  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad  was  fully 
repaired  by  November  26th,3  and  in  a  month  it  had 

1  Cf.  Part  I.,  236. 

9  30  W.  R.,  59.  S2Q  W.  R.,  189. 


424          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

performed  its  task  of  furnishing  the  reserve  sup- 
plies. On  December  24th,  Rosecrans  put  his  army 
in  motion  towards  Murfreesborough,  in  the  vicinity 
of  which  town  Bragg  had  now  concentrated  the 
bulk  of  his  forces.  A  part  of  his  cavalry,  indeed, 
he  had  sent  off  in  two  bodies, — one,  under  Morgan, 
to  break  up  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  railroad, 
which  that  officer  successfully  accomplished  on 
December  26th,1  and  the  other  under  Forrest,  who, 
about  the  same  time,  broke  up  the  railroad  between 
Columbus,  Kentucky,  and  Corinth,  Tennessee,2  on 
which  Grant  relied  for  the  greater  part  of  his  sup- 
plies. But  Bragg  wisely  retained  the  three  brigades 
of  Wheeler,  Wharton,  and  Pegram  with  the  army, 
and  their  skilful  movements  screened  the  positions 
and  manoeuvres  of  his  infantry,  on  which  he  placed 
his  chief  reliance,  and  delayed  the  advance  of  the 
Federal  forces  until  arrangements  could  be  com- 
pleted for  their  reception.3  He  probably  would 
have  done  better  if  he  had  kept  Forrest  and  Morgan 
with  him,  but  it  would  seem  that  they  were  des- 
patched on  their  respective  errands  before  the  move- 
ments of  Rosecrans  indicated  with  certainty  that  a 
battle  was  imminent.4 

On  December  26th,  Rosecrans  commenced  his 
advance.  His  army  consisted  (as  he  states5)  of 
about  47,000  men,  of  whom  43,600  were  infantry 

"29  w.  R.,  153-158- 

•Greene,  70. 
3  29  W.  R.,  663. 

*/£.,  189  ;   i  Van  Home,  217,  218. 

*  Ib. ,  196,  201.     The   December    return  gives  a  much   larger   number; 
30  W.  R.,  283. 


1862]   FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    425 

and  artillery.  Bragg  had  not  quite  38,000  men,  of 
whom  about  33,500  were  infantry  and  artillery.1 

The  Federal  troops  encountered  opposition  at 
every  point,  and  it  was  not  until  the  afternoon  of 
December  30th  that  they  arrived  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  Murfreesborough.  The  Confederate  lines 
were  here  discovered,  and  General  Rosecrans  made 
his  plan  for  an  attack  early  the  next  morning. 

The  stream  known  as  Stone's  River  (or,  rather,  as 
the  west  branch  of  Stone's  River)  rises  some  twenty 
miles  south  of  Murfreesborough,  and  flows  in  a 
northerly  direction  until  it  is  about  a  mile  west  of 
the  town,  where  it  turns  eastwardly  and  crosses  the 
Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad  and  also  the 
turnpike  which  runs  from  Nashville  to  Murfrees- 
borough ;  it  then  turns  to  the  northwest,  pursuing  a 
course  generally  parallel  to  both  these  roads  until 
it  unites  with  the  east  branch,  when  the  united 
stream  continues  in  this  same  course  until  it  falls 
into  the  Cumberland  River  just  east  of  Nashville. 
It  is  a  stream  which  varies  in  depth  at  different 
seasons  of  the  year,  and  at  this  time  it  was  fordable 
in  many  places. 

The  turnpike  running  from  Murfreesborough  to 
Nashville  runs  in  a  northwesterly  direction  to  that 
city,  as  does  also  the  railroad,  which  is  generally 
parallel  with  it.  The  greater  part  of  both  armies 

1  29  W.  R.,  674.  On  November  2Oth,  Bragg  estimated  his  force  of  infantry 
and  artillery  at  40,000  men,  and  his  "  regular"  cavalry,—/,  e.,  his  cavalry 
exclusive  of  Forrest's  and  Morgan's  commands, — at  5000  more  ;  30  W.  R., 
422.  His  field  return  of  December  loth  showed  an  "  effective  total  of  the 
three  arms"  of  51,036  ;  30  W.  R.,  446.  Yet  in  a  letter  to  Johnston  of 
January  11,  1863,  he  says:  "My  infantry  and  artillery  was  [sit]  not 
31,000"  ;  30  W.  R.,  403. 


426  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

was  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  the  railroad,  and 
the  turnpike ;  Rosecrans's  forces  facing  east  and  those 
of  Bragg  facing  west.  Bragg's  left  overlapped  Rose- 
crans's right.  This  was  the  position  of  the  two  armies 
on  the  night  of  December  30,  1862. 

Rosecrans  had  determined  to  push  forward  his 
left  early  the  next  morning,  the  31st,  across  the 
river,  to  seize  the  railroad  at  Murf  reesborough, — thus 
turning  Bragg's  right,  cutting  his  army  off  from  its 
line  of  supplies,1 — and  then  to  drive  it  southward. 

Bragg,  singularly  enough,  conceived  a  similar 
plan.  He  proposed  that,  as  soon  as  it  was  light,  his 
left  wing  under  Hardee  should  turn  Rosecrans's  right, 
and,  supported  by  the  centre  under  Polk,  and,  if 
necessary,  by  troops  taken  from  the  right  wing  under 
Breckinridge, — that  is,  by  the  larger  part  of  his 
forces, — should  drive  the  Federal  army  back  upon 
the  Nashville  turnpike,  should,  if  possible,  seize  this, 
and  also  the  railroad,2  thus,  in  all  probability,  inflict- 
ing a  decisive  defeat  upon  his  antagonist. 

The  Union  army  consisted  of  the  three  corps  of 
Crittenden,  Thomas,  and  McCook.  McCook  was  on 
the  right,  Thomas  in  the  centre,  and  Crittenden  on 
the  left.  Crittenden's  command  rested  on  Stone's 
River. 

On  the  Confederate  side  the  division  of  Breckin- 
ridge of  Hardee's  corps  was  on  the  right,  opposite 
Crittenden's  corps  ;  the  corps  of  Polk  constituted  the 
centre ;  and  Hardee's  other  division,  that  of  Cle- 
burne,  together  with  McCown's  division  of  Kirby 
Smith's  East  Tennessee  army,  which  the  latter  officer 

1  29  W.  R.,  192.  */*.,  664. 


1 86 2]   FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    427 

had  recently  sent  to  Bragg,  composed  the  left. 
The  cavalry  was  ordered  to  operate  in  the  rear  of 
the  Federal  army,  to  pick  up  prisoners,  to  attack 
ammunition  and  supply  trains,  and  to  create  as  much 
disturbance  and  annoyance  as  possible. 

Bragg's  plan  to  extend  his  left  so  as  to  overlap 
McCook's  line  was  not  well  concealed.  It  appears 
that  statements  to  the  effect  that  the  Confederate 
left  extended  beyond  McCook's  position, — "that 
Hardee's  corps  was  entirely  beyond  \i.  e.,  south  of] 
the  Franklin  road," 1  that,  in  fact,  "  the  right  of 
McCook's  line  rested  directly  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
centre," — were  made  to  McCook  in  the  middle  of 
the  afternoon  of  the  30th,  and  were  by  him  com- 
municated to  Rosecrans.2  In  spite  of  this  informa- 
tion, McCook's  entire  line,  with  the  exception  of  one 
brigade  (Willich's),  which  was  on  his  extreme  right, 
and  faced  south,  looked  toward  the  east.  When 
Rosecrans  learned  this,  he  told  McCook  that  "  such  a 
direction  to  his  line  did  not  appear  to  him  to  be  a 
proper  one,  but  that  it  ought,  with  the  exception  of 
the  left,  to  face  much  more  nearly  south."3  Rose- 
crans, nevertheless,  left  the  whole  matter  to  McCook, 
as  knowing  the  ground.  Later  in  the  evening,  Rose- 
crans told  McCook  that  it  was  necessary  for  the 
success  of  his  plan  of  battle  that  he,  McCook,  should 
be  able  to  hold  his  position  for  three  hours,  until 
Crittenden's  attack  should  become  fully  developed. 
McCook  told  him  that  he  thought  he  could  hold  his 


1   29  W.  R.,  255.     McCook  afterwards  verified  the  truth  of  this  state- 
ment ;  id.,  257. 

*  Ib.,  255.  '/*.,  I9l- 


428  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

position  for  three  hours J ;  and,  on  this  assurance,  the 
commanding  general,  though  he  again  expressed  his 
opinion  that  too  large  a  part  of  McCook's  line  faced 
to  the  east,  decided  to  make  no  change  in  his  disposi- 
tions, and  deliberately  took  his  chance  that  Bragg 
would  not  upset  all  his  calculations  by  first  en- 
veloping and  then  routing  his  right  wing. 

It  was  the  second  time  in  the  war  that  similar 
plans  had  been  formed  for  the  conduct  of  a  battle 
by  the  opposing  commanders.  At  the  first  battle 
of  Bull  Run,  General  Beauregard  intended  to  at- 
tack the  Union  left,  while  General  McDowell  pro- 
posed to  turn  the  Confederate  left ;  and  at  Stone's 
River,  as  at  Bull  Run,  the  commander  who  was  the 
first  to  move  controlled  the  course  of  the  action. 
The  orders  sent  by  Beauregard,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, failed  to  reach  his  lieutenants  promptly,  and 
the  approach  of  a  powerful  Federal  force  on  the 
left  of  their  line  compelled  him  and  Johnston  to 
abandon  all  thought  of  resuming  their  interrupted 
plan  and  to  devote  all  their  attention  to  the  danger 
which  threatened  them.2 

It  was  so  at  Murfreesborough.  Hardee  began  his 
attack  soon  after  6  A.M.,S  when  McCown,  closely  fol- 
lowed by  Cleburne,  attacked  Johnson's  division, 
which  occupied  the  right  of  McCook's  line.  It  is 
probable  that  a  somewhat  better  defence  might  have 
been  made  here ;  Johnson  seems  to  have  placed  his 
reserve  brigade  too  far  in  the  rear ;  and  of  the  com- 
manders of  his  other  brigades  one  was  almost  im- 

1  29  W.  R.,  192. 

s  Ante,  Part  I.,  142,  143. 

1  29  W.  R.,  304,  917  et  seq. 


1 86 2]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    429 

mediately  mortally  wounded  and  the  other  captured, 
so  that  the  troops,  who  were  excellent  troops,  were 
for  the  moment  without  commanders.  But  nothing 
could  really  have  been  done  to  defend  such  an  ex- 
posed point.  The  Confederates,  far  exceeding  their 
opponents  in  number  at  this  particular  place,  out- 
flanking them  completely,  pressed  on  with  the  auda- 
city and  energy  which  they  always  displayed  in  an 
assault.  There  was  from  the  first  no  question  as 
to  the  result.  Johnson's  division  was  completely 
routed,  and  its  destruction  exposed  the  right  of 
Davis's  division,  the  next  in  line.  But  Davis  had 
had  more  time  to  prepare,  and  his  resistance  was 
naturally  more  protracted.  So  also  it  was  with 
Sheridan,  who  had  the  division  on  Davis's  left,1  the 
three  constituting  McCook's  corps.  McCook  him- 
self did  all  that  a  good  officer  could  do  under  such 
trying  circumstances.  Sheridan  showed  here  that 
capacity  for  handling  troops  in  action  which  was 
afterwards  to  make  him  so  distinguished.2  He  and 
Thomas,  who  afterwards  commanded  this  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  protracted  the  defence  of  their 
lines  till  11  A.M.3  The  fighting  was  most  obstinate 
and  bloody.  Sheridan's  three  brigadiers  were  all 
killed.  The  losses  on  both  sides  were  terrible.  But 
there  was  nothing  to  be  done  in  the  end  but  to  fall 
back.  The  right  of  the  line  was  turned ;  there  was 
no  natural  obstacle  which  could  be  made  available 
for  defence4;  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  fall 


1  He  was  not  attacked  till  7.15  A.M.  ;  29  W.  R.,  348. 

2  McCook's  report ;  29  W.  R.,  256. 

3  29  W.  R.,  373,  407-  *  **•>  257- 


430  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

back  to  the  Nashville  turnpike,  where  a  junction 
could  be  made  with  the  reserves  and  with  Critten- 
den's  corps. 

This  last-mentioned  officer,  who  commanded  on 
the  Union  left,  got  his  troops  in  motion  about  8  A.M.1 
One  of  his  divisions  was  crossing  Stone's  River  when 
news  was  brought  to  him  of  the  rout  of  the  right 
wing  under  McCook.  Rosecrans,  who,  for  the  last 
hour  or  so,  had  received  word  that  McCook  was 
"  heavily  pressed  and  needed  assistance,2 "  had  con- 
tented himself  with  directing  that  officer  to  "  hold 
his  ground  obstinately  "  ;  but  by  eight  o'clock  it  was 
plain  to  him  that  his  right  wing  was  defeated,  if  not 
routed.  In  this  grave  emergency  Rosecrans  acted 
with  courage  and  decision.  He  ordered  the  bulk  of 
Crittenden's  corps  back  on  the  Nashville  turnpike 
to  reinforce  the  centre  and  right,  leaving  only  troops 
enough  to  hold  and  defend  the  crossing  of  the  river. 
Galloping  back  to  the  scene  of  action,  he  exerted 
himself  gallantly  and  energetically  to  restore  order 
and  inspire  confidence.8  And  he  succeeded.  Sec- 
onded by  Thomas,  Sheridan,  Negley,  Rousseau,  and 
other  capable  and  resolute  officers,  proper  positions 
were  finally  taken  up  :  the  excellent  artillery  of  the 
Union  army — with  the  exception  of  28  pieces,  which 
had  been  captured — was  judiciously  posted;  the 
divisions  of  Crittenden,  and  the  division  of  Rousseau 
of  Thomas's  corps,  which  had  not  taken  a  serious 
part  in  the  action  of  the  early  morning,  were  skil- 
fully arranged  so  as  to  give  support  and  encourage- 
ment to  the  unfortunate  troops  which  in  the  fore- 

1  29  W.  R.,  449.  s  fit.,  193.  3  Cist,  128,  129. 


1 86  2]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    43 1 

noon  had  been  driven  in  such  confusion  across  the 
field  of  battle.  The  new  positions  were  no  sooner 
assumed  than  they  were  attacked  by  the  Confeder- 
ates with  even  more  than  their  usual  impetuosity. 
A  complete  victory  seemed  fairly  within  their  grasp. 
But  their  most  desperate  and  heroic  efforts  were  all 
in  vain.  The  Union  troops  stood  firm.  Their  artil- 
lery was  handled  with  great  effect :  the  Confederate 
losses  were  enormous;  and  at  dark  their  attacks 
ceased. 

Few  battles  have  been  fought  which  have  better 
exhibited  the  soldierly  virtues  than  the  battle  of 
Murfreesborough  or  Stone's  River.  The  Confed- 
erate assaults  were  conducted  with  the  utmost  gal- 
lantry and  with  untiring  energy.  They  were  met 
with  great  coolness  and  resolution.  The  recovery  of 
the  Union  army,  so  nearly  routed,  was  wonderful, 
and  assuredly  could  not  have  been  accomplished  had 
there  been  any  wavering  or  lack  of  confidence  on  the 
part  of  the  high  officers,  or  any  demoralization  on 
the  part  of  the  soldiers.  The  Confederates  had  a 
right  to  claim  a  victory,  for  they  had  taken  28  guns l 
and  about  3700  prisoners.2  Still,  the  Federal  army 
was,  for  all  practical  purposes,  as  strong  as  ever. 
The  truth  is,  the  Confederates  were  not  numerous 
enough  to  complete  their  victory. 

That  the  Union  army  should  have  been  beaten  at 
all,  and  especially  that  it  should  have  been  brought 
so  near  to  an  actual  rout,  was  mainly,  it  must  be 
admitted,  the  fault  of  its  sanguine  and  gallant  com- 
mander. For,  had  he  carefully  weighed  the  informa- 

1  29  W.  R.,  194.  *  •#•,  215. 


432  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

tion  as  to  the  position  of  the  Confederate  forces 
which  he  received  on  the  afternoon  before  the  battle, 
and  had  he  then  carefully  disposed  his  right  wing  so 
as  to  meet  the  assault  which  it  was  plain  Bragg  in- 
tended to  make  the  next  morning,  he  could  have 
saved  his  army  from  the  peril  to  which  it  so  nearly 
succumbed.  It  may  surely  be  expected  of  a  com- 
manding general  who  is  about  to  fight  a  great  battle 
that  he  should  arrange  his  army  in  accordance  with 
his  own  best  judgment.  He  has  the  power  to  do 
this,  and  no  one  can  doubt  that  it  is  his  duty  to  ex- 
ercise his  power.  Yet  Rosecrans  at  Murfreesbor- 
ough  failed  to  insist  that  his  right  wing  should  be 
arranged  in  accordance  with  his  own  judgment.  He 
was,  perhaps,  too  anxious  to  carry  out  his  own  plan  of 
attack  to  give  their  due  importance  to  those  parts  of 
the  line  of  battle  which  were  not  under  his  own  eye. 
Very  possibly  he  did  not  care  to  overrule  the  opin- 
ion of  a  good  officer,  such  as  McCook  was,  in  regard 
to  the  disposition  of  his  own  troops.  At  any  rate,  he 
made  the  great  mistake  of  submitting  his  own  judg- 
ment on  a  matter  of  vital  importance  to  that  of  one 
of  his  corps-commanders. 

On  the  day  after  the  battle,  January  1, 1863,  both 
armies  lay  quiet.  A  part  of  Crittenden's  corps,  how- 
ever, crossed  the  river,  and  occupied  some  command- 
ing ground  on  the  east  side. 

The  next  afternoon,  January  2d,  a  sudden  and 
furious  assault  was  made  on  this  position  by  Breck- 
inridge's  division,  which  was  at  first  successful.  But 
the  place  was  commanded  by  the  Federal  artillery, 
and  troops  were  immediately  sent  to  recover  the  lost 


1862]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.   433 

ground,  so  that  the  affair  finally  turned  out  entirely 
to  the  advantage  of  the  Union  side.  This  ended  the 
bloody  and  indecisive  battle  of  Murfreesborough  or 
Stone's  River. 

The  loss  on  the  Union  side  was  about  9500  officers 
and  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  about  3700  pris- 
oners.1 That  of  the  Confederates  was  about  9000 
killed  and  wounded,  and  nearly  900  taken  prisoners.2 
Late  in  the  evening  of  January  3,  1863,  Bragg  with- 
drew his  exhausted  and  disappointed  army  from  the 
field  of  battle,  and,  passing  through  Murfreesbor- 
ough, took  up  his  winter  quarters  at  and  near  Tulla- 
homa,  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad.3 
Rosecrans  made  no  attempt  to  follow  him  beyond 
Murfreesborough.  The  shattered  condition  of  his 
army  and  the  lateness  of  the  season  alike  prevented 
offensive  movements  during  the  next  few  months. 
1 29  w.  R.,  215. 

*  Ib.,  681. 

3  Ib.,  669.     For  correspondence  showing  that  Bragg  had  to  a  considerable 
extent  lost  the  confidence  of  his  principal  lieutenants,  see  pp.  682-699. 


VOL.  n. — 28 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE  IN  THE 
EAST  :  THE  BATTLE  OF  FREDERICKSBURG.1 

THE  Confederate  invasion  of  Maryland  had  ended, 
as  we  have  seen,2  in  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  and 
the  retirement  of  General  Lee  across  the  Potomac. 
The  Washington  authorities  naturally  expected  Gen- 
eral McClellan  to  follow  up  his  success  with  a  speedy 
invasion  of  Virginia.  President  Lincoln,  Secretary 
Stanton,  and  General  Halleck  had  not  shared  in  the 
exaggerated  estimate  of  the  strength  of  the  Confed- 
erate forces  which  had  so  oppressed  the  spirit  of 
their  general ;  in  their  minds,  the  failure  of  Lee  was 
exactly  what  might  have  been  expected,  and  his  re- 
treat into  Virginia  showed  beyond  a  doubt  that  he 
might  be  advantageously  followed  up,  and,  as  soon 
as  practicable,  attacked  again.  In  this  view  they 
were  probably  right.  Certainly  the  accessions  to 
the  numbers  of  the  Confederate  army  during  the 
autumn,  caused  in  great  part  by  the  return  of  strag- 
glers, and  of  absentees  of  all  kinds,  would  go  far  to 
justify  this  opinion.3 

1  See  Map  XII. ,  facing  page  456. 
*  Ante,  378. 

1  Field-return  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  on  September  22,  1862  ; 
28  W.  R.,  621  ;  ditto,  November  10,  1862  ;  »£.,  713. 

434 


1862]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  435 

But  General  McClellan  took  a  wholly  different 
view  of  the  case.  In  his  mind,  the  North  had  been 
in  imminent  peril  of  being  overrun  by  the  recently 
victorious  army  of  General  Lee,1 — "  greatly  superior 
to  us,"  he  said,2  "  in  number," — and  he,  McClellan, 
had  saved  the  country.3  But  he  was  far  from  con- 
tending that  he  had  routed  his  antagonists.  He 
claimed,  it  is  true,  a  complete  victory,  but  the  scope 
of  the  whole  operation  was  in  his  opinion  limited 
to  the  salvation  of  the  North/  "  Our  victory,"  said 
he  on  the  19th  of  September,  two  days  after  the  bat- 
tle, "  was  complete.  The  enemy  is  driven  back  into 
Virginia.  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  are  now 
safe."5  So  far,  so  good.  But  he  did  not  think  it 
prudent  to  carry  his  army  at  once,  weakened  as  it 
had  been  in  its  recent  battles,  into  Virginia.  He 
indeed  reoccupied  Harper's  Ferry  as  "  a  secure 
debouche " 6  across  the  Potomac,  and  he  fortified 
Maryland,  Loudoun,  and  Bolivar  Heights,  where  he 
placed  Sumner  with  the  2d  and  12th  corps.  But  he 
was  very  far  from  having  a  sense  of  complete  secur- 
ity against  attack.  It  shows  the  tone  of  his  mind  at 
this  time  that  he  should  have  written  to  Halleck 
that  he  thought  that  Sumner  would  be  "able  to 
hold  his  position  till  reinforcements  arrive."7  In 
fact,  so  far  from  being  elated  at  the  result  of  the  re- 
cent campaign,  he  was  not  free  from  the  gravest  ap- 
prehensions. "  A  defeat  at  this  juncture,"  he  says 
in  the  same  despatch,  "  would  be  ruinous  to  our 

1  27  W.  R.,  65.  4/£.,82. 

»/J.,7i.  "  28  W.  R.,  330. 

<!/£.,  93.  «27W.  R.,  70. 

1  Ib.,  70.     "  A  pitiful  assertion,"  as  General  Palfrey  (130)  wellsays. 


436  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

cause."  In  his  opinion  his  soldiers  were  not  in  con- 
dition to  undertake  another  campaign  or  to  bring  on 
another  battle.1  He  thought  that  considerable  time 
should  be  devoted  to  the  reorganization  of  the  army, 
the  instruction  of  the  new  troops,  and  the  filling  up 
of  the  old  regiments.8  His  cavalry,  also,  was  in  bad 
condition ;  a  strange  disease 3  had  appeared  among 
the  horses ;  the  labor  of  doing  picket-duty  for  the 
army  had  broken  down  many  regiments.4  The  sol- 
diers, moreover,  were  greatly  in  need  of  shoes,  blan- 
kets, and  other  articles  of  clothing.5 

It  is  altogether  probable  that  in  most,  if  not  all, 
of  the  above-mentioned  respects  the  army  of  Mc- 
Clellan  was  actually  suffering  from  the  deficiencies 
mentioned  by  him.  But  it  is  plain  that  while  these 
needs  were  being  supplied  the  fine  autumn  weather 
was  passing  away.  It  was  equally  clear  that  the 
army  of  General  Lee  could  not  be  in  much  better 
condition  than  that  of  McClellan ;  in  fact,  it  was 
pretty  well  known  that  the  Northern  army  was  far 
better  supplied  than  was  that  of  Lee  with  every- 
thing necessary  for  a  campaign,  except,  perhaps, 
horses6  for  the  cavalry  and  artillery.7  Hence  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  War  could  not  arrive 


1 27  w.  R.,  70. 

9  Ib.,  70,  71. 

3  Ib.,  78  ;  28  W.  R.,  512,  Franklin  to  Porter. 

4  27  W.  R.,  71.     Cf.  28  W.  R..  484,  485,  490,  491. 
1  27  W.  R.,  ii,  12,  20-22,  74-77. 

*  See  Lee  to  Randolph,  ib.,  701,  709. 

T  During  the  first  half  of  the  war  the  Washington  Government  did  not 
seem  to  understand  the  necessity  of  supplying  the  armies  in  the  field  with  a 
sufficient  force  of  cavalry.  Buell  and  Rosecrans  in  the  West  and  McClellan 
in  the  East  could  never  get  what  their  armies  needed. 


1 86 2]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  437 

at  a  cordial  understanding  with  General  McClellan. 
His  complaints  seemed  to  them  unnecessary  and  far- 
fetched, and  they  even  suspected  that  he  had  no 
serious  intention  of  engaging  the  enemy  that  autumn. 
The  tone  of  his  letters  also  was  that  of  an  officer 
who  proposed  to  do  exactly  as  he  thought  best.  He 
did  not  always  answer  inconvenient  questions,  or 
explain  why  he  did  not  carry  out  his  orders.1 

We  must  mention  another  circumstance  which 
unquestionably  was  one  cause  of  the  grave  and 
increasing  distrust  of  General  McClellan  on  the  part 
of  the  President  and  the  Administration.  This  was 
the  well-known  opposition  of  the  general  to  the 
course  of  the  Government  in  regard  to  the  emancipa- 
tion of  the  slaves.  It  was,  it  is  true,  none  of  Mc- 
Clellan's  business,  as  a  general  in  the  army,  to  take 
any  part  in  this  or  any  other  political  question.  But 
McClellan  entertained  such  inordinate  ideas  of  his 
own  importance,  and  of  the  advantages  which  his 
position  in  the  field  gave  him  of  judging  of  the  effect 
on  the  course  of  military  events  of  any  interference 
by  the  Federal  Government  in  the  direction  of 
abolishing  slavery,  that  he  had  already  written  to 
Mr.  Lincoln,  on  July  7th,  from  Harrison's  Landing, 
a  most  extraordinary  letter 2  on  the  political  situation. 
Hence,  when  the  President  put  forth  his  Proclama- 
tion of  September  22d,3 — five  days  after  the  battle 
of  the  Antietam, — announcing  his  intention  to  free 
all  the  slaves  in  those  States  which  should,  on  Jan- 
uary 1,  1863,  be  in  insurrection,  it  was  natural  to 

1  Cf.  Palfrey,  130. 

*  McClellan's  O.  S.,  487.  3  6  N.  &  H.,  168  et  teq. 


438  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

suspect  that  McClellan's  opposition  to  any  step  of 
the  kind  might  cause  delay  in  the  advance  of  the 
army.  We  do  not  ourselves  believe  that  this  feel- 
ing influenced  McClellan's  action  in  the  slightest 
degree,1  but  it  can  easily  be  seen  that  such  a  sus- 
picion might  widely  prevail. 

While  these  controversies  were  occupying  the 
minds  of  General  McClellan  and  his  political  superi- 
ors in  Washington,  General  Lee's  army  was  gaining 
decidedly  in  strength  and  efficiency  in  its  camp  near 
Winchester  and  Bunker  Hill.2  It  was  while  his  army 
was  resting  here  that  General  Lee  sent  Stuart,  with 
three  brigades  of  cavalry — in  all  about  1800  men — 
into  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  ostensibly  "to 
ascertain  the  position  and  designs  of  the  enemy."3 
Stuart  crossed  the  Potomac  above  Williamsport  on 
October  10th,  avoided  Hagerstown,  went  to  Mercers- 
burg  and  Chambersburg,  where  some  stores  and 
horses  were  picked  up,  and  returned  by  way  of 
Cash  town,  Emmittsburg,  and  Hyattstown,  fording 
the  river  at  White's  Ford,  just  above  Poolesville, 
Maryland.  In  a  sense  his  expedition  was  entirely 
successful,  and  Stuart  certainly  showed  all  the 
skill,  address,  and  courage  attributed  to  him  by  Lee. 
But  with  the  exception  of  fatiguing  the  Union 
cavalry  who  chased  him  or  endeavored  to  intercept 
him,  Stuart  did  his  adversaries  no  harm,  nor  did  he 
bring  his  friends  any  information  of  consequence. 
He  may,  perhaps,  have  excited  (as  he  says  he  did)  a 

1  McClellan  issued  to  his  army  on  October  ?th  a  very  excellent  General 
Order,  enjoining  acquiescence  in  any  policy  which  the  Administration  might 
adopt ;  28  W.  R.,  395. 

*  Allan,  452.  3  27  W.  R.,  152  ;  28  W.  R.,  51  et  seq. 


1862]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  439 

"consternation  among  property- holders  in  Pennsyl- 
vania which  beggared  description,"1  but  what  the 
results,  "  in  a  moral  and  political  point  of  view," 
were,  which  he  says  "  can  hardly  be  estimated," 2  it 
is  not  easy  even  to  conjecture.  One  thing  is  certain  : 
that  if  Stuart  and  his  command  had  been  captured, 
as  they  very  possibly  might  have  been  without  any 
fault  of  theirs,  the  Southern  people  would  never 
have  been  able  to  see  that  it  was  worth  while  to 
risk  so  much  for  the  chance  of  gaining  so  little.3 

On  October  6th,  Halleck  sent  McClellan,  by  Presi- 
dent Lincoln's  direction,  an  order 4  requiring  him  to 
"  cross  the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the  enemy  or 
drive  him  south."  He  was  told  to  move  "  now,  while 
the  roads  were  good."  He  was  further  informed  that 
if  he  should  so  move  as  to  cover  Washington, — that 
is,  on  the  east  side  of  the  Blue  Ridge, — he  would 
receive  reinforcements  to  the  extent  of  30,000  men  ; 
but  that  if  he  moved  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley  he 
could  not  expect  more  than  12,000  or  15,000,  and, 
also,  that  the  President  advised  the  interior  line,  but 
did  not  order  it.5  On  the  next  day  McClellan  wrote 
to  Halleck,6  saying  that  after  a  full  consultation  with 
his  corps-commanders  he  had  "determined  to  adopt 
the  line  of  the  Shenandoah  for  immediate  opera- 
tions," but  that  he  "  did  not  regard  the  line  of  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  as  important  for  ulterior  objects. 


1  But  they  probably  soon  recovered  from  it.  *  28  W.  R.,  54. 

3  Ante,  393.     But  see  2  Henderson,  359,  360.       *  27  W.  R.,  10,  72. 

6  In  an  interesting  and  able  letter  dated  October  I3th,—  ib.,  13,  14,  and 
31  W.  R.,  97, — the  President  gives  McClellan  his  views  in  support  of  this 
course. 

•27  W.  R.,  ii. 


440          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

.  .  .  The  only  possible  object,"  he  continued,  "  to  be 
gained  by  an  advance  from  this  vicinity  is  to  fight  the 
enemy  near  Winchester."  McClellan  preferred  the  in- 
terior route, — which  indeed  was  on  every  account 
superior  to  the  other, — but  he  was  afraid  that  if  he 
took  it  at  that  time,  the  Confederates  would  re-enter 
Maryland,1  the  Potomac  being  at  that  season  very 
low.  Delays,  however,  ensued,  and,  towards  the  end 
of  October, — at  which  date  the  wants  of  the  army  had 
been  measurably  supplied, — a  rise  in  the  river  was  to 
be  expected  at  any  moment.  By  the  time,  therefore, 
that  he  was  ready  to  advance,  the  Union  general  felt 
sure  that  another  invasion  of  the  North  was  no  longer 
to  be  apprehended,  and  that  he  could  safely  adopt 
the  interior  line.  The  12th  corps,  under  Slbcum, 
was,  however,  stationed  at  Harper's  Ferry  and  near 
Sharpsburg,  and  Morell,  with  about  4500  men,  was 
directed  to  guard  the  upper  Potomac.2 

On  October  26th  3  the  rest  of  the  Federal  army, 
numbering  110,665  officers  and  men,4  began  crossing 
the  Potomac  at  and  below  Harper's  Ferry.  The 
right  flank  of  the  columns  was  covered  by  the  cavalry 
under  Pleasonton.  The  march  was  in  the  general 
direction  of  Warrenton.  The  gaps  in  the  Blue  Ridge 
were  successively  occupied  to  prevent  any  interrup- 
tion of  the  communications  with  Maryland.  On 
November  5th  the  army  ceased  drawing  its  supplies 
from  Harper's  Ferry,  and  began  to  receive  them  by 
the  Manassas  Gap  railroad.9  Efforts  were  also  at 

1  27  W.  R.,  83.  *  73.,  86. 

3  Ib.,  86.     The  last  division  crossed  on  November  2d  ;  28  W.  R.,  531. 

428W.  R.,56g.  *  Ib.,  544. 


1862]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE,  441 

once  made  to  repair  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  rail- 
road as  far  as  Warrenton  Junction.1 

On  the  7th  of  November  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  concentrated  in  the  neighborhood  of  Warrenton.2 
On  that  day,  by  an  order  of  the  President,  dated 
November  5th,  General  McClellan  was  relieved  from 
the  command  of  the  army,  and  General  Burnside  was 
appointed  in  his  place.3  Nothing  in  the  correspond- 
ence between  Mr.  Lincoln  and  General  McClellan 
had  indicated  that  such  a  crisis  was  at  hand.  The 
letters  of  the  President  had  been,  as  his  letters  always 
were,  considerate,  kind,  and  friendly.  The  explana- 
tion of  his  change  of  attitude  towards  McClellan  is, 
we  suspect,  to  be  found  in  the  culmination  of  the 
movement  against  McClellan  and  Fitz-John  Porter, 
which  had  its  origin  in  the  events  of  the  latter  part 
of  Pope's  campaign.  We  draw  this  inference  from 
the  fact  that  in  the  same  order  which  relieved  Mc- 
Clellan, Fitz-John  Porter  was  also  relieved  from  the 
command  of  his  corps.  He  was,  soon  after,  tried  for 
disobedience  of  orders,  and  misconduct  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy  on  August  29,  1862,  and  was 
cashiered.  Many  years  afterwards  he  obtained  a  re- 
hearing of  his  case,  was  fully  and  handsomely  vin- 
dicated, and,  in  1886,  was  restored  to  the  army.4  But 
at  this  time,  in  the  autumn  of  1862,  there  was  a  very 
bitter  feeling  in  influential  quarters  in  Washington 
against  both  McClellan  and  Porter,  and  this  order 
of  November  5th,  removing  them  both  from  com- 
mand, was  the  result  of  the  hostility  to  them.  In 


1  28  W.  R.,  549,  555,  559-  '  z8  w-  R-  545- 

8  27  W.  R.,  88.  *  See  ante,  282,  n.  2. 


442  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

the  case  of  McClellan,  however,  there  were  other 
reasons,  which  have  been  sufficiently  referred  to  above. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  give  here  a  resume  of  the 
character  and  abilities  of  General  McClellan.  They 
have  been  freely  commented  on  in  the  course  of  this 
narrative.  We  will  confine  ourselves  to  one  obser- 
vation, and  that  is,  that  McClellan  ought  not  to 
have  been  removed  unless  the  Government  were 
prepared  to  put  in  his  place  some  officer  whom  they 
knew  to  be  at  least  his  equal  in  military  capacity. 
This,  assuredly,  was  not  the  case  at  this  moment. 
No  one,  in  or  out  of  the  service,  had  ever  considered 
Burnside  as  able  a  man  as  McClellan.  His  appoint- 
ment was  a  genuine  surprise  to  every  one  at  all 
acquainted  with  military  affairs.  His  recent  short- 
comings at  the  battle  of  Sharpsburg  were  the  com- 
mon talk  of  the  officers  and  soldiers,  who  all  believed 
that  if  Burnside  had  been  energetic  and  skilful,  the 
bridge  would  have  been  carried  and  Antietam  Creek 
would  have  been  forded  in  the  morning,  and  that 
Lee  would  have  been  defeated  in  the  afternoon.  It 
is  not  easy  to  justify  Mr.  Lincoln's  action  in  this 
matter.  It  may  be  true  that  no  one  of  the  generals 
had  ever  been  specially  marked  out  in  the  opinion 
of  the  army  or  the  public  as  a  possible  successor  to 
McClellan ;  but  we  believe  that  the  selection  of 
Franklin  would  have  met  with  the  widest  approval, 
and  would  have  been  decidedly  the  most  judicious 
appointment  which  the  Government  could  have 
made.1  Franklin,  like  McClellan,  was  a  safe  and 

1  According  to  General  Slocum,  this  was  the  President's  opinion  ;  but  the 
opposition  to  Franklin  on  political  grounds  was  too  strong.  Franklin's 
Memoirs  of  a  Rear-Admiral,  9,  10. 


1862]   FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  443 

careful  commander ;  he  had  recently  shown  at 
Sharpsburg  unmistakable  evidence  of  possessing  a 
true  appreciation  of  the  real  military  situation  on 
the  field  of  battle,  and  we  have  always  been  sur- 
prised that  his  name  was  not  the  one  selected  for 
the  vacant  place  of  commander  of  the  army.  He 
was,  without  question,  far  superior  in  point  of  abil- 
ity to  Burnside,  Hooker,  and  Sumner,  and  it  was  to 
be  expected  that  the  selection  would  be  made  from 
these  four  generals.  Burnside's  successful  expedi- 
tion to  North  Carolina,  however,  told  much  in  his 
favor ;  and  it  is  not  likely  that  either  the  President 
or  the  Secretary  of  War  possessed,  either  then  or  at 
any  subsequent  time,  any  means  of  ascertaining  the 
opinion  of  the  best  men  in  the  army  respecting  the 
merit  of  the  leading  officers.  Burnside  himself,  as 
is  well  known,  accepted  the  position  with  the  great- 
est reluctance.1  He  assured  the  officer  who  brought 
him  the  order  that  he  did  not  consider  himself  equal 
to  the  responsibilities  which  the  command  of  the 
army  involved  2;  but  he  allowed  himself  to  be  over- 
persuaded,  and  set  himself,  after  a  day  or  two,  to 
devising  a  plan  of  operations. 

It  is  time  that  we  returned  to  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia.  General  Lee  kept  his  troops  in 
their  camps  near  Winchester  until  the  movement  of 
the  Federal  army  across  the  Potomac  attracted  his 
attention.  Then,  on  November  2d,  he  himself,  with 
the  corps  of  Longstreet,  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge  at 
Front  Royal,  leaving  Jackson  with  his  corps  in  the 
Valley.3  It  thus  happened  that  at  and  about  the 

1  28  W.  R.,  554. 

»  Cf.  i  C.  W.  (1863),  650.  »  27  W.  R.,  152,  156. 


444  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

time  of  General  McClellan's  removal  from  the  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Lee,  with  Long- 
street's  corps,  was  near  Culpeper  Court  House,  while 
Jackson  was  near  Millwood,1  a  small  town  ten  or 
fifteen  miles  south  of  Winchester.  Lee  was  in  a 
good  deal  of  doubt  as  to  McClellan's  intentions.  At 
times  he  thought  it  possible  that  McClellan  might 
be  planning  to  send  into  the  Valley  a  force  large 
enough  to  deal  with  Jackson,  while  reserving  suffi- 
cient troops  to  resist  a  counter  attack  from  Long- 
street.2  But  this  was  not  one  of  McClellan's  schemes. 
When  Lee  learned  that  the  Union  army  had  occupied 
Warrenton  and  was  proceeding  to  cross  the  Rappa- 
hannock,  thus  threatening  to  push  Longstreet  to- 
wards Gordonsville,  he  at  first  (November  6th) 
directed  Jackson  to  ascend  the  Shenandoah  Valley 
to  Swift  Run  Gap  in  order  to  make  a  junction  with 
Longstreet,  and  he  himself  prepared  to  withdraw 
the  latter's  corps  from  Culpeper  toward  Madison 
Court  House  to  facilitate  this  junction.3  On  the 
8th,  also,  Lee,  apparently  apprehensive  lest  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Federal  army,  which  he  felt  he  could 
not  successfully  oppose  with  Longstreet's  corps 
alone,  might  close  even  Swift  Run  Gap,  reiterated 
his  order  to  Jackson  to  ascend  the  Valley.4  On  the 
9th,  however,  we  find  Lee,  having  received  despatches 
from  Jackson,5  giving  that  officer  ample  discretion, 
— permitting  him  not  only  to  remain  in  the  lower 
Valley  with  the  object  of  operating  on  the  flank  and 
rear  of  the  Federal  army  through  the  lower  Gaps  in 

1  28  W.  R.,  696.  3  Ib.,  698,  701,  703. 

s  /£.,  696-698.  4  Ib.,  704. 

8  Unfortunately,  these  letters  of  Jackson  have  not  been  preserved. 


1 862]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  445 

the  Blue  Ridge,  but  even  to  make  a  demonstration 
of  crossing  into  Maryland,  if  he  deemed  it  advisable.1 
At  this  time  Longstreet's  corps  showed  a  total  of 
officers  and  men  "  present  for  duty"  of  31,925,  and 
Jackson's  of  31,794,  while  Stuart's  cavalry  numbered 
7176  ;  showing  a  total  of  70,895  officers  and  men 
"present  for  duty"2  in  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia. 

McClellan  stayed  a  couple  of  days  with  Burnside,8 
who  was  a  personal  friend  of  his,  to  give  him  all 
needed  information,  and,  presumably,  to  confer  with 
him  about  the  situation  of  the  army  and  the  pros- 
pects of  the  campaign.  In  his  report  McClellan  says 4 : 

"The  reports  from  General  Pleasonton,  on  the 
advance,  indicated  the  possibility  of  separating  the 
two  wings  of  the  enemy's  forces,  and  either  beating 
Longstreet  separately,  or  forcing  him  to  fall  back,  at 
least,  upon  Gordonsville,  to  effect  his  junction  with 
the  rest  of  the  army  \i.  e.,  Jackson's  corps].  .  .  . 
Had  I  remained  in  command,  I  should  have  made 
the  attempt  to  divide  the  enemy  as  before  suggested ; 
and,  could  he  have  been  brought  to  a  battle  within 
reach  of  my  supplies,  I  cannot  doubt  that  the  result 
would  have  been  a  brilliant  victory  for  our  army." 

If  one  were, disposed  to  be  very  critical,  one  might 
object  to  General  McClellan's  speaking  of  attempting 
to  divide  the  army  of  his  enemy,  seeing  that  it  was 
at  that  moment  divided  into  two  nearly  equal  parts, 
separated  from  each  other  by  not  less  than  forty  or 

1  28  W.  R..  705,  710,  711. 

2  Ib.t  713.     In  this  statement  there  is  no  return  for  the  reserve  artillery. 

3  McClellan  left  the  army  on  November  loth  ;  it.,  558. 

4  27  W.  R.,  89. 


446  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

fifty  miles.  But  his  meaning  is  plain  enough.  He 
means  to  say  that,  if  he  had  remained  in  command, 
he  would  have  advanced  against  Lee  and  Longstreet 
in  the  hope  of  bringing  them  to  a  battle,  and  that 
he  had  great  hopes  of  success  in  such  a  battle.  But 
he  implies  that  there  would  have  been  a  limit  to  the 
extent  of  his  advance,  fixed  by  his  ability  to  support 
his  army  by  the  use  of  the  railroad ;  and  he  omits 
entirely  to  give  any  hint  of  his  course  in  case  he 
should  be  unable  to  force  Lee  and  Longstreet  to 
accept  battle. 

Consider  now  that  Lee  and  Longstreet  could  not 
possibly  expect  to  win  a  battle  against  such  great 
odds ;  that  there  was  nothing  whatever  to  prevent 
them  from  retreating  to  Gordonsville,  or  beyond  Gor- 
donsville,  and  there  uniting  with  Jackson ;  and  that 
it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  they  would  omit  to 
destroy  the  railroad — McClellan's  only  source  of  sup- 
ply— as  they  retired ;  and  the  practical  advantage  to 
the  Union  commander  of  the  separation  between  the 
two  wings  of  his  adversary's  army  is  certainly  not 
very  apparent.  But  suppose  that  Jackson  remains 
in  the  Valley,  that  McClellan  advances  to  Gordons- 
ville, and  endeavors  to  get  Lee  and  Longstreet  to 
accept  battle  there.  McClellan's  line  of  supplies 
would  now  be  a  hundred  miles  long,  and  what  would 
there  be  to  prevent  Jackson  from  emerging  from 
one  of  the  Gaps  in  the  Blue  Ridge  and  attempting 
to  cut  the  railroad?1  In  such  a  case  McClellan 
would  almost  certainly  fall  back.  It  has  been  so 
often  said  that  McClellan,  when  he  was  relieved 

1  See  Haupt  to  Burnside,  28  W.  R.,  560. 


i862]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  447 

from  command,  was  on  the  eve  of  a  great  battle,1  that 
it  has  seemed  best  to  point  out  that,  even  according 
to  his  own  estimate  of  the  military  situation,  this 
was  not  the  case.  He  had  really  no  chance  of  fight- 
ing a  battle  unless  he  could  induce  Lee  and  Long- 
street  to  fight  when  it  was  plainly  for  their  advantage 
to  retire.  And,  of  course,  this  was  equally  true  of 
his  successor. 

Nevertheless,  to  advance  towards  Culpeper  as 
rapidly  as  possible  was  clearly  the  thing  for  Gen- 
eral Burnside  to  do.  There  was  a  chance — a 
small  chance,  it  is  true,  but  still  a  chance — of  sur- 
prising Lee  and  Longstreet.  In  war  it  is  not  always 
that  appearances  are  correctly  interpreted,  that  in- 
formation is  promptly  sent,  that  staff  -officers  arrive 
in  time.  Moreover,  the  march  on  Culpeper  would 
not  in  any  way  have  interfered  with  the  step  which 
Burnside  had  finally  resolved  on  taking.  This  was, 
to  make  a  complete  change  in  his  base  of  operations ; 
to  give  up  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  railroad  as  a 
line  of  supply ;  to  march  on  Fredericksburg,  and  be 
thenceforth  supplied  from  Aquia  Creek  by  means  of 
the  railroad  from  that  place  to  Fredericksburg. 
From  Fredericksburg  Burnside  proposed  to  march 
directly  on  Richmond. 

This  plan  of  operations  Burnside  sketched  out  in 
a  letter  to  General  Cullum,  Halleck's  chief-of-staff, 
dated  November  7th,  but  not  despatched  till  the 
9th.2  He  required  that  trains  of  supplies  should 

1  Swinton,    232,  233  ;  2  Comte  de  Paris,  554. 

Z28  W.  R.,  552,  558.  For  apian  of  campaign  via  Culpeper  and  Gordons- 
ville,  see  a  letter  from  General  Sigel  to  General  Burnside,  dated  November 
I3th  ;  it.,  574-576. 


448  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

be  sent  from  Washington  or  Alexandria  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Fredericksburg,  and  that  barges 
loaded  with  provisions  and  forage  should  be  sent 
to  Aquia  Creek  and  Belle  Plain.  Pontoons,  also, 
"enough  to  span  the  Rappahannock  with  two 
tracks,"  he  also  desired  should  be  sent  to  meet 
his  army. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  it  v«ras  General  Burnside's 
intention  to  move  down  towards  Fredericksburg  on 
the  north  side  of  the  Rappahannock,  and,  when 
opposite  the  town,  to  cross  the  river  on  pontoon- 
bridges.  For  these  bridges  he  was  dependent  on 
the  Washington  authorities,  as  no  pontoon-trains 
were  accompanying  the  army.  He  thus  contem- 
plated beginning  his  march  on  Richmond  by  crossing 
the  Rappahannock  River  at  Fredericksburg,  an 
operation  which  it  was  certainly  not  impossible  that 
the  enemy  might  oppose.1  Had  he  crossed  the  river 
at  Rappahannock  Station  and  marched  on  Culpeper, 
Lee  and  Longstreet  would  in  all  probability  have 
retired  behind  the  Rapidan,  and  in  that  event  Burn- 
side  could  have  crossed  that  river  at  Germanna,  Ely, 
and  the  other  fords,  and  moved  on  Spottsylvania 
Court  House  without  the  necessity  of  going  to 
Fredericksburg  at  all,  exactly  as  General  Grant  did 
in  May,  1864.  In  that  case  the  army  could  have 
been  supplied  by  wagons  from  Port  Royal  on  the 


1  General  Halleck  says  (31  W.  R.,  47)  that  Burnside  consented  "so  to 
modify  his  plan  as  to  cross  his  army  by  the  fords  of  the  Upper  Rappahan- 
nock, and  then  move  down  and  seize  the  heights  south  of  Fredericksburg." 
But  General  Burnside  says  (ib.,  84)  that  he  was  "  to  move  the  main  army  to 
Falmouth,  opposite  Fredericksburg,  and  then  cross  the  Rappahannock  on 
pontoon-bridges,  which  were  to  be  sent  from  Washington." 


1862]   FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  449 

Rappahannock,  as  in  the  latter  part  of  May,  1864.1 
Of  course,  Lee  might  have  attacked  Burnside,  as  he 
attacked  Grant  in  the  Wilderness  ;  but  Lee  had  only 
Longstreet's  corps  with  him,  and  could  hardly  have 
hoped  to  succeed.  In  fact,  a  battle  with  Long- 
street's  corps  alone  was  just  what  Burnside  wanted. 
It  is  not  easy  to  see  why  the  opefation  suggested 
above  would  not  have  been  decidedly  preferable  to 
the  course  which  was  adopted  by  General  Burnside. 

The  letter  containing  General  Burnside's  plan  of 
operations  arrived  in  Washington  by  special  mes- 
senger on  the  evening  of  the  10th  of  November  and 
was  in  the  President's  hands  the  next  morning.2  It 
was  not  until  the  14th  that  the  President  gave  to 
the  general's  scheme  what  seems  to  have  been  a 
rather  reluctant  assent.3  "  He  thinks,"  wrote  Hal- 
leek  to  Burnside,  "  that  it  will  succeed,  if  you  move 
very  rapidly ;  otherwise  not." 

Burnside,  however,  made  no  unnecessary  delay. 
On  this  day,  the  14th  of  November,  he  issued  an 
order  organizing  his  army  into  three  Grand  Divisions 
(so  called)  and  a  Reserve  Corps.  The  2d  and  9th 
corps  formed  the  Right  Grand  Division,  under 
General  Surnner ;  the  3d  and  5th  corps  formed  the 
Centre  Grand  Division,  under  General  Hooker ;  and 

1  This  course  substantially  was  suggested  by  General  Hooker  ;  31  W.  R., 
355  ;  I  C.  W.  (1863),  654,  666  ;  and  Burnside  said  that  he  intended  establish- 
ing a  depot  at  Port  Royal  later  on  ;  i  C.  W.  (1863),  652. 

1  28  W.  R.,570. 

3  General  Halleck  was  much  opposed  to  Burnside's  plan,  and  favored 
"  continuing  the  movement  of  the  army  in  the  direction  of  Culpeper  and 
Gordonsville  "  ;  31  W.  R.,  47,  83,  84.  The  President's  assent  was  given, 
so  General  Halleck  says,  to  the  plan  of  crossing  the  Rappahannock  at  the 
upper  fords,  above  the  Rapidan.  This  was  denied  by  General  Burnside  in 
his  Report  ;  ib. ,  84. 

VOL.    II. — 29 


450  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

the  1st  and  6th  corps  formed  the  Left  Grand  Divi- 
sion, under  General  Franklin.  The  llth  corps  and 
some  other  troops,  under  General  Sigel,  formed  the 
Reserve  Corps.  On  the  morning  of  the  15th  Sum- 
ner  began  the  march,  and  on  the  17th  he  had  reached 
Falmouth,  a  village  nearly  opposite  Fredericksburg. 
In  a  day  or  two  Hooker  and  Franklin  arrived.  But 
the  pontoons  did  not  arrive.  That  they  did  not  was 
not  the  fault  of  General  Burnside,  certainly.  It  may 
be,  also,  that  it  was  not  the  fault  of  General  Halleck. 
It  would,  however,  seem  that  the  latter  ought  to 
have  entrusted  to  some  efficient  officer  of  his  staff 
the  whole  matter  of  getting  the  pontoons  from  the 
custody  of  the  officers  who  had  charge  of  them,  and 
of  forwarding  them  to  Falmouth, — of  procuring  the 
necessary  wagons  and  horses  and  barges, — giving 
him  full  authority  to  overrule  all  other  authority, 
and  impressing  upon  him  the  extreme  importance  of 
having  the  pontoons  ready  and  on  the  spot  as  soon 
as  the  army  should  arrive  at  Falmouth.1  This 
certainly  was  not  done ;  and  it  was  not  until  the 
25th  of  November  that  the  pontoons  arrived. 
While  the  army  was  waiting  on  the  north  bank 
of  the  river,  Burnside  considered  and  finally  rejected 
a  plan  of  sending  a  body  of  troops  across  the  river 
by  the  fords  to  hold  the  town  and  the  heights  back 
of  the  town,  for  the  reason  that  the  depth  of  water 
in  the  river  at  that  season  was  liable  to  great  fluctua- 
tions, and  that  i't  might  easily  happen  that  the  troops 
thus  sent  over  to  the  south  side  might  be  obliged  to 
encounter  superior  numbers  before  they  could  be 
reinforced  or  withdrawn.2 

1  See  i  C.  W.  (1863),  649.  s  31  W.  R.,  85.     Cf.  Palfrey,  139. 


1862]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  451 

Meantime,  General  Lee,  who  had,  as  early  as  No- 
vember 12th,1  considered  it  not  improbable  that  his 
enemy,  in  place  of  proceeding  to  Culpeper  and  be- 
yond, in  the  hope  of  forcing  Longstreet  to  a  battle, 
might  march  on  Fredericksburg,  ordered  the  railroad 
from  Aquia  Creek  to  Fredericksburg,  which,  though 
not  in  use,  had  not  been  broken  up  (except  by  burn- 
ing the  bridges)  since  the  Federal  evacuation  of 
those  places  in  September,  to  be  thoroughly  de- 
stroyed.2 On  the  17th  the  indications  of  the  march 
of  the  Federal  army  towards  Fredericksburg  became 
more  apparent.3  On  the  18th  Lee  sent  McLaws's 
division  there  from  Culpeper,4  and,  later  on  the  same 
day,  the  rest  of  Longstreet's  corps  started  for  the 
same  place,5  arriving  there  on  the  21st,  or  a  day  or 
two  later. 

Lee  had  not,  however,  definitely  decided  to  fight 
at  Fredericksburg.  On  the  19th  he  wrote  to  Jack- 
son from  Culpeper  that  he  "  did  not  anticipate  making 
a  determined  stand  north  of  the  North  Anna." 6  Had 
he  intended  from  the  first  to  fight  at  Fredericksburg, 
we  cannot  suppose  that  he  would  have  deferred  so 
long  ordering  Jackson  to  join  him ;  but  Lee's  first 
inclination,  when  the  Federal  movement  on  Freder- 
icksburg became  apparent,  was  to  allow  Burnside 
to  advance  as  far  as  the  North  Anna.  Keeping  this 
in  mind,  one  can  perhaps  understand  in  some  measure 
the  reasons  which  induced  General  Lee,  who  was  in 
face  of  a  largely  superior  force,  to  leave  (as  he  did) 

1  28  W.  R.,  7H,  715. 

1  Ib.,  717  ;  31  W.  R.,  1014.  4  /*.,  1019. 

*  Ib.,  1014,  1015.  "  Ib->  10I9.  1020. 

'  Ib.,  549,  1021.  See,  also,  3  B.  &  L.,  72,  n. 


452          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

so  completely  to  his  lieutenant  the  decision  as  to  the 
time  and  place  of  joining  his  wing  to  the  main  army. 
The  attitude  of  Lee  towards  Jackson  during  this 
period  is,  however,  even  with  this  explanation,  not 
easy  to  understand.  It  is  evident  that  Lee,  at  Cul- 
peper  with  Longstreet,  felt  uneasy  while  Jackson 
was  in  the  Valley,  and  was  inclined  to  the  opinion 
that  Jackson  ought  to  join  him.  In  fact,  on  Novem- 
ber 6th,  he  ordered  Jackson  to  ascend  the  Valley,  in 
order  to  make  a  junction  with  Longstreet  * ;  yet, 
after  this,  he  gave  him  no  positive  orders,  but  left 
everything  to  Jackson's  discretion,  while  expressing 
his  own  opinion  in  unmistakable  terms.  Thus,  on 
November  14th,  Lee  writes  that  he  cannot  see  what 
good  Jackson's  continuance  in  the  Valley  can  effect 
beyond  the  support  of  his  troops,  but  he  leaves  it  to 
him  to  determine  the  question  whether  he  will  con- 
tinue there  or  march  at  once  to  join  Longstreet.2  So, 
again,  on  the  18th,  Lee  informs  Jackson  that  the 
Union  army  is  going  towards  Fredericksburg,  and 
that  his  own  force  is  preparing  to  move  there  ;  and 
adds,  "  unless  you  think  it  is  advantageous  for  you 
to  continue  longer  in  the  Valley  ...  I  think 
it  would  be  advisable  to  put  some  of  your  divisions 
in  motion  across  the  mountains." J  The  next  day, 
Lee,  near  Culpeper,  writes  to  Jackson,4  near  Win- 
chester, acknowledging  a  letter 5  just  received  from 
him,  and  reminding  him  of  the  necessity  of  their 
joining  forces  before  a  battle,  but  leaving  it  to  Jack- 


1  28  W.  R.,  701  ;  Lee  to  Randolph. 

*  Ib.,  720.  4  Ib.,  1021. 

*  31  W.  R.,  1019.  *  These  letters  are  all  missing. 


1 862]  FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  453 

son  to  decide  how  long  he  can  remain  in  the  Valley, 
and  yet  be  able  to  unite  with  Longstreet  for  a  battle. 
Even  after  Lee  had  arrived  at  Fredericksburg  we 
find  him  on  November  23d  writing  to  Jackson  in 
the  same  vein  ;  expressing  distinctly  his  own  opinion 
that  Jackson  ought  to  cross  the  mountains,  but  ab- 
staining from  giving  him  any  order.1  In  this  letter 
he  tells  Jackson  that  Burnside's  whole  army  is 
opposite  Fredericksburg. 

But,  quite  as  remarkable  as  is  the  fact  that  Lee 
gave  to  his  lieutenant  such  ample  discretion  is  the 
view  which  he  entertained  of  the  requirements  of 
the  military  situation.  Lee,  in  his  letter  of  Novem- 
ber 23d,2  did  not  order  Jackson  to  join  him  at  Fred- 
ericksburg, but  preferred  that  he  should  halt  at 
Culpeper,  a  place  not  less  than  forty  miles  from 
Fredericksburg.  "  I  have  thought,"  wrote  General 
Lee  to  Jackson  two  days  later,3  "  that  if  we  could 
take  a  threatening  position  on  his  [Burnside's] 
right  flank,  as  a  basis  from  which  Stuart  with  his 
cavalry  could  operate  energetically,  he  would  be 
afraid  to  advance.  ...  I  believe  now,  if  you 
take  a  position  at  Culpeper  Court  House,  throw  for- 
ward your  advance  to  Rappahannock  Station,  and 
cross  the  cavalry  over  the  river,  the  enemy  would 
hesitate  long  before  making  a  forward  movement." 
We  suppose  General  Lee  must  have  had  in  mind 
Burnside's  probable  course  after  he  should  have 
taken  Fredericksburg.  For  it  is  plain  that  Burnside 
could  cross  the  river  more  easily,  if  anything,  were 
Jackson  forty  miles  away ;  that  Lee  would  hardly 

1  31  W.  R.,  1027.  *  /<*.,  1027.  *  /<*.,  1031. 


454  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

undertake  to  hold  the  heights  of  Fredericksburg 
with  Longstreet's  corps  alone ;  and  that  Burnside's 
situation  for  future  operations  would  be  improved 
by  the  occupation  of  the  city  and  its  vicinity.  His 
subsequent  advance,  however,  on  Richmond  would 
no  doubt  be  harassed  by  the  presence  of  Jackson  on 
his  right  flank,  especially  if  he  should  continue  to 
draw  his  supplies  from  Aquia  Creek;  but  if  he 
should  soon  change  his  base  to  Port  Royal,  and, 
later,  to  White  House,  as  Grant  did  in  1864,  no 
interference  with  his  communications  need  be 
feared. 

But  this  plan  for  the  detachment  of  Jackson's 
command  came  to  nothing.  General  Lee,  on  the 
26th  and  27th  of  November,1  influenced  partly  by 
the  lateness  of  the  season  and  the  consequent  danger 
that  the  roads  might  become  bad,  which  would  ren- 
der the  co-operation  of  Jackson  difficult,  and  partly 
by  certain  indications  that  the  Union  general  in- 
tended crossing  the  river  before  long,  wrote  to  Jack- 
son to  join  him,  if  in  Jackson's  judgment  nothing 
was  likely  to  be  gained  by  his  remaining  away. 
Jackson  joined  the  main  army  by  the  30th  of  No- 
vember.2 One  hardly  knows  which  is  the  more 
remarkable, — General  Lee's  sagacity  in  estimating 
the  inertia  of  his  antagonist,  or  his  temerity  in  con- 
fronting him  so  long  with  a  force  only  one  third  as 
strong,  and  actually  for  a  time  refusing  the  aid 
which  Jackson  was  bringing  to  him. 

1  31  W.  R.,  1033,  1035. 

3  Burnside's  pontoons,  it  must  be  remembered,  arrived  on  November 
25th  ;  ib.,  798.  The  railroad  from  Aquia  Creek  to  Falmouth  was  com- 
pleted on  the  26th  ;  I  C.  W.  (1863),  683. 


1862]   FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.  455 

It  has  been  suggested  that  Lee  could  have  stopped 
the  movement  of  the  Federal  army  1  towards  Freder- 
icksburg  by  approaching  Washington  as  soon  as 
Burnside  had  left  the  line  of  the  Orange  and  Alex- 
andria railroad.  Very  possibly  this  is  true.  But 
for  Lee  to  have  done  this  would  have  been  to  risk  a 
battle  in  which  he  would  have  been  opposed  by  a 
well-appointed  army  much  larger  than  his  own,  and 
to  do  this  without  any  other  object  than  that  of 
winning  that  battle.  For  at  this  season  of  the  year 
no  invasion  of  the  North  was  practicable ;  and  at 
this  time  Washington  was  strongly  held.2  The  situa- 
tion was,  moreover,  very  different  from  that  which 
existed  in  the  previous  August,  when  Lee  advanced 
against  Pope  on  the  railroad  with  the  object  of  de- 
feating him  before  he  could  be  joined  by  the  troops 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  Halleck  had  so 
unwisely  sent  from  the  Peninsula  to  Fredericksburg, 
instead  of  to  Alexandria. 

The  two  armies  were  now  confronting  each  other 
on  the  banks  of  the  Rappahannock.  The  Union 
army  consisted  of  about  122,000  officers  and  men  of 
all  arms  of  the  service 3 ;  the  Confederates  numbered 
about  78,500.4  For  a  trial  of  strength  the  armies 
were  not  unequally  matched,  as  the  position  of  the 
Confederate  army  on  the  heights  behind  the  town  of 
Fredericksburg  was  an  extremely  strong  one,  and 
Burnside  gave  his  adversary  abundant  time  in  which 
to  strengthen  it  by  art,— an  opportunity  which  was 
skilfully  improved. 

1  Swinton,  235. 

9  About  4^7,000  men  "  present  for  duty  "  ;  31  W.  R.,  939. 

3/3.,  1121.  «/J.,  1057. 


456  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

After  some  tentative  movements  at  points  down 
the  river,  especially  at  a  place  called  Skinker's  Neck, 
which  resulted  in  nothing,  Burnside,  on  December 
10th,  decided  on  a  plan  of  operations. 

Of  the  pontoon-bridges  by  which  the  Rappahan- 
nock  (which  is  here  about  140  yards  wide  *)  was  to 
be  crossed,  two  were  to  be  laid  directly  in  front  of 
the  town  of  Fredericksburg,  and  two  others  about 
two  miles  below  these.2  The  Right  Grand  Divi- 
sion under  Sumner  was  to  cross  over  at  the  upper 
bridges,  the  Left  Grand  Division  under  Franklin  at 
the  lower  bridges,  while  the  Centre  Grand  Division 
under  Hooker  was  to  connect  the  two  other  Divi- 
sions, and  its  troops  were  to  be  distributed  as  occasion 
might  require.  Two  bridges  were  to  be  laid  for  its 
convenience.  The  task  of  establishing  the  bridges 
was  to  be  performed  under  the  protection  of  a  pow- 
erful artillery  fire  from  Stafford  Heights,  a  ridge 
which  skirted  the  north  side  of  the  river. 

The  Confederates  were  posted  on  a  range  of 
heights  which  ran  from  a  hill  called  Taylor's  Hill, 
about  two  miles  northwest  of  the  town  of  Fred- 
ericksburg, and  continued — broken,  however,  by 
streams  and  ravines — in  a  southeasterly  direction  to 
a  place  known  as  Hamilton's  Crossing,  where  the 
right  of  their  line  rested.  Stuart  with  his  cavalry 
protected  this  flank.  Longstreet  held  the  left  of 
their  position,  and  Jackson  the  right.  The  whole 
line  was  more  than  six  miles  in  length. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  December  llth  the  Fed- 
eral engineer  troops,  supported  by  some  regiments 

1  Allan,  466  ;  31  W.  R.,  171.  *  See  Map  XIII.,  facing  page  468. 


1 862]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    457 

of  the  line,  began  the  task  of  laying  the  pontoons. 
On  the  Federal  left,  where  there  were  but  few 
houses  on  the  opposite  shore,  no  difficulty  or  opposi- 
tion of  any  consequence  was  experienced,  and  by  11 
A.M.  both  bridges  were  laid.  One  brigade  of  the  6th 
corps — that  of  Devens — crossed  that  afternoon,  and 
held  the  position  during  the  night.  Early  the  next 
morning  the  rest  of  Franklin's  troops  began  to  cross, 
and  by  3  P.M.  the  1st  and  6th  corps  were  in  position 
on  the  farther  bank. 

The  case  of  the  upper  bridges  was,  however,  en- 
tirely different,  for  they  were  thrown  across  the  river 
opposite  the  town,  and  not  even  the  constant  fire  of 
the  Union  battery  on  Stafford  Heights  availed  to 
dislodge  the  sharpshooters  of  Barksdale's  Mississippi 
brigade.  These  daring  and  obstinate  fighters  en- 
sconced themselves  in  the  stone  or  brick  houses  and 
cellars  in  the  lower  part  of  the  town  near  the  bank 
of  the  river,  and  actually  prevented  the  completion 
of  the  bridges  by  picking  off  the  workmen.  About 
4  P.M.,  however,  General  Hunt,  the  Federal  chief-of- 
artillery,  suggested  that  pontoons  filled  with  troops 
might  be  poled  or  rowed  over  the  river.  The  sug- 
gestion was  at  once  adopted  ;  volunteers  were  called 
for;  the  7th  Michigan,  the  19th  and  20th  Massa- 
chusetts, and  the  89th  New  York  gallantly  stepped 
to  the  front,  and  crossed  the  river  in  the  boats.1  On 
landing,  the  Confederates  were  at  once  attacked; 
they  made  an  obstinate  defence ;  the  struggle  con- 
tinued till  dark,  when  they  retired  from  the  town ; 
but  meantime  the  bridges  were  completed.  How- 

1  31  W.  R.,   183,  221,  262,  282,  283,  310. 


458  THE  STOR  Y  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

ard's  division  of  the  2d  corps  occupied  the  town  on 
the  night  of  the  llth,  and  on  the  next  day  the  rest 
of  the  2d  corps  and  the  9th  corps  crossed  the  river. 

The  3d  and  5th  corps — constituting  Hooker's 
Grand  Division — remained  on  the  north  bank  dur- 
ing the  night  of  the  12th;  and  on  the  next  day  the 
divisions  composing  them  were  assigned  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  Right  and  Left  Grand  Divisions. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th,  General  Burnside 
came  to  the  headquarters  of  General  Franklin,  and 
discussed  the  situation  with  him,  General  Reynolds, 
the  commander  of  the  1st  corps,  and  General  W.  F. 
Smith,  the  commander  of  the  6th  corps.1  Two  of 
Stoneman's  divisions  (3d  corps)  had  been  added  by 
Burnside  to  Franklin's  command,  raising  the  total  to 
at  least  50,000  men.2  As  the  Confederate  left  wing 
was  evidently  in  a  very  strong  position,  almost  im- 
pregnable to  direct  attack,  it  was  plain  that  on  the 
employment  to  the  best  advantage  of  the  large  force 
assigned  to  Franklin  depended  the  success  of  the 
next  day's  battle. 

The  field  of  operations  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  bounded  on  the  right  by 
a  stream,  running  through  a  rugged  and  impassable 
ravine,  called  Deep  Run.  The  only  line  of  supply 
and  retreat  was  over  the  pontoon-bridges,  which  had 
been  laid  just  south  of  Deep  Run,  and  were,  there- 

1  i  C.  W.  (1863),  767  ;  Franklin's  Reply,  I.  This  "  Reply  was  a 
pamphlet  written  by  General  Franklin,  defending  himself  from  the  unjust 
and  unfounded  aspersions  against  his  action  contained  in  the  Report  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  See  i  C.  W.  (1863),  57. 

*  /£.,  709.  General  Reynolds  puts  the  figure  at  "  55,000  to  60,000 
men."  Ib.,  699. 


1862]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    459 

fore,  behind  the  extreme  right  of  Franklin's  line  of 
battle.  As  the  enemy's  right  at  Hamilton's  Cross- 
ing was  obviously  not  resting  on  any  natural  obsta- 
cle, and  as  he  had  thrown  up  works  and  had  protected 
them  by  abatis  all  along  his  front,  it  was  sufficiently 
plain  to  General  Franklin  that  the  operation  most 
likely  to  succeed  was  a  movement  in  large  force 
against  the  Confederate  extreme  right,  in  which  both 
his  rear  and  flank  could  be  threatened  ;  and  also  that, 
in  order  to  carry  out  such  a  movement, — Hamilton's 
Crossing  being  some  two  miles  from  the  bridges, — 
important  changes  would  have  to  be  made  during 
the  ensuing  night  in  the  disposition  of  the  Union 
troops.  In  an  account  of  this  matter  given  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  on 
March  28,  1863,  Franklin  says : 1  "I  urged  him 
[Burnside]  to  give  orders  which  would  enable  me  to 
put  the  command  in  such  a  position  that  a  very 
strong  attack  could  be  made  there  at  daybreak  the 
next  morning."  In  his  Reply  to  the  Report  of  the 
Committee,  Franklin  also  says 2 :  "  I  strongly  advised 
General  Burnside  to  make  an  attack  from  my  Divi- 
sion upon  the  enemy's  right  with  a  column  of  at 
least  30,000  men,  to  be  sent  in  at  daylight  in  the 
morning.  At  that  time  two  divisions  of  General 
Hooker's  command  were  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  near  the  bridges  I  had  crossed.  In  order  to 
make  such  an  attack  as  I  had  advised,  I  informed 
General  Burnside  that  these  divisions  must  be  crossed 
during  the  night.  I  reiterated  my  request  that  I 
should  receive  my  orders  as  early  as  possible,  that 

i  i  C.  W.  (1863),  707.  *  Franklin's  Reply,  2. 


460  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

I  might  make  the  necessary  dispositions  of  the  troops 
before  daylight."1  Franklin  then  goes  on  to  say 
that  Burnside  promised  to  send  him  the  orders  in 
two  or  three  hours,  and,  at  any  rate,  before  midnight, 
but  that  they  never  came  until  half-past  seven  in 
the  morning. 

When  the  order 2  did  come,  it  was  found  to  be  as 
far  as  possible  from  an  order  to  attack  the  Confed- 
erate right  wing  with  all  Franklin's  disposable  force. 
It  directed  Franklin  to  do  two  things : 

1.  To  "keep"  his  "whole  command  in  position  for  a 
rapid  movementdown  the  Old  Richmond  Road";  and, 

2.  To  "send  out  at  once  a  division,  at  least,  to 
pass  below  Smithfield,  to  seize,  if  possible,  the  height 
near  Captain  Hamilton's,  on  this  side  of  the  Massa- 
ponax,  taking  care  to  keep  it  well  supported  and  its 
line  of  retreat  open." 

The  only  attack  contemplated  in  this  order  is 
plainly  one  to  be  made  by  a  single  division,  well 
supported,  and  so  handled  that,  if  necessary,  it  can 
retreat  on  the  main  body. 

The  only  operation  indicated  in  this  order  to  be 
made  by  the  bulk  of  Franklin's  command  is  "  a  rapid 
movement  down  the  Old  Richmond  Road,"  and  in 
the  last  part  of  the  order  Franklin  is  told  again  to 
"  keep  "  his  "  whole  command  in  readiness  to  move  at 
once,  as  soon  as  the  fog  lifts." 

Burnside,  therefore,  had  another  scheme  in  his 
mind  for  winning  the  battle  than  that  recommended 
by  Franklin.  What  it  was  appears  from  another 

1  Cf.  General  W.  F.  Smith's  paper  in  3  B.  &  L.,  128,  133. 
«3i  W.  R.,  71. 


1862]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.   461 

part  of  the  order  to  Franklin.  "  He  [Burnside]  1  has 
ordered  another  column  of  a  division  or  more  to  be 
moved  from  General  Sumner's  command2  up  the 
Plank  road  to  its  intersection3  with  the  Telegraph 
road,  where  they  [sic]  will  divide,  with  a  view  to  seiz- 
ing the  heights  on  both  of  these  roads.  Holding  these 
two  heights,  with  the  heights  near  Captain  Hamil- 
ton's, will,  he  hopes,  compel  the  enemy  to  evacuate  the 
whole  ridge  between  these  points." 4  But  why  the 
Confederates  should  be  driven  by  "a  division  or 
more  "  from  the  heights  on  their  left,  and  by  another 
division,  even  if  "well  supported,"  from  the  heights 
on  their  right,  it  is  not  easy  to  conjecture.  One 
rises  from  the  perusal  of  this  famous  order  with  a 
feeling  of  hopeless  amazement  that  such  a  wild  and 
absurd  plan  of  battle  should  ever  have  been  enter- 
tained by  any  one.5 

With  such  an  erroneous  idea  of  the  task  before 
him,  and  with  such  inadequate  plans  of  dealing  with 
it,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  General  Burnside 
would  succeed.  He  had  in  truth  but  one  chance  of 
winning  a  victory  over  General  Lee's  army  on  that 
ground ;  and  that  was  (as  we  have  intimated  above) 
to  recognize  frankly  the  impregnable  character  of 

1  The  order  was  signed  by  the  chief-of-staff  ;  hence,  Burnside  is  spoken  of 
in  the  third  person. 

*  For  the  order  to  Sumner,  see  31  W.  R.,  90. 

3  In  point  of  fact  these  roads  did  not  intersect,  but  ran  parallel  to  each 
other  as  far  as  the  Confederate  line  of  defence,  where  they  widely  separated. 

4  31  W.  R.,  71. 

5  Burnside  states  in  his  Report  (z'3.,  90,  91)  that  the  seizure  of  the  heights 
near  Captain  Hamilton's  would  enable  the  remainder  of  Franklin's  forces 
"to  move  down  the  Old  Richmond  Road,"  and  thus  get  in  rear  of  the  Con- 
federate position  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge.     But  to  do  this  before  he  had 
beaten  his  enemy  would  expose  his  bridge-communications  to  certain  capture. 


462  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

the  Confederate  left,  and  to  entrust  fully  and  entirely 
to  Franklin  the  preparation  for  and  management  of 
an  attack  on  the  Confederate  right  to  be  made  by 
more  than  half  of  the  Federal  army.  This,  as  we 
have  seen,  Burnside  did  not  do.  It  remains  briefly 
to  sketch  the  events  of  the  day. 

Franklin  was  the  first  to  begin.  He  conferred 
with  Reynolds,  who  commanded  the  1st  corps,  as  to 
the  mode  of  carrying  out  the  order  which  was 
received  at  7.30  A.M.  Reynolds  entrusted  to  Meade, 
who  commanded  the  3d  division  of  his  corps,  the 
task  which  Burnside's  order  directed  should  be  per- 
formed by  "a  division  at  least,  well  supported," — 
that  of  carrying  the  height  at  Captain  Hamilton's, 
— and  he  supported  Meade  by  Gibbon's  division  on 
his  right  and  Doubleday's  on  his  left  and  rear. 
Meade  started  out  between  9  and  10  A.M.,  but  his 
march  was  so  interfered  with  by  the  Confederate 
artillery  under  Stuart,  and  especially  by  a  section 
under  the  distinguished  Captain  Pegram,  that  he 
made  slow  progress,  and  finally  other  troops  had  to 
be  brought  forward.  Soon  after  twelve  o'clock, 
however,  he  made  his  attack,  and  succeeded  in  pene- 
trating the  enemy's  lines  and  capturing  several  hun- 
dred prisoners.  Gibbon,  also,  won  a  similar,  though 
not  so  important,  success.  But  the  Confederates 
rallied  and  were  reinforced,  and  drove  back  both 
divisions  with  considerable  loss  and  in  great  confu- 
sion,1 and  pursued  their  advantage  until  checked  by 
the  resistance  of  other  Federal  troops.  Nothing  of 

1  31  W.  R.,  359,  513  ;  i  C.  W.  (1863),  705.  That  Franklin  considered 
the  situation  serious  at  one  time,  is  shown  by  his  despatch  to  Burnside,  31 
W.  R..  118. 


1862]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.   463 

permanent  importance  was  gained  by  the  Union 
advance,  and,  in  fact,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the 
arrangements  for  supporting  the  troops  engaged 
— still  less  for  following  up  any  advantage — were 
satisfactory.  General  Franklin  felt  himself  greatly 
hampered  by  the  injunction — twice  repeated  in 
Burnside's  order  to  him — "  to  keep  his  whole  com- 
mand in  position  for  a  rapid  movement  down  the 
Old  Richmond  Road." l  This  portion  of  the  order 
unquestionably  prevented  Franklin  from  making 
adequate  preparation  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  por- 
tion of  the  order  which  prescribed  the  task  of  the 
single  division.  The  two  parts  of  the  order  were,  in 
truth,  inconsistent  with  each  other.  The  difficulty, 
in  fact,  lay  farther  back  even  than  this.  No  success 
of  any  moment  could  be  expected  under  the  circum- 
stances which  existed  in  that  part  of  the  field,  unless 
a  much  larger  affair  than  the  advance  of  one  division 
was  made  the  object  to  be  attained.  That  the  ob- 
ject ordered  to  be  attained  was  of  such  limited 
scope  was  the  fault  of  Burnside  alone. 

Between  2  and  3  P.M.  Burnside  sent  another  order a 
to  Franklin  "  to  make  a  vigorous  attack  with  his 
whole  force,"  but  it  was  received  too  late  to  admit 
of  the  necessary  dispositions  being  made  for  the 
employment  of  the  troops  in  any  other  way  than 
that  in  which  they  were  at  the  time  occupied.3 

Franklin's  loss  in  this  battle  amounted  to  nearly 
5000  men/ 


1  Franklin's  testimony,  C.  W.  (1863),  710  ;   Reynolds's   testimony,  ib., 
699,  700.  J  3i  W.  R.,  94,  128. 

3  I  C.  W.  (1863),  711.  Contra,  Birney's  testimony,  it.,  706. 

4  31  W.  R.,  133-142. 


464  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

General  Burnside  says  in  his  Report  that  the 
movements  of  Franklin  and  Sumner  were  not  in- 
tended to  be  simultaneous ;  that  he  did  not  intend 
to  move  Sumner  until  he  had  "  learned  that  Franklin 
was  about  to  gain  the  heights  near  Hamilton's."  * 
No  doubt  it  would  have  been  wiser  to  have  adhered 
to  this  determination.  But  he  did  not  adhere  to  it. 
"  General  Sumner's  corps  was  held  in  position,"  con- 
tinues the  Report,2  "until  after  11  o'clock,  in  the 
hope  that  Franklin  would  make  such  an  impression 
upon  the  enemy  as  would  enable  him  [Sumner]  to 
carry  the  enemy's  line  near  the  Telegraph  and  Plank 
roads.  Feeling  the  importance  of  haste,  I  now  di- 
rected General  Sumner  to  commence  his  attack." 
At  this  moment  the  despatches  which  Burnside  was 
receiving  from  General  Hardie  of  his  staff,  whom  he 
had  sent  to  be  with  Franklin,  and  to  keep  him  in- 
formed as  to  the  progress  of  the  fight  there,  showed 
him  that  Franklin  was  having  a  hard,  if  not  a  doubt- 
ful, contest  with  the  enemy.  That  dated  11  A.M. 
reads 3 :  "  Meade  advanced  half  a  mile,  and  holds  on. 
.  .  .  Later :  Reynolds  has  been  forced  to  develop 
his  whole  line.  An  attack  of  some  force  of  enemy's 
troops  on  our  left  seems  probable."  It  is  plain  that 
Burnside,  whether  (as  he  says)  "  feeling  the  import- 
ance of  haste,"  or,  more  likely,  impatient  at  the  slow 
progress  of  Franklin's  movements,  departed  from  his 
original  intention,  and  ordered  Sumner  to  make  the 
attack  on  his  front  while  the  issue  of  Franklin's 
battle  was  still  in  doubt. 


1  31  W.  R.,  qi.     He  also  so  stated  to  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War ;  i  C.  W.  (1863),  653. 

*3i  W.  R.,  94.  »/^.,9i. 


1 86 2]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    465 

The  Federal  right  attack  had  but  a  small  chance 
of  success.  There  was,  however,  in  this  part  of  the 
field  but  one  thing  to  do — if  anything  was  to  be 
done — and  that  was  to  storm  the  Confederate  works 
in  front.  It  was  simply  necessary  to  enlarge  the 
scope  of  Burnside's  inadequate  order  by  sending  in 
all  the  available  troops,  instead  of  the  "  division  or 
more  "  specified  in  the  order.1  As  the  2d  corps 
(Couch's)  occupied  the  town,  it  was  for  it  to  make 
the  attack  in  the  first  place,  and  for  the  9th  corps 
to  follow,  if  it  should  be  deemed  advisable.  As  the 
divisions  of  Couch  emerged  from  the  town,  they 
found  themselves  in  an  open  plain,  with  the  Con- 
federate intrenchments  in  their  front  only  600  or 
700  yards  distant.  From  the  hills  on  their  right 
(Taylor's  and  Stanbury's)  the  Confederate  artillery 
poured  upon  them  an  enfilading  fire.  Directly  in 
face  was  Marye's  Hill,  near  the  foot  of  which  ran  a 
road,  parallel  to  the  line  of  battle,  which  had  been 
cut  through  the  hill  in  such  a  way  that  the  side 
nearest  to  the  Federal  attack  was  protected  by  a 
stone  wall  and  sheltered  by  the  slope  of  the  earth, 
so  as  to  resemble  a  covered  way.  This  side  had 
been  artificially  strengthened,  and  the  road  now  con- 
stituted an  intrenchment  practically  impregnable. 
Above  this  sunken  road  and  on  the  summit  of 
Marye's  Hill  the  Confederates  had  posted  their  sup- 
ports and  batteries. 

The  division  of  French,  which  was  to  make  the 
first  attack,  marched,  on  leaving  the  town,  up  the 
Orange  Plank  and  Telegraph  roads  for  300  yards 

1  31  W.  R.,  90. 


466  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 


or  so  until  a  canal,  or  sluiceway,  was  reached,  which 
crossed  the  roads1  at  right  angles.  This  canal,  or 
ditch,  could  only  be  crossed  by  bridges.  Until  these 
bridges  were  crossed,  the  troops  marched  in  column, 
and  were  exposed  to  the  enemy's  artillery  fire  in 
front  and  flank.  On  crossing,  the  troops  deployed 
for  the  assault  under  the  precarious  shelter  afforded 
by  a  slight  rise  in  the  ground,  and  shortly  after  12 
M.,  they  advanced  to  the  attack  in  the  most  gallant 
style.  But  the  fire  was  too  much  for  them.  The 
sunken  road  could  not  be  carried.2  Couch  at  once 
ordered  in  his  other  divisions  under  Hancock  and 
Howard.  But  it  was  in  vain.  Many  of  the  officers 
and  men,  it  is  true,  got  up  within  a  short  distance 
of  the  Confederate  lines,  but  they  were  mostly  killed 
or  wounded.  Those  who  survived  were  obliged  to 
lie  down,  and  could  not  be  withdrawn  until  after 
dark.  The  losses  were  terrible. 

The  failure  of  the  attempt  of  the  2d  corps  ought 
to  have  satisfied  General  Burnside  that  his  enemy's 
position  was  too  strong  to  be  carried,  but  it  did  not. 
He  insisted  on  more  and  more  assaults.  The  division 
of  Sturgis  and  one  brigade  of  that  of  Getty  from 
the  9th  corps  and  the  divisions  of  Griffin  and  Hum- 
phreys of  the  5th  corps  were  all  thrown  in.  These 
troops  gallantly  attempted  to  carry  Marye's  Hill, 
but  they  were  repulsed  with  great  slaughter  before 
they  could  reach  the  stone  wall.  The  Federal 
losses  in  these  various  attacks,  which  were  all  made 
with  great  bravery  and  were  persistently  and  coura- 

1  These  roads  ran  parallel  to  each  other  and  were  about  300  yards  apart. 
The  Orange  Plank  was  the  northerly  one.  *  31  W.  R.,  222,  223. 


1 86 2]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    467 

geously  pushed,  amounted  to  not  far  from  8000  men. 
The  loss  of  the  whole  army  was  12,653  men.1 

In  the  Confederate  army,  Longstreet  lost  1519, 
killed  and  wounded,  and  Jackson  2682,  making  a 
total  of  4201. 2  Besides  these  losses,  Longstreet's 
corps  was  reported  as  having  127 3  missing,  and  Jack- 
son's 526,4  making  the  total  loss  4854. 

General  Burnside  was  desirous  of  renewing  the 
attack  the  next  day,  and  even  proposed  to  lead  his 
old  corps,  the  9th,  in  column  of  regiments,  to  carry 
by  storm  the  stone  wall  below  Marye's  Hill.  Bat 
he  was  dissuaded  by  the  unanimous  remonstrances 
of  his  officers.5  On  the  night  of  the  15th  the  army 
recrossed  the  river,  and  the  troops  returned  to  their 
old  camps  at  Falmouth. 

In  reviewing  this  bloody  defeat  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  one  is  moved  to  wonder  at  the  fact  that  Gen- 
eral Burnside  made  the  attempt  at  all.  He  had 
practically  no  chance  of  success  in  assaulting  the 
Confederate  left 6 ;  and  even  if  he  had  given  Franklin 
carte  blanche  as  respects  the  attack  on  the  Confederate 
right,  and  had  that  able  officer  done  what  he  told 
Burnside  he  proposed  to  do, — had,  during  the  night, 
massed  30,000  troops  on  his  extreme  left,  and  had 
assaulted  the  heights  at  Hamilton's  Crossing  at  day- 
break,— the  issue  of  the  battle  would  have  been  far 


1  31  W.  R.,  142. 

*  Jb.,  562. 

3  It.,  572. 

4  /<*.,  635. 

5  i  C.  W.  (1863),  653  ;  Palfrey,  188  ;  Swinton,  253 ;  31  W.  R.,  312. 

•  See  the  excellent  criticism  of  General  Palfrey  on  this  subject,  Palfrey, 
184,  185. 


468          THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.        [1862 

from  certain.  For,  in  thus  placing  the  bulk  of  his 
disposable  force  near  Hamilton's  Crossing,  Franklin 
would  have  exposed  his  communications — that  is, 
the  pontoon- bridges — to  an  attack  by  Jackson's  left, 
and  Jackson's  left  could  have  been  strengthened  to  any 
needed  extent  by  reinforcements  sent  by  Longstreet. 
It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  a  serious,  well-sus- 
tained attack  on  the  two  divisions  of  the  3d  corps, 
which  Franklin  would  have  stationed  to  hold  the 
bridges,  would  have  checked  the  Federal  troops, 
even  in  the  midst  of  a  successful  attempt  to  turn 
Jackson's  right.  Nothing  short  of  a  complete  rout 
of  Jackson's  extreme  right — which  was  hardly  to  be 
expected — would  have  answered  Franklin's  needs. 
Not  but  what  the  plan  proposed  by  Franklin  was 
the  best  of  which  the  circumstances  admitted ;  but 
that  the  circumstances  were  very  unfavorable  to  the 
achievement  of  any  success  of  moment  by  the  Union 
army  in  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

The  only  important  reason  given  by  General  Burn- 
side  for  fighting  the  battle  was  that  he  thought  that 
the  troops  which  General  Lee  had  sent  down  the 
river  to  oppose  the  landing  of  the  Federal  army  in 
that  region  had  not  returned.1  It  is  true  that  Gen- 
eral Lee  did  not  recall  these  troops  until  the  last 
moment ;  he  showed  on  this  occasion  as  on  several 
others  a  singular  lack  of  caution  ;  the  divisions  of 
Early  and  D.  H.  Hill  did  not  arrive  on  the  field  till 
the  morning  of  the  13th,  and  to  arrive  there  then  they 
had  to  march  all  night.2  But  Burnside  was  not  justi- 

1  31  W.  R.,  66  ;  i  C.  W.  (1863),  652. 
8  31  W.  R.,  630. 


1862]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    469 

fied  in  attacking  such  a  position  as  that  which  General 
Lee  occupied  at  Fredericksburg  simply  by  assuming 
that  Lee  might  have  unnecessarily  delayed  the  assem- 
bling of  his  army.  It  may  be  admitted  that  this  delay 
on  Lee's  part  was,  perhaps,  in  view  of  the  known 
facts,  rather  to  be  expected ;  and  that  had  Burnside  at- 
tacked him  on  the  12th,  he  would  have  had, pro  tanto, 
a  better  chance  of  success.  But,  as  we  have  shown 
above,  the  position  was  a  very  unfavorable  one  for 
the  Union  army ;  and  even  the  absence  of  two  divi- 
sions from  the  Confederate  line  of  battle  would  not 
have  compensated  Burnside  for  the  radical  defects 
of  the  situation  as  viewed  from  the  Federal  point  of 
view. 

General  Burnside,  though  without  doubt  consider- 
ably affected  by  the  useless  sacrifice  of  life  in  the 
battle  of  Fredericksburg,1  immediately  decided  on 
another  forward  movement,  to  be  made  in  the  latter 
part  of  December.2  Much  to  his  surprise,  he  re- 
ceived a  telegram  from  Mr.  Lincoln  enjoining  him 
not  to  take  any  step  without  first  informing  him.3 
Burnside  then  went  to  Washington,  and  had  a  con- 
ference with  the  President  and  also  with  General 
Halleck  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  ascertained 
that  certain  general  officers  had  informed  the  Gov- 
ernment that  in  their  opinion  any  such  operation 
would  end  in  disaster.4  Burnside  then  attempted  to 
obtain  from  the  President  and  General  Halleck  a 
formal  authorization  for  another  movement  across 
the  Rappahannock.  But  in  this  he  could  not  suc- 

1  3  B.  &  L.,  138.  »  /£.,  96  J  i  C.  W.  (1863),  717. 

1  31  W.  R.,  95.  4  I  C.  W.  (1863),  717. 


470  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR.       [1862 

ceed.  He  finally  determined  to  act  on  his  own 
authority;  and,  on  January  20,  1863,  he  moved  up 
the  river  with  a  part  of  his  army  to  the  fords  of  the 
Rapidan,  and  was  preparing  to  cross  the  stream  in 
force  when  the  whole  operation  was  stopped  by  a 
storm  of  unusual  violence,  which  rendered  all  the 
roads  impassable ;  and  the  army,  tired,  disgusted,  and 
feeling  that  it  had  new  and  just  cause  of  dissatis- 
faction with  its  commander,  who  was  universally 
believed  to  be  incompetent  for  his  high  position, 
returned  to  its  camps  near  Falmouth.1 

Then  General  Burnside,  apparently  wearied  with 
repeated  disappointments,  having,  moreover,  abun- 
dant reason  to  know  that  several  of  his  highest  of- 
ficers considered  him  to  be  entirely  unfit  to  command 
the  army,  and  having  come  to  believe  that  his  ill- 
success  was  due  mainly  to  their  insubordination,  or 
at  least  to  their  unwillingness  to  serve  under  him 
with  spirit  and  heartiness,  wrote  his  celebrated 
General  Order,  No.  8,2  dismissing  from  the  service 
Generals  Hooker,  Brooks,  Newton,  and  Cochrane, 
and  relieving  from  duty  with  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac Generals  Franklin,  W.  F.  Smith,  Sturgis, 
Ferrero,  and  other  officers.3  Armed  with  this  order 
he  again  went  to  Washington  and  had  a  conference 
with  the  President.  Mr.  Lincoln  treated  the  unfor- 
tunate general  with  his  accustomed  kindness  and 
consideration.  He  easily  perceived  the  facts  of  the 
situation.  He  saw  that  Burnside  was  not  equal  to 


1 31  w.  R.,  752-755- 

*  i  C.  W.  (1863),  719. 

3  31  W.  R.,  998.     Cf.  Franklin's  Reply,  II,  notes. 


1862]    FEDERALS  RESUME  THE  OFFENSIVE.    471 

the  command  of  the  army,  and  he  knew  also  that 
every  one  recognized  this  to  be  the  fact.  He  saw 
that  the  consciousness  of  this  lack  of  trust  in  him 
by  the  army  had  naturally  affected  Burnside's  mind, 
and  that  to  some  extent,  at  any  rate,  the  unlucky 
officer  deserved  his  sympathy.  But  he  saw  clearly 
that  it  was  impossible  that  Burnside  should  con- 
tinue in  his  post.  He  therefore  relieved  him  from 
the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  re- 
fused to  accept  his  resignation  from  the  service, 
which  Burnside  in  his  despondent  frame  of  mind 
begged  him  to  receive.  He  gave  him,  instead,  a 
leave  of  absence  for  his  home  in  Providence ;  and,  on 
the  16th  of  March,  1863,  he  appointed  him  to  the 
command  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  with  his 
headquarters  at  Cincinnati,  where  he  relieved  Gen- 
eral Wright. 

On  the  25th  of  January,  1863,  President  Lincoln 
appointed  General  Hooker  to  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  relieved  Generals  Sum- 
ner  and  Franklin  from  further  duty  with  that  or- 
ganization. Whether  Franklin  and  Sumner  were 
relieved  at  Hooker's  suggestion,  we  do  not  know. 
Sumner,  though  an  old  man  for  a  military  life,  being 
over  sixty  years  of  age,  was  apparently  still  strong 
and  vigorous.1  Franklin's  conduct  at  Fredericks- 
burg  was  probably  never  fully  understood  by  Mr. 
Lincoln,  who  doubtless  thought  that  with  the  large 
number  of  troops  under  his  command  he  might  have 
accomplished  more  had  he  zealously  discharged  his 
duty.  To  the  peculiar  difficulties  to  which  we  have 

1  He  died,  however,  during  the  year. 


472  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.        [1862 

called  attention,  arising  from  the  nature  of  the  field 
of  battle,  and  from  Burnside's  unsuitable  and  inade- 
quate orders,  the  President  apparently  gave  no  heed. 
To  him,  as  to  many  good  men,  dealing  with  a 
subject  of  which  they  know  little,  it  was  easier  to 
explain  a  failure  by  attributing  it  to  moral  causes, 
than  to  make  the  effort  which  a  man  would  have  to 
make  who  should  undertake  to  master  the  details  of 
the  situation  in  which  his  unfortunate  subordinate 
was  placed,  and  to  consider  the  different  courses 
open  to  him,  in  the  same  spirit  in  which  he  would 
deal  with  any  other  serious  intellectual  or  practical 
problem. 

Had  he  made  this  effort,  the  President  could  not 
have  failed  to  see  that  Franklin  had  contributed  the 
only  valuable  suggestion  for  winning  the  battle  of 
Fredericksburg ;  that  criticism  on  his  performance 
of  the  petty  rdle  which  he  was  by  Burnside  con- 
demned to  play  was  a  mere  waste  of  time  ;  and  that 
his  failure  to  accomplish  anything  under  such  cir- 
cumstances could  in  no  way  justify  the  removal  from 
the  army  of  so  intelligent  and  capable  an  officer. 

Substantially  the  same  reflections  occur  when  one 
thinks  how  the  services  of  Buell  and  Porter  were 
also,  long  before  the  close  of  the  war,  lost  to  the 
Union  cause. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS. 

IT  will  hardly  be  denied,  we  imagine,  that  the 
military  situation  at  the  close  of  1862  was  far  more 
favorable  for  the  Southern  Confederacy  than  any 
one  could  have  predicted  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year.  Great  opportunities  had  been  thrown  away 
by  the  generals  on  the  Union  side. 

Twice  during  the  year  might  the  Confederate 
army  of  the  West  have  been  attacked  under  excep- 
tionally favorable  circumstances  by  a  much  more 
powerful  force,  but  Grant  after  Shiloh  and  Halleck 
after  Corinth  threw  away  their  chances.  No  simi- 
lar opportunities  were  offered  to  Buell  or  to  Rose- 
crans.  Hence,  at  the  close  of  the  year  we  find  the 
army  of  Bragg  resolutely  confronting  its  antagonist 
on  the  field  of  Murfreesborough. 

In  the  East,  by  the  interference  of  President  Lin- 
coln and  Secretary  Stanton  with  McClellan's  plan 
of  uniting  the  force  under  McDowell  to  the  army 
near  Richmond  in  the  latter  part  of  May,  the  best 
chance  of  success  offered  in  the  course  of  the  Pen- 
insular campaign  was  thrown  away  ;  while  Me- 

473 


474  THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.       [1862 

Clellan,  by  not  attacking  Lee  at  Sharpsburg  on 
September  16th,  failed  to  improve  the  most  prom- 
ising opportunity  for  destroying  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  which  up  to  that  time  had  been 
presented. 

The  task  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  certainly 
not  been  lightened  by  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg, 
nor  had  that  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  by  the 
battle  of  Murfreesborough.  But  the  acquisition  of 
Kentucky  and  of  middle  Tennessee  undoubtedly 
gave  the  latter  army  a  great  advantage  in  its  efforts 
for  the  recovery  of  East  Tennessee. 

Of  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
under  General  Grant  in  the  autumn  of  1862  in  the 
direction  of  Vicksburg  on  the  river  Mississippi  we 
have  not  spoken,  believing  that  they  should  be  con- 
sidered in  connection  with  the  subsequent  move- 
ments of  that  army,  which  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  that  important  place  in  July,  1863. 

We  have  been  able  to  study  the  events  of  the 
war  in  the  preceding  pages  with  a  more  personal 
interest  in  the  chief  actors  than  is  ordinarily  possi- 
ble in  a  military  narrative,  because  the  War  Records 
contain  the  letters  and  despatches  written  by  these 
actors  at  the  time,  as  well  as  the  reports  of  their 
achievements  or  failures  written  after  the  happening 
of  these  occurrences.  The  history  of  this  war  can 
therefore  be  presented,  not  only  as  a  series  of  iso- 
lated pictures,  but  as  a  succession  of  incidents  in 
the  lives  of  those  who  had  charge  of  the  military 
operations. 

We  can  therefore  see  in  many  cases  the  aim  and 


1 86 2]  GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS.  475 


object  of  movements,  whose  purpose,  in  the  absence 
of  these  letters  and  despatches,  would  be  matter  of 
conjecture  only,  and  we  can  trace  the  connection  of 
events  with  more  confidence,  and,  it  is  believed, 
with  more  satisfaction. 

END    OF   PART   II. 


MILITARY  HISTORY. 
THE  ART  OF  WAR. 

The   Middle  Ages,     From  the  Fourth  to  the  Fourteenth  Century. 
By  CHARLES  OMAN,  M.A.,  F.S.A.,  Fellow  of  All  Souls'  College, 
Oxford.     8°,  pp.  667.     With  24  plates  of  maps,  plans  and  iilui.- 
trations        .........         $4.50 

The  above  volume  forms  the  second  of  a  series  of  four  in  which  the 
author  intends  to  present  a  general  sketch  of  the  history  of  the  art  of 
war  from  the  Greek  and  Roman  times  down  to  the  beginning  of  the 
i gth  century.  The  first  volume  in  chronological  order,  which  will 
cover  the  classical  division  of  the  subject,  will  be  issued  shortly. 
The  third  volume  will  be  devoted  to  the  isth,  i6th,  and  I7th  cent- 
uries, while  the  fourth  volume  will  treat  of  the  military  history  of 
the  r8th  century,  and  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  wars  down 
to  Waterloo. 

THE  STORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 

A  Concise  Account  of  the  War  in  the  United  States  of  America 
between  1861  and  1865.      By  JOHN  CODMAN  ROPES. 

To  be  complete  in  four  parts,  printed  in  four  octavo  volumes, 
with  comprehensive  maps  and  battle  plans.  Each  part  will  be  com- 
plete in  itself  and  will  be  sold  separately. 

Part  I. — Narrative  of  Events  to  the  Opening  of  the  Campaigns  of 
1862,  with  5  maps,  8°  (now  ready),  pp.  xiv.  +  274      .         $1.50 

"  The  most  complete,  comprehensive,  and  interesting  account  of  the  Civil  War 
which  has  ever  been  published.  .  .  .  We  unhesitatingly  recommend  it  as  con- 
taining a  wealth  of  information  that  no  one  can  afford  to  be  deprived  of." — Ntw 
Haven  £t/e.  Leader. 

"  The  work  is  thoroughly  impartial,  and  moreover  is  free  from  individual 
caprice.  .  .  .  The  manner  is  much  that  of  a  skilled  attorney  stating  his  co.se, 
only  in  this  instance  the  writer  states  the  case  for  both  sides." — Cincinnati 
Commercial  Gazette. 

Part  II.— The  Campaign  of  1862.     With  13  maps.     8°. 

DECISIVE  BATTLES  SINCE 
WATERLOO. 

A  Continuation  of  Creasy's  "Decisive  Battles  of  the  World."     Bf 
THOMAS    W.   KNOX.      With    59  plans  and  illustrations.     8  , 
pp.  viii.  +  490  ....  ...         $2.50 

"  Must  go  wherever  Creasy's  invaluable  preceding  book  of  1852  has  gone,  and 

perhaps  wtiere  it  has  not  found  its  way.     .     .     .     The  author  ha*  done  his  work 

well  and  attractively."— Hartford  Post, 

THE  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812; 

or.  The  History  of  the  United  States  Navy  during  the  Last  War 
with  Great  Britain.     By  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT.     3d  edition, 

8°,  pp.  xxxviii.  +  531 $2.50 

"  Shows  in  so  young  an  author  the  best  promise  for  a  good  historian — fearlessness 
of  statement,  caution,  endeavor  to  be  impartial,  and  a  brisk  and  interesting  way 
of  telling  events."  —  N.  Y.  Times. 

"  The  reader  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  book  unconsciously  makes  up  his  mind  that  he 
is  reading  history  and  not  romance,  and  yet  no  romance  could  surpass  it  in 
interest."  —Philadelphia  Times. 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS,  New  York  and  London. 


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